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Agyeman

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2022-01-05
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2023-12-29
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un-security-council

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  1. We appreciate the Mission’s efforts to build trust and social cohesion among the several ethnic communities in Kosovo and encourage open, transparent and inclusive engagement with all sectors of society as a means to ensure the durability of agreements reached in the political sphere. We also welcome the important initiatives under the women and peace and security and youth and peace and security agendas that seek to enhance the capacity of women and young people to meaningfully participate in the processes. In conclusion, I wish to reiterate our support for the collective efforts of the Security Council geared towards normalization between the two sides and the objective of peace in the region.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9155 (2022) · source

  2. The impasse on vehicle license plates must equally be addressed through practical measures. Ghana firmly believes that any normalization efforts and the pursuit of the legitimate aspirations of the two sides must be founded solely on the principles of international law, the values and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the path for a political solution set out in resolution 1244 (1999). To do otherwise, as the international community has become acutely aware, would upend the rules and norms of our international system that are critical to the maintenance of international peace and security. In our view, UNMIK’s mandate to promote security, stability and respect for human rights remains relevant as long as Kosovo is divided along ethnic lines.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9155 (2022) · source

  3. It is in that context that we welcome the discussions held on 18 August between the representatives of the two sides at the highest level and note the commitments made towards the de-escalation of tensions. We urge restraint from rhetoric and actions that are unhelpful to the course of peace and reiterate our call on both sides to recommit to the full implementation of their respective obligations under previous and future agreements to be reached in the context of the EU- facilitated dialogue. The flexibility of the parties and their readiness to make necessary compromises would be valuable to making progress in that regard. In the immediate term, the parties must resume the implementation of the energy road map in order to ensure the continued supply of energy for heating during the winter season, which is already upon us.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9155 (2022) · source

  4. The recent report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/739) highlights continuing political tensions between the Kosovo region and Serbia, which have stalled the further implementation of the agreements reached in the framework of the European Union (EU)- facilitated dialogue for the normalization of relations. We note with concern the unresolved issues pertaining to the freedom of movement, energy-supply challenges in northern Kosovo and the agitations regarding in-Kosovo voting during Serbia’s general elections held in April. Despite those contentions, we believe that dialogue at the highest political level, backed by the genuine commitment of the leaders to work through their differences, will positively impact the efforts for a peaceful and comprehensive resolution of the long- standing issues.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9155 (2022) · source

  5. At the outset, I would like to acknowledge the presence of His Excellency Mr. Nikola Selaković, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia, and thank him for his statement. My delegation is also grateful to Ms. Caroline Ziadeh, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), for her comprehensive briefing. We welcome her committed leadership of UNMIK in the performance of its stabilization mandate, pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999). We also take note of the contribution of Ms. Donika Gërvalla-Schwarz in this meeting.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9155 (2022) · source

  6. In conclusion, the A3 believes that strong political will and cooperation by the Malian authorities, together with deeper cooperation with regional actors and a united Council, is required to address the situation in Mali and bring lasting peace to our brotherly country.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9154 (2022) · source

  7. The Commission’s involvement in climate-related peace and development interventions, as well as in the promotion of community-based dispute resolution mechanisms is also encouraged. The A3 is alarmed by the deteriorating humanitarian situation, which is evidenced by the more than 1.8 million people facing severe food insecurity, with 2 million children under age five being affected by acute malnutrition. We therefore reiterate the Secretary- General’s call for the international community to step up its funding support to help realize the $686 million humanitarian response plan required for Mali in 2022.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9154 (2022) · source

  8. We therefore urge for coordinated action among the countries of the region on the matter, including on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities. Addressing the root causes of instability in Mali, as well as aggravating factors such as climate change and the coronavirus disease pandemic, is essential. We urge the elevation of the role of women and youth towards the sustenance of peace and development, including through the Peacebuilding Commission’s initiatives targeting youth, women and agricultural self-employment, as well as the strengthening of measures to empower and enhance their full and meaningful participation in all political processes.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9154 (2022) · source

  9. In a related development, we are concerned about the continuing detention in Mali since July of 46 Ivorian soldiers who we are told were deployed in support of a MINUSMA contingent. While the A3 welcomes the Malian authorities’ commitment to resolving the challenge, we appeal for an acceleration of the resolution of the matter. We support the Secretary- General’s call for all efforts to be made in building trust and cooperation between Mali and its neighbours and international partners. We also remain anxious concerning the spillover effect of the protracted crisis in Libya on Mali, the possible return of foreign terrorist fighters and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9154 (2022) · source

  10. The A3 believes that the strategic review of MINUSMA, which is expected in January 2023, will provide some comprehensive and forward-looking recommendations that can make the Mission more responsive to the evolving nature of conflicts in Mali. We believe the Mission could benefit from stronger support in troop contribution and capacity-building on counter-terrorism measures, as well as the provision of adequate logistics, including air- lift assets. It is also important for the Malian authorities to adhere to the status of forces agreement that they have committed to, and that should be done in a manner that enhances the coherence of objectives and actions for lasting peace in Mali. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Mali is equally important.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9154 (2022) · source

  11. The A3 unreservedly condemns yesterday’s attacks on MINUSMA in Tessalit, as well as all attacks on its personnel, and calls for swift investigations to ensure the prosecution of the perpetrators, given the fact that such acts constitute a violation of international law and international human rights law. If we are to ensure that MINUSMA’s presence has a greater impact on the situation in Mali, urgent steps need to be taken to address the myriad of challenges facing the Mission, including disinformation campaigns against it and restrictions on its movement, including in the air space, which are affecting the Mission’s response to early-warning alerts.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9154 (2022) · source

  12. We underscore the need for a more holistic approach, as envisaged in the ongoing work of the United Nations-AU-ECOWAS joint assessment in the Sahel. We look forward to an outcome of the joint assessment that can leverage the best elements of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Accra Initiative, the Nouakchott process and the Multinational Joint Task Force in responding robustly to the growing incidence of terrorism in the Sahel, including in Mali. The A3 also believes that the continuing presence of MINUSMA is an important stabilization factor in Mali. We salute the personnel who continue to sacrifice their lives to the cause of peace in Mali and pay tribute to those who have lost their lives in the line of duty.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9154 (2022) · source

  13. Additional steps must therefore be taken to generate capabilities under the force adaptation plan and to augment the troops in a manner that clearly responds to the actual political and security dynamics in the country. The heightened levels of insecurity are also linked to concerns about human rights violations. We encourage the Malian authorities to continue to cooperate with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to enable the Mission to conduct investigations into alleged incidents of human rights violations where necessary. The dire security situation in Mali reinforces the importance of adapting regional tools for response and forging a harmonized, multi-dimensional approach to dealing with the multiple crises.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9154 (2022) · source

  14. The evolving nature of the terrorist activities, including the increasing use of improvised explosive devices, has resulted in deadly attacks on civilians and civilian objects. The reconfiguration of international counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel, including the withdrawal of the French forces from Mali, has also created capability gaps. Furthermore, the decision by some of the troop-contributing countries to withdraw their troops by the close of the year could worsen the situation. While we commend the Malian authorities for the steps taken to fill the gaps through an increased military presence in parts of the country — accompanied by the redeployment of the civilian administration and the adoption of a stabilization strategy and action plan for the central regions — challenges still remain.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9154 (2022) · source

  15. Support for sustaining such processes is essential, as it will help consolidate the gains made so far and accelerate progress towards the realization of the 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Mali. Despite those positive developments, Mali is not out of the woods yet. The A3 urges for the firm and timely implementation of the peace agreement. We encourage stronger political will on the part of the Malian authorities to make good on their commitments. We support close monitoring in that regard by the local monitoring committee, made up of representatives of the African Union (AU), ECOWAS and the United Nations. With regard to the security situation, we remain concerned about the heightened threats posed by the expanding terrorist groups and growing intercommunal violence in Mali.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9154 (2022) · source

  16. On the political front, we welcome the agreement reached between Mali and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on the transitional timetable for elections to be held in March 2024, as well as the adoption and promulgation of the Electoral Law and the elaboration of a new constitution. Support by the international community for the implementation of the commission created in July to monitor the timetable for political and institutional reforms is essential if constitutional order is to be restored in Mali in a transparent and inclusive manner. The convening of the high-level decision-making meeting in August is also a significant development, as it has created an atmosphere conducive to reconciliation — a necessary ingredient for the consolidation of peace in Mali.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9154 (2022) · source

  17. I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the three African members of the Security Council — Gabon, Kenya and my own country, Ghana (A3). We welcome the report of the Secretary-General (S/2022/731) and thank Special Representative of the Secretary-General El-Ghassim Wane for his briefing. We also welcome the presence of His Excellency Mr. Abdoulaye Diop, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali, at today’s meeting. Since the Security Council was last briefed on the situation in Mali, three months ago (see S/PV.9061), significant developments have taken place in the country, including on the political front. While we acknowledge some gains in addressing the crisis there, the political, security and humanitarian situations remain challenging.

    2022-10-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9154 (2022) · source

  18. For once, the parties need to prove to the international community that, notwithstanding their differences, they can prioritize the needs of the people they are seeking to govern. Their main preoccupation as they return to the negotiation table should therefore not only be limited to the extension of the truce, but should be geared towards a nationwide ceasefire as a prelude to negotiations towards a comprehensive and durable political solution spearheaded by Yemenis, with the support of the international community.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  19. We commend all stakeholders that have made contributions to enable the first phase of the operation to commence and call for expedited action by the United Nations and all those involved in the process in order to avert a humanitarian and environmental disaster. Another positive development is the generous contributions of the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America in order to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen so as to enable it to continue its monitoring and inspection role with regard to commercial and bilateral assistance cargo destined to the Red Sea ports in Yemen. In conclusion, we entreat the parties to be flexible and to make the necessary concessions in order to renew the truce agreement, in the interest of all Yemenis.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  20. That unfortunate development continues to bring immense suffering and hardship to the people of Taiz and the affected governorates, whose access to essential supplies have been unfairly limited for years. We call on the parties, particularly the Houthis, to take immediate steps towards lifting the siege in order to help ease the suffering of the affected people. In the midst of the current uncertainty in Yemen, we are pleased to note that there is a glimmer of light at the end of the tunnel, as the needed funding goal for the first phase of the controlled dismantling of the FSO SAFER oil tanker has been reached.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  21. It is our hope that much of the country’s population, who have been pushed into poverty, hunger and desperation over the past eight years, will be allowed to enjoy the dividends of the expired truce that was beginning to return dignity to them through the gradual restoration of some basic services and the steady return of economic activities, including increased fuel availability and the rise in the number and frequency of commercial flights into and out of Yemen, among other things. It is regrettable that the continuing blockage of roads into and out of the city of Taiz remains one of the main sticking points of negotiations to extend the truce. The curtailment of the right of civilians to move freely in a safe and secure manner through the blockage of the main roads linking the city with other parts of Yemen is unacceptable.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  22. We are deeply concerned that, notwithstanding the lull in hostilities, landmines continue to pose a serious threat — not only to the safety of civilians, but also to agricultural land, which unfortunately disrupts agricultural production and jeopardizes livelihoods and recovery efforts. We call for concerted global efforts to address the situation. While the lull in hostilities may have marginally boosted the country’s economy, the economic decline continues to afflict the people of Yemen.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  23. Those who have chosen to take this illegal action are reminded that they will be held to account for targeting humanitarian workers and impeding the delivery of humanitarian assistance, which runs counter to international human rights and humanitarian laws. Equally concerning are the risks that misinformation and disinformation campaigns continue to pose to such workers in Yemen. We call for more discussions and exchanges within humanitarian organizations, as well as awareness-raising programmes among civilian populations on humanitarian and human rights laws in order to help bridge the knowledge gap so as to help deter such a menace. As highlighted in today’s briefing, the danger posed by explosive remnants of war in Yemen, particularly in Al-Hudaydah, remains high.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  24. On the humanitarian front, we call for continued international support to address the widespread food insecurity in Yemen, which puts part of the country’s population at high risk for famine. We acknowledge the recent support from the international community, including some members of the Security Council, but as Assistant Secretary-General Msuya pointed out in her briefing, more still needs to be done to help to bridge the humanitarian funding gap and ensure that food and other essential supplies reach all those in desperate need, particularly women and children. We also remain concerned about the fate of missing and detained humanitarian workers in the country and want to use this opportunity to call for information on their whereabouts and their immediate and unconditional release.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  25. In that regard, we call on the parties to be flexible and engage constructively in the spirit of compromise as they return to the negotiating table, even in dealing with contentious issues, such as the reopening of roads in Taiz and the payments of salaries of civil servants in Houthi-held areas, among others. Ahead of the renewal of the truce, any escalation of hostilities by the parties will not only reverse the marginal progress made in the past six months but will likely also exacerbate the humanitarian situation in the country and worsen the plight of many Yemenis. Even though there is currently no formal truce in place, we implore the parties to refrain from actions that may derail the relative calm and tranquillity that the people of Yemen have enjoyed in recent times.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  26. We therefore want to encourage the Special Envoy not to be daunted by the current setback, but to continue to be focused in his pursuit of peace for the benefit of all Yemenis. As we welcome the continuing engagement of the Government of Yemen with the Special Envoy in his quest to extend the truce, we note with regret the maximalist demands of the Houthis over the past days of the negotiations, which have unfortunately stalled efforts to renew the truce. It is imperative that the interests of ordinary Yemenis, who have endured a lot of hardship and suffering over the past seven years, reign supreme as the parties engage in the negotiations.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  27. The international community must therefore do everything within its power to get the parties to extend the truce agreement in order to forestall any possible return to military hostilities and their attendant consequences for civilian lives. Particularly, regional stakeholders with influence over the parties must leverage their relationships with the parties to facilitate an agreement as soon as practicable. We applaud the efforts of the Special Envoy, the entire United Nations team and all other stakeholders involved in the negotiation process. We know that change does not happen overnight, but with perseverance and dedication, a solution to the Yemeni crisis will be found.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  28. Let me begin by thanking Special Envoy Hans Grunberg and Assistant Secretary- General Joyce Msuya for their briefings. I also welcome the representatives of Yemen and Saudi Arabia to today’s meeting. As we consider the situation in Yemen, we deeply regret the inability of the parties to reach an agreement to extend the truce for six months as proposed by the Special Envoy. Rather than a historic step forward towards the consolidation and expansion of the truce, the people of Yemen now must dread the prospect of a return to the dark days of violence, and indiscriminate killings and the destruction of what is left of civilian infrastructure.

    2022-10-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9152 (2022) · source

  29. It is therefore important for the international community and donor partners to increase climate-financing support in order to help the continent to adapt and to address the menace in a sustainable manner. Ghana believes that climate-related security risks are evident in Africa and require total commitment at the national, regional and international levels to effectively build resilience in addressing the situation on the continent.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  30. It is important that we support the Fund in order to enable it to continue on that trajectory, while also encouraging synergies between such interventions and the overall approach to maintaining sustainable peace. In its collaboration with the peacebuilding arm of the United Nations, the Council should also sustain the whole-of-society approach, while paying attention to vulnerable groups such as women and young people in the process. I cannot conclude without mentioning the burning issue of climate financing. While the countries of Africa require about $2.8 trillion for the period 2020 to 2030 in order to implement their nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the annual climate financing flows in Africa is reported as being less than 5 per cent of global climate financing.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  31. In that regard, we note the international support for the Africa Multi-hazard Early Warning and Early Action Systems Situation Room for disaster risk reduction and believe that its further strengthening could aid in building capacities to forecast and proactively act on threats and develop resilience to climate-related security risks on the continent. Thirdly, the Council must enhance its collaborative arrangements with relevant United Nations entities in the peacebuilding sector doing commendable work through interventions aimed at addressing climate-related security threats. We are told that, since 2017, the Peacebuilding Fund has allocated $63.4 million to climate security-related projects in countries on the Council’s agenda.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  32. Also, the inclusion of the climate-security nexus in regionalized mandates, such as that of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, should be extended to other applicable missions in the light of the reality of the issue in the region and the continent at large. Secondly, in dealing with the climate and security agenda, the Council should encourage the strengthening of the capacity of regional and national actors to enhance early-warning systems and data-analysis capacities, which are critical for regional preventive action.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  33. As we explained earlier, there is a sufficient link between the climate and security crises, and the Council, as the primary organ for maintaining international peace and security, must embrace climate action in the resolution of conflicts where it is relevant and/or useful to do so. That is not to suggest that Security Council should engage in norm-setting for climate action, but rather that it should not be made to shy away from applying norms universally agreed under the UNFCCC. We therefore encourage the Council to continue with the existing practice of including language relating to climate security in country situations and peacekeeping-mission resolutions, where necessary. That practice has led to the creation of an Environmental Security Adviser position in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  34. African States contribute the least to increases in global greenhouse-gas emissions, yet they bear the greatest consequences of climate change. The twenty- seventh Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, to be held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, should therefore be a different Conference of the Parties — one where commitments made are translated into action. That would be, in our view, a real commitment to breaking the link between the climate and security nexus on the African continent. In furtherance of the climate and security agenda, we will share three main points. First, the Security Council should not be prevented from dealing with relevant aspects of the climate question.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  35. Therefore, while there may not be a harmonized view over the degree to which climate change leads to insecurity or whether, in situations of conflict, climate-change hazards are reinforced, we cannot continue to be in disagreement over the notion that, in seeking to resolve conflicts, climate risks, where relevant, have to be tackled as part of the peace efforts. As we confront a worsening ecological threat to the continent of Africa and its impact on social and political instability, we must harness available instruments, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032), in order to weaken the link between the two crises and abate its escalation into violence.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  36. As we see from the field, especially on the African continent, the two crises interact. In the Lake Chad region, for instance, where the lake has contracted by more than 90 per cent from its 1960 size, we are witnessing the threat-multiplier effect of climate change for peace and security, including on food and water insecurity, loss of livelihoods, climate-induced displacement and exacerbating vulnerabilities, tensions and conflict. Also, in a 2020 study, the ICRC confirmed what was repeated here today — that of the 25 countries deemed most vulnerable to climate change, 14 were in conflict. Moreover, more than half of the ongoing United Nations peace operations are in countries with the highest exposure to the effects of climate change.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  37. I wish to begin by thanking the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Gabon for convening this high-level debate on climate and security in Africa and for his statement. We welcome the statements of Assistant Secretary-General Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee and Mr. Tanguy Gahouma-Bekale, former Chair of the African Group of Negotiators on Climate Change. We also thank Mr. Patrick Youssef, Regional Director for Africa of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for his additional perspective. As a member of the Group of Friends on Climate and Security, we associate ourselves with the statement to be read out by the representative of Germany on behalf of the Group. The contention on the question of climate and security is one that, we believe, has to yield to emerging knowledge of the firm link between the two.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  38. The political will and commitment of Member States, including the Security Council, will continue to be essential in sustaining peace in Africa. We also heard renewed support for the permanent representation of Africa in a reformed Security Council. The time to move past words into action is now.

    2022-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9149 (2022) · source

  39. The role of women and young people in sustaining peace and development should be elevated. Fourthly, it is important for the cooperation between the two bodies to continue to harness the rich experiences built over the years in the area of preventive diplomacy and mediation. As we have consistently maintained, prevention is always better than curing, and early support for regional preventative measures would go a long way in maintaining international peace and security and in realizing the AU Silencing the Guns by 2030 initiative. In conclusion, Ghana believes that there is no better way to address the myriad security and development challenges in Africa than through the enhancement of home-grown interventions, coupled with deeper cooperation among the United Nations, the AU and other interregional arrangements.

    2022-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9149 (2022) · source

  40. Thirdly, in the light of the increasing incidents of terrorist attacks in many parts of the continent, we cannot approach our collective response to such threats in a business-as-usual manner. As the African Union proceeds with its implementation of the Malabo Declaration on Terrorism and Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa of 28 May 2022, it is important that the United Nations be a partner in that process. In this regard, it would be important that, in addressing terrorism and governance challenges on the continent, United Nations-African Union cooperation addresses the root causes of instability on the continent while also addressing the impact of climate change, the coronavirus disease pandemic and other aggravating geopolitical situations.

    2022-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9149 (2022) · source

  41. We are optimistic that the mandate of the Independent High- level Panel on Security, Governance and Development in the Sahel, which is undertaking that assessment, would emerge with a more sustainable approach to addressing the multidimensional crises in the region and on the continent at large. We encourage that such joint approaches be extended to the assessment of the performance of a number of peacekeeping missions on the continent that have yet to fully deliver on their expected objectives and mandates, while also focusing on resolving the concerns over predictability, sustainability, and flexibility of financing for African Union-led peace support operations.

    2022-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9149 (2022) · source

  42. First, we emphasize the need for consultations between the United Nations and the African Union to be deepened and for there to be proactive focus on reinforcing capacity for homegrown solutions to deal with the continent’s complex security challenges. In this regard, we urge that such consultations should, for instance, include support arrangements for the 2021-2025 workplan on the enhancement of the African Standby Force, which is soon due for submission to the African Union Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security. Secondly, we encourage the further implementation of joint briefings, missions and assessments on issues of peace and security on the continent, including the ongoing joint independent assessment of security and development in the Sahel led by the former President of the Niger, Mr. Mahamadou Issoufou.

    2022-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9149 (2022) · source

  43. We therefore underscore the importance of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter and the need to deepen the cooperation and partnership between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council across the peace continuum, from conflict prevention and peacekeeping to peacebuilding and sustaining peace, as well as the need to address the request for sustainable financing of AU-led peace support operations. To ensure the cooperation between the United Nations and the AU in furtherance of durable peace and security on the continent, we would want to highlight a few additional points.

    2022-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9149 (2022) · source

  44. In our determination to reverse the roll back of democracy in five countries on the continent, silence the guns in Africa and develop the resilience of many societies experiencing strain caused by climate change and other contexts that engender fragility, it is clear to us that while the African Union should take a leadership role on the basis of its normative frameworks for peace and security, and in terms of governance, the responsibility and support of the United Nations should not be curtailed and will continue to be critical.

    2022-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9149 (2022) · source

  45. Let me begin by thanking you, Mr. President, for your continuing leadership of the Security Council during this month’s Gabonese presidency. I also welcome the briefings by Secretary- General António Guterres and Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat at this important annual debate on cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union (AU). Strengthening the links of cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union is required to sustain peace and security on the continent, but also to address the multifaceted dimensions of the socioeconomic and other challenges that negatively affect Africa.

    2022-10-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9149 (2022) · source

  46. In that regard, we urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to refrain from further missile test launches and to take the urgent and necessary steps to ease tensions in the region. We also reiterate our call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to adhere to the relevant Security Council resolutions and resume constructive and credible dialogue with the relevant parties in a manner that recognizes regional and global security concerns. We hope that the Council and other relevant parties will be able to act in a manner that preserves the peace, while at the same time ensuring that the humanitarian needs of the people of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are addressed.

    2022-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9146 (2022) · source

  47. Reports that it has made preparations at its Punggye-ri nuclear test site, possibly for a seventh nuclear test, coupled with its claim to have advanced its development of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as its threat to use nuclear weapons if its national interests are threatened, are extremely worrisome and run contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Council must therefore make a unified call on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to take immediate, urgent and concrete steps to bring itself into compliance with its international obligations. At a time of such global fragility, the world can ill afford to have multiple crises.

    2022-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9146 (2022) · source

  48. It is particularly concerning that the launch was carried out in breach of several Security Council resolutions, without regard for aviation or maritime safety and without any warning, for that matter. Ghana is gravely concerned about and firmly deplores this current launch and others before it. Since the beginning of this year, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has significantly increased the frequency, types and delivery systems of the missiles it has launched.

    2022-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9146 (2022) · source

  49. I would like to begin by thanking Assistant Secretary-General Khaled Khiari for his briefing of the Security Council. Ghana continues to be concerned about the escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula and the wider North-East Asia region. Those renewed tensions have been occasioned by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s repeated missile launches over the past week, particularly its launch on 4 October of an intermediate-range ballistic missile that flew over Japan. The present missile launch — the first to follow such a trajectory since 2017 and the first weapon of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to reach such a distance — represents a clear escalation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s actions against its neighbours and against international peace.

    2022-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9146 (2022) · source

  50. In that regard, we encourage the early convening of the high-level in-person meeting between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Director-General of the OPCW, as it would help to revive efforts towards the final resolution of the issues. In conclusion, we wish to reiterate our call for enhanced engagement between the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the Syrian National Authority in order to address all outstanding issues, which constrain meaningful progress in the full implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) in a satisfactory manner.

    2022-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9141 (2022) · source