YouSaid · the spoken record

Biang

lines on the record
1,385
first
2021-12-09
most recent
2023-12-21
sittings or episodes
203
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. Of course, we know that in order to stop and regulate the spiralling processes of the drivers of conflict, we will have to go further, identifying and acting on the deep-rooted parameters of conflicts in Africa. Those will be unearthed only as part of a broader approach that integrates socioeconomic security with improved living conditions. Once again, I thank my dear colleagues. May God bless the Security Council.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9518 (2023) · source

  2. Today the Security Council has been able to give effect to the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations by taking ownership of an essential aspect of its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Africa, whose populations are among the peoples of the world, as emphasized at the very outset of the Charter of the United Nations, will finally be able to legitimately harbour the same aspirations for security and dignity, which implies an equitable role in dealing with threats to peace in a manner commensurate with the provisions of the United Nations, in particular the assessed contributions of its regular budget. We welcome the unity around this table to give effect today to a vital paradigm that echoes the indivisibility of international security.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9518 (2023) · source

  3. For a long time, the African Union depended on donations from the international community. This tendency limits the scope of action of the available mechanisms, as the contributions from abroad are neither philanthropic nor disinterested. Depending on the circumstances, those contributions can be redirected, weaken or lead to financial disengagement or mercantile or transactional approaches. It is worth highlighting that Africa still holds the sad record of the highest number of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Of the 16 peacekeeping operations under way at the moment, until recently nine were located on the African continent, demonstrating the level of instability that prevails there. At the same time, the continent faces many existing and future challenges.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9518 (2023) · source

  4. Given the persistence of deadly conflicts on the continent, as Africans, we have been constructively self-critical with regard to the effectiveness of the mechanisms and tools available, and we have full confidence in Africa being able to solve its own problems. But insecurity is constantly taking on new forms, and there are asymmetrical threats to peace. Given the conflicts in different areas of the continent, we have been called upon to change our paradigm, not only with regard to the means of action to address these issues, but also with regard to the very image of the African continent, which very often seems to be one of war, crisis, ethnic and political conflicts, displacement, refugee camps, poverty and dependence. Financial resources are as much the engine of war as they are the heart of peace.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9518 (2023) · source

  5. Mr. Biang (Gabon) (spoke in French): As the representative of one of the three African members of the Security Council (A3), I would like to thank all of the members of the Security Council for the adoption of the resolution submitted this evening (resolution 2719 (2023)), which will open a new chapter for Africa. Every time this Council fulfils its vocation, such as today, it shows that it is a powerful rampart and a deterrent against war, and it revives hope for current and future generations. The resolution adopted this afternoon is an important message from the United Nations and from the international community to the African peoples. It represents a milestone in responding to the legitimate aspirations of these people to security and dignity.

    2023-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9518 (2023) · source

  6. I would like to conclude by emphasizing the urgent need for the Council to act with greater determination to cut off financing for armed groups, which is fuelling instability and violence in various regions of the world, and the need to dispel the impression that any breach or violation of the small arms non-proliferation regime would have no consequences for their authors.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  7. Our course of action must be reinforced by requiring traceability measures for conventional weapons and pairing the violation of international non-proliferation commitments with adequately dissuasive sanctions. The Security Council must make it a rule to take action automatically whenever it determines that such a violation has been committed. The Security Council should also take the principled position of underscoring the seriousness of such acts, while specifying the range of measures or sanctions it might consequently be called upon to impose.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  8. The Council must ensure that the authority and effectiveness of the relevant international instruments are strengthened. The Council has the mandate to promote the universality and full implementation of treaties, while taking cooperative action to prevent the trafficking in arms and their means of delivery. The international community must show that it is united in its action, overcome differences between the strategic interests of States or groups of States, and take practical measures to strengthen each of the existing frameworks in order to ensure that States adhere more firmly to the entire gamut of commitments on the non-proliferation of weapons, in particular light weapons.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  9. The seriousness of the current situation augurs a critical phase for international security, with the risk of seeing true proliferation having even greater destructive consequences, entailing the major threat to international security of further international destabilization, which is likely to lead to a markedly broader unstable strategic landscape and a spike in and increased resilience of the global terrorist threat. The increase in tensions among the poles of influence and the insatiable quest for hegemony additionally complicate the control and regulation of the circulation of arms and exert significant pressure on fragile States in terms of securing their arms stockpiles. More than ever, the fight against arms proliferation must be a top priority of the global security agenda.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  10. The increasing level of awareness of this issue on the part of the international community and its ongoing hope to control, if not halt, the circulation of weapons of war must be encouraged. That hope has led to the adoption of relevant multilateral and regional disarmament instruments, culminating in the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty in 2013. In addition to taking stock of recent major events, we must assess their implications, consider possible responses available to the international community and draw from the lessons learned from successive crises in order to step up the fight against the proliferation of small arms, as most crises of the recent past and current crises are fuelled by gaps in the international non-proliferation system.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  11. It is of paramount importance that we encourage the coordination of programmes of action and the various peacebuilding actors by creating a positive dynamic and overcoming political divisions, conflicts of interest and hidden agendas in order to build consensus on shared standards and actions in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Gabon calls on the Security Council to strengthen its mechanisms for cracking down on networks financing armed groups in Africa and fully supports the efforts and advocacy of the African Union Peace and Security Council at this critical time, when the continent is vulnerable to the growing number of armed groups, attacks by terrorist groups and other asymmetric threats to peace and security.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  12. Above all, it is imperative that the assets of the armed groups and nebulous terrorist groups that are plaguing Africa be tracked with the same rigour as international terrorist groups, by using the full range of counter-terrorism financing mechanisms, both at the level of supply chains and with regard to end buyers. The strengthening of cross-border security cooperation through joint regional operations, the exchange of financial information among countries, combating environmental crime, the freezing of assets, extrajudicial cooperation, countering the illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons and combating money laundering are all measures that must be implemented in a coordinated manner at regional and global levels.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  13. Beyond today’s debate, the Security Council must take a more serious look at the alarming situation affecting several regions of the African continent. There is a need for urgent solutions to adequately deal with the bloodshed and hardship caused by the financing of armed and terrorist groups. The scale of the task requires a multidimensional response involving both security and development. We must identify the grey zones of the criminal economy and their links with the official economy. It is essential to identify the networks of companies, armies, transporters, arms dealers and traffickers, banks, illegal financial networks and the wide array of intermediaries, including companies that enjoy respectability via a veneer of legitimacy.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  14. In addition, armed and terrorist groups have progressively set up supply channels for various types of resources to better finance themselves. Consequently, underground criminal economies have been established in certain parts of States’ territories and in cross-border areas. As a result of the proliferation of small arms and the predation of natural resources, conflicts are self- perpetuating and the revenues derived from trafficking in natural resources is enabling the purchase of weapons and the recruitment of militias. Moreover, an armed and criminal economy is being organized on the basis of wild species of flora and fauna, coltan, gold and tin, as well as child labour. That parallel economy is being run by armed gangs, security companies, buyers, brokers and clandestine exporters, with regional and international repercussions.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  15. A subregion such as Central Africa is today infested by hundreds of armed groups who are taking control of whole swathes of States’ territory and committing an increasing number of atrocities against civilian populations. The mapping of armed groups attests to the clear link between their deployment and their control over natural resources. The illicit exploitation of natural resources, together with human trafficking, kidnapping for ransom and drug trafficking, is a major source of financing for terrorism and transnational crime in Africa. A genuine new illicit triangular trade is linking, before our eyes, Africa, as an exporter of raw materials, to countries that export weapons and mercenaries through countries that offer parallel financial arrangements.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  16. Mr. Biang (Gabon) (spoke in French): I commend Ecuador for taking the initiative to convene this important open debate. I thank High Representative Izumi Nakamitsu for her informative briefing. I also thank Ms. Cécile Aptel and Ms. Folade Mutota for their important contributions to this debate. The combination of crises in several regions of the world has led us to place arms proliferation issues once again at the forefront of international security concerns. The distressing massive armament being seen in areas plagued by chronic cycles of conflict and tension is reviving the fears of civilian populations and the traumas experienced during the two World Wars.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  17. I would like to thank my team for its dedication, and the Secretariat and Security Council Affairs Division for their professionalism. I would like to wish my successor every success and to assure him of my complete availability.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  18. I briefed the Council three times; twice relating to the work of the Committee and once following my visit to Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Resolution 2700 (2023) instructed the Committee to promptly review the updating of the list of persons and entities designated under resolution 2653 (2022), taking into account the report submitted by the Panel of Experts. In my capacity as Chair, I actively collaborated with the members of the Committee to promote and facilitate the implementation of the Council’s instructions. The Committee was proactively seized of the matter and recently, on 8 December, four individuals were inscribed on the sanctions list. I would like to conclude by thanking all members of the Committee for their commitment.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  19. The Committee received briefings from the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations, from the Panel of Experts, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and INTERPOL. The Committee carried out its work primarily through written proceedings. Throughout my mandate, more than 90 notes were sent. Ten official communications to Member States and other stakeholders were sent, and three notes verbales were sent to Member States. I visited Haiti and the Dominican Republic from 12 to 16 June, when I had the privilege to meet with senior officials in Haiti and the President of the Dominican Republic. The visit helped to enhance cooperation between the Committee and its Member States. Owing to extraordinary circumstances, I was not accompanied on the visit by the members of the Committee.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  20. Lastly, I would like to take stock of the work of the Committee established on Haiti. The Committee was established on 21 October 2022 subsequent to the adoption of resolution 2653 (2022), and I was appointed Chair in 5 December 2022. The Committee guidelines were adopted on 8 February 2023, and were then adopted and revised on 6 November 2023 following the adoption of resolution 2699 (2023), which established an arms embargo in Haiti. The Committee also began the process geared towards reaching a cooperation agreement between the Committee and INTERPOL through an exchange of letters. The Committee is currently awaiting a response from the Secretary-General of INTERPOL for the agreement to enter into force. The Committee held seven meetings in 2023; six informal consultations and one briefing from Member States.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  21. My country’s position is reflected in my own personal view of the International Criminal Tribunals’ work, which are essential subsidiary bodies in countering impunity for the grave crimes perpetrated in the Balkans and Rwanda. During our chairmanship, we observed meaningful progress, particularly concerning the effective transition of the Mechanism to a residual institution, in accordance with the goal set out in resolutions 1966 (2010) and 2637 (2022). We hope that the efforts of the Working Group will continue in an unfettered way, with the effective cooperation of Member States. I would like to take this opportunity to wish every success to my successor, Ambassador Michael Kanu, in this important responsibility, and I assure him of my delegation’s full cooperation.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  22. Furthermore, following the death of Judge Elizabeth Ibanda-Nahamya of Uganda in January 2023, the Secretary-General nominated Judge Lydia Mugambe Ssali of Uganda in May 2023 as her replacement. The next Mechanism progress review will be held in 2024 under a new chairmanship. It is important to note, for reference, that the Working Group met formally with the President and the Prosecutor of the Mechanism on 9 and 13 December 2022 and on 9 June and 11 December 2023 successively. The official Council meetings to assess the progress of the Mechanism took place successively on 14 June (see S/PV.9062) and 12 December 2022 (see S/PV.9217) and on 12 June (see S/PV.9344) and 11 December 2023 (see S/PV.9502). I would like to reiterate my country’s steadfast support for the work of the Informal Working Group.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  23. Regarding the renewal of the mandates of the judges, the President and the Prosecutor, from a practical standpoint, I would like to stress that the renewal of the President’s mandate happened just after the adoption of resolution 2637 (2022) pursuant to procedure involving an exchange of correspondence between the Council and the Secretary-General. Judge Graciela Gatti Santana of Uruguay was therefore appointed to replace Judge Carmel Agius of Malta. The renewal of the mandate of the 24 judges happened just after the adoption of the resolution, in consultation with the Presidents of the Security Council and the General Assembly, through an exchange of correspondence initiated by the Secretary- General. The renewal of the Prosecutor’s mandate is the only one related to this matter that was initiated by resolution 2637 (2022).

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  24. That important resolution had the merit of aligning all key aspects linked to advancing the Mechanism’s work, including the questions of workload, the relocation of convicted persons who have completed their sentences and cooperation with States where fugitives are suspected of having found refuge. The review also included the implementation of, and follow-up to, recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the evaluation of key points related to the Mechanism’s working methods.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  25. In the first two years of my mandate as Chair of the Working Group, we focused mainly on two salient issues: first, the biennial review process of the Residual Mechanism’s activities and, secondly, the renewal of the mandates of the judges, the President and the Prosecutor. Regarding the process of reviewing the Mechanism’s work, from the beginning of our chairmanship, the objective has been to consult with all members of the Working Group to reach agreement on a timeline related to reviewing the Mechanism’s methods of work. Resolution 2637 (2022), which was adopted unanimously in June 2022 (see S/PV.9072), concluded the Council’s review of the progress of the Mechanism’s work, including significant progress of its functions since the previous review, which took place in 2020 under the chairmanship of Viet Nam.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  26. As Chair of the Informal Working Group on International Criminal Tribunals, established pursuant to resolution 1966 (2010), during my last statement — on Tuesday, 12 December — at the briefing on the twenty-third progress report (see S/2023/566) of the International Residual Mechanism (see S/PV.9502), I had the opportunity to convey my deep gratitude to all Member States for their invaluable support and the spirit of cooperation they demonstrated throughout my mandate. I would also like to thank the Secretariat for the high quality of its technical assistance, which not only facilitated our chairmanship but also the conduct of our work.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  27. I would also like to stress the importance of the work carried out by the Group and by the Panel of Experts, which are crucial to the Committee receiving objective and reliable information. I would also like to highlight the support behind the work of the experts, which is exceedingly important. I would now like to turn to my chairmanship of the Working Group on the International Tribunals.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  28. I would like to recall that the Government of South Sudan can request exemptions from the Committee to address the equipment needs of its armed forces. It is important to underscore the fact that the Security Council has asked the Government of South Sudan to report to the Committee by 15 April 2024 on progress made towards meeting the main benchmarks. To summarize — or to make a long story short, as they say — I would like to reiterate the importance of the Chair’s visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan. I think that it is possible, in those regions, for that kind of visit to be repeated so as to raise public awareness about the objectives and scope of Council sanctions.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  29. I want to encourage the Government of South Sudan to redouble its efforts to organize safe, free, fair and credible elections, including by engaging in dialogue with the relevant stakeholders on the preparations required for the elections. I would like to highlight three important points concerning the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement and the relevant main benchmarks, and of the arms embargo. First, I welcome the progress made so far in implementing the Revitalized Agreement, including the recent deployment of 750 members of the first group of graduates of the necessary unified forces, and I stress the importance of continuing to make progress in implementing the Revitalized Agreement and the main benchmarks.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  30. First of all, I would like to welcome South Sudan’s decision to accept returnees and refugees from the Sudan since the conflict in that country began in April, and I would like to express my concern about the disastrous humanitarian situation in South Sudan, in particular the record levels of food insecurity and the challenges posed by natural disasters and regional insecurity, as well as the persistent violence in the Sudan. I would also like to underscore that all the parties have an obligation to facilitate humanitarian access. I welcome the recent progress in the reconstitution of the National Constitutional Review Commission, the National Electoral Commission and the Political Parties Council in preparation for the elections scheduled for December 2024.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  31. I would like to say a few words about the lifting of the notification regime on the Democratic Republic of the Congo set forth in resolution 1533 (2004). I would like to reiterate Gabon’s conviction that the removal of the notification clause in December 2022 has been an asset to the country’s Government in enabling it to respond more effectively to the armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and that it will enable the country’s authorities to fulfil their responsibilities in the face of the security challenges posed by well-equipped armed groups that are receiving arms in violation of the arms embargo. Let me now make a few personal remarks on South Sudan.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  32. With regard to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I would like to reiterate my deep concern about the deteriorating security situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo owing to the recurring activities of armed groups. I condemn the indiscriminate targeting of civilians and the involvement of armed groups and criminal networks in the illicit trafficking in natural resources. I would also like to stress the importance of listing individuals who commit serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, as well as individuals and entities involved in the illicit trafficking in resources, which fuels the activities of networks of armed groups. We believe that those individuals would be further deterred if they felt the crushing weight of being singled out by the Sanctions Committee.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  33. In my capacity as the Chair of the Sanctions Committee on South Sudan, I had the privilege in October of making a visit — a field visit this time — to South Sudan, in the company of the majority of the members of the Committee. Most of the discussions during the visit focused on the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, in particular chapter 2, on transitional security arrangements, the fulfilment of which is closely linked to South Sudan’s compliance with the main benchmarks set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2577 (2021), and South Sudan’s call for the lifting of the arms embargo. I would now like to make a few personal observations on my perception of the conduct of the first two Committees, whose activities I just mentioned.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  34. Over the past two years, among other things, the Committee’s discussions focused on the political, security and humanitarian situations in South Sudan, the progress and the challenges in implementing the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and the situation of children in South Sudan. I regret that the Sanctions Committee on South Sudan, like the Sanctions Committee on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was not able to reach consensus on a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, who had briefed the Sanctions Committee six times between 2015 and 2021. I hope that the Committee will soon find consensus to on hearing briefings by the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  35. I am therefore grateful that we were able to make that visit last year, particularly in the context of the continuing tensions between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. Let me now turn to the activities of the 2206 Committee, concerning South Sudan. Over the past two years, the Committee met 14 times in informal consultations — six times in 2022 and eight times in 2023. The Committee heard briefings by the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children in Armed Conflict and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, among others. Three of the informal consultations took place within the framework of the Committee’s briefings to Member States, during which the Coordinator of the Group of Experts presented the Group’s interim and final reports to participants.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  36. The information shared in such briefings would be extremely valuable for the members of the Committee. I therefore hope that my successor will continue to organize regular briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, and that the Committee will reach consensus on hearing similar briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. In November 2022, along with the majority of the members of the Committee, I had the opportunity to visit the Democratic Republic of the Congo; I also visited Rwanda and Uganda. Logistical and health difficulties linked to the COVID-19 pandemic had prevented my predecessor and the members of the Committee from visiting Rwanda and Uganda in November 2021.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  37. Among other things, the discussions focused on the security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the activities of armed groups, the monitoring of the arms embargo, the management of arms and ammunition, the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the situation of children in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Four informal consultations took place with States in the region to consider the mid-term and final reports of the Group of Experts. I regret that consensus was not reached during my chairmanship on hearing a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, who had reminded the Committee that, every year from 2015 to 2021, there had been briefings on those matters.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  38. Before I do that, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Secretariat for the support it has provided me over the past two years. Allow me to begin by summarizing the activities of the 1533 Committee, concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Over the past two years, the Committee met more than 20 times in various formats, including remotely during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. The Committee heard briefings by its Group of Experts, as well as the Minister of Mines of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and representatives of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations Mine Action Service and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  39. Over the past two years, I have had the immense privilege of chairing three Security Council Committees, namely, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004), concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015), concerning South Sudan; and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653, (2022) concerning Haiti. In addition to chairing those three Committees, I also chaired the Council’s Informal Working Group on International Tribunals, established under resolution 1966 (2010). I am pleased to have the opportunity today to brief the Council on the activities of those Committees and of the Informal Working Group in 2022 and 2023, and to share with the Council some personal observations.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9508 (2023) · source

  40. Lastly, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the Committee, South Sudan and countries of the region for their active engagement in the work of the Committee and participation in Committee meetings this year. I encourage Member States to continue to strengthen their cooperation with the Panel of Experts and the Committee. I would also like to thank the Secretariat, in particular the Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch, for its invaluable assistance in the daily work of the Committee. I wish every success to the incoming Chair of the Committee.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9507 (2023) · source

  41. The discussion focused primarily on the arms embargo and the implementation of the key benchmarks, set out by resolution 2577 (2021), as well as on progress in the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, specifically chapter II on transitional security arrangements. The overall security and humanitarian situation, including issues related to preparations for elections, currently scheduled for December 2024, was also discussed. Since the beginning of 2023, the Committee has received four exemptions requests concerning the travel ban and assets freeze measures, three of which were granted.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9507 (2023) · source

  42. With regard to the Chair’s visit to South Sudan from 21 to 28 October, I, in my capacity as Chair of the Committee, and the delegation met with relevant stakeholders in the country, including His Excellency President Salva Kiir, First Vice-President Riek Machar, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, members of the Council of Ministers, the Deputy Speaker and several parliamentarians of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, the United Nations country team, members of the diplomatic corps based in Juba and civil society representatives, including women’s groups, youth groups and religious leaders.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9507 (2023) · source

  43. On 28 November, the Committee discussed the Chair’s report of his visit to South Sudan, conducted from 21 to 28 October. In addition, on 20 October, Committee members met in informal consultations at the Permanent Mission of Gabon, where delegations received briefings from the Secretariat ahead of the Chair’s visit to South Sudan.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9507 (2023) · source

  44. On 7 September, the Committee heard a briefing by the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on the Panel’s work plan for the mandate to be renewed pursuant to resolution 2683 (2023). On 10 October, the Committee heard a briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. On 17 October, the Committee heard a briefing by a representative of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, on behalf of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 2664 (2022). On 17 November, the Committee heard a briefing by the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on the Panel’s interim report submitted pursuant to paragraph of resolution 2683 (2023) and discussed the recommendations contained therein.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9507 (2023) · source

  45. On 17 February, the Committee heard a briefing by the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts at a meeting that was open to all Member States, concerning the Panel’s interim report submitted pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 2633 (2022), contained in document S/2022/884. On 31 March, the Committee heard a briefing by the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts on the Panel’s final report submitted pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 2633 (2022) and discussed the recommendations contained therein. On 30 May, the Committee heard a briefing by the Coordinator of the Panel of Experts at a meeting that was open to all Member States, concerning the Panel’s final report submitted pursuant to paragraph of resolution 2633 (2022), contained in document S/2023/294.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9507 (2023) · source

  46. In my capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015), concerning South Sudan, I have the honour to inform the members of the Security Council of developments since my previous briefing to the Council, on 13 December 2022 (see S/PV.9219). In my statement I will provide a brief overview of developments in the Committee since the beginning of 2023, including my visit at the end of October to South Sudan as Chair of the Committee, accompanied by a delegation. With regard to the appointment of the Panel of Experts, following the consensus reached on the list proposing the experts to serve on the Panel, pursuant to resolution 2683 (2023), the Secretary-General appointed the five experts on 21 July. To date in 2023, the Committee has met on eight occasions in the format of informal consultations.

    2023-12-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9507 (2023) · source

  47. We are working to expand the sanctions regime, and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) concerning Haiti has made significant progress in that regard. I would like to conclude by once again commending Kenya for its leadership and commitment, which deserves to have the multifaceted support of the international community. We also commend the efforts on the ground of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Caribbean Community for their multifaceted contributions and call once again for the full and effective implementation of resolution 2699 (2023).

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9504 (2023) · source

  48. It is crucial that we see the Multinational Security Support Mission deployed, because what is at issue is a restoration of the rule of law, reform of the judicial system and the professionalization of the Haitian National Police, ensuring that it is autonomous, fully operational, well structured and well equipped. It is vital that we work for the effective deployment of the force, which when combined with the sanctions provided for by the regime chaired by Gabon will constitute an asset not only in bringing about a return of peace and stability to Haiti but also in ending the human rights violations, kidnappings, sexual violence, human trafficking, extrajudicial executions and arms smuggling afflicting the country.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9504 (2023) · source

  49. The security situation in Haiti remains very worrying. The country remains prey to violence, including kidnappings with demands for ransom, clashes between rival gangs, mob justice and infiltrations of institutions orchestrated by gangs and criminal networks. More than half of the territory of Port-au-Prince, the capital, is in the hands of criminal gangs who impose their own laws and make the daily life of the Haitian population hell. The Security Council’s adoption on 2 October of resolution 2699 (2023), aimed at enabling the deployment of a specialized multinational force to provide support to the Haitian National Police in combating the extreme gang violence and restoring peace and security in the country, was greeted with great hopes. However, since then its implementation has been slow in getting off the ground.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9504 (2023) · source

  50. To that end, further enshrining the legacy of the Tribunals and the Mechanism is a noble duty and constitutes a major advantage in combating impunity and strengthening and promoting international criminal law.

    2023-12-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9502 (2023) · source