YouSaid · the spoken record

Abdou Abarry

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582
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2020-03-31
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2021-12-30
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un-security-council

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  1. Cognizant of the threat posed by terrorism to international peace and security, on 28 September 2001 the Security Council adopted resolution 1373 (2001), inviting States Members of the United Nations to put in place adequate legal instruments for preventing and suppressing, by all lawful means, the financing and preparation of any terrorist act on their territories. As a Member State that is concerned with respect for international law and its international commitments, my country, the Niger, has taken several steps in that direction and has tirelessly cooperated with the competent United Nations entities, including the Executive Directorate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which is responsible for following up with Member States on the implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and other relevant Council resolutions.

    2021-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/48 (2021) · source

  2. I would like to thank the Tunisian presidency for having organized this debate on such an important and pressing topic. I would also like to thank Mr. Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, and Ms. Michèle Coninsx, Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, for their particularly thorough presentations. My thanks also go to Ms. Fatima Akilu for the perspective that she has just shared with us on the subject.

    2021-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/48 (2021) · source

  3. In conclusion, it should be noted that the acknowledgement in the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan of concerns such as the ratification of international conventions on the protection and promotion of human rights, transitional justice and the implementation by the Government of a national plan for the protection of civilians offer hope for a coordinated transition between the two missions. In that connection, we call on all of the Sudan’s partners to join the country in a successful transition through the organization of democratic elections.

    2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source

  4. Regarding the coordination between the establishment of UNITAMS and the drawdown of UNAMID, the A3+1 commends the transitional Government of the Sudan for its collaboration with, and support for, the UNITAMS planning team in facilitating a coordinated transition between the two missions. We believe that the situation on the ground and the arrangements put in place by the transitional Government to ensure stability and the protection of people and property in Darfur are such that UNAMID should begin the drawdown process and hand over to UNITAMS as of 31 December, in accordance with resolution 2525 (2020).

    2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source

  5. The humanitarian situation in the Sudan is further exacerbated by the economic crisis; food insecurity; the adverse effects of climate change, as illustrated by the worst floods the country has experienced since 1988; epidemics; intercommunal violence; the prolonged displacement of populations; and the influx of refugees from neighbouring States. The current situation, which affects just over 9.6 million people, demands that we demonstrate our responsibility and solidarity with the Sudan with a view to mitigating the impact of the humanitarian situation on its ongoing peacebuilding process. It also illustrates once again the interdependence between security and development.

    2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source

  6. On the socioeconomic and humanitarian front, the A3+1 welcomes the economic and financial reforms undertaken, despite the difficulties related to the coronavirus disease pandemic. We call on the Government and partners of the Sudan to build on the conclusions of the national economic conference held in Khartoum from 26 to 28 September. I am pleased to note that the United States decision to remove the Sudan from the list of State sponsors of terrorism will, as we have always S/2020/1183 emphasized, promote the Sudan’s economic and social development through access to international development financial institutions.

    2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source

  7. We commend the collaboration of the African Union and the United Nations as well as the leading role played by subregional bodies and neighbouring countries, namely, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and South Sudan, in the peace process. In addition, the upsurge in intercommunal violence and the clashes between Government forces and certain armed groups that remain outside the Agreement attest to the need for continued efforts to address the root causes of the conflicts, in particular poverty and unemployment. In that regard, we call on Abdul Wahid Al-Nur to join the peace process as soon as possible in order to give comprehensive and inclusive peace a chance in the Sudan.

    2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source

  8. To that end, we call on all signatories and partners of the Sudan to honour their obligations to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of the Agreement, which would include progress on issues such as gender equality, the protection of human rights and the rule of law. The ongoing peacebuilding process requires all parties to commit to the Agreement and to work actively to clarify and address all outstanding issues. That would facilitate the mobilization of the trust fund integrating the strategic, technical and planning dimensions of activities in support of the peacebuilding process.

    2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source

  9. Our statement focuses on three main points — the political and security situation; the socioeconomic and humanitarian situation; and the issue of coordinating the transition to the establishment of UNITAMS following the drawdown of UNAMID. First, with regard to the political and security situation, the A3+1 welcomes the initiatives that led to the signing of the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan on 3 October. Despite lingering challenges, the signing of the Agreement demonstrates the willingness of the parties to the conflict to strive for lasting peace in the Sudan, under the auspices of the transitional Government.

    2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source

  10. I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Group of African countries on the Security Council — the Niger, South Africa and Tunisia — as well as Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (A3+1). The A3+1 thanks the Secretary-General for his reports on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) (S/2020/1155) and on the drawdown of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and a follow-on presence (S/2020/1115). We would also like to thank Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Ms. Rosemary DiCarlo and Mr. Atul Khare for their briefings and efforts in support of the ongoing peace process in the Sudan.

    2020-12-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1183 (2020) · source

  11. It is indeed vital that security-sector reform policies and programmes be developed, managed and implemented by national rather than external actors, as stated by experts and confirmed by examples of successful processes. I cannot conclude without mentioning the important role played by United Nations peacekeeping missions and the Peacebuilding Commission in the process of transforming the security sector through their vital support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  12. In addition, the promotion of youth, gender and the principle of gender equality should be supported, in accordance with article 63 of the revised Treaty of ECOWAS (1993), the organization’s Gender Policy (2004) and article 81 of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework, as well as its regional Plan of Action for the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2010). This inclusive approach should also properly take into account and address emerging threats to peace and security, including terrorism, climate change and pandemics. While welcoming recent developments in the area of security-sector governance, my delegation reiterates the need for national ownership of the process.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  13. In that regard, my delegation welcomes the involvement of the Security Council and various other United Nations bodies, in particular the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, and of regional and subregional organizations, which, by means of strategic partnerships, work together to strengthen good governance in the security sector.It is also important to underline that no transformation of the security sector can be complete without the contribution and involvement of independent monitoring actors such as civil-society organizations, which are an essential component of the consolidation of any viable democratic process.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  14. Through subregional mechanisms, the Niger has focused on strengthening and increasing cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member States so as to better promote security-sector reform in an increasingly globalized context. It is in the context of pooling our efforts that we are committed, within the political framework of ECOWAS, to the reform and governance of the security sector, as adopted in 2016, consistent with the policies of the African Union and the United Nations in that area.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  15. That is how, by virtue of its geographical location, the Niger, which is surrounded by three hotbeds of tension — Boko Haram in the south, the Libyan crisis in the north and that in Mali in the west — has prioritized building the capacity of the security sector, specifically in the areas of defence, the police, justice, the penal system, the judicial system, border management and customs, so as to better adapt those security instruments to current threats, of which the greatest is the expansion of terrorism into the Sahel. In that context, it is important to underline all the ongoing efforts made by my country in terms of training the various actors in the security sector and in the modernization of their equipment.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  16. It is important to stress that all those initiatives take account of the importance of youth employment. Offering young people an opportunity to be active reduces their vulnerability in a regional environment that exposes some of them, especially those in rural areas, to the temptation of recruitment by the forces of evil.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  17. My country, the Niger, believes that such reforms are of crucial importance given the difficulties caused by the insecurity that has prevailed in the Sahel for almost a decade now, with the aim of maintaining the security and stability of the country and in order to establish and strengthen the foundations for sustainable socioeconomic development. That is why part 3 of the Renaissance programme, entitled “Ensuring the safety of people and property”, has the following objectives: the redefinition and implementation of a national security policy that takes into account the political, economic and military dimensions; the consolidation of State authority at all levels; and the pursuit and strengthening of security cooperation with neighbouring countries.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  18. Allow me at the outset to congratulate you, Madam President, on your country’s accession to the presidency of the Security Council for the month of December and to thank you for having made the issue of security-sector reform a priority. I would like to assure you of the Niger’s full support and of our appreciation for the efforts made in connection with your country’s proposal for a draft resolution (S/2020/1158) on the subject. I wish also to thank the various speakers for their valuable and diverse contributions to our debate today. The transformation of the security sector remains more necessary than ever given global developments and the fresh challenges facing our States.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  19. In conclusion, allow me to express my delegation’s appreciation to the Special Envoy and his team for their tireless efforts to engage in dialogue with all stakeholders in the process, including the Women’s Advisory Board and civil society organizations, in Syria and in the region.

    2020-11-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1147 (2020) · source

  20. Rajasingham, it is clear that the humanitarian assistance provided to the Syrian people does not come close to meeting their needs. The delivery mechanism for this aid must be substantially improved throughout the Syrian territory. Therefore, procedures at the Bab Al-Hawa crossing point and between the contact lines need to be streamlined and simplified to speed up the delivery of humanitarian aid, including much-needed medical supplies and equipment for the Syrian health system to deal with the pandemic. At the same time, we call for the easing or suspension of unilateral economic sanctions that could undermine Syria’s ability to deal with the pandemic. Those sanctions are a source of aggravation, not only for Syria but also for its neighbours.

    2020-11-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1147 (2020) · source

  21. The Niger maintains its view that the political and humanitarian issues of the Syrian crisis cannot be dealt with separately, as the continuation of hostilities has a negative impact on the humanitarian situation, which, in turn, affects the peace process. Indeed, the contamination rate of COVID-19 in Syria remains a major concern, as weakened health infrastructure, insecurity, living conditions and the lack of access to adequate water and sanitation facilities, particularly in the north, hamper the ability to respond effectively. A large number of vulnerable people, including internally displaced persons and refugees, are at high risk of contracting the virus. That is a major risk factor for a more acute crisis, as social distancing is virtually impossible in overcrowded camps. From the detailed briefing just delivered by Mr.

    2020-11-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1147 (2020) · source

  22. With regard to the work of the Constitutional Committee, we are pleased to learn that, should the restrictions related to COVID-19 be lifted, the Special Envoy will hold the fourth round of consultations from 30 November to 4 December 2020, and a fifth round in January 2021. To that end, my delegation calls for flexibility on the part of all stakeholders in order to move forward on the political path towards lasting peace in Syria. The parties to the conflict should also take steps to strengthen mutual trust, including through unilateral mass releases of detainees and by providing information to the families of missing persons, as confidence-building measures as requested by the Special Envoy.

    2020-11-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1147 (2020) · source

  23. We also reiterate the calls of the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy for an immediate national ceasefire in Syria in order to create the conditions for the political process to succeed and mitigate the effects of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, which is spreading with alarming virulence throughout the country. However, and as my delegation has repeatedly stressed, these calls, the echoes of which we eagerly await, must not distract us from the fight against terrorism, just as it is crucial to prevent criminal groups from taking advantage of the current health crisis.

    2020-11-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1147 (2020) · source

  24. The resolution of this crisis, as we will never stop saying, must be achieved on a political and not a military basis, in accordance with a process led by the Syrians themselves and through the various components of Syrian society. That is why it is urgent to put the political process back on the right track, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015). As Geir Pedersen mentioned last month, “A political deal to implement 2254 (2015) is indeed the way to restore Syria’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and meet the legitimate aspirations of all Syrians.” (S/2020/1049, annex I ) To that end, I would like to call on the actors in the Syrian conflict to exercise greater restraint and to work to de-escalate the hostilities.

    2020-11-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1147 (2020) · source

  25. I thank Ms. Khawla Matar and Mr. Ramesh Rajasingham for their briefings. At a time when, in other theatres, we are beginning to see very encouraging signs that the crisis is being resolved through dialogue, the situation in Syria remains deadlocked. The increase in hostilities reported in recent weeks in north- west Syria, which has cost the lives of several people, including three children and two humanitarian workers, as reported by UNICEF, remains a source of concern. My delegation condemns this resurgence in violence and calls on the parties to immediately cease hostilities, which is a sine qua non for achieving tangible progress in resolving the crisis in Syria.

    2020-11-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1147 (2020) · source

  26. It is therefore ever more crucial for the global coalition against Da’esh and the United Nations to remain vigilant and continue to support Iraq in combating the terrorist hydra so as to thwart its hopes of re-emerging.

    2020-11-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1144 (2020) · source

  27. With regard to the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and the return of missing Kuwaiti property, including the national archives, my delegation commends the action of the Iraqi Government on 16 September to repatriate human remains believed to be those of Kuwaiti citizens, despite the restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. We commend UNAMI, the Tripartite Commission and the International Committee of the Red Cross for their determined efforts to move this issue forward and for their logistical support. In conclusion, I would like to recall here that, as Iraq attempts to recover from the deep crisis it has endured in recent years, we must not lose sight of the fact that a victory over the Islamic State in Iraq in the Levant is not synonymous with its elimination from the region.

    2020-11-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1144 (2020) · source

  28. With regard to the electoral process, the support of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) to the Independent High Electoral Commission remains paramount, in particular with regard to strengthening the operational and logistical capacities of the Commission. The same applies to the support of the international community and all of Iraq’s regional and bilateral partners, with a view to ensuring free, fair and credible elections next year. The Niger remains convinced that a sustainable process must include Iraqi women and young people. We therefore welcome the announcement made on 1 October by the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs concerning Government plans to adopt a national development plan that would complement existing legislation on increasing the number of women in high-level decision-making positions.

    2020-11-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1144 (2020) · source

  29. We welcome the decision to compensate demonstrators who have been injured. However, the increase in the number of killings and attacks on human rights activists and defenders by unidentified armed assailants remains a cause for concern. My delegation therefore calls on the Government to take concrete steps to honour its commitment by making operational the institution responsible for investigating the killings of activists and other human rights defenders and bringing perpetrators to justice. We believe that this will help ease tensions in the country and build trust between the Government and the people.

    2020-11-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1144 (2020) · source

  30. I would like to thank Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert for her excellent briefing and her team’s hard work in a complex environment. I would also like to welcome the representative of Iraq to today’s meeting. Iraq is attempting to rebuild after years of conflict in a very complex environment that has led to many internal crises, including the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, whose spread is increasing at an alarming rate. My delegation acknowledges the efforts of the Iraqi Government to meet these challenges and implement reforms, including in the fight against corruption, in order to steer the country towards a brighter future. With respect to the protection of human rights, the Niger welcomes the progress made by the Iraqi Government in this area, although much remains to be done.

    2020-11-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1144 (2020) · source

  31. In conclusion, and as stated by the Secretary-General in his report, “The international community has a moral obligation and shared responsibility to support the member States of the G-5 Sahel in their commendable efforts to bring peace and sustainable development to the region” (S/2020/1074, para. 56). Council members are also encouraged to be more pragmatic on this issue, which goes beyond the Sahel and calls for a comprehensive response. In sum, the primary mission of the Joint Force is to rid the Sahel of these forces of evil, which could otherwise extend their reach to other regions.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1126 (2020) · source

  32. In doing so, consideration should be given to the provisions of resolution 2391 (2017), which clearly stipulate that support to the Joint Force should not affect the performance of MINUSMA. In addition, the current sociopolitical and security situation in Mali requires that MINUSMA redouble its efforts and focus on the core tasks of its mandate in order to achieve its strategic priorities. At a time when several countries in the region are engaged in electoral processes that reveal or accentuate certain weaknesses, I am pleased to commend the positive role played by the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel and call on all partners to further coordinate their initiatives and other support to the Sahel region.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1126 (2020) · source

  33. While we duly appreciate the progress made in the collaboration and support provided by MINUSMA to the G-5 Sahel Joint Force, it clear that this mode of support is neither adequate nor sufficient in the context of the fight against terrorism. Secretary-General António Guterres has reiterated this view in numerous reports, including in his latest assessment of this support. If the Joint Force is eventually to become self-sustaining, we would ultimately have to implement the recommendations of the assessments relating to support for the Joint Force. That would require the establishment of a United Nations support office dedicated to the Joint Force and funded by assessed contributions from Member States.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1126 (2020) · source

  34. It is clear that the return of the defence and security forces throughout the country is a prerequisite for the restoration of regional administrations, which is why it is essential that the Malian authorities consolidate their hold on the regions concerned. The A3+1 welcomes the significant progress made by the Joint Force in developing and implementing the human rights and international humanitarian law compliance framework, including the establishment of a mechanism for identifying, monitoring and analysing harm to civilians. That illustrates the strong commitment of the G-5 countries in the Sahel to respecting human rights and international humanitarian law.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1126 (2020) · source

  35. The A3+1 welcomes the decisive support provided by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to the Joint Force, including in Mali in the context of the stabilization and gradual restoration of State authority in the centre and north of the country. The same applies to the measures taken in recent months by the Mission in the context of the implementation of resolution 2531 (2020) and the completion of the construction and handover of the temporary headquarters of the Joint Force, which has considerably improved the Force’s ability to operate more effectively. However, recent events in Mali have served as a wake-up call for us to redouble our efforts to help the country ensure the integrity of its territory and the security of its population.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1126 (2020) · source

  36. In terms of the Joint Force’s performance, the operations carried out in the past 10 months in all three areas of operation have made it possible to neutralize and/or arrest 123 terrorists; arrest 104 traffickers; seize, recover or destroy 214 motorcycles and 17 vehicles; destroy several logistics depots or sites for manufacturing improvised explosive devices; and recover nearly 200 weapons and thousands of munitions of all calibres. At the same time, the restructuring of the Executive Secretariat of the G-5 Sahel has made it more operational, enabling it to provide more effective support to the Joint Force.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1126 (2020) · source

  37. The A3+1 welcomes the increase in the operational capacity and the pace of operations of the Joint Force, whose successes are increasingly regular, as well as the operationalization of its police component. Operation Sama 1 is an encouraging example in that regard. Moreover, the announcement made on 5 October in Nouakchott, during the eighth ordinary session of the G-5 Sahel Council of Ministers, of the forthcoming deployment of a Chadian battalion to participate in Operation Sama 2, further strengthens us in the fight against terrorism, particularly in the Centre Sector. We welcome the continued efforts of the African Union Peace and Security Council to work toward the upcoming deployment of 3,000 members of the African Union Standby Force, which will further bolster the fight against terrorism in the region.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1126 (2020) · source

  38. The A3+1 also welcomes in this regard the funding pledges made for humanitarian interventions, amounting to $996.8 million for 2020 and $725.4 million for 2021, and encourages international partners to give priority to the States concerned and their specialized agencies in the implementation of the programmes identified. With regard to the security situation, we welcome the improvement of the situation in the Liptako-Gourma region as a result of the ongoing operations by the G-5 Sahel Joint Force aimed at cutting off the various supply channels for armed terrorists and organized-crime groups. However, security threats remain a great concern, and we condemn the increase in terrorist attacks against the defence and security forces and the growing intercommunal violence provoked by local armed groups as well as terrorist groups.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1126 (2020) · source

  39. The Secretary-General’s report also highlights the deterioration of the humanitarian situation, which aggravates the fragility of the G-5 Sahel States and the living conditions of the populations affected. Indeed, in 2020, some 31.4 million Sahelians are unfortunately in need of assistance and protection, while the effects of the coronavirus disease, food insecurity, climate change and floods have complicated the situation. In this context, we welcome the ministerial round table on the Central Sahel — Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger — held in Copenhagen on 20 October and co-organized by the United Nations, Denmark, the European Union and Germany, on the humanitarian crisis in this region.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1126 (2020) · source

  40. We therefore welcome all efforts to establish a facility to coordinate financing to Sahelian entities, which remains a guarantee of success for all our actions on the ground. With regard to the implementation of the priority investment programme, by way of illustration we can cite a pilot cross-border cooperation initiative, the Integrated Territorial Development Project, between the municipalities of the Sahel (Burkina Faso), Timbuktu (Mali) and Tillabéri (Niger) regions, which are home to 5.5 million inhabitants. The initiative is planned for a period of one year and financed to the tune of 1 billion CFA francs ($1.8 million) by the West African Economic and Monetary Union.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1126 (2020) · source

  41. It remains clear that in the Sahel the priority investment programme remains important and is the relevant framework for urgently needed action. Its implementation must therefore continue to be a priority, just as it must remain the channel through which international support must be provided, giving priority to local skills and enterprises. In order to do this, two priorities seem fundamental to us: financing quick- impact projects based on private-sector involvement, in a spirit of collaboration with the decentralized authorities, and targeting border regions so that the job opportunities created provide a credible alternative to the recruitment of young people by armed groups. This is why the A3+1 insisted on taking into account local content through resolution 2531 (2020).

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1126 (2020) · source

  42. In this context, we stress the need for a holistic approach involving political, security and socioeconomic development actions that can lead to lasting peace and stability in the region. Furthermore, we believe that this cannot be achieved without addressing the root causes of terrorism in the Sahel. In this regard, the A3+1 welcome the foresight of the G-5 Sahel authorities, which led to the adoption in 2016 of a security and development strategy whose implementation is based on a priority investment programme and focuses on governance, resilience, security and infrastructure. It consists of a portfolio of 40 structuring projects with a total value of nearly €2 billion, 13 per cent financed by member States. Its first phase began in 2019 and will be completed in 2021.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1126 (2020) · source

  43. Before getting to the heart of the matter, I would like to welcome the fact that this time around, the report under consideration (S/2020/1074) has taken into account the perspectives emanating from the G-5 Sahel Joint Force, which is the report’s main subject. This has undoubtedly been made possible through increased collaboration and information-sharing with countries and relevant actors on the ground. The Sahel region is facing multiple and multifaceted challenges with devastating consequences for States and their populations. The nexus between development and security is clearly established in this region, where these phenomena interact with each other in a feedback-loop effect.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1126 (2020) · source

  44. On behalf of the Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa and Tunisia (the A3+1), I would like to express our sincere thanks to Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, for his excellent briefing and his sustained commitment to the stabilization of the Sahel. We also thank the Permanent Representative of Mali, Mr. Issa Konfourou, for his participation in today’s briefing on behalf of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel), Ambassador Robert Keith Rae, Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, and Mr. Koen Vervaeke, Managing Director for Africa at the European External Action Service.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1126 (2020) · source

  45. That is certainly why notable progress is being made on the political front, with the launch of discussions, on the military front, with a ceasefire agreement that is more or less holding up and on the economic front, with the collegial management of revenues from oil, whose production has been significantly ramped up. It is high time that we left it up to Libyans to discuss their country’s destiny among themselves. We should let them stop fighting and start debating.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1129 (2020) · source

  46. What is even more worrying is that there are currently more than 70,885 confirmed cases, including 970 deaths. In that context, special attention should be given to the situation of African migrants in detention camps, who are often used as fighters or human shields by the various armed groups in the country. It is regrettable that despite that real danger, more than 11,000 people have been returned to Libya and are at risk of being exposed to human rights violations, detention, abuse, trafficking and exploitation, as has been documented by the United Nations. I would like to end with an expression of hope. Today we sense that Libyans, like their supporters, have realized that military options will not work.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1129 (2020) · source

  47. At the economic level, the serious consequences of the conflict have led to a deterioration in living conditions and reduced Libya’s once-legendary ability to provide other aspects, beyond basic social services, that foster the development of its population. The fall in oil production has been a major contribution to that issue. We therefore welcome the fact that all petroleum facilities have reopened and that according to the National Oil Corporation, production has increased and now stands at 1 million barrels a day. We hope that the resumption of normal oil production will serve to meet the urgent needs of Libyans across the country.We remain concerned about the humanitarian situation in Libya. The coronavirus disease pandemic continues to wreak havoc across a country where the violence has also damaged the health-care infrastructure.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1129 (2020) · source

  48. We call on the Libyan parties concerned to fully implement the ceasefire agreement, respect international humanitarian law and continue efforts to achieve concrete results through political, economic and military dialogues, in line with resolution 2510 (2020). The Niger is also encouraged by the announcement regarding the organization of elections in December 2021. We call on the international community, and the United Nations in particular, to take early measures to support the electoral process, which will undoubtedly constitute an important milestone on the path to normalizing the situation in Libya. In respect of the belligerents, we believe that true legitimacy is obtained through the ballot box and not through external alliances, which cannot replace the dialogue among the daughters and sons of Libya.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1129 (2020) · source

  49. We are encouraged by the efforts and determination shown by Libyans during the recent consultations of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission in Ghadames regarding the implementation of the 23 October ceasefire agreement. That is a decisive step towards the stabilization of Libya, but one that will be a genuine sign of progress only if accompanied by the departure of foreign forces and the cessation of external interference. The Niger welcomes the creation by the Secretariat of an inter-agency planning team for Libya with a view to supporting the implementation of the prospective ceasefire monitoring mechanism in an integrated and timely manner.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1129 (2020) · source

  50. My delegation would like to reiterate its appreciation for the tangible efforts of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and its Head, Ms. Stephanie Williams, as well as neighbouring countries and regional organizations, in particular the African Union, the League of Arab States and the European Union, in promoting peaceful dialogue. The rounds of talks held in Morocco between the Libyan delegations of the High Council of State based in Tripoli and the Parliament based in Tobruk, as well as the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum convened in Tunis, are to be welcomed, as they have contributed greatly to instigating the current positive momentum.

    2020-11-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1129 (2020) · source