YouSaid · the spoken record

Buthelezi

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1992-07-16
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1992-07-16
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  1. When the International Commission of Jurists came, they sucked all this information from them - ail this poison about us - and spread it all over the world. Side by side with the means employed to end conflict and violence have been the negotiations for a new constitution for South Africa. Unlike all previous experiences in Africa, this is a constitution that has to satisfy the aspirations not only of the black majority. but also

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  2. We would welcome a very strong and effective international fact-finding mission charged with the task of researching the origins of violence and monitoring the current violence in order to present a more objective and non-partisan picture in place of the present charges and counter-charges which have bedevilled the negotiation process in our country. It is no use for the President of the ANC to come here to quote so-called cases, because some of the members of the board in question are ANC members, including Mrs. Sisulu; something like that is not impartial in any sense. There are organizations with some innocuous-looking names in South Africa, such as the Human Rights Lawyers and the Legal Resources Centre, which are all operations fronting for the ANC and which then issue these reports.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  3. If this is encouraged, CODESA will suffer what will perhaps turn out to be irreversible damage. The promotion of the perception that these constitutional matters about the future of the country can be sorted out on a bi-polar basis, by only the ANC and the South African Government, is the very thing that is bound to widen cleavages that exist. These in turn fan the flames of violence. With all due respect, the Government and the ANC will never be able to solve the problem of violence nor of negotiations by themselves. South Africa is a multi-racial country. The ethnology of South Africa is such that you need to handle things with care.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  4. But there was no equivalent outcry to what there is now in Boipatong because it was Inkatha Freedom Party members who died, and because the IFP did not have the resources to publicize the event as it should have been publicized, and becauses bodies like the OAU and yourselves have never given us a chance to speak for ourselves. We do not Say that we want to make propaganda here; we want to speak, as I am doing, so that you hear all sides and then make up your own minds. The publicity that ensued in Boipatong was generated by those who have the resources to generate it, and who have the international connections that we don't have. I believe that it is wrong for the South African Government to talk only to the ANC about CODESA, outside of CODESA.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  5. The whole world has heard of Boipatong because it has been given effective and proper: coverage. Thirty-nine people died in a hideous attack on the Boipatong community. In April this year, only a matter of weeks ago, a similar attack took place at Crossroads squatter camp in the East Rand. Twenty-five members of the IFP were attacked and people lost their lives in an orgy of nocturnal violence, which - like the Boipatong violence - took the lives of women and even babies. I can mention many other massacres. In some cases South African police were implicated, and were in cahoots with members of the UDF. They killed members of the IFP in massacres where youths were killed; 13 youths were killed in Ngwatshan. I can mention cases where a number of people have been Similarly killed.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  6. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) has made representations to the National Peace Committee set up by the National Peace Accord to include the monitoring of the policies and strategies of the political parties which are signatories to the Accord. We want more than the actual investigation of specific incidents of violence. Past revolutionary propaganda and current revolutionary activity need to be brought into focus if we are ever going to come to grips with the real causes of violence. We of the IFP do not have the resources, the people, the money or the diplomatic support to dominate both South African and international media when it comes to violence in South Africa. In my package you will find, if you accept it, articles by two very senior journalists who point out this bias as far as the IFP is concerned.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  7. This specific focus of the Goldstone Commission must be taken into account when its findings are used as input assessments of the culpability of the South African Government and of any political party for the current impasse in negotiations. We appreciate the privilege of being able for the first time, in keeping with the audi alteram partem principle, to put across our own point of view in this United Nations forum. And I want to emphasize that one can send many delegations to Africa, either the Organization of African Unity or yourselves, but as long as there is a partisan stance, from which you just listen to one side and not to other parties, you never resolve the problem; in fact you exacerbate it.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  8. By its very nature, we face the reality that the Goldstone Commission's terms of reference precluded it from making assessments of the relative value of political parties and their contribution to the peace process. It is also precluded from going back beyond 1989, when, in fact, it was in the late 1970s and early 1980s that the foundation was laid for the current violence in South Africa. It was during those times that ANC issued statements for internal consumption stating that Buthelezi was not a puppet of the regime, but a counterrevolutionary, and that they must work on him to deprive him of his base. Some of the top members of ANC said that Buthelezi was a snake that poisoned South Africa - "we must hit him on the head". That was the forecast.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  9. I want to pause here to bring the Goldstone Commission into perspective, as I see it. Last year, there were multi-party negotiations which culminated in the National Peace Convention at which the National Peace Accord was signed on 14 September 1991. Even on that occasion the President of ANC stated to Mr. De Klerk that he had no intention of dismantling UmKhonto weSizwe, the military wing of ANC, before the ink was dry after the signing. This Peace Accord established various mechanisms to combat violence. One of these mechanisms was the Commission for the Prevention of Violence and Intimidation. Quite clearly the Goldstone Commission is only at the beginring of its work. Ever since the National Peace Convention, violence in the last year has continued to escalate and has now reached crisis proportions.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  10. We had a good example of the cruel manner in which a supposed member of the Inkatha Freedom Party was hacked to death in front of all the cameras of the world, in front of a throng of people on the day of the funeral in Boipatong, in front of the top leadership of the ANC, and was burned in front of all them. The people at KwaMadala hostel are frightened and are seeking an alternative to life in that area because they have to live under the threat of violence all the time. I am not making a statement of culpability of the KwaMadala inmates. I am not one of those who blame a whole hostel if some of the criminals in its midst do horrible things. I am just referring to the unhelpful habit of some people who, before they have the facts of a matter, rush off to apportion blame to all the inmates of that hostel.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  11. But many of the hostels have not been attended to for many years and are therefore not fit for human occupation. They need to be upgraded and made decent for those who use them. We in the IFP have no objection if some of the hostels are converted into family units. But there is no doubt that many of our people will want to use this sort of accommodation for many years to come. The KwaMadala hostel which has been in the news after the Boipatong tragedy has, for the last few years, become a desperate refuge for people. That is, men, women and children who have fled from the endemic violence in the Vaal Triangle. These are people whose homes have been gutted and whose lives have been traumatized by the death of their loved ones by hideous violence.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  12. They are part of the migratory labour system which was forced on black South Africans by various white regimes, including the apartheid regime. In the past, the South African Government did not allow black workers to bring their wives and children with them to their places of work. One Deputy Minister, Mr. Froneman, once described black women and children as "superfluous appendages". There are, however, hundreds of thousands of black workers who have no intention of bringing their wives or families with them to the cities. These people will need single quarters for the foreseeable future. It is also our position that half the black population of South Africa consists of people who are only 15 years of age or younger. So we have a very young population which will also need decent single quarters for a very long time.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  13. There is also a double standard in this case because there are some people coming into Transkei who have been arrested by the Transkei police. They were carrying lists of some of the leaders of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and were coming to kill them. One of them had an identification which showed that some members of the Umkhonto weSizwe, the military wing of the ANC, had already been integrated into the Transkei army. There are double standards here, because the head of the Transkei was trained by the South African Defence Force, as was the army of the Transkei. Then there is the issue of hostels. I want to state that hostels, where black males are singly housed, are part and parcel of South Africa's indefensible past.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  14. The Goldstone Commission is now actually conducting an inquiry. I am surprised that people who are lawyers and legal-minded people should talk about something that is still being inquired into by the Goldstone Commission, saying that those people are members of hit squads. This is exactly what the Goldstone Commission is now going to ascertain, The bias in the South African media is unbelievable. The star witness in this case, Gunsi Khumalo, who said that we are hit squads, was completely discredited by the advocate who represented us. He admitted that in fact he was lying and that he had never seen any training of such hit squads. That is the red herring that the President of the ANC and the President of PAC have injected into this discussion.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  15. With respect to the incident that was cited twice here by both the President of ANC and the President of PAC about the training of the 200 Zulus, what happened at that time is that Mr. Derek Lionel, a leader of UmKhonto weSizwe, the military wing of the ANC in Swaziland, was preparing a hit squad to come and kill me and my colleagues and to destroy buildings, because I did not accept so-called independence. I have no army; the Zulus have no army at all. Therefore, the Commissioner of Police decided to get 200 Zulus to train in the VIP protective services. He then took those people to the military to train them for us in VIP protective services. We then integrated them into the KwaZulu police, and some of them were given to us to look after ministers, myself, our buildings and so forth.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  16. I have never seen people - for example, in a parade, soldiers or police - with swords butchering anyone. The thing we should deal with in South Africa is the culture of violence. You can use a woman's shoe to kill people. It is the culture of violence that all of us in South Africa must deai with. I would like to ask the permission of the President to distribute copies of a text which I have already sent to him by fax for the information of members. I do not want to dwell on this issue now. The text offers more information on the issues that I have mentioned. I will distribute copies if members wish - unless, of course, they do not want to be confused by the truth or by the facts.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  17. Inkatha also makes any deal between the ANC and the Government at the expense of democracy unlikely to succeed. The grotesque propaganda strategy in which a party with a massive arsenal of modern Soviet weapons pleads for the disarming of ordinary Zulu people, who have 'traditionally carried spears, sticks and shields, is eloquent testimony of the extent to which unreality has become the norm in our country. I have stated over and over again that I support the prohibition of carrying dangerous weapons in public. However, there are some things which are just accoutrements of the Zulu people. We have traditional accoutrements such as my stick, which I am carrying here and which I will carry to the end of my days. It is a cultural thing of my people.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  18. They are shock troops who coerce and intimidate everyone who refuses to carry out ANC orders and to accept ANC policies. The reason the Inkatha Freedom Party has incurred the wrath of the ANC, and has thus been subjected to venomous propaganda attacks such as we saw yesterday, is precisely because it is the only political formation capable of halting, independently of the South African Government, any attempt by the ANC to seize power unconstitutionally. Inkatha is the only party that can resist the coercion and intimidation of its members, though at great cost to us. Our opponents realize that Inkatha stands as a bar to any attempt to establish an undemocratic one-party State in South Africa in place of the present apartheid State.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  19. The ANC has a military wing, as I stated, called UmKhonto weSizwe, consisting of thousands of people who have received training in the former Soviet Union and other collapsed Eastern European regimes. The organization is in control of vast arms caches of modern weapons, including the notorious AK-47 rifles. We are compelled to negotiate with an ANC which adamantly refuses to halt recruitment and the military training of its members. Since February 1990, thousands of militarily trained members of UmKhonto weSizwe have been released from prisons; they have returned from exile and are now in South Africa. My people are being killed by operatives of Umkhonto weSizwe. These people cannot suddenly transform themselves into peaceful canvassers for democratic elections.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  20. There were other parties, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party, when it was still the Inkatha Cultural Liberation Movement, which did not go into exile, as I say, and had to find other strategies and tactics with which to oppose apartheid. There was also the internicine and fratricidal violence, which I have mentioned. In other words, the picture in reality is far more complex than that presented by those who seek to produce a doctored version of the history of our country in the last few years. On behalf of the Inkatha Freedom Party, I wish categorically to reject any attempt to paint the ANC and the other organizations as white knights in shining armour who have never soiled their hands with coercion, intimidation and violence.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  21. There was broadcast after broadcast from Radio Freedom in Lusaka by the ANC asking young people to band themselves together and kill all those whom they designated as collaborators. For decades South Africa has been a country divided unto itself. Violence has become almost a way of life for many in South Africa. There was the so-called armed struggle which, as I have stated, was waged by the ANC and other revolutionary organizations. There was the reaction of the authorities, who said that the struggle for freedom of the oppressed people was a Soviet-sponsored one in support of total onslaught on South Africa - that was the official view.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  22. International television was there, church figures, such as Archbishop Tutu were there, making political speech after political speech, aimed at incitement and the destruction of the climate for negotiations. I should like to say that the violence, unlike what the representative of Lesotho stated, did not begin in Natal KwaZulu. It started in 1984 in the Vaal Triangle - where it is hottest even now - where Boipatong is situated. It has always been a difficult area. The first black violence took place there in 1984, when a black councillor, Mr. Jacob Dlamini, was incinerated in his car, for no reason other than that he was a councillor, and therefore a "collaborator" in the eyes of those who killed him.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  23. The truth is that we, as leaders, have been engaged in a constant campaign to restrain our followers, who have been the victims of attacks by organizations which for decades have had violence as part and parcel of their policies. The tragedy is that the hideous massacres caused in Boipatong was overlaid with gleeful exploitative action from some quarters. There was what I can only call a veritable orgy of propaganda in which the South African Government and the IFP were blamed for the violence that took place. In fact, members of the IFP were killed in Boipatong. In fact, some members of the IFP were buried as members of the ANC in that big funeral that took place. They were buried as members of the ANC because they died in that massacre.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  24. People have short memories and now seek to denigrate the efforts of Kwadzulu and the Inkatha Freedom Party in the fight for freedom. I say all this because there seems to be a perception that the age-old struggle between black and white has now become a struggle for power between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) of which I am President. The IFP, which is a signatory to the National Peace Accord, has never had a policy of fomenting violence against anybody. If the IFP actively incited the Zulu mation against its political opponents, the situation in South Africa would been been quite different, quite chaotic.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  25. The progress that has been made in the drive towards democracy in South Africa is the work of many hands over Many generations. On my own behalf, and that of the KwaZulu Government, I wish once again to point out the historical fact that the biggest national group in South Africa, the largest nation in South Africa, the Zulu nation, refused to accept "grand apartheid". This was a fundamental reason for the failure of the attempt to turn parts of South Africa into zones in which the white minority would be dominant. For years I personally, on behalf of my Government and on behalf of all the people of South Africa, refused to enter into any negotiations with successive Governments, uniess and until Mr. Nelson Mandela was released, the ANC and other organizations unbanned and exiles allowed to return home.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  26. Mandela himself explained to the chiefs that he could not see me because some members of the ANC had throttled him - he used the word "throttled". The decades-long cycle of violence and conflict was broken by the fundamental change of policy enunciated by the State President, Mr. De Klerk, in the South African Parliament on 2 February 1990. This meant that for the first time in the 80-year history of the South African State, the conflict between black and white would henceforth be resolved through reconciliation and negotiation. The De Klerk speech was a victory for all the people of South Africa. As members of the Council know, victory has many generais. Many now unilaterally claim that the historic De Klerk speech was the result of the efforts of this or that organization. We do not agree.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  27. But later, as there was an eruption of violence in Pietermaritzburg, he then requested me to go with him there to address a joint peace rally of our followers, and I agreed with alacrity. But the problem is that a few days before we were due to go there, I received word that Mr. Mandela was no longer going there, and I telephoned him. He then told me that Mr. Harry Gwala, who is a hard-line Stalinist in my part of the world, had led a delegation of about 100 people to the office of the ANC in Johannesburg and had told Mr. Mandela that he should not go with me to address the joint peace rally because if that happened there would be a blood bath. I disagreed that there would be any such bloodbath. But, in fact, some chiefs in Umthata, when Mr. Mandela visited Umthata later on, asked him why the meeting had not taken place and Mr.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  28. Tambo, the then President of the ANC in exile, when we talked for two-and-one-half days on the struggle in South Africa; and it was clear that we differed on two things: one, we differed on the use of violence - we could not embrace that - and, secondly, nor could we embrace sanctions. To talk about Mr. Mandela is very emotional, for our relationship is not only political, or just between colleagues, but there are family relationships, and throughout his incarceration in jail we corresponded. Up to the time he was released he corresponded with me. In fact, one of the first people that he telephoned after he was released was myself. He did so to say that he wanted to come and see me in my home. He also wanted me to make arrangements for him to see the King of the Zulus, to which I agreed.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  29. In fact, it seems to me that people have short memories because all along I have had a very good relationship with Mr. Tambo. I met with Mr. Tambo in London; I met with him in Stockholm; I met him in Lagos; and we met in Malawi; we met in Nairobi; and we met throughout the years until 1979. There was no problem between us, and even after I founded the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), there was this good relationship. Let alone to talk about Mr. Mandela himself. Mr. Mbegi is here. In fact, in the mid-1970s he came to Heathrow Airport and said to me "we are allies". We regarded ourselves as allies, even though I had founded the Inkatha Freedom Party. But we wanted to do in tandem those things that it was possible to do. I actually took a delegation to London in 1979 where we had a two-and-a-half-day discussion with the delegation led by Mr.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  30. He is, in fact, the Commander-in-Chief of the military wing of the ANC, UmKhonto weSizwe, and only a few months ago he was in Uganda wearing military fatigues talking to some people in their camps in Uganda, as the Commander-in-Chief of the military wing, of UmKhonto weSizwe. There was the reaction of the authorities who saw this struggle for freedom of the oppressed people as part of an internationally sponsored total onslaught on South Africa. There were parties which never went into exile and which had to find other strategies and tactics with which to oppose apartheid within South Africa. There was also internecine and fratricidal violence between those who differed from one another politically and in terms of method and on tactics. We have never differed with the ANC/SACP alliance on the objectives of the struggle.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  31. I refer to the National Peace Accord, which was signed on 14 September 1991, and the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) established on 20 December 1991. For decades South Africa has been a country divided unto itself. Violence has become almost a way of life for many. There was the armed struggle waged by the African National Congress (ANC) and other revolutionary parties. Even now the armed struggle is nearly suspended, and I think that the international community should note that. It is merely suspended. So the ANC has always had this second string on its bow of resuming the armed struggle. Mr. Mandela is not only the founder of the armed struggle, of which UmKhonto weSizwe is the military wing.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  32. South Africa has never been a typical colonial situation. In economic terms, South Africa exhibits the characteristics of both the first world and the third world. The white minority and the black majority are destined to carve out a common destiny in one country. The construction of a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic State will call for reconciliation and statesmanship of the highest order. It is not brinksmanship that is going to do this but statesmanship. It is compromise that will do this. It is give and take. The response of the South African people to the problems of transition has been heartwarming. There is virtual unanimity on the need to solve the crisis in the country through reconciliation and negotiation. In that regard, one can point to the two main institutions that have emerged in our body politic.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  33. For decades it has thrashed South Africans with propaganda assserting that it is the vanguard liberation movement, and with the assertion that the only thing worth negotiating about is the handing over of power to the people - that is, handing over power to itself. There is no need for me to sketch the apartheid society from which our nation has begun to emerge. South Africa is a founder-Member of the United Nations. From its inception the United Nations has had the situation in South Africa inscribed on the agenda of either the General Assembly or the Security Council, to say nothing of United Nations agencies. In other words, the international community is well informed about South Africa. But this very familiarity with the general situation might tend to induce simplistic perceptions of the specifics on the ground within the country.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  34. I want a political system where governments come and go as the electorate appoints and removes them from office. That for me is one of the essentials of democracy. In a very real sense it does not really matter who the first government is after apartheid as long as the electorate has the power and the mechanism to remove unpopular governments from office. Therefore, the first thing I say to the Security Council is that it must hear what the ANC says as being said by a revolutinoary organization, which, like revolutionary organizations around the world throughout the ages, is interested only in establishing itself as a government returned from exile. Indeed, Mr. Mandela often refers to the ANC as a government in waiting. The ANC has its own political monster of its own making.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  35. De Klerk; it is confronting a re-institutionalized South Africa, which is driving all political parties before it towards centre-stage politics where negotiations can succeed. The ANC is faced with the reality that as a revolutionized party regarding itself as a government returned from exile it is facing an institutionalized process of socialization. The ANC is actually driving for its own party political gains, in the presentations it has made to the world generally and to the United Nations in particular. If the United Nations cannot recognize that revolutionary organizations throughout the world, throughout history, have never been in the habit of attempting to establish political systems which make it possible for other political parties to win elections, we are wasting time.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  36. It will therefore be politically advantageous to the ANC to delay progress in CODESA and then come with devastating demands at a time which will leave Mr. De Klerk no recovery time before elections. Quite clearly, a negotiation crisis which adversely affects the Government will favour mass-action politics and the drumming up of support for ANC demands. We have seen this happening in the present crisis. Right at the outset of assessing the present crisis in this statement, I must state that, as dangerous as this crisis is, it will only be an opening gambit if Mr. De Kierk does not crumble in the face of this first ANC anti-negotiation onslaught. Mr. De Klerk will not crumble. I say this not because of any assessment of Mr. De Klerk's strengths or weaknesses, but because in fact the ANC is not confronting Mr.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  37. I hope to persuade members of the Council that the ANC's withdrawal from CODESA and its adoption of confrontational politics in mass-action programmes are aimed at shaping South African politics to its Liking. The realities are that the Preparatory Committee at the end of last year established CODESA as a negotiation forum, and that forum is still the only negotiation forum in South Africa. We all have our own views of its deficiencies and strengths, but the ANC alone makes out that CODESA is fatally flawed. The breakdown of negotiations or any lack of clear indication that negotiations are going to succeed, and succeed in a climate of growing hostility, will feed right-wing politics. The ANC will be aware of this.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  38. There are only those who should be equal partners in a negotiation process. Any detailed examination of what actually transpired between CODESA 1 and CODESA 2 would show that a deadlock was reached in CODESA because the ANC failed to gain the support of something like half of all the delegates for its proposals. That is what happened; it was not the Boipatong massacre. The harsh reality for the ANC is that it will have to learn that there is a set of black choices in South Africa, that there are those who oppose it and that there are many parties who will not be dictated to by it. It will have to fend for itself as a free political party amongst other political parties if it is to construct a role in the emergence of a new democracy.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  39. South Africa was in a state of war, and both insurgency forces and counter-insurgency forces killed in search of political gain or in defence of that which they already had. An independent United Nations fact~finding team would establish this to be so. This Security Council debate on the situation in South Africa suffers grievously because no such inquiry has been made. I appeal to you, Sir, and to all other members of the Security Council to bear this in mind as you consider the arguments and positions put to you. The first myth to be dispelled is that there is any one-to-one relationship between the process of change taking place in South Africa and what happened in any African country which gained its liberation through a liberation war. There are no vanquished in South Africa and there are no victors.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  40. There will be no solution to the South African problem unless at least the South African Government/National Party and the KwaZulu Government/IFP as well as the ANC Alliance are parties to the solutions attempted. Any international inquiry of any worth would establish that the IFP has lost over 200 branch and regional office-bearers and over 2,000 ordinary members in the hideous violence that has taken place in the country. However, violence began and, whatever its root cause, all sides are mauled by it and therefore all will have to be party to stopping it. The claim by the ANC that the South African Government is dominantly the cause of the violence is totally unproven.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  41. The ANC would have it that only it and the South African Government matter when it comes to negotiating a new democracy for South Africa. Not one single metre of South African territory was liberated by the ANC, primarily because the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the KwaZulu Government, representing the Zulu nation, did not back its revolutionary call. On the other hand, the Government's homeland policy and much of its apartheid structuring had to be abandoned because the IFP, of which I am President, and the KwaZulu Government vehemently rejected apartheid and opposed it every inch of the way. Were it not for the IFP, South Africa would long since have been a Confederation of Southern African States. This would have presented an intractable international problem to the world.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  42. We also have at least two revolutionary parties returned from exile grappling with the problems of translating their revolutionary drive into a democratic drive. We also have numerous opposition parties which have always opposed apartheid with various tactics and strategies. Each set of forces in those categories has its own perspective, and each deserves an extensive hearing if members of the Security Council are to arrive at a balanced view of what is actually happening in South Africa. I would welcome any Security Council inquiry into what is happening. The more the world knows about what is really taking place, the more helpful I think the United Nations and the international community will generally be. I have come to dispel some myths which only I can dispel.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  43. Mr. BUTHELEZI: I am very pleased to have been afforded an opportunity to address the Security Council on current developments in South Africa. I applaud the decision of the Security Council to give me this opportunity, because it seems to me that it is only fair, when the organization I represent and the people I represent are the subject of discussion both here and in other chambers, that we should be given our democratic right to speak for ourselves. At the end of a very long struggle South Africa at last stands on the threshold of a new freedom and democracy. At this moment of transition we face complex challenges for which there has been no real parallel in the world. We have a white minority racist Government turning its back on its past intentions and genuinely espousing negotiations for a non-racial, non-sexist, open democracy.

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source