YouSaid · the spoken record

Adeniji

lines on the record: 44
first: 2001-06-28
most recent: 2005-10-13
sittings or episodes: 2
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Nevertheless, we hope that this time, with the collaboration of all concerned, with the great involvement of ECOWAS and the AU and, of course, the United Nations, we are optimistic that the story will be different. What is important at this stage is that the Security Council demonstrate the sense of urgency that has characterized the speed with which, at the African level, ECOWAS and the AU Peace and Security Council - even at the level of heads of State or Government - have been able to get together to do their own part at this preliminary stage in the resolution of the crisis in C6te d'Ivoire.”
2005-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5278 (2005) · source
“In conclusion, it is needless to say that the clock is ticking towards the 30 October date and there are many steps to be taken on the ground in cote d'Ivoire, not only to enable us who are present to have all the parties in Cote d'Ivoire accept the decision of the Peace and Security Council - a decision which will hopefully be endorsed by the United Nations Security Council - but also to be able to make a firm commitment for the decision's implementation, as that is really a key issue in Cote d'Ivoire. We are not short of agreements - we have had a series of agreements on the Cote d'Ivoire situation, to which all the main parties have subscribed - but when it comes to the implementation stage, this is another story.”
2005-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5278 (2005) · source
“Now, please believe me, speaking as a former Special Representative of the Secretary-General, that this is far too low a number for the level required if a credible disarmament in C6te d'Ivoire is desired. Thus, the AU expects and hopes that this United Nations Security Council's resolution on the AU Peace and Security Council's report, which Mr. Djinnit will succinctly, but in some detail, present to you, will be adopted quickly so that between now and the end of October we can put all the structures into place that will be absolutely essential for the post- 30 October governance of the country. We hope that this same resolution will include a firm commitment on the increase of ONUCI.”
2005-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5278 (2005) · source
“I should like, however, to call attention to one important aspect of the decision that concerns the request of the AU Peace and Security Council to the United Nations Security Council - a request which is not being made for the first time, I daresay - to consider a substantial increase in the strength of the United Nations Operation in C6te d'Ivoire (ONUCI). That request is particularly germane in a period which is fast approaching when it is envisaged and hoped that we will witness increased activities in Cote d'Ivoire, linked to the disbanding and disarmament of the militias and, not least, the conduct of free, fair, transparent and credible presidential elections in C6te d'Ivoire. The current authorized troop level of ONUCI is, I believe, just over 7,000.”
2005-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5278 (2005) · source
“The recommendations of ECOWAS were, by and large, the basis for the adoption of its own decision by the Peace and Security Council at the 6 October meeting, but I will not elaborate on those recommendations. However, the result of the summit of the AU Peace and Security Council is, of course, what the AU delegation has brought to submit formally to the Council this afternoon, in accordance with paragraph 14 of the Peace and Security Council's communique that reads "Decides to submit this decision to the United Nations Security Council to obtain its support (S/2005/639, Annex). That decision, and a brief synthesis of its main points, I shall leave to the Commissioner for Peace and Security, Mr. Djinnit, to present to you very succinctly.”
2005-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5278 (2005) · source
“The Peace and Security Council underlined the need to review the situation in C6te d'Ivoire before 30 October 2005, and requested ECOWAS to convene urgently at the summit level to assess the situation and report thereon at a meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council to be convened urgently at the summit level to consider the matter and decide accordingly. Thus, in view of the urgency of the issue, ECOWAS convened an Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government on 30 September 2005, in Abuja, to consider the situation in C6te d'Ivoire and the developments that would have to be put in place post-30 October. The ECOWAS Summit made far- reaching recommendations that were submitted to a meeting of the Peace and Security Council, which itself was held within a week of the Abuja Summit, on 6 October 2005.”
2005-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5278 (2005) · source
“During the course of its deliberations, the Peace and Security Council received a report from President Thabo Mbeki, the Mediator, who also happened to be the Chairman of the Council for that month. After that very clear and lengthy expose, the Peace and Security Council expressed concern that, notwithstanding the tireless efforts of the AU Mediator, the Ivorian parties had not demonstrated the necessary political will for the full implementation of the agreements reached on the outstanding issues, particularly the dismantling and disarmament of the militias, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes and the creation of conditions for the holding of free, fair and transparent elections.”
2005-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5278 (2005) · source
“Obviously, considerable progress has been made in the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis, Accra and Pretoria agreements during the mediation period of the South African President. Notwithstanding the progress, when it started to become clear that the transition period - which was expected to end with the holding of elections on 30 October 2005 - could not be completed, it became urgently necessary to consider how to manage the post- 30-October arrangements. Thus, at the initiative of President Obasanjo, Chairman of the African Union, a meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council at the level of heads of State or Government was convened in New York at the margins of the General Assembly on 14 September 2005.”
2005-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5278 (2005) · source
“That situation and the need for anticipatory actions to avert a catastrophe that could set back the entire West African region by several years, if not decades, account for the flurry of activities - one phase of which is culminating in the appearance before the Council today of an AU delegation that I have the privilege to lead. This Council is well aware of the commendable efforts and the significant resources that the South African President, acting on the authority of the African Union, has devoted to the peace process in Cote d'Ivoire in the past nine months or so. Both ECOWAS and the African Union have paid well- deserved tributes to President Thabo Mbeki.”
2005-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5278 (2005) · source
“It is a subject with regard to which we have witnessed, alternately, periods of great expectation and periods of great anxiety - anxiety for Africa in general, but particularly for the West African region, whose States, because of their proximity to cote d'Ivoire and their strong economic and cultural links, are very vulnerable to the effects of developments in that country. Today, as over the past few weeks, Cote d'Ivoire is witnessing one of the cyclical periods of anxiety. But this time it is potentially explosive, in particular because of the impossibility of meeting the deadline for the transition phases envisaged in the Linas- Marcoussis Agreement.”
2005-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5278 (2005) · source
“I would like first of all to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. I would also like to thank you and the other members of the Council for having given me this opportunity to address you on the peace process in C6te d'Ivoire. This is an issue which has repeatedly appeared on the agenda of the Council in the past two years, and one that has been a source of great preoccupation to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU).”
2005-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5278 (2005) · source
“But these are all essential ingredients in ensuring a lasting peace in Sierra Leone, so we hope that donors will not show any fatigue at this stage of the process, and that the response to the campaign to launch the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be not only adequate but also prompt, so that, as has been said here by several speakers, the Commission and the Special Court, which are meant to assist the people of Sierra Leone in addressing the events of the past and therefore in being able to look forward to a life of national reconciliation and national forgiveness, can be put in place. One must certainly not be at the expense of the other, and one must certainly not be far away from the other.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“I think it was put there because of the record on raising resources for issues that concern human rights by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. I think it is a task that is taken very, very seriously. What is required, of course, is support and encouragement for the High Commissioner by donors, as set out in the concluding part of the tenth report of the Secretary-General on UNAMSIL. The Secretary-General, of course, recognized the fact that many calls are being made on the resources of donors for the peace process.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“We are now ensuring that adequate information is provided to disarmed combatants in the disarmament and demobilization camps before they are finally demobilized, during the four-week period or whatever other period they choose to stay: all the information about the options that are available to them, so that once they are demobilized and go back to their villages, they can make up their minds about precisely which reintegration projects they want to enter. The last question that was asked - I believe by the representative of Colombia - was whether it was the duty of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to collect funds for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. That is what exists in the enabling instrument for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“There had been something of a lacuna in the past between what was available on the one hand and knowledge on the part of disarmed combatants about the availability of such facilities on the other. But that has been addressed through a joint effort by the secretariat of the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“The children are given counselling to let them know that they no longer belong to fighting forces, but that they are now normal children, and to help them readjust to their new status as normal children. They receive psycho-social counselling; they also receive educational support. In fact, most of them indicate that their one ambition is to go, or go back, to school. The arrangements are made by the Child Protection Network, in collaboration with the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation. The National Commission also helps ensure that school facilities are provided for them. The next question concerned information on reintegration programmes for ex-combatants.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“That is why great emphasis is being placed on reintegration programmes, and that is why it is absolutely essential that those reintegration programmes be well funded: in order to make sure that ex-combatants are equipped for a productive, useful life in the future, a life which would contribute not only to their own sustenance and that of their families, but to the overall development of Sierra Leone. A question was raised about the fate of child combatants. Just as reintegration programmes are being developed for adult combatants, so also in the case of child combatants. As a matter of fact, once those child combatants are delivered by the fighting forces, they are taken to centres which are run by various humanitarian agencies. These agencies have formed a group called the Sierra Leone Child Protection Network.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“While that has not yet reached an alarming state, particularly because of the numbers involved in the disarmament process - just about a quarter of the total declared number of combatants who have to be disarmed - nevertheless the alarm has to be sounded right now, from the beginning, that the greatest danger that could result from disarmed combatants who are just left on their own is certainly that of crime. They might take to criminal activity as a means of sustaining themselves.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Because of that, the number of weapons will not really be very great as compared with the number of combatants who were disarmed. Basically, our requirement for anyone to enter the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme is that he or she either must produce a personal weapon or must belong to a group that had used a group weapon - and that the group weapons must be produced along with the combatants who had used them. We intend to stick with that requirement, with some flexibility in some cases as we go along. With respect to the quality or the nature of the weapons that were submitted under the programme, I would say that they range from personal weapons, to machine guns, to mortars, to artillery weapons, and even to anti-aircraft guns. A question was also raised about the possibility of crime among ex-combatants.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Mr. Adeniji: Thank you very much, Mr. President, for your comments, and I thank members of the Security Council and those who have been invited by the Council to participate in this open meeting for the comments they have made. As I said earlier, the support of the Security Council has been very instrumental in bringing us to where we are today. A few questions were posed, and I will try to quickly answer those questions. Several questions were posed by the representative of Norway. One was on the quantity of weapons that have been collected as compared with the number of disarmed combatants. I think it should be borne in mind that the weapons that were collected represented both the personal weapons of combatants and group weapons: weapons that were used by a group of combatants, not just by individuals.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“But with some degree of foresight on our part, and with a lot of push by the Force Commander, a device had been worked out whereby we have a permanent rotating presence in Kono assured by part of the Bangladeshi contingent. I must say here that that presence 4 the presence of those two companies - made all the difference in the manner in which Kono, which everyone had thought was taboo and a no-go area, had been handled.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Despite the problem of their small numbers - which we still have, because the expansion that the Council accorded to UNAMSIL recently has really not been translated physically on the ground, and we are still awaiting the Pakistani battalions - the troops on the ground, under the very capable and inspired leadership of the Force Commander, Lieutenant-General Daniel Opande, whom I have the pleasure of having with me here for this briefing session, have been willing to exert themselves, perhaps sometimes beyond the call of duty. This is what has enabled us to handle the Kono incident in the way that it was handled, because we really do not have a deployment as such in Kono. It was not part of our deployment plan at this time, because of the lack of troops. This is the area we have reserved for the additional troops that were coming.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Finally, may I express my appreciation for the continued support which members of this Council have always given to UNAMSIL, even in the darkest days, as it were, of the Mission. I think that the unflinching support of the Council gave a lot of courage not only to UNAMSIL but also to the people of Sierra Leone to persist in the efforts which have led us to where we are now. May I also express particular appreciation to the countries that have contributed troops on the ground.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“With the continuing consensus by all sections of Sierra Leonean society, including the RUF, as to the value of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, we in UNAMSIL have been making intensified efforts for the establishment of that Commission. The High Commissioner for Human Rights and I, as selection coordinators, have advanced in the process of identifying the commissioners. I do hope that the relatively modest amount that will be required for the operation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be quickly donated so that the Commission can commence operations as fast as possible. It is certainly desirable, as many Sierra Leoneans have expressed, that priority of operation should be given to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This priority is the desire of many Sierra Leoneans.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“In conclusion, at a time when there is a general feeling of the dawn of peace in Sierra Leone, it is heartening to note the commencement of the demonstration of this period of reconciliation and national healing. The experiment of lodging together disarmed RUF and CDF combatants in the same DDR facility was spontaneously repeated by the two groups in Kono, when, in what they termed a gesture of the feeling that the war is over, according to them, these two opposing groups received each other in their reciprocal camps in visits which they called overnight visits of brotherhood. The Government of Sierra Leone, and the President personally, are in the forefront of promoting this process of reconciliation. UNAMSIL, as indicated in the report of the Secretary-General, has been playing a leading role also.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“There are many doubts as to the feasibility of that date. Besides, the Government's vision is silent on the issue of the period after September and before the elections. These and other related issues - such as the nature of the electoral system to be adopted, assurance that a large segment of Sierra Leoneans, notably refugees and displaced persons, are not to be disenfranchised, linkage between the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme and elections - will all draw attention in the coming period. I hope that consultations will be held between us and ECOWAS and the Government of Sierra Leone, as has been the case.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Indeed, as I was told by the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Konare of Mali, and President Obasanjo of Nigeria, at their bilateral consultation in Abuja on 18 June, that both ECOWAS and UNAMSIL must henceforth be prepared to focus on political issues which, from the information that the two Presidents said was available to them, the RUF would begin to raise at subsequent meetings. The issues that would arise suddenly would concern the governance of the country after the expiration of the six-month extension of the Government on 30 September this year, the extent of the transition period before elections and the date of the elections. In the political vision announced by the Government of Sierra Leone, elections are to be held in December 2001 in accordance with the strategic plan of the National Electoral Commission.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“It would be totally incomprehensible if the international community were not able to provide the relatively modest amount that is required for this programme when that amount is compared with what is being spent on peacekeeping. The Sierra Leonean people would just not understand. So far, UNAMSIL has maintained a decision which it arrived at jointly with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Government of Sierra Leone as far back as November - when the first meeting was held, to agree on the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement - not to discuss political issues with the RUF. Since then, at the subsequent meetings, we have held to that position. The position was to ensure progress in the decisions of the first and second Abuja meetings. Given the present progress, it will become difficult to maintain that position.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Funds have to be available to provide the facilities for the programme; funds have to be available to take care of incentives for the combatants; and funds have to be available to assure provision of reintegration packages. In that context, therefore, the Security Council may wish to back up the efforts of the Secretary-General to encourage donors to take urgent follow-up steps to the Paris conference and for them to convey firm pledges to the Sierra Leone DDR trust fund, which is being managed by the World Bank. If the response is not quick enough, the Council, in my view, may be called upon for an alternative source of funding. UNAMSIL's increased role in the programme has placed it at centre court, to use a tennis expression during this week of Wimbledon.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programme, as emphasized in the tenth report of the Secretary-General, will run out of funds in August unless the $31 million in additional funding, which is required, starts coming into the World Bank's multi-donor trust fund. The donors' conference on the programme, which was convened in Paris on 11 and 12 June 2001, was encouraging in the unanimous applauding of the important strides that have been made. However, this, unfortunately, did not immediately result in definite financial pledges. It cannot be overemphasized that the greatest danger that could disrupt the progress currently being made is a mishandling of the DDR programme.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Of course, more will need to be done in recognition and encouragement of the present RUF leadership's demonstrated commitment to the peace process. In this connection, the Government of Sierra Leone will meet to devise ways of absorbing qualified elements of the RUF into other arms of Government besides the army. It will also need to start the release of the RUF elements other than the co-leadership, of course, who have been in detention since May 2000. In addition, the Government will have to take further measures to encourage the transformation of the RUF into a political party, fully committed to making whatever contribution it can within the political setting. For its part, the international community will need to step up its support for the rapidly evolving peace process.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“The number of released today stands at 1,215. Of these, 1,062 were released by the RUF and 153 by the CDF. The expansion of Government authority throughout the country is being actively pursued, with the advice and support of UNAMSIL. The Mission has also continued to promote confidence-building measures in order to encourage Government functionaries, including ministers, to go to areas which, up until the present time, have been under the domination of the RUF, and vice versa. This has considerably reduced mutual suspicion and virtually stopped the RUF's questioning of the authority of the Government. For its part, the Government has begun to make concrete gestures, such as the process that will lead to the recruitment of some RUF combatants into the Sierra Leone army.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Most of the roads in the country have been reopened and are free of security- related roadblocks, hitherto erected by the RUF and the CDF. This has considerably improved humanitarian access and the resumption of humanitarian operations by agencies and organizations. On 26 June, a multidisciplinary team, led by UNAMSIL, and composed of representatives of United Nations agencies and the Sierra Leone National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, conducted an assessment of the humanitarian needs in the Kono and Kailahun districts, even in advance of the disarmament programme in those areas. This is indicative of the forward planning that the general improvement within the country has made possible. The release of child combatants and other abducted children, including females, has also continued.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Thus, I envisage the formal commencement of the disarmament programme in Kono, as well as in Bonthe, on 1 July. Meanwhile, in the course of this month of June, we have continued the final phase of disarmament in the Port Loko district, which, again, had to be delayed, because no camp was available in which to keep the combatants. As of yesterday, the total figure of disarmed combatants since the relaunching of the programme on 18 May stands at 6,342, which consists of 2,004 RUF, 4,210 CDF and 128 remnants of the Sierra Leonean army and the Armed Forces Ruling Council. Considerable progress has also been made in other aspects of the peace process, which thus strengthens the general perception in Sierra Leone that peace is at last in sight.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“It has thrown out of gear the plan that the secretariat of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration had made. The decision of the joint tripartite committee of the Government of Sierra Leone, the RUF and UNAMSIL, at its meeting of 2 June, to commence disarmament in the Kono district, and to associate with Kono the Bonthe district for the CDF, had to be in response to that development, which as I said, was unforeseen. The delay in the implementation is clear evidence that the disarmament programme has become, one could say, a victim of its own successful relaunching. With disarmament in Kono not envisaged until towards the end of the whole programme, no facility for the programme exists in Kono, or even near Kono. It is now being constructed and should be ready in a couple of days, on 30 June.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“It also created a secure corridor for a possible overland return of Sierra Leonean refugees from Guinea, whose plight, of course, had been of serious concern to the international community, with various plans being proposed, none of which, unfortunately, ever worked. Fifthly, and lastly - and this was one of the consequences that neither I nor any of my colleagues in UNAMSIL had foreseen - the success of the Kambia operation precipitated the unexpected urge of Sierra Leoneans in the other border area of Sierra Leone with Guinea - that is, in the Kono district - to wish to return immediately to their own districts. This has since occasioned the leapfrogging of the disarmament programme into the Kono district.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Thirdly, the presence of an arm of Government such as the army in the Kambia district, for the first time since the RUF occupied that area about four years ago, was to represent a major step in the extension of the Government's authority. Fourthly, these three earlier reasons for going into Kambia were intended to address a subregional dimension of the Sierra Leone conflict. In accordance with the plan, the removal of the RUF and deployment of the Sierra Leone army ensured the security of the Sierra Leone-Guinea border in that area. It thus removed one of the flashpoints in the Mano River Union conflict.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“The uneventful deployment of the Sierra Leone army justified my insistence that it could be done without what, in retrospect, could have been a very, very bloody battle with unpredictable results. That had been the plan: to send the newly trained Sierra Leone army against the RUF. I opposed that, because I thought that the new Sierra Leone army was very much untried and untested and that it would be a very sad mistake to expose them in that way. We then found, when we went to Kambia to disarm the RUF, that in fact the numbers of RUF combatants in that district had been so grossly underestimated that, sadly, there would have been disastrous consequences.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“The CDF - the other militia group, which is allied to the Government of Sierra Leone - whose turnout at the beginning on 18 May was rather lacklustre and was a disappointment to us - obviously felt challenged when they heard, from their own leaders whom I had taken with me to witness the disarmament of the RUF, how the RUF had turned out and how they had disarmed and carried out the exercise. Thereafter, they took the programme seriously. Secondly, the deployment of the Sierra Leone army in Kambia after the evacuation by UNAMSIL of the disarmed RUF forces was to stop RUF incursions into Guinea, which had provoked massive retaliatory attacks by Guinea.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“The operation was to commence on 18 May and was to last 10 days, and it was to be followed immediately by the deployment of the new Sierra Leone army in Kambia. Permit me to dwell a little on the significance of the agreement concerning Kambia and its successful implementation. Kambia was deliberately chosen in order to tackle several problems at the same time - to kill several birds with one stone. First, on disarmament, it was to be the first positive proof that the RUF genuinely meant their commitment to that programme; they had assured us and UNAMSIL all along that they were deeply committed to it. The turnout and disarmament of RUF combatants in the Kambia district on 18 May - beginning with the brigade commander himself, whom I personally disarmed - was indeed an impressive show of commitment.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“The combination of those activities and consultations carried out by UNAMSIL, which included the delicate consultations on Kambia, resulted in such positive trends and signals that I considered it appropriate to commence the process which ultimately led to the holding of the review meeting on 2 May 2001 at Abuja, which we now refer to as "Abuja II". In line with the decisions taken at that meeting, UNAMSIL, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF met again, in Freetown, on 15 May 2001 to discuss the details of the practical implementation of the resumption of the process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Modalities for the commencement of the simultaneous disarmament of the RUF and the Civil Defence Force (CDF) in the Kambia and Port Loko districts were agreed upon.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Happily, in View of the fact that they were enjoying the benefits of the cessation of hostilities, which continued to hold, neither the Government of Sierra Leone nor the RUF was anxious to resume generalized armed conflict, notwithstanding the fact that several other provisions of the Abuja Agreement had not been implemented by the end of the 30 days. Throughout this lull, UNAMSIL continued to work closely with the Government of Sierra Leone. It also intensified its contacts at several levels with the RUF, aimed at building mutual confidence, exploring ways to ensure progress on the provisions of the Abuja Agreement, and making a realistic assessment of the intentions of the RUF. That period also enabled UNAMSIL to build up the strength of its troops from the low level it hit after the withdrawal of two contingents.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“I shall recall what I said on the last occasion I addressed the Council in relation to the Ceasefire Agreement signed at Abuja on 10 November 2000 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). I said on that occasion that the Agreement encompassed not only undertakings relating to the cessation of hostilities, but also other important elements, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, which obviously required more time than the 30 days stipulated for the review of the Agreement.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source
“Mr. Adeniji: It is a great pleasure to be appearing before the Security Council today. The Council has been meeting under your able direction, Mr. President, during a month of momentous activity. My appearance, of course, is in connection with the presentation of the tenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), document 8/2001/627. Since my last opportunity to brief the Council on UNAMSIL, on 14 February 2001, the Sierra Leone peace process has witnessed changes that are remarkable both in magnitude and in pattern of development. A detailed account is contained in the Secretary-General's report.”
2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source