YouSaid · the spoken record

African Integration and Chadians Abroad of Chad

lines on the record
12
first
2021-05-18
most recent
2021-05-18
sittings or episodes
1
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. “All that the G-5 Sahel lacks are the means to carry out its security and development activities, namely, thorough and sustained international support to achieve its objectives, for the good of Africa and humankind. Finally, I would like to express my warm congratulations and thanks to the President of the Security Council for holding this meeting. We will undoubtedly have to continue these exchanges in order to assess the progress made in the implementation of our respective commitments.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  2. “In order to accelerate the implementation of the development and security strategy, the G-5 Sahel has also adopted an integrated priority action framework, the objective of which is to enable the identification of rapid, realistic, measurable and f lexible actions to be carried out on the security and development fronts in priority fragile areas and then extended to the humanitarian, governance and reconciliation spheres. That means that the G-5 Sahel has a comprehensive range of short-, medium- and long-term projects, programmes and actions, identified by our States and based on our realities on the ground, aimed at lifting the Sahel out of the current crisis situation and effectively addressing the root causes that contribute to it.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  3. “It simply needs substantial support. The only option to provide the support it requires is through the establishment of a support office, financed by compulsory contributions from Member States. Of course, there is no purely military solution to the Sahel crisis. There is also the development component, which constitutes the other pillar of the G-5 Sahel, and its implementation must be accelerated. Since its creation, the G-5 Sahel has had in place a strategy for development and security based on four strategic axes: defence and security, governance, infrastructure and resilience and human development. Those axes are broken down into a priority investment programme.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  4. “The terrorists will exploit any loopholes in the ranks of the international community and build strength with all manner of new recruits, including from criminal organizations and terrorists fleeing from elsewhere. Moreover, the persistence of terrorist attacks demonstrates the resilience of terrorists and their ability to take the initiative in the face of the slightest weakness, absence or inaction on the part of States and their partners. In that struggle, lasting security requires the military defeat of the terrorist core group in order to restore security. Without the defeat of the terrorists, any other non-military action will not have the desired effect. The Joint Force is ready to achieve that objective, which is expected of it by its populations, the States of the region and the international community.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  5. “As noted in the Secretary-General’s report, significant progress has been made in terms of implementation in that regard. The States members of the G-5 Sahel remain committed to the full implementation of the compliance framework and will spare no effort in further strengthening respect for human rights, the protection of civilians and the integration of gender issues in the actions of the Joint Force in particular and the G-5 Sahel in general. We are at a pivotal juncture. The questions, hesitations and prevarications of our partners will unfortunately serve only to give the terrorists respite and strengthen them, as they are observing and noting the lack of action. That will encourage the terrorists to believe that the efforts of States and the international community are failing to eradicate the scourge.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  6. “Given the major limitations of the existing mechanisms for supporting the Joint Force, the most appropriate and effective option remains the creation of a logistical and operational support office, financed by compulsory contributions from Member States. The support office would enable the Joint Force to definitively resolve the issue of sustainable, predictable funding so that it could focus its full attention on the fight against terrorism in order to restore security, stability and peace and create the conditions for much-needed sustainable socioeconomic development in the region. Of course, the Joint Force will continue to pursue full respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, in accordance with the compliance framework and the due diligence policy.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  7. “As for the logistical support provided by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to the Joint Force within the framework of the technical arrangement, while it is a great contribution to the Force, its full implementation continues to suffer due to major difficulties, including the cost of transporting consumable items to battalions on the ground, as the Joint Force does not have its own logistical means to do so. Furthermore, due to its limited nature, MINUSMA support does not cover all of the essential needs of the battalions in the different time zones. Certain battalions in the eastern zone, for example, rarely have their requests fulfilled due to the various constraints linked to the nature of such support.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  8. “However, despite the progress made, the Joint Force is still facing challenges related to sustainable and predictable funding that hinder its full operationalization, thereby affecting the morale of the troops, as the Secretary-General eloquently noted in his report (S/2021/442). It is true that the Joint Force has benefited from the support of its partners within the framework of multilateral support to the Force and the national armies of the G-5 Sahel States. Unfortunately, it is also true that such support, although essential, remains uncertain. The voluntary contributions pledged by our partners are slow to materialize, meaning that the Force’s needs are far from being met in a timely manner.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  9. “The departure of mercenaries from Libya poses a risk of further deterioration for our countries, which could wipe out the gains made and thrust the subregion back into violence that is difficult to control. More conflict in the subregion will be detrimental to Africa as a whole. In order to prevent the African continent becoming a battlefield and a rear base for the international terrorist movement, it is essential to take control of the situation and defeat the terrorists in the Sahel. That is possible, and one of the tools at our disposal in that fight is the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel. By ramping up its capabilities, we can eradicate the terrorist threat in the Sahel and create the conditions for stability and harmonious and sustainable development in the region for the benefit of the whole of Africa.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  10. “Those mercenaries and fighters of all kinds have been ordered by the international community, in particular the Security Council, to leave Libya without adequate disarmament and support measures. That has exposed the neighbouring countries to the danger of coming into contact with those mercenaries and the tons of heavy armaments, as well as sophisticated military equipment, in their possession. That which has already occurred in Chad due to the incursion of mercenaries from Libya, resulting in the late Marshal Idriss Deby Itno being killed in action on 20 April, is a perfect illustration of what could happen anywhere in the Sahel if adequate accompanying measures are not urgently taken by the international community, in particular by the Security Council. It also shows how fragile the situation in the Sahel remains.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  11. “For example, since 2020, several operations have been carried out in the central time zone — the epicentre of terrorist attacks — in conjunction with Operation Barkhane partners, achieving satisfactory results. However, the security situation remains highly concerning. Terrorist attacks continue to plunge the national armed forces and civilian populations into mourning. Attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger have resulted in the deaths of more than 400 people since March. Moreover, the subregional security dynamic is undergoing developments that further exacerbate the already serious and complex security context in the G-5 Sahel region. I would like to touch on the departure of mercenaries and foreign fighters from Libya.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source

  12. “At the outset, I would like to congratulate the People’s Republic of China on its assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of May and to thank it for holding this meeting on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel). I also wish to thank Mr. Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations; Brigadier General Oumarou Namata, Commander of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force; and Ambassador Mohamed Fathi Ahmed Edrees, Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission, for their excellent briefings on the situation concerning the Joint Force and the G-5 Sahel in general. As mentioned by previous speakers, the Joint Force, which was created in 2017 by the G-5 Sahel Heads of State, has achieved some considerable and commendable successes, despite the multiple challenges it continues to face.”

    2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source