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Brammertz

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2006-03-16
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2023-12-12
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  1. Mr. Brammertz: Once again, I would like to thank the Council for the opportunity to brief it on the progress made by the Independent International Investigation Commission. The Commission's latest report covers activities in the last three months. As outlined in previous reports, the Commission remains mindful of its obligation to maintain the confidentiality of its investigations in order to protect both the integrity of the legal process and individuals who cooperate with the Commission. Since the last briefing to the Council, the Commission has continued to enjoy productive cooperation with the Lebanese authorities in all areas of its work. The Commission meets regularly with the Prosecutor General of Lebanon and senior members of his office and with magistrates assigned to the various cases.

    2007-03-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5642 (2007) · source

  2. A delayed response, or worse still a lack of response, to its requests severely hampers the progress of the Commission's work. Finally, in the light of the proposed creation of a special tribunal for Lebanon, the Commission will realign its objectives and organize its work in a manner that will facilitate the transition to such a tribunal. The Commission hopes and trusts that it will be able to continue to count on the Security Council's support in carrying out its mandate.

    2006-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5597 (2006) · source

  3. The Commission's work on the 14 cases continues to elicit links between each case and to the Rafik Hariri case. Further analysis will be done in the next reporting period to develop these links. Similarly, the Commission will continue to provide support in the Gemayel case, focusing during this initial period on assisting with identifying those who physically perpetrated the crime and on examining whether links to the other cases exist. The Commission still faces many challenges. It requires assistance from the United Nations Secretariat in areas such as recruitment, procurement, administration and finance, to facilitate and support the necessary pace of its work. It also needs the continued support of Member States to which it addresses requests for assistance.

    2006-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5597 (2006) · source

  4. The lack of responsiveness by certain States has impeded or slowed down the work of the Commission on several fronts. In View of the crucial nature of the information that it seeks to obtain from States and the limited time frame in which it aims to complete its investigative activities, the Commission trusts that it will enjoy full and prompt cooperation from all States during the next reporting period. The Commission has made progress in the two main areas of its investigation in the Hariri case: developing crime scene evidence and investigating potential perpetrators. Fifty interviews and other types of evidence collection are planned for the next reporting period and, as always, the Commission's objective is to collect evidence that will be admissible before a future tribunal.

    2006-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5597 (2006) · source

  5. The Commission is satisfied with the timeliness and efficiency of Syria's assistance to the Commission and with the logistical and security arrangements made for its investigation activities on Syrian territory. The Commission will continue to rely on Syria's full cooperation, as this remains crucial to the swift and successful completion of its work. 3 Since 15 September 2006, 10 new formal requests for assistance have been sent to five different States, bringing the total number of requests sent to States other than Lebanon and Syria since March this year to approximately 60. Although most States have responded positively to the Commission's requests and have actively assisted its work, including by facilitating witness interviews and providing other support and information, some States have provided late or incomplete responses.

    2006-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5597 (2006) · source

  6. The Commission regularly shares with the appropriate Lebanese authorities the substance of all relevant information that it obtains, where necessary in a manner that does not compromise the interest of the source of this information. This information-sharing process is especially important when the information is relevant to individuals who are detained. The cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic with the Commission remains generally satisfactory. During the reporting period the Commission submitted 12 formal requests for assistance to Syria and undertook a number of investigation activities and interviews of individuals in Syria.

    2006-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5597 (2006) · source

  7. The Commission is providing investigative support by helping to identify the perpetrators and the vehicles that were used in the attack. It is also working to reconstruct the modus operandi of the assassins. After seven days of investigation at the crime scene, a total of 250 exhibits were sent to a laboratory for forensic research and analysis. It is the preliminary assessment of the Commission that Minister Gemayel was the subject of surveillance as part of a planned assassination operation against him. The Commission has continued to cooperate closely with the Lebanese authorities. The Commission is very grateful for all the support it receives from those authorities, especially at a time when the security situation in Lebanon remains highly volatile.

    2006-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5597 (2006) · source

  8. These links, which relate to the nature of the attacks, the nature of 06-66630 the victims and the modus operandi of the perpetrators, support the analytical hypotheses discussed in the Commission's report of June 2006 (S/2006/375, annex). The Commission also believes that the motive to attack at least some of the victims was associated with the victims' common objectives and interests, and thus that these attacks may have been linked by a common intent. On 21 November 2006, Pierre Gemayel, the Minister of Industry, was assassinated. Two days later, following a request from the Lebanese Prime Minister and a decision taken by the Council, the Commission started providing technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of the Gemayel case.

    2006-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5597 (2006) · source

  9. At this stage of the Commission's investigation, a smaller number of motives have emerged as the most plausible. During the reporting period the Commission has continued to extend technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in the 14 cases. The Commission has focused in particular on interviewing witnesses associated with the victims of the six targeted attacks. It has thus far conducted 19 interviews in connection with this line of enquiry and has a number of further interviews scheduled for the next reporting period. A considerable number of links between the six cases, and between these cases and the Rafik Hariri case, have emerged from these interviews.

    2006-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5597 (2006) · source

  10. The Commission has so far conducted 17 interviews in Syria and Lebanon in connection with this line of enquiry and has held a number of meetings with relevant Syrian and Lebanese officials. It has collected substantial quantities of computer and electronic data - some of which is encrypted or in code - and has visited a number of locations in Syria. This aspect of the investigation will continue during the next reporting period. The Commission also continues to collect information about the increasing threats against and pressure on Rafik Hariri during the last 15 months of his life. An analysis of this information reveals a number of potential motives to kill Rafik Hariri, the majority of which are in one way or another linked to his political activities.

    2006-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5597 (2006) · source

  11. The Commission hopes that, after a second phase of analysis, the specific geographic and ethnic origin of this person can be determined. Many other aspects of the investigation are ongoing. For instance, the Commission continues to focus on analysing information relating to Ahmed Abu Adass, in order to establish how Abu Adass was identified, where and when that occurred, who may have been involved in organizing his appearance in the video in which he claimed responsibility for the assassination, and what happened to him after the video was made and delivered. The Commission has also undertaken investigations with regard to individuals associated with Ahmed Abu Adass in Lebanon and elsewhere.

    2006-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5597 (2006) · source

  12. The report confirms many of the Commission's own hypotheses, for example that there was only one blast and that the Mitsubishi van was the carrier of the improvised explosive device. The expert report also supports the hypothesis that an RDX-based high explosive was used. Recent forensic results also confirm that it is likely that a person triggered the explosion from within or immediately in front of the Mitsubishi van rather than through the use of a remote-controlled device. The Commission is also analysing the human parts belonging to the unidentified male believed to be the bomber that were recovered from the crime scene. 06-66630 Forensic results show that the individual did not spend his youth in Lebanon, but was situated there in the last two to three months before his death.

    2006-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5597 (2006) · source

  13. In this context, the Prosecutor General of Lebanon and the Commission believe that placing information concerning suspects and witnesses in the public domain would make it difficult for sensitive witnesses to step forward and engage with the Commission and may be prejudicial to future trials before a tribunal. The findings presented in this report have to be understood with those limitations in mind. The Commission's investigation in the Hariri case has remained focused on developing crime scene evidence and investigating potential perpetrators and their linkage to one another. Following the collection of forensic evidence at the crime scene in June 2006, the Commission has received a final report from external forensic experts.

    2006-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5597 (2006) · source

  14. Mr. Brammertz: Mr. President, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to present to the Council the fourth report for 2006 of the International Independent Investigation Commission (S/2006/962, annex). The report covers the activities of the Commission between 25 September and 10 December. As members of the Security Council are aware, the political climate in Lebanon has been volatile during this reporting period. Cabinet minister Pierre Gemayel was assassinated in Beirut on 21 November; large demonstrations have taken place; and the complex discourse surrounding the establishment of a special tribunal for Lebanon is still ongoing. This has had an inevitable impact on the Commission's investigation and security requirements. The Commission has reached a critical stage in its investigations.

    2006-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5597 (2006) · source

  15. The Commission is putting in place such mechanisms in order to allow more individuals with appropriate knowledge to step forward and assist it in this sensitive area of its work. The third area of particular importance is resources. Strengthening the Commission's institutional capacity is critical. Recruiting and retaining competent personnel remains a concern, as this affects the Commission's ability to fulfil its mandate in a timely manner. The Commission trusts that the Security Council and all States will continue to support it in managing these and other challenges.

    2006-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5539 (2006) · source

  16. The Commission is satisfied with the progress made so far in the investigations and will continue to obtain the best possible results throughout the next reporting period and until the end of the current mandate in June 2007. These results can be achieved only with the continued support of all States. In this context, three areas are of particular importance. The first area is requests for assistance. During the last six months, more than 70 requests were sent to States for their assistance, and the Commission anticipates sending more such requests. Timeliness of answers by States remains of paramount importance, especially in light of the time constraints the Commission faces. The second area is witness protection. Witness protection measures are crucial to the further development of the investigations.

    2006-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5539 (2006) · source

  17. Pursuant to the common understanding reached between the Commission and the Syrian Arab Republic earlier in the year, Syria's cooperation with the Commission has continued to be timely and efficient. During the reporting period, the Commission submitted 11 formal requests for assistance to Syria, seeking information and documentation about certain individuals and groups. Syria also provided documentation relating to experiments it conducted concerning the properties and impact of various controlled explosions. Follow-up meetings have taken place with experts from the Commission to discuss these experiments. The level of assistance provided by Syria during the reporting period remains generally satisfactory.

    2006-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5539 (2006) · source

  18. The Commission is grateful to the Lebanese authorities for the outstanding support and work undertaken, especially considering the particularly difficult circumstances that marked the reporting period. The Commission requires the assistance and full support of States on technical, legal and judicial matters relevant to the investigation. Between 15 June and 15 September 2006, a total of 39 new formal requests for assistance were sent to 12 different Member States and international institutions. Most 3 Member States responded in a positive and prompt manner to the Commission's requests, providing forensic technical assistance, technological support and tracking and analysis of telephone communications and facilitating witness interviews.

    2006-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5539 (2006) · source

  19. The Commission anticipates that further links between these cases will become evident upon further collection of information and evidence. The Commission has continued to interact closely with the Lebanese authorities - the Government of Lebanon, the Prosecutor General and his senior staff, the investigating judges assigned to the cases, as well as with the liaison officer appointed by the Internal Security Forces. The Commission has continued to share with the competent Lebanese judicial authorities all relevant documentary, testimonial and physical information obtained in the course of its investigation, including information relevant to individuals who are detained and the assessment of the credibility of witnesses.

    2006-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5539 (2006) · source

  20. Forensic evidence in these cases is being compared with that of the Hariri case, for example by using common fingerprint and DNA databases. The second area is, as already mentioned, the communications analysis. The objective is to lift, from the vast amount of communications traffic in Beirut during the period of the attacks, those numbers common to some of the attacks, and to link other relevant numbers. The third area concerns the conduct of interviews where the interviewees can provide information on individual cases as well as on multiple cases' commonalities. As a result of the work done during the reporting period, the Commission has strengthened its preliminary conclusions that the 14 cases were not commissioned and executed by 14 disparate and unconnected persons or groups with separate motives.

    2006-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5539 (2006) · source

  21. The Commission's strategic objectives for the coming months are to undertake approximately 50 key linkage-related interviews, collect and analyse a large amount of already identified electronic data, technical intelligence and documentation and develop its communication and further sensitive sources. In Security Council resolution 1686 (2006), the Council expanded the Commission's mandate in relation to the technical assistance it provides to the Lebanese authorities in 14 other cases. The 06-54337 Commission has increased the resources it devotes to this technical assistance and has concentrated on three main areas. The first area is in forensic investigation and analysis for each case to establish the nature and location of the explosive devices used.

    2006-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5539 (2006) · source

  22. The reduced security arrangements for Rafik Hariri after his resignation as Prime Minister created a number of vulnerabilities enabling the attack to be perpetrated more easily. As a priority, the Commission is analysing and investigating the communications traffic relevant to the case and its international aspects. They demonstrate a complex network of telecommunications traffic between a number of individuals relevant to the investigation. Thanks to its communication analysis, the Commission understands better the preparatory aspects of the attack, notably of the activities and locations of the six SIM. card holders alleged to have been part of the bombing team. This work remains ongoing and is one of the areas where comparative analysis with the 14 other cases is being pursued.

    2006-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5539 (2006) · source

  23. The Commission has also reached preliminary conclusions about a number of issues that were previously unclear. For instance, two sounds were heard by some witnesses on 14 February, while there was, according to our findings, only one explosion. There are scientific explanations for this phenomenon. The Commission continues to investigate the modus operandi used by the perpetrators. It is examining information suggesting that Rafik Hariri was the subject of earlier surveillances and possibly of earlier attempts to kill him. It is likely that the alleged bombing team knew that electronic countermeasures were in place to protect the convoy and Rafik Hariri and that they chose a method of attack that would not be impeded by such countermeasures.

    2006-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5539 (2006) · source

  24. Several of these remains appear to correspond to the person that allegedly detonated the improvised explosive device, a man in his early twenties. Further forensic tests are taking place to possibly establish the regional origin of that person; his DNA is being compared with existing DNA databases in several countries. Independent tests carried out in two separate environments earlier this year, as well as scaling explosion experiments have corroborated the findings 06-54337 of the Commission with regard to the characteristics and nature of the explosion of 14 February 2005. In its previous report, the Commission indicated that the minimum quantity of explosives used was 1,200 kilogrammes. Subject to final results, it is now estimated that the quantity of explosives used would have been closer to 1,800 kilogrammes.

    2006-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5539 (2006) · source

  25. Despite this situation, the Commission has made progress in its investigation of the killing of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others and in the expanded technical assistance it provides to the Lebanese authorities in the investigation of certain other crimes. In the Hariri investigation, 20 major investigation and analysis projects are ongoing. The previous report (8/2006/375, annex) concentrated on the extensive forensic examination of the crime scene and of the blast that killed Mr. Hariri and 22 others. Over the past month, the focus has been on consolidating the results of that examination and on conducting a significant number of interviews with a View to identifying the perpetrators at all levels. The DNA analysis conducted on the human remains found at the crime scene produced crucial results.

    2006-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5539 (2006) · source

  26. Mr. Brammertz: I am grateful for the opportunity to present the report of the International Independent Investigation Commission (S/2006/760, annex). Like the previous reports, this report provides a snapshot of the Commission's work over the past three months and of its ongoing activities. It gives only as much detail as is possible in view of the underlying need to preserve confidentiality and investigative leads. The reporting period was marked by the conflict in Lebanon. As a result, and in accordance with United Nations security regulations, the Commission's international personnel were required to leave Lebanon on 21 July 2006. The Commission relocated to a temporary base in Cyprus, where activities resumed almost immediately upon arrival. The gradual process of returning international personnel to Lebanon has already started.

    2006-09-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5539 (2006) · source

  27. The Commission could also conceive of a more proactive role for itself in supporting Lebanese judicial authorities in strengthening their investigations. I am fully aware of the high expectations that the Commission's mandate and work create among the families of the victims - and, in fact, among the Lebanese public at large. I understand the need to obtain answers to the questions surrounding the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the 14 other attacks. It is precisely for those reasons that there is no alternative to staying focused and continuing to tackle these questions one by one and in a systematic manner that will provide the level of evidential certainty required by any court so that justice will eventually be done. I thank the Council very much for its continued support.

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  28. While continuing essential forensic work, the Commission will, in the months ahead, focus on the identification of the perpetrators and those who commissioned the crime. The Commission welcomes the 4 May 2006 request of the Government of Lebanon to the Secretary-General to extend its mandate for a further period of up to one year. Such an extension would provide a sense of continuity and stability and guarantee steady operations and planning. Moreover, in the light of the potential linkages between the Hariri investigation and the 14 other cases, the Commission believes that a much more concerted and robust effort is needed to move these cases forward. External support in providing technical assistance and forensics expertise to the Lebanese investigations will be critical.

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  29. The procedure aims at ensuring uniformity in the work of the Commission and respect for minimum professional standards. The internal procedure takes into account Lebanese law and judicial procedures, as well as relevant international standards and the procedures of international criminal jurisdictions. That will help ensure that any information collected by the Commission is admissible in future legal proceedings, possibly before a tribunal of an international character. Considerable progress has been achieved in the Hariri investigation. Critical forensics work on the crime scene and the convoy vehicles has been completed. The modalities and circumstances of the attack of 14 February 2005, which killed Rafik Hariri and 22 others, are now largely understood.

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  30. The consolidation of the Commission's structure and capacity is therefore an ongoing effort. In my last briefing I expressed serious concern over the lack of readily available and qualified personnel for the Commission. While the Commission is still not at full capacity, the situation has improved. Most of the Commission's key functions are now filled or under recruitment. We have 24 investigators, lawyers and analysts on board, with 10 additional staff scheduled to join us soon. As a result, the vacancy rate has dropped from almost 50 per cent in January to less than 20 per cent today. A key aspect of the Commission's institutional consolidation has been the adoption of its own internal working procedure, as directed by resolution 1595 (2005).

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  31. The reasons for that include the lack of Lebanese forensic capacity to collect and analyse evidence and a lack of horizontal coordination among the cases due to an apparent fragmentation within the Lebanese judicial and law enforcement system. The Commission has little reason to believe that the status of these cases will change much in the foreseeable future unless external assistance is provided. Given the significance of the 14 cases and their potential importance to the Hariri investigation, I believe that a more concerted and robust effort is needed to advance the investigation of these cases. Progress in the Commission's investigative work when providing technical assistance will not be possible without the strong backbone of a solid organization.

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  32. The Commission's focus during the reporting period has been twofold: to advance the status of each case individually and of all cases horizontally so as to establish potential links between the attacks. As a result, the cases can be linked analytically in a number of different ways, and from varying perspectives, notably in the similarities in their modus operandi and their intent. However, in terms of evidence, none of the cases is developed to an extent that would allow for the identification and linking of perpetrators. In fact, all 14 cases are at present lacking significant forward investigative momentum.

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  33. Moreover, interaction with the Lebanese authorities continues to be excellent at all levels and on all aspects of the Commission's mandate. The commitment and support of the Prosecutor General of Lebanon and his Office, and that of the respective investigating judges, have been instrumental in much of the progress made. The Government of Lebanon, the armed forces and the internal security forces ensure, with much dedication, that the Commission can carry out its work in a secure environment, despite persisting security challenges. The Commission is particularly grateful for that support. The Commission has also continued its technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of 14 other attacks that occurred in Lebanon.

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  34. Three of those requests were submitted as a result of my meetings in Damascus with the President and the Vice-President on 25 April 2006. At that meeting, the President reiterated the assurances given by other senior officials that Syria intends to comply fully with all Commission requests. The Commission will continue to request this full cooperation from Syrian authorities, including in collecting documents, seeking specific information and facilitating interviews of Syrian citizens. There has also been a substantial increase in the number of requests for assistance submitted to other Member States. Since 15 March 2006, 32 formal requests for assistance were sent to 13 Member States. 3 That increase underlines the wide reach of the Commission's investigative activities and the international character of its work.

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  35. These include interviews with Syrian and Lebanese officials from a number of different organizations and agencies. The level of assistance provided by Syria during the reporting period has generally been satisfactory. Syria responded to all of the Commission's requests, and did so in a timely manner. In some instances comprehensive responses were provided. Since March, the Commission has submitted 16 formal requests for assistance to Syria. Some of those seek, within a set time frame, detailed information on the Syrian military and civilian intelligence apparatus in Lebanon. Others request the facilitation of witness interviews in Syria or the sharing of information obtained by the Syrian authorities in the course of their own investigations.

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  36. On the other hand, the Commission does not exclude the possibility of an operation planned and executed by a relatively small single team. The Commission is also developing working hypotheses regarding those who commissioned the crime. Given the many different positions occupied by Rafik Hariri and his wide range of public and private sector activities, the Commission is investigating a number of different motives, including political motivations, personal vendettas, financial circumstances and extremist ideologies, as well as any combination of them. In this context, the Commission is continuing with a series of interviews of individuals who it believes can assist in clarifying the formal and informal structures prevailing in Lebanon and the wider region at the time of the assassination.

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  37. The Commission has developed two basic working hypotheses regarding the perpetrators of the attack. On the one hand, the Commission is considering the possibility that the attack was planned and executed in a compartmentalized manner. In practice, this would mean that different people were responsible for or involved in the planning of the attack, the reconnaissance and surveillance, the preparation of the IED, the acquisition of the Mitsubishi truck, the identification of the individual used as the trigger mechanism and the claim-of- responsibility video. Each part would have been carried out by individuals or groups who were not 06-38709 necessarily aware of or involved in other parts of the operation.

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  38. The detonation of the IED was most likely initiated by an individual within or immediately in front of the Mitsubishi. The Commission does not believe that the claim of responsibility expressed in the video tape delivered to Reuters and Al Jazeera immediately after the attack establishes the identity of the individual. In fact, DNA analysis of human remains recovered from the crime scene suggests that there is no evidence that the individual claiming responsibility for the attack, namely Ahmed Abu Adass, was the individual who initiated the detonation of the IED. The crime must be considered a targeted assassination. The large quantity of explosives used elevated the attack to an almost "guaranteed" level: the magnitude of the explosion was designed to ensure the success of the operation even if the Hariri vehicle was not directly hit.

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  39. That will facilitate an understanding of the planning and execution of the crime, the nature and composition of the perpetrating team and its skills and coordination, the time spent to plan the attack, the period during which the decision to assassinate Rafik Hariri was taken, and the extent of the involvement, potential advance knowledge or complicity of other individuals. Based on the results of the investigations and analysis and the evidence collected so far, the Commission has reached the following preliminary conclusions. One above-ground explosion took place on 14 February 2005 at precisely 12.55 p.m. A large improvised explosive device (IED), placed in a Mitsubishi truck, was detonated as the Hariri convoy passed by. The IED contained a minimum of 1,200 kilogrammes of TNT equivalent.

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  40. Twenty-four projects are under way concurrently, including forensic examinations of the crime scene and the convoy vehicles; a review of the telecommunications used by the alleged perpetrators; and the interviewing of key witnesses and sensitive sources. Most notably, the Commission has invested a major 23-day effort in the systematic forensic examination of the immediate circumstances of the Hariri attack. One of its main objectives was to establish a unifying theory on whether the explosion occurred below ground or above ground, whether it consisted of one or two blasts or a combination thereof, 06-38709 and how it was triggered.

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  41. Mr. Brammertz: I would like to thank you, Madam President, for having given me the opportunity to present to the Council the fourth report of the Independent International Investigation Commission (5/2006/375, annex). The report details further progress made in the investigation of the killing of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others. It also provides an update on the technical assistance that the Commission has been affording to the Lebanese authorities in the investigations of 14 other crimes. In particular, the Commission has developed its investigative activities, increased its technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities, strengthened its organizational structure and capacity and adopted its internal procedure. The investigation has further developed over the past three months.

    2006-06-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5458 (2006) · source

  42. We are aware of the challenges the judiciary is facing in his country and hope that the presence of the Commission in Beirut will contribute to strengthening the Lebanese judicial system. Let me also express my gratitude to the security and military forces ensuring in Beirut our security around the clock. They are doing an excellent job, and I would like to thank the media in Lebanon and the wider region for respecting the confidentiality of the investigation and thereby facilitating its conduct. Finally, I wish to thank the Security Council for its support and continued interest in this very important matter.

    2006-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5388 (2006) · source

  43. Confidentiality, on the other hand, requires that we not disclose information on the investigative strategy or harm the rights of the accused. That would inevitably have a negative impact on a later case in court. We cannot predict the outcome of the investigation. We also cannot guarantee that the investigation will be finalized in a few months, but we will work to ensure that the best possible investigative result is achieved. That will be done by combining professional skills with analytical and forensic expertise, while respecting internationally recognized standards. Before closing, let me take this opportunity to express my thanks to the Prosecutor General of Lebanon and his staff for the excellent interaction between his office and the Commission.

    2006-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5388 (2006) · source

  44. I will report to the Council on the progress made in that respect in my next report, or earlier if necessary. Let me conclude by making some general observations. The management of expectations remains a key challenge. Expectations are very high, sometimes unrealistically so, and differ depending on one's perspective. Therefore, the Commission has to strike a balance between the understandable interest for transparency in its work, on the one hand, and the need to protect the confidentiality of its findings, on the other. At this stage, transparency for us can only mean reporting on working methods and professional standards applied, and revealing in general terms the progress made in the investigation.

    2006-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5388 (2006) · source

  45. It was therefore of the utmost importance to achieve clarity with the Syrian authorities about the legal framework for cooperation and access to information, sites and Syrian citizens. By addressing those issues, the Commission can now focus its efforts on the substance of its requests for cooperation from Syria. The understanding reached with the Syrian Foreign Ministry on the practical modalities of our cooperation should be seen against that backdrop. Our expectations vis-a-vis the Syrian authorities are high in that respect. The Commission has already prepared several new requests for cooperation to the Syrian Foreign Ministry. The coming weeks will prove whether our requirements will be fulfilled and our cautious optimism was justified.

    2006-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5388 (2006) · source

  46. If we succeed in addressing those problems swiftly, the investigations into the additional 14 cases could provide valuable links and commonalities among these cases and with the assassination of Rafik Hariri and 22 others. Investing in technical assistance to the relevant Lebanese authorities is therefore an investment in the Commission's investigation. However, the Commission will not be able to address the broader capacity problems alone. It will be for the international community at large to support the Lebanese authorities through more in-depth needs assessments and targeted long-term assistance programmes. Improved and timely cooperation from Syria will be a critical factor in continuing the Commission's work successfully.

    2006-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5388 (2006) · source

  47. We have also made progress in implementing the request to provide technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in their investigations of 14 other cases of a possible terrorist nature. We have completed our first round of evaluations of all cases, and agreed with the Prosecutor General and the investigation judges on what assistance is needed. We have also started to provide, on a case-by-case basis, practical assistance in such areas as forensics and analytical and legal expertise. However, structural problems within Lebanese law enforcement and judicial systems in coping with the demands of those cases have been apparent. More cooperation and communication among the different Lebanese agencies is necessary, as are more specialized and investigative capability and forensic expertise.

    2006-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5388 (2006) · source

  48. I am optimistic that that progress will provide critical links in identifying and holding accountable those responsible for the crime, at all levels of the chain of command. While I understand the strong public interest in learning about further details on the status of certain lines of inquiry, we have agreed with the Prosecutor General of Lebanon not to publicly discuss such details at this stage of the proceedings. I firmly believe that that policy is necessary to safeguard the integrity of the ongoing investigation and to avoid revealing our strategy. Bearing in mind the possible establishment of a tribunal of an international character, it is critical that we respect the rights of the defence and not jeopardize the security of witnesses or other sensitive sources.

    2006-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5388 (2006) · source

  49. Adequate investigation capacity requires appropriate information and case management, the analytical capability and methodology necessary for a case of such high complexity, legal advice that ensures adherence to the recognized standards of law, readily available in-house expertise in forensics, and adequate capacity to address witness-protection needs. With that more systematic approach we have made further progress in the investigation into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others. We have advanced our understanding of the crime, its circumstances and modus operandi. We have developed new lines of inquiry and pursued and further evaluated existing leads and discarded others.

    2006-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5388 (2006) · source

  50. During its initial three-month mandate, the Commission naturally focused on quickly collecting information in support of, and for further use by, the national judicial authorities. Since the Council's adoption of resolution 1644 (2005), and with the possibility of a tribunal of an international character looming, a more systematic and methodological approach will be essential. We have to make sure that this investigation is conducted with the utmost professionalism and in adherence to recognized standards of international criminal law. Only then will it be accepted and thus provide the basis for a judicial process - possibly before such a tribunal. In fact, professionalism is reflected not only in the Commission's investment in highly qualified staff but also in its tools.

    2006-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5388 (2006) · source