YouSaid · the spoken record

Bildt

lines on the record
62
first
2000-02-28
most recent
2000-06-23
sittings or episodes
4
sources
un-security-council

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  1. “The fact that the key political and military leaders of what is left of Yugoslavia have been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia for crimes against humanity means that they are de facto excommunicated from any sort of dialogue or diplomatic contact. This is natural, but it is undoubtedly also a dilemma. We can neither make peace without Belgrade, nor talk about the different issues of the region as a whole without taking in Serbia, but there is also no way in which we can deal with those personalities who are indicted by the International Tribunal or their close associates.”

    2000-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4105 (2000) · source

  2. “In the early 1990s there was the United Nations and European Union-sponsored International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and since the summer of last year there has been the Stability Pact initiative, sponsored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and initiated by the European Union. The European Union has also offered to conclude stabilization and association agreements with each of the countries of the region. These important efforts notwithstanding, it is my belief that there will be a need for a structure that in its scope, firmness and perspective goes well beyond what has so far been contemplated. All this being said, we all know that there are virtually no possibilities at the moment of proceeding along this path of a possible peace. We are, mildly speaking, handicapped by the regime in Belgrade.”

    2000-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4105 (2000) · source

  3. “Only thus could that deal be achieved, and only thus can that deal be carried forward. Fourthly, and what is perhaps most difficult, we must be able to set an agreement firmly within the context of a wider arrangement for the region as a whole, and preferably for the region within the wider European context. There are obvious interrelationships between the different conflicts in the region, and there is an obvious need to create a wider framework that will not only guarantee the stability of the different deals in the region but will also promote the common policies of reform, reconciliation and reintegration, which will be absolutely crucial to future development. There have been, and there are, important regional initiatives.”

    2000-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4105 (2000) · source

  4. “Although this certainly remains the core conflict yet to be settled, its settlement is no longer enough. The future of Kosovo affects the region as a whole in a very profound way. We must thus be clear in seeking the voice and the involvement of the leaders in Skopje and Tirana, as well as other regional capitals. We must take into account the views expressed in Podgorica and in Sarajevo. We must treat it as a truly regional issue. Thirdly, I believe it is fundamental that we be ready to make it clear that a true deal will be one that meets the minimum demands of everyone, but the maximum demands of no one. This was the essence of the political deal that resulted in the Peace Agreement for Bosnia. It answered to the minimum demands of everyone, while it met the maximum demands of no one.”

    2000-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4105 (2000) · source

  5. “It is based on concrete experience in the region during the past 10 years. For only when there has been a solid consensus among the key international actors - often the United States, the countries of the European Union and the Russian Federation - has it been possible to achieve political agreements between the different warring parties in the different conflicts in the area. Any lesser combination has, as a rule, been doomed to failure. It is thus important for there to be a dialogue within the Council on the shape of the regional settlement that must come. Secondly, I believe that the States of the region must be active participants in the search for this settlement. In Rambouillet a year ago, the search for a settlement was primarily between Belgrade and the political representatives of the Kosovo Albanians.”

    2000-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4105 (2000) · source

  6. “There are simply too many expectations and too many fears generated by the apparently unresolved core issues of the conflict. It is thus imperative, if we are not going to give up our search for self-sustaining stability, that we be ready to resume the search for a peaceful settlement to the conflict. The time might not yet be ripe for more concrete moves, but the time is certainly ripe for discussion of the core issues. Let me indicate four starting points for such a search for a settlement. They, in turn, come on top of the most obvious point, namely, taking into account the wishes of all those living or having their roots in Kosovo. First, I believe the search for a regional settlement must have the solid support of the Council. This is not just an abstract principle or political statement.”

    2000-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4105 (2000) · source

  7. “In 1995, after massive failures and massive efforts, we managed to achieve a political settlement in Bosnia. The Dayton Peace Agreement remains one of the most ambitious agreements of its kind in modern history. In 1999, efforts to seek a political settlement to the conflict in Kosovo failed, and the war that resulted ended with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), as well as with a military-technical agreement. But there was and there is no proper peace agreement. This is a key factor that makes the task of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo so demanding and so difficult. And since the core issues of the conflict concerning the long-term position of Kosovo are not seen as settled, it has also made it much more difficult to move towards stability for the region as a whole.”

    2000-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4105 (2000) · source

  8. “We know, of course, from rather bitter experience that virtually every step of disintegration in the region has been associated with violent conflict of one sort or another, more often than not resulting in massive violations of human rights, massive ethnic cleansing and massive destruction of economic and social infrastructure. This has not been a region of velvet divorces; this has been a region of violent divorces. As we look at the region today, we have to conclude that the forces of disintegration are still stronger than the forces of integration. As long as this is the case, a self- sustaining stability that also conforms to our other values will be most difficult to achieve. This makes it even more important to press on with our search for such stability.”

    2000-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4105 (2000) · source

  9. “As we look at the situation now, a decade later, I do not think it is possible to say that we have managed to achieve a situation of self-sustaining stability in the region. Indeed, our combined political, humanitarian, economic and military involvement in the different parts of the region is larger and more demanding than ever before. Were it to be withdrawn today, we would be facing new wars tomorrow. The larger issue that we are confronted with in the region is the conflict between what I refer to as the forces of integration and the forces of disintegration. The conflict is between those who favour, or at least accept, integration within their societies as well as between them, and those who favour - often in the name of extreme nationalism - disintegration within their societies and between nations.”

    2000-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4105 (2000) · source

  10. “Old regimes and old structures of repression were thrown away, and the international community was faced with the task of helping the region transit to a new order of stability, now also built on respect for human rights and democracy. This has proved to be a most challenging task. Some would describe it as a succession of failures: the failure to prevent the war in Croatia, the failure to prevent the war in Bosnia and the failure to prevent the war in Kosovo. Those wars of course devastated the lives of people and devastated the region. The United Nations system, from the very beginning, has been at the forefront of the efforts to alleviate suffering and help ordinary people. It has often, as the Council knows, been a thankless task.”

    2000-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4105 (2000) · source

  11. “But Kosovo is only one small part of a region that is in search of stability, and my task as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General is to see what can be done to prevent new conflicts from occurring, as well as to see what can be done to pave the way for self-sustaining stability in the region as a whole. Instability and conflict are not recent phenomena in this region. We often tend to forget that conflicts and instabilities in the Balkans dominated the first decade of the twentieth century as much as they dominated the last. To find a stable political order for this region, with its rich mosaic of peoples, cultures and traditions - the result of millennia of rule by multinational empires - has been a most difficult task. It was a decade ago that we were confronted with these issues again.”

    2000-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4105 (2000) · source

  12. “Mr. Bildt: It is indeed an honour to be able to address the Council on the search for self-sustaining stability, as well as human rights and democracy, in the Balkans. Kosovo is once again the centre of public attention. But it is not my task to go into the details of all of the challenges we are facing there. Indeed, Mr. Kouchner will be briefing the Council on these on 6 March, I understand. It is enough for me to repeat what I remarked in informal consultations last year: that the operation in Kosovo is the most complex and the most challenging operation of this sort that the United Nations has ever been asked to undertake.”

    2000-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4105 (2000) · source