YouSaid · the spoken record

Badr

lines on the record
13
first
2016-09-23
most recent
2016-09-23
sittings or episodes
1
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un-security-council

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  1. We seek a world free of nuclear weapons, including nuclear testing. We swiftly and unequivocally condemn those that conduct nuclear tests. And we remain committed to the universality of the NPT and the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Egypt has been, and will continue to be, a staunch advocate of a robust nuclear non-proliferation regime that is geared towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

    2016-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7776 (2016) · source

  2. The provisional nature of that regime should be maintained, in accordance with the Treaty provisions, and the official operational status launched upon the Treaty's entry into force. The draft resolution also reflects a puzzling dilemma. While some States express enthusiasm here in the Council about the urgency of completing the verification regime, they contradictorily do not shoulder their responsibilities by ratifying the CTBT, and their legislative branches repeatedly refuse to ratify the Treaty, thereby precluding the possibility that the verification regime would come to fruition. We hope that there is some explanation for this dichotomous behaviour and contradictory message. Egypt was among the first countries that negotiated and signed the CTBT. We fully support the purpose and objectives of the Treaty.

    2016-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7776 (2016) · source

  3. The draft resolution sets an unwelcome precedent and may be perceived as an encroachment by the Security Council on the independent standing of international organizations and treaty bodies, dictating certain procedures and measures to be undertaken, despite not being endorsed by the collective will of its member States. Sixthly, progress pertaining to the verification regime of the CTBT falls within the prerogative of the Preparatory Commission. According to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, 85 per cent of the verification regime has been successfully provisionally set up. Progress in all three pillars of the regime * namely, the International Monitoring System, the International Data Center and on-site inspection - is noted.

    2016-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7776 (2016) · source

  4. Fifthly, the draft resolution's intrusive nature in the work of the Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat is counterproductive. The Secretariat is, and should remain, a State-driven body that should solely determine its direction and preserve its prerogative to take decisions independently, without external interference. The Security Council should not be in a position to meddle in the work of the Secretariat and intrude in the practice of reporting its conduct. It is up to the Preparatory Commission to decide what is conducive and favourable to its work, in accordance with the Organization's priorities and aspirations of its member States.

    2016-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7776 (2016) · source

  5. Fourthly, this draft resolution inequitably and unreasonably puts those that possess nuclear weapons with those that do not on an equal footing. It calls on States to refrain from conducting any nuclear-weapon test explosions and urges all States that have either not signed or not ratified the CTBT, particularly the eight remaining annex 2 States, to do so without delay. The draft resolution ought to have placed special responsibility on nuclear-weapon States and States non-party to the NPT. To equate States that are party to the NPT with those that are not, while simultaneously calling on both categories of States to refrain from nuclear testing, is an unconvincing argument. Rationally, the onus rests chiefly on those States that actually possess the capability to conduct nuclear tests.

    2016-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7776 (2016) · source

  6. The maintenance and modernization of nuclear weapons runs contrary to the legal obligation and spirit of the NPT, which explicitly calls for effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear arms race. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of these weapons. Consequently, the fact that nuclear disarmament is practically absent from this draft resolution severely undermines its credibility and erodes its effectiveness. It sends the wrong message to the international community, that the Security Council is selective, biased and engaged in a cherry-picking approach when it comes to the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. The message this draft resolution sends is: Testing no, possession and modernization of stockpiles yes.

    2016-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7776 (2016) · source

  7. In fact, the draft resolution does not adequately respond to the CTBT's own preambular section, which stressed the "need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". Nuclear disarmament therefore should have been the priority in this draft resolution. It should have expressed its unequivocal rejection of the modernization of stockpiles of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States and the role they devote to nuclear weapons in their strategic doctrines. Let me take this opportunity, therefore, to categorically reject the notion put forth by some States that nuclear stockpile maintenance is consistent with NPT objectives. It is not.

    2016-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7776 (2016) · source

  8. By exclusively addressing nuclear testing in this draft resolution, the Council bypasses the central point that the continued possession of nuclear weapons in itself, and the constant prolongation by those that possess them to engage in meaningful disarmament, is what challenges, if not threatens, global stability. This draft resolution, inappropriately, makes no reference to the obligation stipulated in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that calls on nuclear-weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament. It turns a blind eye to the outcome documents of the NPT Review Conferences of 1995, 2000 and 2010, including the 13 practical steps.

    2016-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7776 (2016) · source

  9. Thirdly, it is unusual, if not remarkable, that a draft resolution dealing with the CTBT fails to adequately address the urgency of concrete steps towards achieving nuclear disarmament. While nuclear testing should certainly be ceased in its entirety, as the Treaty clearly advocates, the international community has a much more pressing obligation and responsibility to advance nuclear disarmament. If the Council is genuinely concerned about the perils of nuclear weapons and their potential use or testing, it would only be logically coherent to treat the cause and not just the symptom.

    2016-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7776 (2016) · source

  10. Despite a modest reference to it in the preamble to the draft resolution, the NPT is completely overlooked in its operative paragraphs, despite being the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It is surprising that, while the draft resolution encourages promotion of the CTBT's universality, it makes no reference whatever to the importance of achieving universality for the NPT. What is the reason for the eagerness about the former and complete silence about the latter? We call on all NPT member States to promote the universality of the NPT, promptly and actively. As the key foundation of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, the NPT deserves greater prominence.

    2016-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7776 (2016) · source

  11. Developments and progress related to the Treaty are regularly examined by the Preparatory Commission and the Provisional Technical Secretariat. The Council's intrusion into the dynamics and technicalities of the CTBT creates unnecessary duality and generates an atmosphere that is not conducive to inclusive deliberations. All States parties and signatories to the CTBT should be fully engaged in any discussion of relevance both to it and to its technical bodies and verification regime. Such discussion should not be limited to members of the Security Council. Secondly, the draft resolution fails to highlight the centrality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

    2016-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7776 (2016) · source

  12. It is in that context that I wish to express our discontent and dissatisfaction with today's draft resolution (8/2016/800) on the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It is seriously flawed and does not deserve the Security Council's attention. Its contribution to the nuclear disarmament regime is minimal and ineffective. Rather than strengthening that regime, the draft resolution squanders an opportunity to emphasize how urgent it is that we advance nuclear disarmament. We regret that it was introduced without incorporating several essential amendments suggested by my delegation. I would like to address six specific concerns that we have about the draft resolution. The first is the fact that the Security Council is not the appropriate forum for addressing the CTBT in the way the draft resolution attempts to do.

    2016-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7776 (2016) · source

  13. Mr. Badr (Egypt) (spoke in Arabic): Contrary to our usual rule, I will deliver my statement in English, owing to the technical nature of the topic under discussion and also so that we can be sure, in view of its vital importance, that our message is accurately conveyed. (spoke in English) Egypt's commitment to the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime is unwavering. For decades, nuclear disarmament has been a top priority of our foreign policy, and it continues to be a significant one for the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Our interest is founded in our long-standing belief that nuclear weapons present a grave threat to international peace and security and that collective global action is needed to eliminate them.

    2016-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7776 (2016) · source