YouSaid · the spoken record

S. Jayakumar

lines on the record: 84
first: 1996-09-24
most recent: 2003-09-24
sittings or episodes: 4
sources: un-general-debate

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Politics, as is often said, is the art of the possible. There is no need, therefore, to succumb to despair or cynicism. We should turn the page and move on.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“But it is not impossible, if we can find the discipline to debate the issues openly and realistically, with a clear appreciation of both the limitations and potential of the United Nations. Recent events in Iraq have shown that the United States needs the United Nations. It is also a fact that the United Nations needs the United States. Since there is a convergence of interests for the two to cooperate in order to achieve our shared interests and objectives, it is surely not impossible for us to negotiate and agree upon a new paradigm of cooperation between the world’s sole super-Power and the world’s only, and indispensable, United Nations. 32 The United Nations is not a panacea for all the world’s ills. Neither is the United Nations a global villain. The United Nations is a political institution.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“But it has been continuously interpreted and re-interpreted to meet changing geopolitical circumstances and new challenges, many of which were unforeseen by the founders of the United Nations. Today we are again faced with radically new threats, not least of which are the global terrorist networks that respect neither national boundaries nor traditional international law. Clearly, the United Nations needs to fashion new and more flexible rules to deal with these new threats. Yet, at the same time, we must continue to ensure that there are adequate safeguards to prevent abuse or a return to the law of the jungle. Finding the right balance between those equally urgent imperatives will not be easy.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“The starting point for that effort must be acceptance of the fact that, while the United Nations stands for ideals that we must never relinquish, the reality is that the United Nations both reflects and shapes geopolitics. Underlying the debates in the run- up to the war, and still infusing the controversies, is acute uneasiness over the distribution of power in the post-cold war international system. But can the United Nations escape that reality? The fact is that the United Nations can operate only on the basis of a hard-headed appreciation of the realities of power. If we allow exaggerated rhetoric about the role of the United Nations to obscure that fact, then we do the United Nations a disservice. The Charter of the United Nations has remained essentially unchanged since 1945.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“It will be some time before consensus can be reached on the role of the United Nations in post-war Iraq. Some are loath to grant ex post facto legitimization of military action. At the same time, there is reluctance to cede power won with blood. But the legitimacy that the United Nations brings is unique. The debate on the role of the United Nations will continue. It can, and should, go on. But that does not mean that the United Nations should be in paralysis. We must at the same time press on with our commitment to fulfil the fundamental purposes of the United Nations, which, as stated in the Charter, are “To maintain international peace and security”, “To develop friendly relations among nations” and “To achieve international cooperation”.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“This is not the occasion to revisit old debates over whether the war in Iraq was authorized on the basis of a continuity of authority from 1990 to 2003. Certainly, as resolution 1441 (2002) recognized, Iraq had been in material breach of several resolutions. My point is that, whatever its eventual outcome, the intense diplomatic effort to secure another explicit resolution for the use of force was itself testimony to the importance attached by all to the Security Council’s legitimizing role. In May, only weeks after a formal end to major combat operations was declared, resolution 1483 (2003) was adopted without any dissenting vote, recognizing that the United Nations had a significant role in post-war Iraq. More balanced views are now beginning to emerge, albeit still tainted by the bitterness of the debates in the run-up to the war.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“After all, while Security Council resolutions have the force of law, they are, at the end of the day, first and foremost political documents indicating the degree of consensus that can be achieved among its most powerful members at any one time. I do not think that it is self-evident that the 2002- 2003 clash of interests over Iraq was qualitatively different from the differences between the permanent members during the previous decade. I do not think that the disagreement over Iraq has permanently damaged the United Nations. The 2002-2003 crisis over Iraq in the Security Council only underscored what we have known all along, namely, that the Security Council can authorize intervention only when the permanent members are in agreement, and that all States, big and small, will do what they must to protect their vital national interests.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“By 1998, the withdrawal of the United Nations Special Commission and Operation Desert Fox marked the end of the Security Council’s consensus on Iraq. Thereafter the Security Council acted in accordance with a complex balance of principles and national interests, resulting in inconsistent and incoherent decisions. In the oil-for- food debates humanitarian concerns about the consequences of sanctions were mixed with the commercial and business interests of some of the permanent members. That did not, however, make the Security Council irrelevant. It merely meant that the Council served as a forum for managing competing interests, an important 31 role that it has played for all its history.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“The war in Iraq was not the first time, and will not be the last time, that the Security Council was unable to act. The hope of the late 1980s and early 1990s that the end of the cold war would at last enable the Security Council to discharge its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security has long been shattered. In retrospect, Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait in 1990 represented an unusually clear-cut violation of fundamental Charter principles. That greatly eased the task of securing Security Council authorization for military action. But the consensus on Iraq was short-lived. By 1994, France and Russia began to call for a road map for the lifting of sanctions.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“The doctrine of humanitarian intervention — or “responsibility to protect” — so boldly brought to the fore by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, has for several decades challenged the conventional concepts of non- intervention and the sovereign equality of States. Another challenge to traditional approaches has been the threat posed by non-State actors, especially the contemporary menace posed by perpetrators of international terrorism. The problem posed by rebel groups in civil conflicts is another example. In its efforts to respond to egregious violations of human rights, starvation, anarchy and chaos, the Security Council had already stretched both the authority of the United Nations to intervene and the definition of “threats to the peace” and “aggression”.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“It is here that the rhetorical exaggerations I mentioned earlier stand most in the way of clear and rational thinking about the strengths and limitations of the United Nations. Traditional international law recognizes only two grounds for the use of force: self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter and authorization by the Security Council. That seeming clarity is deceptive. Even before the latest Iraq war, traditional interpretations of the Charter had been questioned. The doctrine of self-defence has long been the subject of learned debate. The current controversy over the right to pre-emption is only the latest manifestation.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“There has never been a period in world history when there have been more international legal regimes and norms regulating State behaviour. The Secretariat is the depository for over 500 international treaties covering the entire spectrum of global activities. International legal regimes and norms are imperfect in their efficiency and observance. Some international norms are hotly contested. Still, the conduct of international relations today does not take place in a vacuum, but within that framework of laws, rules, standards and norms. Nevertheless, there is no escaping the fact that the maintenance of international peace and security is first among the purposes of the United Nations, and the most contested and controversial of its roles. It is also the focus of the current debate over Iraq.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“Few States, large or small, would agree to entrust their security or other vital national interests entirely to a multilateral institution. On the other hand, no State, however powerful, can always succeed in achieving its objectives without the help of others. Every State will choose the option that serves its interest best. Furthermore, the United Nations as a total system is bigger than the General Assembly and the Security Council. As we debate the future of international organizations we should not forget that the world has never been more interdependent, and therefore more in need of global governance. The United Nations now has more than 190 Members and has never been closer to the ideal of universal participation.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“If that meant that the United Nations was irrelevant, then it was irrelevant long before the recent war in Iraq. The ability of the United Nations to act and the kinds of actions it took have always been contingent on how States, and in 30 particular the permanent members of the Security Council, perceived whether the United Nations served their interests. But the United Nations and the United Nations system have always endured. Neither the variable fortunes nor the survival of the United Nations should surprise anyone. The United Nations functions in an international system consisting of sovereign States. Multilateralism and unilateralism were never mutually exclusive alternatives; they are different options in every State’s menu of policy choices.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“It has oversimplified the debate and glossed over the more complex reality. The danger is that we may believe in the rhetoric and arrive at wrong conclusions about the relevance, or irrelevance, of the United Nations. I am therefore joining that debate with some trepidation, and I do so only to highlight some of the complexities, in the hope that it will contribute to a more balanced appraisal of the United Nations. I shall start by restating some basics. In the 58 years since its formation, the influence and role of the United Nations in world affairs has always flowed and ebbed in accordance with shifting geopolitical tides. The role of the United Nations has been indispensable on some crucial international issues; on other occasions the United Nations has had no role, or only a marginal role.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“The run-up to the war in Iraq saw a heated debate about the role of the United Nations. The United Nations is, of course, no stranger to controversy, but that debate was notable for being framed in particularly stark terms. The rhetoric was inflamed and inflated. It has been variously asserted, with glee or gloom, that the United Nations was irrelevant or irreplaceable, a threat to national sovereignty, the sole source of international legitimacy, merely a tool of the remaining super-Power, or the only way to restrain that super- Power. There are indeed serious issues that require debate, but the simplistic manner in which that debate was framed — in particular the portrayal of a struggle between unilateralism and multilateralism — is, in my view, unhelpful. Unfortunately, that rhetoric has obscured, rather than clarified, the issue.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“I would like to congratulate Mr. Julian Hunte, the Foreign Minister of Saint Lucia, on his election as the new President of the General Assembly. Singapore is delighted that a fellow small island State and member of the Forum of Small States holds that office. I also join others in paying a tribute to United Nations personnel who have fallen victim to violence or attacks, including a special tribute to the late Sergio Vieira de Mello. The terrorist attack that caused his death has outraged the entire civilized world. Sergio dedicated his life, and ultimately gave his life, in the service of the United Nations. He is mourned and missed by his many friends around the world. We can best honour his memory by reaffirming our commitment to the ideals that he served.”
2003-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 58 (2003)
“Switzerland may be a new member; however, it has also provided the second most important venue for United Nations activities. It has therefore long been a partner of the United Nations and, I believe, this partnership will be deepened with its membership.”
2002-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 57 (2002)
“That would be an abdication of individual and collective responsibility. Finally, as one of two Asian elected members of the Council, we were pleased to make a small contribution to the East Timor success story. This success was made possible only by the hard work and sacrifices of its people, with the support of the international community. Today, the United Nations continues to play a critical role in preserving the peace in East Timor and in ensuring that the Government and people of East Timor have the opportunity to succeed in their quest to build a democratic, stable and viable State. We look forward to welcoming East Timor as the 191st Member of the United Nations. Let me conclude by warmly congratulating Switzerland for becoming the 190th Member of the United Nations.”
2002-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 57 (2002)
“It is nevertheless too early to gauge the success and effectiveness of the Security Council in responding to the scourge of terrorism. Whether the Security Council can continue to develop appropriate responses over the long run at this plastic phase of the creation of a new strategic era will be a critical test of its relevance in the new century. It is naive to expect that the swift unity of global action post 11 September will henceforth be demonstrated on all global issues. Our experiences in the Security Council attest to protracted processes being the norm rather than the exception for coalescing international action. But where international consensus has not yet consolidated over situations posing serious and immediate threats, the lack of international consensus in itself cannot be an excuse for inaction.”
2002-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 57 (2002)
“They produced a new era, confronting the Security Council with a new and distinct threat to international peace and security. Singapore has therefore served in two very different Security Councils one before 11 September and another after those tragic events. For the Security Council to remain effective, it has to demonstrate that it can respond effectively to new challenges. Otherwise, its relevance and credibility will be compromised. As a small State, we are vulnerable to such terror attacks. As a member of the Security Council, we have supported initiatives which address this new threat. A key lesson that we have learnt is that, for all its imperfections and occasional failings, the Security Council often does work.”
2002-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 57 (2002)
“I would like to conclude by sharing our experiences on the Security Council. Almost two years ago, members of the General Assembly gave Singapore the honour and privilege of serving as one of the elected members of the Security Council. Our term ends this December. I want to thank all those who showed their trust in us by giving us this unique opportunity. Our experience has been a fulfilling and enriching one from which we have drawn important lessons and insights. The Security Council has gone through many phases. Designed first of all to deal with inter-State conflicts, the Security Council has increasingly moved towards handling intra-State conflicts in the post-cold-war era. But the terrorist attacks of 11 September were an unprecedented development.”
2002-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 57 (2002)
“These problems must be addressed by capacity-building and infrastructure development within developing countries, with whatever international assistance is necessary, and by the elimination of trade barriers and protectionism in the developed countries. The events of 11 September underscored that, in an interdependent world, no one is invulnerable. Local problems can easily be transformed into global problems. Each day that we do not act to address and contain these problems increases their potential to do more harm. Our collective security is dependent on our ability and willingness to confront new challenges. We should not await another catastrophe on the scale of 11 September before we are forced to act on other equally challenging global problems that confront us. The war against terrorism has to be waged with both guns and butter.”
2002-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 57 (2002)
“The United Nations dialogue among civilizations is a key initiative that we should build upon. The dialogue among civilizations celebrates diversity and introduces a new paradigm of international relations, promoting a dialogue among the major world religions and cultures. Dialogue between the different cultures and religions would help to reduce the sources of prejudice and intolerance that currently colour individual and societal perceptions. Another longer-term challenge is to address the economic and social conditions that encourage terrorists. International economic integration is ultimately the only guarantor of prosperity, but the fact is that globalization is both incomplete in scope and uneven in its distribution of costs and benefits. Many developing countries remain imperfectly integrated into the world economy.”
2002-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 57 (2002)
“The battle against terrorism has also to be fought at the philosophical level. Some terrorists have tried to depict the current global anti-terrorism campaign as a war against Islam. This is obviously not true. No religion tolerates terrorism, and Islam certainly does not, but we should not ignore the extent to which the 10 appeal of extremists such as Osama bin Laden resonates with the marginalized and disenfranchised, feeding upon stereotypes and prejudices. At a time of confusion and uncertainty, the value of cross-cultural understanding and communication cannot be underestimated. As an international Organization with near universal membership, the United Nations can play a key role in promoting tolerance and understanding between nations, cultures and religions.”
2002-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 57 (2002)
“But as we consider new international mechanisms to fight terrorism, we should pause to reflect on a key question: how can we ensure effective coordination between the United Nations, other regional and international organizations and Member States? How can we synergize respective international, regional and national competencies to maximize operational effectiveness against terrorism? The United Nations comparative advantage and aptitude reside in its consultative, coordinating and facilitative functions. Ultimately, however, the contributions made by the United Nations must depend on the political will and resolve of its Member States to make its laws and norms work. Achieving the right equilibrium of responsibilities and obligations is crucial if we are to succeed in our common mission to defeat international terrorism.”
2002-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 57 (2002)
“This commitment to collaborative international action, however, has only recently begun to take shape. Since 11 September, various organs of the United Nations system have examined their respective responsibilities and available tools so as to undertake this collaborative mission in the most effective manner. The report prepared by the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism is a clear example. Coordination and coherence within the United Nations system should certainly be enhanced. The common enemy we face has built up a sophisticated and complex global network that requires an appropriate response.”
2002-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 57 (2002)
“Indeed, the war on terrorism has reordered international priorities and has created new opportunities for partnership, casting a new strategic overlay over great-Power relationships. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Many of us have long had unhappy experiences with it. But 11 September focused us on its globalized nature and stressed the need for coherence and coordination in international cooperation. After 11 September, a number of international, regional, subregional and national plans of action and strategies to combat terrorism emerged. Some of these proposals took the form of specific and practical counter-terrorism measures. Others assumed a more normative character. These efforts are the building blocks for coordinated international action against terrorism.”
2002-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 57 (2002)
“On 12 September 2001, the Security Council adopted, by consensus, its resolution 1368 (2001), condemning the terrorist attacks and expressing its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the attacks. It was followed shortly by a consensus resolution of the General Assembly, resolution 56/1. Within three weeks of the attack, the Security Council negotiated and adopted, again by consensus, its resolution 1373 (2001), a landmark resolution which dealt comprehensively with counter-terrorism and provided a common legal basis for all States to take action against terrorists and their supporters. The Security Council's response to 11 September was impressive and was possible only because all the major Powers agreed on the need to respond decisively to the terrorist threat.”
2002-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 57 (2002)
“Hence, it is useful to reflect on the forces that brought us together and on what key lessons we have learned. After 11 September 2001, the international community rallied together because we all realized that the challenges posed by those events affected the common interests of all States. The common menace of terrorism elicited a cohesive psychological response. Everyone is vulnerable. In Singapore, we discovered terrorists belonging to a regional network with links to Al Qaeda, whose tentacles spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and even Australia. Its targets were United States, Israeli, British and other foreign interests. But a cohesive response also requires a galvanizing force. The United Nations provided that. The United Nations also legitimizes international action.”
2002-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 57 (2002)
“My warmest congratulations go to you, Sir, on your early election as President of the General Assembly, which was the first fruit of the revitalization efforts of your predecessor, Mr. Han Seung-soo. We congratulate both of you on successfully implementing these new procedures. 9 After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the world joined the United States in expressing grief and outrage. Citizens from nearly one half of the United Nations Member States perished. A swift, determined United Nations response set the stage for a united global effort to weed out terrorism. Never in recent history have so many States acted in such unison as members of one international community as they did in the months following 11 September. That was not inevitable. The international community could easily have fractured after 11 September .”
2002-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 57 (2002)
“Action on the Secretary-General's proposals, therefore, should not have to await general agreement on Security Council reform. By focusing on 12 his proposals, by subjecting them to a thorough and positive discussion, I believe we can move urgently needed United Nations reforms forward at a faster pace than has hitherto characterized the reform process. And we can still remain seized of, but not hostage to, issues that may take more time to command general agreement or that require Charter amendment.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“It has no direct mandate to act on behalf of the membership as a whole on many other urgent international questions. International peace and security are no longer the only definition of high international politics. Development and the environment are two areas that are obvious and of increasing importance. Such issues in which the Security Council is not the lead United Nations body have risen in prominence on the post-cold-war international agenda. They will remain high priorities for the majority. There can be no legitimate leadership role for the United Nations that does not deal with such issues. Herein lies the critical importance of the Secretary- General's proposals. They can make an immediate and tangible difference to issues affecting the entire international community which are beyond the scope of the Security Council.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“Of course, they are important. We should continue to work on them. The issues I have raised are complex. But there is no avoiding them. I remain confident that with patience and sincerity we will eventually find our way out of the thickets of ambiguity into which we have wandered. I am confident that we will eventually succeed in our common endeavour to enhance the ability of the Security Council to exercise leadership in the management of global affairs and enhance its legitimacy to do so. But this is only one facet of United Nations reform. The Security Council is not necessarily the only United Nations body that is important, nor even always the most important. The Security Council is empowered to act on behalf of the membership as a whole on questions of international peace and security.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“My point is therefore that, given this reality, it would be a historic mistake to artificially link the Secretary-General's managerial, administrative and structural reforms to far more contentious questions of Security Council or other matters that would require the support of the two-thirds membership needed to effect Charter amendments as defined in Article 108. There is no need to handicap ourselves in this way. Not all aspects of the Secretary-General's proposals are equally acceptable to all Members. But, taken as a whole, it will be far easier to reach a general agreement on more aspects of the Secretary-General's proposals if they are considered in themselves and not linked to more politicized and therefore more intractable questions. This is not to say that Security Council or financial reforms are unimportant.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“We should therefore make progress cautiously, especially on such fundamental questions. This is why the Non- Aligned Movement has wisely decided that efforts at restructuring the Security Council should not be subject to any imposed time-frame. Of course, there has been an evolution in the positions of the major Powers over the last four years. There will be further positive changes over time. But it will certainly take time. No country readily changes the status quo if it benefits from the status quo.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“The position of permanent members will have a decisive influence on whether or not Security Council reform moves forward. As things presently stand, it seems clear that what will not evoke a veto from any of the current permanent members will not command the support of the two-thirds membership required to make the necessary Charter changes. At the same time, what would attract the support of the vast majority of United Nations Members is more likely than not to provoke a veto. This is where, like it or not, we currently stand. A similar case could be made on the closely related question of financial reform. This too, has its own deep complexities; its own intrinsic contradictions between what would be acceptable to the majority and what the major Powers want. Not every change is necessarily for the better.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“We cannot know how an expanded Security Council consisting of an expanded number of permanent members will operate because, as I argued a moment ago, the definition of what constitutes a new permanent member cannot be separated from the question of the veto. And the current permanent members have refused to pronounce on this. At this point, effectiveness and efficiency as an argument against a Security Council of more than 21 breaks down completely. I could go on with my analysis. But I hope I have demonstrated that several critical aspects of the positions of the major countries on Security Council reform need further clarification before progress can be made. I do not believe that the ambiguities and contradictions are going to be resolved soon. They are the natural consequence of sovereign States pursuing their national interests.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“But no one has yet made a convincing argument that a Security Council of, say, 26 members, as has been proposed by the Non- Aligned Movement, would be any less efficient or effective than a Security Council of 21. This is of course assuming that effectiveness and efficiency are not narrowly defined as merely making it more difficult for 11 any of the current permanent members and their allies to ensure that nobody can prevent them from having their own way. In any case, can we really decide on the effectiveness and efficiency of an expanded Security Council before we know what the powers of the new permanent members are going to be? This leads us into a tautological situation.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“Moreover, creating five new permanent members in a Security Council of 21 will seriously upset the present balance between permanent seats and non- permanent seats. This is also a situation which will not be acceptable to the majority of the Member States. It will certainly not command the support of the two thirds of the membership required by the Charter to effect any change to the Security Council's present composition. Those that have argued for an expansion of the Security Council to no more than 21 members have done so on the grounds that this is the maximum number that can function effectively and efficiently. These are concerns that we should all share. Nobody wants an ineffective or inefficient Security Council.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“Three out of the five current permanent members have also been adamantly opposed to the expansion of the Security Council beyond a total of 20 or 21 members. This effectively blocks any expansion of the Security Council. Let us suppose that agreement is reached on the identity of the five new permanent members: Japan and Germany and three from the developing countries, whichever they may be. But if the current permanent members that argue against an expansion of the Security Council beyond 21 members remain firm in their position, this would mean only one additional non-permanent seat for the 165 remaining members of the United Nations, all of which have a desire and a right to serve the United Nations on the Security Council at least occasionally. This inequitable arrangement would certainly be rejected by the majority.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“Now, if this justification for the retention of the veto by the original five permanent members has any validity, then the question that arises is whether any new permanent member that is not given the veto is really deserving of that status? Would such countries really enjoy the international stature and the capability and clout to make such a crucial contribution to international peace and security as to warrant being given permanent status? And if not, why give them permanent status? Could they not make financial and other contributions to the United Nations in some other, way as many countries with no such aspirations already do? If there is a need for new permanent members, and I believe there is a need, then the veto is not a question that can be postponed or discussed separately from the issue of their identities.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“The reality, of course, is that this is not going to happen any time soon. Any attempt to curtail the veto will be vetoed. Undemocratic though it may be, the veto will be with us for the foreseeable future. And it is not without a certain utility in so far as it helps prevent conflicts among the major Powers which could undermine the United Nations. It has been argued that the veto acts as a fail-safe mechanism. The veto will prevent those countries that are so essential to the maintenance of peace and security and to the operation of the United Nations that they deserve permanent status from being compelled to take any action that would lead to conflicts among themselves.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“This, in our view, makes it even more difficult to believe that any developed country permanent member would ever allow any developing country to acquire the veto, even though they have made it clear that they want to retain unrestricted use of the veto for themselves. The powers of new permanent members are not questions that can be deferred to a later date merely to make it easier to quickly determine the identity of the new permanent members. They are intrinsic to the very notion and definition of permanent membership. Is a new permanent member really a permanent member if it does not have the same powers as the original five permanent members? Article 27 has been controversial from the very founding of the United Nations. There is now a wide consensus that the use of the veto should be curtailed with a view to its eventual abolition.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“But even if we could simultaneously reach agreement on the identity of the three permanent members from among the developing countries, together with Japan and Germany, there are further complexities of equal importance. What will be the status of the new permanent members? Even those current permanent members that have strongly supported Germany's and Japan's aspirations have been silent on whether Germany and Japan should have the veto. Even treaty allies of Japan and Germany, countries that have pledged to go to war at their side and for them, have taken no position on this crucial question.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“They have been debated for the last three years without satisfactory answers. But unless there are clear answers, my concern is that suggestions for a differentiated selection process for permanent members from among the newly industrialized and newly developing countries will only lead to permanent stress, divisions and conflict for most regions, or it will lead to a two-stage decision- making process where the elevation of Germany and Japan will not for many years, if ever, be matched by any degree of consensus for the developing nations of Asia, 10 Africa and Latin America. Such a discriminatory situation would be clearly unacceptable to a majority of Member States, including many of those that aspire to permanent status.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“Will the two-thirds membership prescribed by the Charter really be sufficiently familiar with conditions outside their own respective regions to make an informed and legitimate choice, binding on regions of which they are not members? Then, conceptually, is it not inherently contradictory for a member to be said to be permanent but nonetheless be subject to rotation? Who will such a member represent: its own national interests or the region's interests? Can it really represent the latter? Indeed, what is the regional interest? How will it be determined? Is the regional interest necessarily synonymous with the interests of the larger members of a region? Can a rotational system work for any region except Africa, where it is already an established principle? None of these questions will be easy to answer.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“When challenged, several of them have recently for the first time conceded that in addition to Japan and Germany they would in principle be willing to accept three permanent seats for developing nations from the regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America. This is welcome progress. Nevertheless, important ambiguities still remain. How will the three developing countries be chosen? It has been suggested that individual countries be chosen by a two-thirds vote of the membership as a whole. It has also been suggested that they could be subject to some system of rotation within the regions. Both, however, are problematic concepts. Can a country really legitimately represent a region if it is chosen outside the region?”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“Several permanent members have been categoric only in their desire to see Japan and Germany as new permanent members. Many other countries, including my own, would agree that, when general agreement is reached on the expansion of the Security Council, Japan and Germany should be new permanent members. But an equally large number of countries, and I believe Japan and Germany are among them, would also agree that any general agreement on expansion must include some developing countries as new permanent members to reflect new international realities. On this point most permanent members have been far less clear.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)
“It has not been clear that the current permanent members really want change except on their own terms and in circumstances that will not erode their current status and prerogatives. Critical ambiguities in their positions have held up progress and will continue to do so unless clarified. One school of thought is that we should decide on Security Council reform during this General Assembly. I can well sympathize with the frustrations of those who feel that the current debate is going nowhere. But precisely because this is so, we need to ask: What is it that we are going to decide upon? The answer is far from clear. Indeed, the entire Security Council reform process is in danger of being lost in a wilderness of logical contradictions and ambiguities. Please permit me to spell out some of these contradictions and ambiguities.”
1997-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 52 (1997)