YouSaid · the spoken record

Allam-Mi

lines on the record: 155
first: 2008-09-19
most recent: 2018-06-13
sittings or episodes: 18
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Chad, for its part, intends to commit to progressively taking charge of the DIS following negotiations planned for 2010 with the Secretariat of the United Nations. I would like to note, as most speakers today have done, that the tireless resolve of Chad to resolve its domestic problems has recently been illustrated by three major events: the completion of a census of the population, with a view to holding free and transparent legislative and then presidential elections, beginning in June 2010; the establishment of the National Independent Electoral Commission, which is equitably made up of 15 members of the majority and 15 members of the opposition, with its chairman chosen by a consensus of all parties; and the return to legality of several hundred elements of armed groups in the country, which had come from the Sudan.”
2009-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6172 (2009) · source
“The international community, in particular this Council and all peace- and justice-loving countries, should work to meet its very urgent staff and equipment needs so that it can effectively and fully carry out its mandate in optimal conditions. We warmly thank the institutions and countries that have contributed human and financial resources. We also express our gratitude and thanks to the generous contributors to the Detachement integre' de securite (DIS) trust fund. That local policing unit is quite original and has a role on the ground that is of great importance. The financing of the DIS will unfortunately be a source of concern, if, by the end of the year, additional financial efforts are not made both by previous contributors, who have been generous, and by new contributors.”
2009-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6172 (2009) · source
“Mr. Allam-mi (Chad) (spoke in French): I take the floor to say a few brief words on the excellent report of the Secretary-General (S/2009/359) on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), which has just been introduced to us by Mr. Angelo. First of all, however, I would like to extend my congratulations to you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month of July. With respect to MINURCAT, I note that it is deploying to the satisfaction of my country and the United Nations. Its positive role in protecting vulnerable populations, including refugees, displaced persons, humanitarian workers and others, should be recognized and welcomed, as most speakers have done.”
2009-07-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6172 (2009) · source
“The Council must clearly condemn the Al-Bashir regime for its repeated acts of aggression over the years against my country, which has suffered too much from war and aspires to live in peace under the rule of law and democracy, even though that is not what Khartoum would prefer.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“This new situation, which dangerously threatens peace and security in the subregion in general and in Chad in particular, deserves the urgent attention of the Council so that it can take all appropriate measures to put an end to the Sudan's repeated aggressions against my country, which needs the international community's support to protect its integrity, its stability and the security of its population. The Security Council must no longer tolerate the fact that thousands of men equipped with hundreds of vehicles are being mobilized by the Sudan in plain view of the entire world to attack my country.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“The Chad-Sudan mediation cannot deny that, because it requested that the Doha meeting be delayed and held on 28 April instead of 7 April, as previously planned, to give the Sudanese Government time to fulfil its commitments under the 25 October Sirte Agreement by moving its puppets away from the border and disarming them. The Doha agreement also refers to the Sirte Agreement in its provision calling for the parties to comprehensively implement the agreements of which they have been witnesses and guarantors.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“Therefore, I wish to state that, on my Government's instructions, I requested that the Security Council hold an urgent meeting to consider the new aggression committed by the Sudan against my country. I thank the Council for heeding our appeal and organizing this meeting. It is no longer a secret to any Council member present here that the puppet force created, armed, equipped and led by Sudanese soldiers and reinforced by the notorious Janjaweed militia has constantly attacked my country. As I said, the Secretary-General's most recent report indicated the presence of that force near El Geneina, in the Sudan.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“With the ink on the Doha Agreement not even dry, the Government of Chad denounced the aggressive posture of the Khartoum regime, which had launched several armed columns, equipped with 350 vehicles, against our country. They were defeated, but we do not exclude the possibility that Khartoum will repeat its aggression. The Chadian Government believes that, by unleashing that planned aggression against Chad, the Sudanese regime renounced the Doha agreement. Through its statement, the Government of the Republic of Chad wishes to draw the international community's attention to the bad faith of the Khartoum regime and to ask that it take all necessary useful measures to help Chad protect its stability, its integrity and the safety of its beleaguered population.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“On 5 May, the Government of the Republic of Chad recalled that it had welcomed the signing of the Doha agreement on normalizing relations with the Sudan - the umpteenth agreement, as knowledgeable observers ironically stressed. Trusting in the commitment of the mediator countries and the expressed will to implement the provisions of all previous agreements, the Government of the Republic of Chad emphasized that it hoped that this time, there would truly be a return to peace and trust between the two countries. Regrettably, the Chadian Government bitterly noted that the intentions and the strategy of the Khartoum regime had not changed and that, by signing the Doha Agreement, the Khartoum regime had acted with the same duplicity as with previous agreements.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“Members will recall that I emphasized their presence in the Sudan and that, under the 25 October 2007 Sirte Agreement, they were supposed to be disarmed and regrouped where they were stationed. That is why, before the Council, we welcomed the Secretary-General's most recent report on this topic (S/2009/199), in which he stated in paragraph 13 that those indebted to Khartoum - our phrase - "continued to consolidate their forces in West Darfur near El Geneina". On the same occasion, I reaffirmed our commitment to comply with the provisions of all the peace agreements linking us to the Sudan: the Tripoli, Dakar and Riyadh Agreements. And I concluded by expressing to the Council our hope that the Chadian-Sudanese peace talks to be held in Doha, Qatar, would pave the way for a true normalization of our relations.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“They will agree too that those who, as I said, are still today being unfairly called the armed opposition must renounce the use of force and return to the country, in accordance with the 25 October 2007 Sirte Agreement, instead of rejecting that Agreement on the pretext that it is obsolete, thus helping to consolidate the democratic rule of law, to which we want them to truly commit themselves by endorsing the 13 August 2007 political agreement. However, I also quite rightly emphasize that we should not dream too much, as we know that they are not free to choose that path, which is contrary to their masters' Machiavellian designs. Despite the Doha agreement, their masters ordered them to enter Chad, and its army supports them in attacking Chad.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“But the most spectacular attacks were those of 13 April 2006 and 2 February 2008 on N'Djamena, clearly revealing Khartoum's intention to overthrow State institutions. With regard to what is occurring in the eastern part of my country, members will agree with me that I was right to tell them in my previous communications that the rule of law and democracy, which we intend to consolidate in Chad, necessarily depend on stability and peace in the country, and not the obscure strategies of the groups of armed mercenaries in the pay of the Sudan. They will agree that the establishment of a lasting peace in Chad depends also, and in particular, on the consolidation of the democratic rule of law in the country through effective implementation of the provisions of the 13 August 2007 political agreement sponsored by the international community.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“And it has not stopped trying to unite all those tribal components into a common front and has made available to them several military training camps in Darfur. 09-33090 Moreover, the Khartoum regime applauded the desertion of some elements of the Chadian National Armed Forces in October 2005 and the defection of some Chadian officers in December 2005. Those soldiers and officers were retrieved by Khartoum, which placed them at the head of its war machine to conceal its aggression as an intra-Chadian issue. That subversive force became active on 26 September 2005 , when it attacked the Chadian town Moudeina. Two major attacks were carried out on Adre on 18 December 2005. That double attack on Adre was followed by a huge offensive against several Chadian military garrisons in eastern Chad and a Sudanese refugee camp on Chadian territory.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“How can you put on an equal footing the one that started the war - the aggressor - and the one that is defending itself: the victim. We are the victims of a Machiavellian machination of the Khartoum regime, whereas we have not stopped working for peace in Darfur. But Khartoum has unjustly accused us of being behind the rebellion in Darfur and has mounted a vast war machine to destabilize our country. The proof exists. We have proof that since the beginning of 2005, the Sudan has recruited, equipped and trained a subversive tribal force against Chad. These are Sudanese, Chadian and bi-national combatants whose only goal is to overthrow the legitimate institutions of the country. It made available to that force Toyota military vehicles, heavy weapons, equipment stockpiles, food, fuel and so on.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“Peace agreements have been signed at the level of heads of State - first in Tripoli, Libya, on 8 February 2006; in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 3 May 2007; and in Dhaka, Senegal, on 13 March 2008 - not to mention the many communiques issued in the context of peace initiatives of the countries of the subregion or of the African Union under the auspices of our brother, Guide Muammar Al-Qadhafi. Once the meeting was over and the agreement signed, the ink hardly dry, whether immediately afterwards or a few days or weeks later, we were attacked by forces coming from the Sudan. In short, if, despite all those agreements, the situation continues to worsen, it is because somewhere there is ill will and bad faith. One tends to say that it is the fault of both countries, which seems to us inaccurate.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“However, with the agreement of the Sudan, we facilitated a meeting between the envoy of a great country and Mr. Khalil of JEM. That envoy used his good offices for the resumption of the Doha inter-Sudanese talks, with a View to a ceasefire and a political settlement of the Darfur crisis. He managed to convince IBM. to dispatch a delegation to Doha. Did we commit a crime by playing our role of facilitator? Khartoum's attitude does not surprise us if we look at the past.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“For a moment, I actually hoped that it would be the end of those attempts to overthrow the legitimate institutions of the country and to install in N'Djamena an authority loyal to Khartoum - Khartoum, which thus hopes to benefit from the complicity of such an authority to continue with impunity its crimes against humanity in Darfur. However, at the time of the press conference that followed the signing of the agreement, a slight doubt about Khartoum's good faith crossed my mind. Indeed, in answer to a question about the presence of subversive forces on Sudanese territory, the Sudanese Minister wanted it believed that the fighters of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) were based in Chad, giving as an example the presence in N'Djamena of Mr. Khalil, the head of that movement.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“Mr. Allam-mi (Chad) (spoke in French): I would like first of all, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of May. I would also like to welcome the Secretariat's report and to assure it that it has received our full attention. I have come from Doha, where once again I was naive enough to hope that the Khartoum regime had decided to put an end to its aggression against my country and indeed to its subversive attempts to thwart our policy to consolidate the rule of law and democracy.”
2009-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6121 (2009) · source
“In other words, my country once again reiterates before the Security Council its willingness to cooperate fully and on a sound footing with the United Nations for the fulfilment of its noble mission to maintain peace and security in the region in general and in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic in particular. 8”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“Finally, in general, there is a real need for consultation and close cooperation between MINURCAT and the Chadian authorities responsible for implementing the issues covered by the report in its sections IV B on justice and prisons, IV C on human rights, IV D on civil affairs and IV E on gender. The success of the Mission and the sovereignty of Chad depend on that. All our observations have been made in a constructive spirit so that MINURCAT can deploy in eastern Chad taking into account the realities of the country.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“It therefore seems to us untimely to suggest, as in paragraph 58 of the report, the transitioning of DIS from a donor- supported initiative to one financed by the Government of Chad. Is my Government not already making sufficient financial efforts ensuring the security of the border? Moreover, unlike the indications of paragraph 49 of the report, the Chadian authorities are completely unaware of the onset of construction work for two new parking spaces at the airport of Abeche' and the international airport in N'Djamena, which at present are completely overtaken by the military activities of the Chadian national army, the United Nations, and even Operation Epervier. It is absolutely necessary that the parking spaces at the airport of Abeche and the international airport in N'Djamena be built.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“With regard to paragraph 34 of the report on the question of installing a VHF radio communications system, we do not understand the delay, since on 5 February 2009 we were promised that the communications system would be installed by the end of February. Since the communications system is still not operational, the patrol and escort missions of the Detachement inte'gre de securite (DIS) elements are handicapped because they are cut off from their base. Still with regard to the DIS, it should be noted that there are serious logistics difficulties, as paragraph 34 of the report stresses. It is particularly under-equipped in vehicles, although we had placed great hope in logistics financing from the Trust Fund.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“For our part, we propose that negotiations take place in N'Djamena between the competent authorities and the Secretariat to reach a legal and administrative agreement that takes into account the sovereignty and concerns of Chad, without of course losing sight of the model status-of-forces agreement annexed to the report of the Secretary- General contained in document A/45/594. Furthermore, the Chadian authorities deplore the fact that they did not know about the 15 patrols and military escorts that the report mentions in paragraph 28, since the MINURCAT liaison officer never mentioned such patrols during meetings of liaison officers, as the EUFOR liaison officer did in the past.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“We are ready, if it asks, to help the Sudan settle the Darfur crisis as we have in the past, before it betrays us by arming Chadians against its own rebellion and then against the legitimate institutions of the country. We hope that the Chadian-Sudanese peace talks, to be held soon in Doha, Qatar, will open the way for a true normalization of our relations. Allow me also to refer to some specific points of the report. With regard to the document establishing MINURCAT II, we cannot accept a document prepared in advance, a sort of ready-to-wear item that we are asked to take or leave.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“However, not to draw undue attention to the situation, contrary to what the report says, the Chadian Minister for External Relations, Moussa Faki, at a meeting informed some diplomats of that, but individually and not all. I also alerted the Secretary-General, who sent his assistant responsible for peacekeeping operations to meet me. We would also like to reassure the Secretary- General and the Security Council that taking measures to defend ourselves militarily does not obviate our determination to normalize our relations with our neighbour, the Sudan, with which we have historic, multifaceted and unavoidable neighbourly relations. That is why we reiterate our commitment to respecting the provisions of all peace agreements - from Tripoli to Dakar and Riyadh - that link us to those brother countries.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“Those so-called opposition groups would thus contribute to consolidating the rule of democratic law, to which we expect them to display genuine commitment by adhering to the political agreement of 13 August 2007. Perhaps, however, we should not dream too much, since we know that they are not free to choose that route, which goes against the Machiavellian schemes of their patron. That is why we call them mercenaries paid by our neighbour, and not "opposition". We are cheered by the reference in paragraph 13 of the report to the fact that they have "continued to consolidate in West Darfur near El Geneina", in the Sudan. That is why we have taken the military steps necessary to respond to any eventuality. We cannot be blamed for defending ourselves.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“All provisions have been made for the population census to begin on 20 May 2009 with a View to organizing free and transparent elections. As for national reconciliation with the so-called political and military elements, the Government is doing its best to that end. Now that the implementation of the political agreement on the national issue to which I have just referred is on the right track, it is for those whom the report mistakenly refers to as armed opposition to renounce the use of force and to return to the country in compliance with the Sirte agreement of 25 October 2007, instead of rejecting it on the pretext of its supposed obsolescence.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“That is why we cannot understand why it is stressed in paragraph 62 of the report that implementation of the political agreement of 13 August 2007 has reached an impasse. Unfortunately, some have been quick to bring up only that point of the report in order to dramatize the political situation in Chad. There have been difficulties, to be sure, but they have already been overcome thanks to the mediation of partners. A compromise was found between the parties on a parliamentary amendment of the statute of the National Independent Electoral Commission to ensure that its independence could not be contested. It must be recalled that the Commission's membership is based on parity - 15 members of the majority and 15 of the opposition, while its presiding officer must be appointed by consensus among all parties.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“On 15 March, the authority of European Union-led (EUFOR) military force in Chad and the Central African Republic was transferred to the United Nations, to the satisfaction of all. We are pleased to note the acknowledgement by the Secretary-General in his report (S/2009/199) of the cooperation of the Chadian Government, which allowed the transfer of authority to take place in the best possible conditions. We reiterate our willingness to pursue that cooperation with the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) so that it may effectively accomplish its mandate in the East of our country. Turning to the report of the Secretary-General, my Government has instructed me to make some observations. We wish to reassure the Secretary-General of Chad's unwavering will to resolve its internal problems.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“Mr. Allam-mi (Chad) (spoke in French): First, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you, Sir, on your accession to the presidency of the Council for the month of April. Allow me also to greet the Assistant Secretary-General and to stress the great interest with which the Government of Chad heard his briefing. It is also my pleasure to welcome the statement of the Czech Republic presidency of the European Union and to express yet again the gratitude of my country to the European Union, which has responded to our expectations and those of the humanitarian community by protecting, in the best possible manner, the people affected by the insecurity in the eastern part of our country.”
2009-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6111 (2009) · source
“We would like to underscore that, in contrast to allegations launched by some against France, which is a long-standing friend of my country, this operation is not seeking to support a regime, but rather to help a country and its people remain standing and survive in view of a security and humanitarian catastrophe that threatens peace and security in the subregion. We also wish to commend humanitarian workers who, through their activities, risk their lives on a daily basis for the sake of vulnerable people. Finally, it would be remiss to conclude without repeating the ongoing readiness of the Chadian Government to cooperate with the United Nations with a view to the preparation for the replacement of EUFOR by a military component of MINURCAT.”
2008-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6042 (2008) · source
“In spite of the inevitable criticism on the part of the opposition, the Chadian Government believes that the process is still headed in the right direction and is committed to seeing the process through to its conclusion in the form of free, transparent elections. While we are discussing replacing EUFOR with a MINURCAT military component, I would like to convey my country's the gratitude and acknowledgement to the European Union, which has answered our expectations, as well as those of humanitarian workers, seeking to protect people exposed to the prevailing insecurity in eastern Chad. 08-6445] In particular, we would like to thank France, who initiated this rescue operation and serves as its principle component.”
2008-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6042 (2008) · source
“To strengthen national cohesion, the Chadian armed groups must renounce the use of force and must return to the country, in full respect of Syrte Agreement of 25 October 2007, rather than refuting the Agreement on the pretext that it has expired or by inventing an alibi in order to continue their subversive operations against the interests of their country. Additionally and above all, establishing a lasting peace in Chad will require the strengthening of the democratic rule of law in the country through a genuine implementation of the provisions of the political agreement of 13 August 2007.”
2008-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6042 (2008) · source
“We do not have sufficient capacity to address the magnitude of the challenges we face in the field. The international community is called on to help us to strengthen our capacity, although clearly not at any price. Without a doubt, settling the crisis in Darfur will be the fundamental political solution the situation in eastern Chad. We shall spare no effort, if so required, to enable a successful outcome to the negotiations to achieve peace in Darfur. No Sudanese rebel movement in Darfur has received or will receive Chad's support unless it is in the service of peace. The rebels may enjoy of local support owing to the intra- communitarian border war, but that is not the responsibility of the Chadian Government.”
2008-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6042 (2008) · source
“Without wishing to poison the relationships with our Sudanese neighbours and brothers, we must state nevertheless that we do not understand the observations that certain parties have made in seeking to equate the aggressor and the victim, and to engage in a bizarre dialectic that seeks to justify the causes by the consequences. Refugee camps, displaced persons camps, forced recruitment, including of child soldiers, trafficking in weaponry, violations of human rights in the area and impunity are all clearly the consequences of the Darfur crisis. We would have favoured moving the camps or a true neutralization of the area, while assuming the responsibility of securing our own border. That is the truth of the matter. In Chad, there is no political resolve to favour insecurity or impunity.”
2008-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6042 (2008) · source
“That means that the establishment of the rule of law and democracy that we hope to consolidate within Chad will necessarily require stability and peace in the country to thwart the obscure strategies of armed groups. For us, the source of our insecurity comes from the East of our country, which is destabilized by the effects of the crisis in Darfur: Sudanese refugees, displaced Chadians who are victims of Janjaweed attacks, repercussions in eastern Chad of the intercommunity conflicts in Darfur, the exploitation of these conflicts by politicians to establish and use armies to overthrow democratic national institutions, widespread cross-border banditry, and so on.”
2008-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6042 (2008) · source
“We do have a sufficient unit of police officers and gendarmes to offer to MINURCAT. At the same time, we have recommended the increase of the level of the DIS to 1,700 troops. We reiterate our desire that the financing of the DIS should come from the United Nations budget. In its absence, however, we appeal to the international community for its contributions to the Trust Fund. We agree with those who are of the view that no military force can sustainably guarantee security if the political context underlying the original insecurity does not change. Let us not forget, however, that this force must serve the law, that is, the democratic rule of law that is being established within Chad, and that it must be stronger than the illegal groups that are being maintained from abroad.”
2008-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6042 (2008) · source
“Furthermore, allow me to reiterate my Government's position whereby, in order to guarantee the lasting effects of a United Nations presence in eastern Chad, there are no grounds for giving it a political mandate, given that the political questions related to the situation in eastern Chad are being addressed in frameworks with which we are well acquainted. Here, too, our position aims simply to ensure heightened efficiency so that the ongoing mediations are not uselessly complicated or duplicative. However, we welcome the fact that the United Nations is supporting this process and will be involved in it. With regard to the deployment of the Detachement Integre de Securite (DIS), the 850 planned personnel are late in being deployed, given the slowness and limited capacity of the United Nations centre responsible for their early training.”
2008-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6042 (2008) · source
“In this regard, in the context of the fruitful ongoing consultations that will continue to take place in the future between the competent Chadian authorities and the team of the Secretary-General, we believe that we are not far from arriving at definitive shared conclusions that will enable the immediate planning of that force with a view to an effective transfer of authority on 15 March 2009 between EUFOR and the new force. At the same time, of course, we underscore our support for the request made by our Central African brothers and neighbours, as stated by their representative, for the renewal and strengthening of the presence of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) in the North-East of their country.”
2008-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6042 (2008) · source
“Mr. Allam-mi (Chad) (spoke in French): Mr. President, thank you for this opportunity to contribute my Government's observations on the contents of the report under consideration (S/2008/760). First of all, I would like to welcome the briefing on the report of the Secretary-General given to us by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Angelo, and also for this opportunity to make my observations on the report. Our experience with the European Union-led military force (EUFOR) offers us many valuable lessons that can inspire us in the design of the new force to ensure an effective implementation of the original mandate, which strikes us as being both good and clear, given that the international presence in eastern Chad is not a classic peacekeeping operation, as we have often been reiterated.”
2008-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6042 (2008) · source
“The hundreds of political parties in Chad have signed a platform of understanding, known as the political agreement of 13 August 2007. All who signed that agreement are within the country and we are making our way towards free and transparent elections under the supervision of the international community. Those who have taken up arms should give them up and should return to the country in accordance with the Sirte Agreement, which for us still remains valid.”
2008-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6029 (2008) · source
“Chad is a poor country that cannot allow itself the luxury of supporting rebels from another country, and even less able to those from a friendly, neighbourly country such as the Sudan. On the contrary, Chad could contribute positively in the Sudan in the context of a dialogue among Sudanese. Chad is prepared to actively support all efforts to bring peace to Darfur. We welcome the normalization of relations with the Sudan in the context of the Dakar agreement, and we will work towards the consolidation of friendly relations and good-neighbourliness with our Sudanese brothers. For 6 us, as long as the tragic situation in Darfur is not settled, our fear is that relations between the two countries could run the risk of being negatively affected. We have no internal problems.”
2008-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6029 (2008) · source
“I also wish to express my satisfaction with the positive results we have just received in our consultations with the Secretariat, regarding the deployment of the new United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad II (MINURCAT II). With regard to the neutralization of the camps just mentioned - a situation that has resulted from the lack of effective neutralization of those camps - the fact that the Sudanese are recruiting there is not the sole responsibility of Chad. Those who claim that we support the Sudanese rebels are unable to provide us with any tangible proof. Chad does not manufacture weapons. Chad does not have weapons to provide to any rebellion.”
2008-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6029 (2008) · source
“We hope that the new MINURCAT, expanded through a military component, will be effective in meeting the expectations of those who will be its beneficiaries: refugees, displaced persons and, of course, the local populations, which have felt the pressure of this situation, as Mr. Holmes has just indicated, as well as humanitarians. Let us hope that the new operation will help us to demilitarize the camps in order to address what has been said regarding the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and other Sudanese actors who would take advantage of the situation in order to carry out recruitment in the camps. My Government reiterates its complete readiness to fully cooperate with the United Nations mission in the eastern part of our country.”
2008-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6029 (2008) · source
“Mr. Allam-mi (Chad) (spoke in French): I thank Under-Secretary-General Holmes for his complete briefing on the security and humanitarian situation in eastern Chad. I wish, however, to stress, on behalf of the Chadian Government, that overall there has been an improvement in the situation compared with a year ago. We owe that to the mobilization of our own resources and to support from the international community, especially the Security Council, which 5 took the decision to deploy the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) / European Union operation in eastern Chad and Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR). To be sure, there have been shortcomings, which have sometimes been criticized by non-governmental organizations, which are rightly demanding in that regard.”
2008-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6029 (2008) · source
“Yes, we signed agreements in Dakar, and since then we have had several meetings in the context of the follow-up committee. During the most recent committee meeting, the Sudanese Government and ourselves, we pledged, in the presence of the international community, to re- establish diplomatic relations between our two countries, it being understood that the Sudan was the country that had broken them and that Chad could not fail to agree to their re-establishment. As in the past, Chad has the political will to help the Sudan resolve its crisis in Darfur by peaceful means. Thus, we are willing to assist our Sudanese brothers. We hope that this squabble - which is destabilizing the eastern part of our country and threatens security in the subregion - will end.”
2008-09-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5976 (2008) · source
“I would certainly not like to give the Council the impression that the operation is useless; it is supported by the Government of Chad and is useful for the populations concerned. The EUFOR-MINURCAT operation must be maintained. It is a question of improving it and ensuring that its follow-on is carried out by the United Nations under the best possible conditions. That is our objective. 8 It is true that the international community's presence in the eastern part of our country has a deterrent aspect - which we perhaps do not often see- and thus, even if it is not a peacekeeping operation, that it could contribute to the establishment of conditions for a return to peace in the region. Before concluding, I must refer to our relations with our neighbour the Sudan.”
2008-09-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5976 (2008) · source
“But we are requesting further consultations precisely because of those questions, so that we can together define the concept of MINURCAT and the success of a military operation, without having the feeling that our hand is being forced, as well as specify the mandate. We welcome the fact that, thank God, the Council has interested itself in the issue and that it is already expressing its intention to authorize, at the appropriate time - as I read in the Secretary-General's proposal - the deployment of a MINURCAT military component. We hope that things remain at the level of intentions as we wait for the Secretary-General and Chad to come to a preliminary understanding on the operational and practical aspects of the issue.”
2008-09-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5976 (2008) · source
“We would have preferred to talk about "armed groups", "rebels" or some other term, but the term "armed opposition", which I think I read in the report, is not appropriate in our view. The Government of Chad is implementing the Sirte agreement with the armed groups in the context of the 13 August agreement that we signed with the political parties. Contrary to what is being said, however, that agreement is not simply a technical one to organize elections. It also has a political, economic and social content that takes all of Chad's problems into account and recommends solutions. There is a tendency to present it as a mere technical electoral agreement, which it is not. I also wish to say that Chad and the President of the Republic are ready to accept the replacement of EUFOR by a military force of the United Nations.”
2008-09-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5976 (2008) · source
“Their role must be clearly defined to avoid misunderstanding. We must bear in mind that this is a very special mission - one that is essentially humanitarian in nature but not a classical peacekeeping operation. We must not disappoint the populations concerned: the displaced, the refugees and those who host them. We must serve them and not the N'Djamena Government. Since the operation was accepted as humanitarian from the outset, we should like to avoid any subtle deviation that would add confusion by giving it a political mandate advocating particular good offices. Mediation and political agreements exist in other frameworks. Let the parties observe those. We talk of armed opposition, but in our country there is a democratic opposition and a democratic political life. We are trying to build and consolidate our rule of law and democracy.”
2008-09-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5976 (2008) · source