YouSaid · the spoken record

Kardelj

THE RECORD WRITES THIS SPEAKER AS KARDELJ

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171
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1948-09-24
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1951-09-24
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un-general-debate

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  1. An atmosphere of grave international tension, fraught with the dangers of war, dominates today both the work of the United Nations and the relations among nations in general. It is no overstatement to say that present world conditions submit the United Nations to one of its most difficult tests, the outcome of which will largely determine its future strength and role. It is high time that this Organization, which hundreds and hundreds of millions of men and women rightly expect to find a solution of the deadlock in which the cause of peace at present finds itself, should show that it is capable of uniting the will of all its Members on one question, namely, that the peace of the world must be preserved.

    1950-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 5 (1950)

  2. It considered, however, that such a pact could be useful only if it were open for accession to all countries, since all nations, whether great or small, had an equal interest in peace. 72. Yugoslavia did not overlook the importance of the part which the great Powers played in the welfare of mankind, particularly with regard to the maintenance of peace. It felt, however, that the collaboration on equal terms of the smaller countries in all efforts for peace was essential in order that such peace should not be confined merely to the great Powers but that it should also exist between the great and smaller Powers, that it should be a democratic peace, a peace of nations with equality of rights, a peace for all, not merely for those with force at their disposal.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  3. The Yugoslav delegation must state that the Government of the Soviet Union should put its principles into practice, especially where it was easiest, namely, towards the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, a country which belonged to no bloc, which was no threat to anyone and was geographically close to the USSR. 70. That was all the more appropriate since Mr. Vyshinsky had declared that the USSR wished to collaborate peaceably and on equal terms with every country ready to adopt a similar attitude and since that was exactly the kind of collaboration which Yugoslavia desired and was always prepared to provide. 71. In conclusion, Mr, Kardelj returned to the proposals submitted to the General Assembly by Mr. Vyshinsky. The Yugoslav delegation was favourable, in principle, to the conclusion of a pact for strengthening peace.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  4. They were aware of the fact that progress demanded an ever increasing development of the creative energies of nations and that such a development could be achieved only if it were protected from every form of foreign domination and every form of external pressure. 69. Mr. Vyshinsky had strongly denounced in his speech (226th meeting) both the policy of warmongering and recourse to the threat of war. He had emphasized that the USSR Government heartily supported the principle of the equality of rights as between States. He had submitted to the General Assembly proposals emphasizing his Government’s wish that all disputes should be settled by peaceful means.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  5. The Yugoslav delegation, however, felt that those facts could not be passed over in silence, because it was not in fact merely a question of an ideological conflict, but of a desire for hegemony to be exercised over Yugoslavia, an independent country which was threatening no one, which was busied in building its own socialist economy and therefore had no other desire but peace. 68. In their struggle for independence and for the principle of equality of rights in international relations, the peoples of Yugoslavia were defending the right of every nation to the free development of its creative forces, in other words, the establishment of conditions essential to human progress. They were not guided by narrow nationalist considerations, by an absurd claim to a life independent of the remainder of the human race.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  6. Brazenly, without the least concern for verisimilitude or any attempt to disguise self-evident contradictions, such calumnies had been hurled at Yugoslavia in the course of the trial that the moral outlook of those who could stage such sinister farces must raise a shudder. Yet those same people must needs try to demonstrate that Yugoslavia was an aggressive country, bent, it appeared, on launching an armed attack against all the eastern European countries. That was necessary in order to justify the brutal pressure on Yugoslavia. 67. Despite the fact that world public opinion had been engaged by those problems for many months, Mr. Vyshinsky had not said a word about them.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  7. Moreover, the Greek democratic army command was being used for political slander of Yugoslavia although not long before Yugoslavia had been blamed for its sympathies with that movement. A considerable section of the Press and broadcasting stations throughout the world had been mobilized to spread base calumnies against Yugoslavia and to insult it. 66. Furthermore! provocative trials, such as the Rajk case in Hungary, had been instituted. Those trials would take a major place in the history of international provocation, if only by reason of the Machiavellian ingenuity of the accusations against Yugoslavia.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  8. In order to establish a hegemony over Yugoslavia, every form; of pressure, backed by a campaign of lies and slander unparalleled in history, had been brought to bear on it. Organized economic pressure had all but brought about a complete economic blockade of Yugoslavia by eastern European countries. An attempt was being made to terrorize people with weak nerves by means of notes which were of inordinate- length and which were not in accordance. with diplomatic practice. That was accompanied by countless frontier incidents and by troop movements amounting to military demonstrations. 65. It would suffice to say that, from 1 July 1948 to ,1 September 1949, 219 frontier incidents involving the use of arms had been provoked by Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. There had also been 69 violations of the Yugoslav air space.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  9. The peoples of Yugoslavia who, by their own efforts and great sacrifices during the Second World War, had achieved their national and social freedom, wished to organize the socialist life of their country in their own way. They were convinced that by so doing they were serving not only their own interests, but also those of peace and of human progress. They were convinced that, in taking such an attitude, they were showing respect for the historic past and culture of other nations and for their right to live and develop on their own lines, thus bringing their individual contribution to the common cause of human progress. 64. As was always the case in similar historical circumstances, there had been an attempt to cloak the true ideological and material nature of the dispute.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  10. It was impossible to talk about non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States, while occupying a position such as that taken by the USSR towards Yugoslavia, an independent State. If was not possible to speak of peace and, at the same time, utter the threats which the Soviet Union had uttered against Yugoslavia. 62. That was the more significant since the USSR must be as well aware as any other country that Yugoslavia was not backed by any bloc of Powers and had not entered into any secret treaties or military alliances with any Powers hostile to it. That was probably why it thought it could employ, in regard to Yugoslavia, methods of diplomacy hitherto unknown in history and which moreover could not be considered as creditable to the country practising them. 63..

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  11. As an instance of discrepancies between words and acts, Mr. Kardelj dwelt on the anti-democratic agitation instigated by the Government of the Soviet Union against Yugoslavia, which had lately aroused world public opinion. 60. That agitation showed that the USSR Government was not always the champion of the world’s current aspirations to democracy and peace. Yugoslavia appreciated certain positive and progressive stands taken by that Government in favour of peace and encouraging pacific co-operation between nations, and supported them. There was, however, a radical difference between the words and the deeds of the Government of the Soviet Union. That was particularly obvious in its relations with Yugoslavia. 61.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  12. It should be noted that the current situation was favourable to a rapid economic development of under-developed countries; The best solution of the problem would be one which permitted under-developed countries to rely on the United Nations for economic assistance. Any measure to that end would be a great step towards strengthening the independence of many countries, and thereby towards strengthening peace. 58. Yugoslavia’s attitude on all those questions was well known owing to the position it had taken since the inception of the United Nations. Eighteen months previously, however, it had been faced with the. new problem of defending its independence and sovereignty. A difference had arisen between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. 59.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  13. What should be sought was an increase in the well-being and strength of each country, the maximum development of its productive powers and the strengthening of its autonomy. 56. That was one of the most important questions before the United Nations, although it was among those in which United Nations action had been particularly ineffective. 57. It was true that by its resolution 200 (III) of 4 December 1948 the General Assembly had decided to provide technical assistance to underdeveloped countries, and that measures were being taken to make the assistance available through the United Nations and its specialized agencies. That might be a useful step. The under-developed country which received that assistance, however, had to have the means necessary to profit by it.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  14. It was clear to everyone that the existing discrepancy between the wealth of technical resources and general economic progress of highly-developed countries on the one hand, and the economic position of underdeveloped countries on the other, represented a clear danger to the pursuit of normal economic relations. 54. The United Nations must solve that problem by providing under-developed countries with assistance in the spirit of the Chapter, in other words, the kind of assistance which would help to strengthen the independence of those nations. 55. It would be absurd to speak of economic and political collaboration with respect for the rights of all countries, if the basic premise was that the economies of under-developed countries should only complement the economies of the more developed countries.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  15. The assertion that the principle of the sovereignty of States was out of date, and that it was necessary to set up a world government or State — which, in fact would legalize political and economic domination by one great Power or another — was equally incompatible with any desire for peace. It was impossible to speak of peace and at the same time heap insults upon a Government which called for a greater measure of democracy in international relations. Such contradictory assertions had been — made, and the Yugoslav delegation considered that to be an extremely dangerous factor, which constituted a permanent threat of war. 53. It was obvious that the question of the equality of rights and the independence of small countries was closely linked to the problem of their economic development.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  16. Hence all efforts to strengthen peace must be indissolubly linked to the struggle for equality in relations between peoples and States, for the preservation of the independence of small States, for the establishment of conditions in which political or economic pressure would have no place in international relations. Those were the questions which really put the sincerity of statements in favour of peace to the test. 52. It was impossible to speak of peace while weak or small countries were threatened and their right to self-determination violated, and while they were exploited or subjugated.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  17. On the other hand, if that principle was not observed, there existed a real threat to peace, not only in relations between States which had a different social structure, but also in relations between States with the same structure. 50. It could be said, therefore, that the threat of war was due, not to differences in social structure, but to the existence of imperialistic and antidemocratic tendencies in international, relations, to the violation of the principle of equality of the rights of States and peoples, to the economic exploitation of other nations, and to intervention in the domestic affairs of other States. 51.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  18. If the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States were respected, it was obvious that difference of social structure did not constitute a threat of war. 49. The representative of China, at the 223rd meeting, had preached a real crusade against communism; in fact, he had advocated war against the Soviet Union. It was quite obvious that it was not possible to speak of peace when such appeals were made. Yugoslavia felt that, if it were recognized that every nation had the right to decide its own destiny and to organize its own social structure, peaceful collaboration among States of different structure was quite possible.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  19. If the United Nations was to be considered an important instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security, it was necessary, above all, to combat the tendency to conceal the real meaning of international questions behind parades of propaganda and allegedly democratic watchwords. 48. One of the questions which constantly arose was whether States with different social structures could co-exist and collaborate peacefully for the purpose of ensuring a lasting peace among the nations. The answer must necessarily be in the affirmative, for if peace were desired, it must be ensured under the existing conditions of a world as it was, by taking into consideration the fact that different States had different social structures.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  20. Lastly, at the very time when there was so much talk about the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries, it was clear that, in fact, such intervention had become the principal instrument of the foreign policy of the great Powers, and that it constituted the main reason for fearing a new war. 46. Such facts, however, which propaganda tried to present under a very different guise, were carefully hidden from public opinion. It even seemed that certain persons were eager to transform the United Nations into a platform for that kind of propaganda. 47. The question was whether the General Assembly would become the scene of appeals for peace, made for propaganda purposes, or would take effective measures for the maintenance of peace.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  21. Thus, although the enslavement of nations was considered to be a crime, such enslavement nevertheless continued owing to the use of a whole series of political and economic procedures. 43. The equality of rights of all the sovereign countries were solemnly recognized; some of, those, however, who in words declared themselves in favour of that principle had scant regard for it. in their own relations with other countries. 44. Moreover, a dangerous policy, based on the idea that, in order to defend peace, it was necessary to make the threat of war felt, had found widespread application. 45.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  22. It was true that, during the preceding ten years, and especially after the cruel ordeal of the Second World War, democratic feeling had so increased among nations that it had become very difficult openly to defend the colonial system, inequitable relations between various nations, imperialistic expansionism, and the attempt of the great Powers to impose their will Upon the weaker Powers. Whatever party they belonged to workers expected an ever increasing consideration to be given to their democratic opinions. 42. That did not mean, however, that everything condemned by the popular democratic conscience had disappeared. The unsound policy was continued, under cover of propaganda tricks.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  23. Mr. KARDELJ stated that he wished to dwell on a few fundamental facts which, in his opinion, were of very great importance to the world in general, and especially to his country. 40. He wished, first, to point out that discrepancies between words and deeds had reached absolutely astonishing proportions; that was true even in the United Nations. It was undeniable that, even in the Assembly, most of the international questions which gave rise to controversy were presented in a guise very different from reality. 41.

    1949-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 4 (1949)

  24. Vyshinsky’s proposal and would support any other proposal aimed at the strengthening of peace and of peaceful co-operation among the peoples.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  25. Vyshinsky’s proposal for the reduction of armed forces by one-third represent a vitally important contribution to the struggle for peace and for peaceful collaboration between the peoples and thereby to the strengthening of the United Nations itself. The acceptance of that proposal would make an important contribution to the liberation of the masses of the people from the fear of war, to the renunciation of the threat of war as a means of international politics and to the creation of an atmosphere in which burning international questions could be solved with greater success. In conclusion, Mr. Kardelj said that the Yugoslav delegation, in expressing the desire of the Yugoslav people, who had not forgotten the sufferings and horrors of the Second World War, was fully resolved to support Mr.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  26. The system of international co-operation, set up at the height of the war and directly afterwards, a system which had found its expression in the United Nations, was now in their way. If, however, the people were to devote themselves wholeheartedly to peaceful construction, it was vital that that system of international co-operation should be strengthened. To achieve that end, however, far more must be done than Mr. Spaak had proposed. Tangible proof must be given to millions of workers, who were daily being intimidated by the clamour of the warmongers, that they had no need to fear the future. The only effective means of securing that end under the present circumstances was to prohibit the atomic weapon, to control atomic energy and to bring about a general reduction of armaments. Hence Mr.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  27. Spaak’s argument, if correctly understood, was that co-operation with the Soviet Union was impossible because the latter was a communist country. The Government of the USSR had, however, taken the same form both during and after the war, as well as at the time of the San Francisco Conference. At that time no one had regarded the Soviet Union’s social system as an obstacle to co-operation, although the quotation from Lenin, cited by Mr. Bevin was familiar. The representatives of the majority were adopting a different attitude to the question today, for the reason that their own standpoint had undergone a change and not that of the Soviet Union or the peoples’ democracies.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  28. That did not mean that the programme of the socialist countries entailed war with the capitalist countries or that no co-operation in the sphere of international relations was possible between the capitalist and the socialist countries. The question was not that of the possibility or otherwise of co-operation but rather, as the President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had stated, that of the existence or non-existence of a desire to cooperate. The Soviet Union and the people’s democracies had proved and were proving every day their readiness for such co-operation and their conviction that it was both possible and necessary. The same could not be said of the leading States of the majority in the United Nations. Mr.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  29. If that quotation were closely examined, however, it was clear that Lenin had merely said that the socialist countries must be vigilant, because the capitalist world would not tolerate the co-existence of a new and more progressive socialist system and would therefore attempt to crush it with all the means at its disposal. The prolonged foreign intervention, to which the representative of the Byelorussian SSR had referred at the 147th plenary meeting provided direct confirmation of the accuracy of Lenin’s view. The warmongering propaganda of today and the uncompromisingly antagonistic policy towards the Soviet Union and the peoples’ democracies proved beyond a shadow of doubt that, despite Mr. Bevin’s assertions, Marxist-Leninism had not become obsolete, and that Lenin’s warning was still valid.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  30. In other words, the peoples must themselves decide whether they would willingly submit to American world domination or whether they preferred subjugation by force. Obviously no country desiring free development on the basis of its own ideas and of progressive social achievements could accept such alternatives. In justifying his stand with regard to the USSR proposal for the reduction of armed forces and the prohibition of the atomic weapon, Mr. Bevin had quoted from Lenin in evidence of the dangers threatening the capitalist countries from the Soviet Union.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  31. He merely wished to emphasize that the plan aimed at a fundamental alteration in the principles on which the United Nations was based. For example, the United States plan abolished inter alia the principle of unanimity of the great Powers in connexion with the control of atomic energy. The obvious aim was to remove all obstacles from the path of United States policy. Many influential Americans were openly saying that the United Nations should be transformed from a community of equal and sovereign States into a world State, in which the full hegemony of the United States of America would of course be ensured. Influential circles in America were openly appealing to the peoples of the world to renounce their sovereignty, to accept United States hegemony and all that it involved, so as to be saved from the atom bomb.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  32. Kardelj’s purpose in enumerating some of the main problems facing the United Nations was not to deal with them in substance, but rather to point out the fundamental sources of the difficulties encountered in the sphere of international co-operation and in the work of the United Nations. Those questions and many other facts showed that the chief weakness of the Organization lay in the attempts of the leading group of States of the majority to transform the Organization into an instrument for their own purposes. The line taken by the United States of America with regard to atomic energy had the same purpose in view. Detailed criticism of the substance of the American plan for the control of atomic energy had been made on more than one occasion in the Assembly and he did not propose to repeat the arguments put forward.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  33. As regards Yugoslav displaced persons, the Yugoslav Government demanded the implementation of the General Assembly’s resolution 3 (I), namely, that all criminals who took part in the extermination of peaceful inhabitants and of antifascists should be handed over to Yugoslav tribunals. For other displaced persons an amnesty had long since been granted by the highest Yugoslav authorities. It was inhuman and contrary to the interests of co-operation among the nations to deceive a mass of misguided people, who were grasping at every opportunity to keep themselves alive, and to detain them abroad. The Yugoslav Government requested the United Nations to assist those people to return to their country to take up peaceful work. Mr.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  34. Such propaganda obviously presupposed that the masses of the world’s population had already forgotten that most of the refugees had fled from their countries with the Nazi army because they had collaborated with it or had been deceived by their quisling leaders. There was no need to enlarge on the subject. The important fact was that the displaced persons, who were naturally willing to sell themselves for a crust of bread to anyone ready to buy their services, were partly being employed as cheap labour and partly in hostile and diversionary acts against the States of Eastern Europe. Peace and peaceful co-operation among nations were hardly possible when fascist hirelings were being sent to engage in diversionary activities in countries which were Members of the United Nations.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  35. American control over strategic raw materials was being established. The welding of military alliances was being encouraged and a network of military bases organized. It was perfectly clear that such steps were bound to result in a deterioration of international relations. They had at the same time dealt a heavy blow to the role and authority of the United Nations. The authors of the Plan could hardly be unaware of those probable international repercussions; hence they had assumed a very heavy responsibility for the deterioration of international relations. As regards the question of displaced persons from Eastern Europe, reactionary propaganda was striving to represent those people as victims of an «intolerable» regime on the other side of the «iron curtain».

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  36. Obviously those terms had been deliberately drawn up so as to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union and to the peoples’ democracies; otherwise, why had the initiators of the Plan not raised the matter within the United Nations? The results of the Marshall Plan were already becoming discernible. They confirmed the correctness of the Yugoslav view of the economic role of the Plan. It had produced serious international political consequences both in Europe and in the world as a whole. Western Germany was becoming an industrial and military base of the United States of America. German revisionist and imperialist tendencies were being revived. The Marshall Plan countries were being compelled to accept terms which were tantamount to the incorporation of their countries in United States strategic plans.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  37. The Federated People’s Republic of Yugoslavia was one of the countries which had been unwilling to accept such terms, which would have impeded its economic development and endangered its plan of socialist reconstruction, and the country’s independence. Mr. Bevin had stated in his speech that the countries of Eastern Europe had been «forbidden» to join the Marshall Plan. So far as Yugoslavia was concerned, no orders had been issued to its Government, which had taken its own decision, being convinced, then as now, that the terms of the so-called Marshall Plan were unacceptable to an independent country which had embarked upon the general development of its productive resources.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  38. Lastly, they were entitled to expect that the assistance granted for reconstruction would not be accompanied by conditions restricting their independence. Yet the majority in the General Assembly and in other organs of the United Nations had taken an entirely different road under the influence of the diametrically opposed attitude of the United States delegation. The economic organs of the United Nations were virtually paralysed and the implementation of the so-called American European Recovery Programme, the Marshall Plan, had begun outside the framework of the United Nations. The crux of the matter was that American aid to Europe was linked with terms directly contrary to the Charter and altogether inconsistent with the independence of peoples.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  39. The peoples of the countries devastated by the war had rightly anticipated that the work of the United Nations as a whole, and that of its individual organs, headed by the Economic and Social Council, would increasingly aim at eliminating that discrimination in the allocation of economic assistance for the reconstruction of their countries and discrimination in economic relations in general. They were entitled to expect that those relations would develop the productive forces of the countries concerned, and would in particular promote their industrialization, without which there was today neither independence nor equality of nations. They had also expected that those relations would promote trade and other economic relations among the States on a basis of equality, in other words, in the spirit of the Charter.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  40. At the second special session of the General Assembly, the majority had openly revised the decisions taken earlier on the Palestine question. Thus a settlement of the question was being delayed, while in Palestine hatred was being kindled and blood was being shed. Many other questions had suffered a more or less similar fate. They had not been solved in accordance with the democratic principles of the Charter. The policy of the majority with regard to international economic co-operation was also contrary to the principles of the Charter.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  41. Those peoples were having to pay with their own blood for every step they took towards freedom. The colonial system was nevertheless being portrayed in the Assembly almost in the guise of a charitable institution. In that connexion, mention must be made of the Palestine question. The implementation of the General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 on the partition of Palestine might have saved many human lives in that country. However, it very soon became clear that the United States of America and the majority in the Security Council had no real intention of implementing the resolution and were passively observing the execution of a policy aimed at creating chaos in Palestine and at provoking aggression against the State of Israel.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  42. He would adduce a few facts on the national and colonial question. The majority of Members of the United Nations had approved treaties providing for the administration by trustee countries of territories received in trust as integral parts of their own territories, even giving them the right to use those territories for the establishment of military bases. In other words, instead of a system enabling Trust Territories to develop more quickly into independent States as laid down by the Charter, colonial regimes of the usual type had been set up in them. When such conditions prevailed in territories under trusteeship, it was obvious that conditions in other colonial, so-called Non-Self-Governing Territories could not be different. No wonder therefore that uprisings were spreading throughout the colonial world.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  43. The obvious purpose of the false account of internal conditions in those countries was to divert world public opinion from the main questions of present-day international relations to secondary questions, to give an erroneous explanation of existing contradictions in international relations and to further the ideological mobilization of the masses for a policy directed against the Soviet Union and the peoples’ democracies. If it were the essence of the question of human rights which was to be considered, socialist countries had a definite advantage over others. There was a great discrepancy between the words and deeds of the leading States of the majority as a whole and in the work of the United Nations in particular, a discrepancy so glaring that no solemn declarations on human rights made in the Assembly could conceal it.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  44. Clearly, such a policy was bound to result in a deterioration of international relations. The representatives of certain States had said a great deal about human rights as being one of the main questions of our time. It was undoubtedly a momentous and important question. When, however, they considered the practical aim of declarations on human rights made in the Organization, the inevitable conclusion was that those declarations served entirely different aims, which were quite unconnected with the consolidation of those rights in the world. On the contrary, they were inflicting grave harm on the cause of international co-operation. The question had been treated tendentiously and was directed against the USSR and the other peoples’ democracies.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  45. The majority of the Security Council fully upheld not merely the above-mentioned violation of the clauses of the Peace Treaty with Italy, but also supported the policy of the United States of America and the United Kingdom, which was aimed at a de facto revision of the Peace Treaty. The Yugoslav Government had submitted a complaint to the Security Council (S/9M), pointing out that the United States of America and the United Kingdom authorities in Trieste were carrying out a policy consisting of the virtual incorporation of the Free Territory in Italy. The majority of the Security Council had however taken no action to ensure the implementation of the Peace Treaty, thus breaking its solemn pledge to guarantee the independence and integrity of the Free Territory of Trieste.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  46. By its resolution of 10 January 1947 the Security Council had pledged itself to protect the independence and integrity of the Free Territory and to appoint a governor as soon as possible. The Free Territory was still under a provisional regime of military occupation and a governor had not yet been appointed, a fact for which three great Powers were to blame. Use had been made of all sorts of manoeuvres in order to prevent the implementation of those clauses of the Peace Treaty with Italy, which concerned the Free Territory, while the resolution put forward by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (S/980), drawing the attention of the Security Council to the necessity and obligation to appoint a governor of Trieste as early as possible, had been rejected.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  47. The USSR Government had recently taken a practical step towards the solution of the Korean question by its decision to withdraw Soviet troops from Korea. The Assembly might with advantage recommend the United States Government to do likewise. Such a recommendation would do more for the cause of peace than the special commissions of the United Nations, which had largely compromised themselves to such a degree that they were everywhere regarded with suspicion and even hostility. The same was true of the fulfilment of international treaties and obligations. To take the Free Territory of Trieste as an example: the Italian Peace Treaty had come into force on 15 September 1947; more than a year before.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  48. Instead of accepting the USSR proposal for the withdrawal of all forces of occupation from Korea, thus enabling the Korean people to decide their own fate, a Commission had been set up, whose real aim was to provide cover and justification for an electoral comedy in Southern Korea and for the creation of a puppet government, dependent upon foreign support and charity and consequently an obedient tool of its masters. All that that Commission had succeeded in accomplishing was to compromise the United Nations in the eyes of the Korean people and of world public opinion as an Organization which through its Temporary Commission, was giving assistance to those engaged in suppressing the independence of the Korean people.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  49. Those were, however, the very reasons which prevented the Greek people from expressing their will in a genuinely democratic manner. In those circumstances the responsibility for the situation in Greece evidently lay with the Athens regime and with those foreign Powers which supported it. Mr. Kardelj said he had dwelt at some length on the work of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, because that Committee had been used as a means of levelling direct accusations against the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. The same course had, however, been taken with similar United Nations bodies, for instance, the Temporary Commission on Korea.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)

  50. The task of the United Nations should in fact be to draft such a plan and not to nominate committees which had proved to be the mere servants of those who had organized and were responsible for the civil war. » (Blue Book of the provisional democratic Government of Greece, pages 196 and 197.) Mr. Bevin’s remark that the Greek people had never had an opportunity of free development since the war ended was true, but to blame the northern neighbours of Greece or the Soviet Union was wholly contrary to truth and to the facts. Neither the northern neighbours of Greece nor the USSR had persecuted Greek antifascist fighters, imposed anti-democratic regimes on the Greek people, staged electoral comedies, or rehabilitated fascists and quislings; all that had been done under British and American patronage.

    1948-09-24 · UN General Assembly · General Debate, Session 3 (1948)