YouSaid · the spoken record

Captan

lines on the record
61
first
2001-01-25
most recent
2003-03-18
sittings or episodes
3
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. “In addition, the RUF obtained weapons directly from the Sierra Leone army inventory when the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), headed by Johnny Paul Koroma, took power in May 1997 and entered into a power-sharing arrangement with the RUF. The Sierra Leone Government may also have been a source of supply to the RUF when it requested two waivers of the provisions of the ECOWAS protocol on the small arms moratorium on 23 June 2000 and 18 July 2000. The waivers were to permit the importation from the United Kingdom of five rounds of 7.62 NATO ammunition, 4,000 rounds of 81 mm mortar ammunition, and five million rounds of 7.62 NATO link ammunition for General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs).”

    2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source

  2. “However, the Panel negates this conclusion when it recognizes the following sources of weapons acquired or seized by the RUF - namely, considerable amounts of weaponry seized from the Sierra Leone armed forces; a significant number of weapons seized from a Guinean unit of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in January 2000; and another Guinean unit serving under the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that had previously been disarmed during ambushes and seizures. Great amounts of rifles were lost to the rebels, as well as eight armoured personnel carriers and several other military vehicles, when UNAMSIL contingents were kidnapped and disarmed in May 2000. This can be seen in paragraph 179 of the Panel's report. Additional sources of weapons to the RUF include those seized from the Indian contingent of UNAMSIL.”

    2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source

  3. “This should refute the conclusion reached in paragraph 89 of the Panel's report that "it is not conceivable that so much of Liberia's own diamond production could avoid the detection of government". With regard to the supply of arms to the RUF, the Panel's conclusion erroneously presupposes that virtually all of RUF's weapons are obtained from external sources, in this case Liberia.”

    2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source

  4. “The problem has been further exacerbated by the Government's lack of resources and personnel, including customs, immigration, transport and communications. Liberia's export statistics clearly illustrate that the 1987 pre-war official diamond export was 295,000 carats. This is in contrast to the official export figures of 8,500 carats for 1998 and 1999 respectively. The Ministry of Finance estimates that this represents only 10 per cent of the domestic production, and the Ministry of Land, Mines and Energy estimates it to be 20 per cent. In other words, depending on which figure is used, between 80 and 90 per cent of Liberia's domestic production of diamonds is smuggled out of the country.”

    2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source

  5. “It is puzzling that the experts' report would attempt to have the international community believe that, during this period, the value of Sierra Leone's annual production of diamonds was approximately $450 million. Clearly, these figures are grossly inflated. No one familiar with the industry would agree with the Panel that the pre-conflict value of Sierra Leone's annual production was anywhere close to $450 million. It is acknowledged that smuggling is endemic to the diamond industry worldwide and not limited to Sierra Leone. Historically, Liberia itself has faced this problem and previous Governments have been unable to adequately address it. This Government finds itself in a much weaker position, having recently emerged from a disastrous seven-year civil war that completely destroyed the basic national infrastructure.”

    2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source

  6. “What the Government of Liberia can confirm is that it is neither connected nor a party to the illicit trade of Sierra Leonean diamonds. If, as claimed in the report, the Government of Liberia was exporting and selling $217-million-worth of diamonds annually to Belgium, the report fails to provide evidence of a trail of financial transactions implicating the Government of Liberia. According to the Panel's report, during the period 1994-1999, a total of $227-million-worth of illicit diamonds was traded annually between the three neighbouring countries of Guinea, Gambia and Cote d'Ivoire, in addition to the alleged $217-million value of illicit Sierra Leonean diamonds that were purportedly exported from Liberia. Significantly, these figures exclude the official exports from Sierra Leone.”

    2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source

  7. “The appointment of a new interlocutor and leadership for the RUF was achieved as a result of an initiative of the President of Liberia at a meeting held between some heads of State of ECOWAS and the RUF commanders in Monrovia on 26 July 2000. These efforts on the part of the President of Liberia were made with the sole objective of furthering the peace process in Sierra Leone. Notwithstanding these initiatives, the Government of Liberia has and continues to be the target of grossly unsubstantiated allegations of diamond smuggling and gun running with the Revolutionary United Front. On the issue of diamonds, the Government of Liberia can neither deny nor confirm that the war in Sierra Leone is financed by the sale of conflict diamonds.”

    2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source

  8. “The President also averted a potential armed confrontation between Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie that had the potential of derailing the peace process in Sierra Leone. The President accepted the request of ECOWAS, in consultation with the United Nations, to remove Sam Bockarie from Sierra Leone to Liberia. It must be recalled that, at the request of ECOWAS and the United Nations, the President of Liberia negotiated the release of over 500 United Nations peacekeepers who had been taken hostage by the RUF. In addition, Liberia has permitted RUF delegations going to ECOWAS-sponsored meetings to transit through its territory. Liberia has also permitted RUF officials to hold meetings on its territory with officials of ECOWAS and the United Nations.”

    2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source

  9. “In keeping with the ECOWAS mandate, the President of Liberia organized several meetings in Monrovia between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) leadership, ECOWAS leaders - including the Chairman of ECOWAS, President Alpha Konare; the President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo; the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, President Gnassingbe Eyadema; President Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia - and officials of the United States Government and the United Nations, aimed at moving the peace process forward. Meetings were also convened between leaders of the RUF and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in Monrovia, which led to the return to Freetown of Corporal Foday Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma.”

    2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source

  10. “In that communique, the Authority of Heads of State of ECOWAS requested the President of Liberia to "get personally involved in solving the issues which hamper the peace process in Sierra Leone and to seek adequate solutions in consultation with the other Heads of State". Also, the Government of Liberia could not have been an uninterested bystander. Liberia and Sierra Leone share common historical, cultural and family ties, as well as a common border. In addition, Liberia is hosting over 100,000 Sierra Leonean refugees as a result of the civil conflict. It is the considered position of the Government of Liberia that peace in Sierra Leone is synonymous with to peace in Liberia. There can be no peace and stability in Liberia until there are enduring peace and stability in Sierra Leone and other neighbouring countries.”

    2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source

  11. “The Government of Liberia expresses its gratitude to the Security Council for the opportunity to make a statement at this important hearing on the report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000) in relation to Sierra Leone. The Government of Liberia notes the report ofthe Panel of Experts with serious reservations. Members of the Security Council will recall that the involvement of the Government of Liberia in the resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone is a result of a mandate from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), contained in a final communique issued in Bamako.”

    2001-01-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4264 (2001) · source