YouSaid · the spoken record

Bintou Keita

lines on the record
37
first
2020-09-08
most recent
2021-03-30
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3
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un-security-council

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  1. Under my leadership, MONUSCO will focus on three core tasks: first, the deployment of good offices and political strategies to support both the protection of civilians and stabilization efforts, notably through security governance reforms, and continuing the fight against impunity; secondly, supporting the Democratic Republic of the Congo in its regional and continental leadership to enhance peace and stability in the Great Lakes region; and thirdly, the implementation of our transition strategy, with the United Nations country team and other partners and donors, seeking an improvement of the Government’s ability to ensure the protection of civilians, especially in conflict-affected areas.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  2. I am pleased to note and report President Tshisekedi’s continued commitment to improving relations with the neighbours of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which remains of vital importance to the stabilization of the eastern provinces of the country and to ensuring peace and security throughout the subregion. I pledge to actively support our regional Special Envoy, Huang Xia, so that we can seize the opportunity of the African Union chairmanship of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to advance an ambitious programme of international cooperation in various fields, including issues of peace and security, as well as those of humanitarian aid, development and the fight against impunity.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  3. This brings me to another opportunity — President Tshisekedi’s recent assumption of the chairmanship of the African Union. This chairmanship not only symbolizes the return of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the concert of leading nations of the African continent; it must also make it possible to demonstrate the commitment of the country and the region to silencing the guns once and for all in that part of the continent. It is essential that we support the commitment of President Tshisekedi and his African Union chairmanship to firmly and definitively anchoring the Great Lakes region in a dynamic of peace, security and inclusive and sustainable regional economic development.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  4. A break with untenable policies of the past and the implementation of sustainable processes are necessary to dismantle armed groups and to ensure the ability of the Congolese security forces to fully take over responsibility for the protection of civilians. The regional dimension is also important in this respect. Without a new regional vision and common platform to find non-military solutions to cross-border conflict drivers — whether foreign armed groups or illicit trade in natural resources — the Mission’s work with our Government partners will be limited in its sustainability. In this, I will redouble engagement with the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region and also request the Council’s support for our joint regional engagement.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  5. While this will require an important military and police security guarantee to hold the space for political resolutions, the main thrust of the effort should be political. The implementation of our provincial strategies is crucial in this respect, tied as they are to the Mission’s transition planning and including the necessity to counter spoilers — those networks at the national and local levels that support the activities of armed groups and profit from an economy of war. In this sense, we are stressing the need to accelerate the security sector reform process and operationalize the disarmament, demobilization, community reintegration and stabilization programme.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  6. Indeed, in my first mission to these areas, through exchanges with provincial authorities, civil society and my United Nations colleagues, I saw first-hand the challenges that this part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to face. I renewed the Mission’s and country team’s commitment to working, together with all partners and colleagues, to help alleviate the Congolese population’s long-standing, unacceptable suffering. To silence the guns, there is no military solution, but political strategies. These strategies must take into account and address the many social, economic and governance needs, including in relation to the management of the security apparatus and addressing the underlying challenges of land insecurity and improving transparency and accountability in the mining sector.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  7. Partners such as the World Bank and the European Union are stepping in as well with much-needed assistance for community-based DDR and resilience programming, as well as infrastructure that will enhance the Government’s ability to extend State authority and provide protection in conflict zones. At the same time, the Peacebuilding Fund supports reconciliation and social cohesion, inclusive local governance, community reintegration of ex-combatants and durable solutions for displaced populations. However, the deeply rooted and complex conflict dynamics in the Kivus and Ituri mean that we are not yet at the stage of contemplating MONUSCO’s withdrawal from these provinces, given the extremely serious security, protection and humanitarian challenges that are still present there.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  8. As we prepare to close in June MONUSCO’s field offices in the Kasai region — and I believe we will be able to do the same next year in Tanganyika — we are expanding cooperation with the United Nations country team in the rule of law domain and in the framework of the humanitarian-development-peace triple nexus, approach. This is aimed at reducing the humanitarian needs and vulnerability of the people, contributing to stabilization and sustainable development. We are foreseeing to use similar approaches in the Kivus and Ituri, while also using the full spectrum of peacekeeping tools in view of accelerating progress towards conflict resolution.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  9. At the same time, I have emphasized as well the need to overcome the deadlocks that have been holding back political progress and stabilization. In collaboration with partners, the Government must address the immense and pressing security, humanitarian and development needs facing the country. In this, it must ensure that the actions needed to respond to these needs are not further delayed. The process of MONUSCO’s transition has itself helped spur other opportunities to increase cooperation within the United Nations family and with other partners.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  10. These include the reform of the Congolese military and police forces; taking ownership for the effective protection of civilians at the national and provincial levels; ensuring effective and sustainable, community-based disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); strengthening the civilian and military justice systems and support to transitional justice; and beginning plans for the 2023 electoral cycle. I am underlining to all stakeholders the need to act within the constitutional framework and to organize the elections in a timely and inclusive manner, respecting the electoral calendar. I am committed to working hand-in-hand with our partners to ensure the success of this new Government.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  11. I have been encouraged by the President’s determination and willingness to mobilize all necessary resources to address the security and stabilization needs of the Congolese people in the east, as well as by the pragmatic, constructive and open engagement I enjoyed with the Prime Minister-designate and all other senior Congolese officials. I have therefore stressed to the Congolese leadership that the new Government must act promptly on a number of priority areas, which in turn correspond to the priorities outlined in MONUSCO’s mandate.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  12. The full support of the entire Council will be essential in this regard. The first opportunity I see concerns the formation of the new Government and our work in partnership with it to support the implementation of much-needed reforms. Through my exchanges with President Tshisekedi and the Prime Minister- designate, I can report that there is a momentum for change that can be built. There is an opening to push forward the necessary governance and institutional reforms, which will have a direct impact in supporting a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in the east.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  13. I therefore feel that the 33 months before these electoral deadlines are a road that we must take together with the Government and the Congolese people by redoubling our energy and efficiency in overcoming the obstacles and meeting the challenges that will arise in order to continue the democratic consolidation of the country and its institutions and to move forward towards the stabilization of the east and the reforms necessary to that end. It is in this context that I would like to discuss the opportunities that the current political situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo offers, as well as the risks it entails. Indeed, we cannot ignore the challenges, persistent weaknesses and remaining obstacles; overcoming them will require the international community and the Government to speak with one voice and act with common resolve.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  14. The electoral process of 2023 represents a new, critical stage in the process of democratic transition, institutional consolidation and stabilization in the country. After the peaceful transfer of power between President Kabila and President Tshisekedi in 2019 and the reshuffle of the ruling coalition over the past three months, this deadline is already informing political positions, reform proposals on the agenda of the returning Parliament and public debate. In accordance with the wishes of President Tshisekedi, Prime Minister-designate Mr. Jean-Michel Sama Lukonde Kyenge has also indicated to me that the preparation for the 2023 elections is one of the priorities of the upcoming Government.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  15. I thank you for giving me the opportunity to address you today to introduce the Secretary-General’s report on the activities of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2021/274) and to provide an overview of the current situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Shortly after my arrival in Kinshasa as Special Representative of the Secretary- General, I initiated a series of consultations with the main political leaders and actors and Congolese civil society, and visited the provinces in the east and Kasai where MONUSCO is present, to meet with Mission teams and assess progress in the implementation of our mandate and the challenges to come. The first conclusion I came to following these early consultations is that the country already had its eyes on the elections of 2023.

    2021-03-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/316 (2021) · source

  16. To conclude, I would like to put forth three recommendations to the Security Council and Member States to optimally position the United Nations in advancing nationally owned and led security-sector governance and reform efforts by, first, recognizing security-sector governance and reform primarily as political processes and ensuring that peace operation mandates on SSR are linked to broader political objectives; secondly, systematically recognizing the coordination role of the United Nations and the necessity of partnerships as means to align international assistance with national SSR priorities; and, thirdly, supporting inclusive SSR processes and prioritizing efforts aiming at increasing women’s participation in national security services by identifying and addressing systemic barriers to their recruitment, retention and promotion.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  17. In Mali, MINUSMA successfully supported the establishment of a vetting mechanism that will prevent perpetrators of sexual violence from joining the Malian army. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, MONUSCO has supported efforts by Congolese military justice to prosecute, among others, cases of sexual violence. However, despite the progress made, there is an enormous gap between the expectations for gender-responsive SSR processes and the availability of the resources — political, technical and financial — necessary to foster inclusivity and representativity within security institutions at all levels.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  18. Inclusive and gender-responsive SSR requires strong political leadership to transform long-held stereotypes and patriarchal norms about women in uniform, such as establishing gender-parity quotas, assessing barriers to women’s inclusion, delivering advanced career opportunities and ensuring women’s promotion to leadership roles. It takes time for security institutions to evolve. But whenever security services discriminate against or fail to protect individuals or communities based on gender, race or ethnic affiliation, accountability must be swift and impartial. Finding that balance is a challenge that societies around the world grapple with daily. In the Central African Republic, MINUSCA supported the Armed Forces of the Central African Republic in building facilities for women soldiers in Camp Kassaï, east of Bangui.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  19. An inclusive and consensual national SRR vision, backed by coordinated international partners, is the most efficient way forward.Thirdly, lasting security will remain elusive as long as the underpinning analysis, assessment and implementation of security governance reform excludes women’s and minorities’ perspectives and security needs. Security sectors in many countries continue to be largely dominated by men and systematically discriminate against women. SSR is a key opportunity to raise awareness and generate a national commitment to addressing inequalities by building security institutions that are more gender-neutral and representative of minorities.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  20. That included support for the elaboration of the AU Policy Framework on SSR, the development of a tailored capacity-building programme and, more recently, bolstering strategic coordination between the African Union and partners in the framework of an SSR steering committee. The European Union is also a key and longstanding SSR partner in many settings. Bilateral SSR support and assistance programmes are almost always in place and are often most influential. In all settings, we strive to ensure coordination among partners and the compatibility of their approaches, for the benefit of the host country and local communities. I must be frank: sometimes this can be a rather challenging task. We need to redouble our efforts to work together on the ground through joint analysis, assessment and joint implementation whenever possible.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  21. The current MONUSCO transition provides a fresh opportunity for a structured dialogue and forging a consensus that should not be missed. Secondly, coordination and close cooperation among partners on the ground is essential. The United Nations is rarely alone in assisting security-sector reform. Given the complexity of the task, partnerships are a welcome necessity. The African Union — supported by its regional economic communities and regional mechanisms — has been at the forefront of advancing security-sector reform at the policy and operational levels in Africa. We built a strategic partnership with the African Union Commission, focused on advancing the African Union’s (AU) leading role in SSR on the continent and in Silencing the Guns.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  22. Yet despite the significant progress made, too often SSR support is narrowly focused on enhancing the capacity and capability of security providers and often at junctures when such an investment is unlikely to be sustainable. In many settings, the social contract remains fragile, there is deep mistrust towards security services, and there is no dialogue on security and defence matters between authorities, political actors and the population at large. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, lack of a national consensus and the multiplicity of partners and competing visions have led to a narrow focus on the reinforcement of military capacities at the expense of a wider approach to the protection of civilians.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  23. The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is facilitating dialogue with national authorities and partners to create space for sustainable SSR while also supporting the efforts of the military justice system to hold security elements accountable. The United Nations Mission in South Sudan is employing good offices and providing technical expertise to support the articulation of a national reform model. In all of those contexts, peace operations are working to enhance the coordination of international partners in support of national SSR priorities and are injecting critical capacity into security-sector institutions and personnel.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  24. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) uses good offices and mediation efforts to advance the implementation of SSR provisions in the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, signed at Algiers; the Peacebuilding Fund was also the first partner to support the compliance framework for the Group of Five for the Sahel Force, which the United Nations S/2020/1176 is mandated to support, with approximately $600,000 in seed funding, quickly followed by European Union funding of €10 million. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) provides technical and logistical support to the recruitment, integration and deployment of security services.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  25. First, SSR can succeed only when it is part of a wider political process; also, political considerations must result in the design of reasonable plans and realistic expectations. In that regard, we welcome the Security Council’s linking of SSR- mandated tasks to the strategic priorities of peace operations such as support for peace processes, stabilization, the extension of State authority and the protection of civilians. Let me list some of the SSR tasks that peace operations perform.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  26. Security-sector reforms should be part of larger political strategies and priorities, as, for example, in Afghanistan, Liberia and Sierra Leone; also, security-sector-reform processes are more sustainable when based on inclusive citizen involvement, including of women and youth. Expectations, however, need to be realistic. Security-sector governance and reform is a complex and long-term endeavour, sometimes spanning a generation. It requires a deep understanding of the root causes of a conflict, sustained political will to overcome resistance and the space to implement difficult political decisions. It also requires the balancing of all stakeholders’ security needs. With that in mind, let me reflect on three strategic points, based on lessons learned from our experience in implementing security-sector reform mandates.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  27. There is indeed broad recognition that security-sector governance is a key element of United Nations support for national efforts to sustain peace and prevent the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict across the entire peace continuum. This applies from prevention to peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development settings. As one example, the Peacebuilding Fund invested $21 million during 2017 through 2019 in support of those efforts in countries such as Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Guinea and Liberia. The joint United Nations-World Bank study, Pathways for Peace, illustrated the importance of security-sector governance, including the fact that security-sector reforms play a critical role in prevention. We can see this in Indonesia, Kenya, Timor- Leste and Tunisia, to name but a few countries.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  28. I would like to thank the South African presidency for having convened this high-level debate. I am very pleased to address the Council today with Mr. Zouev and African Union Commissioner Chergui on the topic of security-sector governance and reform. I will outline the strides that we have made and the challenges that we face in supporting Member States that embark on security-sector reform in contexts of fragility and post-conflict recovery. For societies recovering from conflict and instability, security-sector reform (SSR) holds great promise: democratically governed, effective and accountable security and justice sectors — which reflect the social fabric of the nation — create a safe and secure environment in which the rule of law and economic and social development can take root for the benefit of States and their peoples.

    2020-12-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1176 (2020) · source

  29. In that connection, I welcome the Security Council’s open debate via video-teleconference on cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, particularly the OIF.

    2020-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/893 (2020) · source

  30. In all aspects of our partnership with the OIF in terms of peace and security, we jointly support and promote multilingualism. Indeed, we subscribe to the idea that diversity, particularly linguistic diversity, is one of the riches of the cultural heritage of humankind. We therefore work together to celebrate and protect that diversity. The coronavirus disease pandemic has highlighted the need for enhanced and renewed multilateralism in order to meet the challenges of our times. Cooperation within and among international organizations is one of the pillars of multilateralism. The close partnership between the United Nations and the OIF is fully in line with that objective.

    2020-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/893 (2020) · source

  31. Moreover, working with the OIF, we strongly support the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel), notably through our support for the G-5 Sahel Priority Investment Programme and the G-5 Sahel Joint Force. The Joint Force, in particular, continues to grow in strength and deserves enhanced international support. Finally, it is important to underscore the important role the OIF plays in the area of peacebuilding, in cooperation with various organizations, each of which also plays a unique and essential role. In particular, I welcome the OIF participation in the work of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) on Burundi, Guinea, Guinea- Bissau and the Central African Republic, as well as in ad hoc meetings of the PBC on other conflict-affected francophone countries.

    2020-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/893 (2020) · source

  32. Secondly, I welcome the strong support that OIF member States are providing to peacekeeping operations in the spirit of partnership anchored in the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative. In A4P, the OIF co-sponsors and supports the theme of performance and accountability. To this end, we are making joint efforts together with the OIF to increase the level of French-speaking civilian and uniformed personnel in peacekeeping operations deployed in French-speaking host countries, including through French-language training. We encourage OIF member States to continue their efforts aimed at building the capacity of francophone civilian and uniformed personnel, including to enable them to reach senior positions in peacekeeping operations and beyond.

    2020-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/893 (2020) · source

  33. It is also in line with resolution 2250 (2015) on youth, peace and security. The imperative need for the just inclusion of women and youth in all aspects of the life of society and the international community is inescapable. In the French- speaking world alone, with some 274 million male and female French speakers across 54 States, women inarguably represent half of the population and young people under the age of 30 represent the majority. Our partnership with the OIF for the implementation of the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy, adopted in January 2019, aimed at strengthening the number of French-speaking women in uniform, is a modest contribution to this effort.

    2020-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/893 (2020) · source

  34. Also in the area of prevention, the OIF played an important role in the establishment of the Francophone Network for the Prevention of Violent Radicalization and Violent Extremism that Could Lead to Terrorism to mobilize Francophone expertise on this topical international issue, which is a considerable contribution, particularly in the Sahel. Conflict prevention is also based on promoting fully inclusive societies, especially for women and young people. It is a key area of collaboration between the United Nations and the OIF. Indeed, we need to redouble our efforts aimed at promoting the involvement of women and youth in conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as in electoral processes. This commitment is part of the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), which celebrates its twentieth anniversary this year.

    2020-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/893 (2020) · source

  35. Since our cooperation is rich and multifaceted and the time available for this briefing is limited, the examples I will cite are merely illustrative and not exhaustive. First of all, I would like to commend the joint work of the United Nations and the OIF in the areas of early warning and conflict prevention, and in electoral assistance and observation of electoral processes. Recently, the United Nations and the OIF have cooperated in those areas in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Madagascar and the Central African Republic. The quadripartite meeting on Cameroon of the United Nations Secretariat, the OIF, the Commonwealth and the African Union, held on 20 July, is an example of expanded cooperation in early warning and prevention.

    2020-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/893 (2020) · source

  36. Our partnership is anchored at the highest level, as demonstrated by today’s meeting of the Security Council and by the General Assembly’s regular adoption of resolutions on cooperation between the United Nations and the OIF, the latest of which was adopted on 15 April 2019 (resolution 73/290). Furthermore, contacts between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the OIF, Ms Louise Mushikiwabo, are constant. In addition, interactions between the Secretary-General and the Secretariat, on the one hand, and the Group of Francophone Ambassadors to the United Nations, on the other, are equally frequent. Allow me to focus today on our collaboration in the area of peace and security.

    2020-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/893 (2020) · source

  37. I thank you, Sir, for the opportunity to address the Council on the subject of cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, and the role of the International Organization of la Francophonie (OIF) in this context. This is a particularly opportune time to look at the partnership with the OIF, as both our organizations are celebrating important anniversaries this year: 50 years for the OIF and 75 years for the United Nations. Today, together with the OIF, we are working to promote international peace and security, particularly through early warning and conflict prevention, and peacekeeping and peacebuilding. We are also partnering in promoting sustainable development, good governance, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the inclusion of women and youth.

    2020-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/893 (2020) · source