YouSaid · the spoken record

Castaneda Cornejo

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32
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1994-11-23
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1994-11-23
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un-security-council

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  1. “To all of them, we reiterate our gratitude and appreciation for their contribution to the successes and progress we have achieved so far. At the same time, we would like to state that we remain confident that we will continue to enjoy the generous cooperation and solidarity of the international community, which are still necessary, indeed essential, to our efforts to make the transition from peace-keeping to post-conflict peace- building in El Salvador.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  2. “Javier Perez de Cuellar, as well as by their Special Representatives; the efforts made by the friendly countries that have consistently supported the process: Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Spain and the United States; the constant attention that the members of the Security Council have given and continue to give to developments in El Salvador by adopting measures to promote the peace process; the assistance of the organizations of the United Nations system, in particular the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund and the specialized agencies; and, in general, the support of the international community, which has demonstrated its solidarity with the aspirations of the people of El Salvador.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  3. “However, certain key undertakings have yet to be implemented, although it is expected that this can be done within a reasonable period of time." (ibid., para. 29). In fact, the peace process in El Salvador is continuing to develop successfully, but it has not yet been completed. The recent free and democratic elections held in March and April this year are a significant step forward, but the full success of this process will be attained only when the outstanding agreements have been fully implemented. The full and total compliance with those agreements, and the promotion of a culture of peace in El Salvador are firm commitments that have been repeated by President Armando Calderon Sol. We deeply appreciate the efforts made by the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and by his predecessor, Mr.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  4. “The general opinion is that it has been one of the most successful peace-keeping operations ever developed by the United Nations. In this regard, we share the views of the Secretary- General that are contained in his latest report (S/1994/1212), dated 31 October 1994, on the subject of verification of compliance with the Agreements in El Salvador. I quote: "The Organization played a central role in the negotiation of the peace accords from start to finish and has overseen a multidimensional peace-keeping and peace-building operation in whose design it played a key part. It remains engaged in the transition from peace-keeping to post-conflict peace- building." (S/1994/1212, para. 28) "The Salvadorian peace process holds the promise of being a_ remarkably - successful achievement once it is completed.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  5. “To that end, under Security Council resolution 693 (1991) of 20 May 1991, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established, initially with a mandate limited to active verification of compliance with the Agreement on respecting and guaranteeing human rights. Later - on 14 January 1992 - the mandate was expanded by resolution 729 (1992), which established the Division of Military Observers who would verify the cessation of the armed conflict and specific agreements relative to the armed forces, and the Division of Police Observers, which would cooperate in the field of law and order. Consequently, between 26 July 1990 and the present, ONUSAL has performed an extraordinary and praiseworthy role.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  6. “The obligations and responsibilities of the United Nations also included the delicate function of international verification on the ground that the commitments entered into by the parties following the end of the armed conflict were being complied with. These commitments had been laid down not only in the Esquipulas II Agreements but also in the Agreements of Geneva, Caracas and San Jose on human rights. At the request of the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN, and following the dispatch of a preliminary mission to El Salvador and a favourable report from the Secretary-General, the Security Council decided, prior to the cessation of hostilities, to create a comprehensive mechanism to monitor compliance with the Agreements that gradually resulted from the negotiations.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  7. “The implementation of this set of agreements, especially after the signing for peace in Chapultepec, have been the pillars on which rest the aspirations of the people of El Salvador to overcome economic and social imbalances that have prevailed throughout its history and to achieve transparency in the political process and reconciliation among its people, leading to permanent social peace. Pursuant to a sovereign decision of the Government of El Salvador and the political will of the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN), the participation of the United Nations was not limited to contributing to the success of the negotiating process and concluding partial agreements, such as the set of political commitments enunciated in the agreement of Chapultepec.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  8. “The outcome of the negotiations, contained in various agreements - San Jose, July 1990; Mexico, April 1991; New York, September and December 1991 and January 1992; and Chapultepec, January 1992 - in addition to ending the war and demobilizing the insurgency, provided a_ broader, multidisciplinary framework which included provisions concerning respect and guarantees for human rights, constitutional reforms in respect of the armed forces, the judicial, electoral and human-rights systems, the establishment of the Commission on the Truth to investigate serious acts of violence committed since 1980, the creation of a national mechanism to verify the agreements - National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace - a process of cleansing the armed forces based on the investigation of all its members by an ad hoc commission, the reduction and overcoming of impunity, the abolition of security groups, the doctrine and education system of the armed forces, the establishment of a new national civil police force, the outlawing of illegal groups, the political and institutional participation of the FMLN and measures leading to a new, more just and equitable economic and social order.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  9. “The complexity of the crisis in El Salvador - which necessitated not only putting an end to the armed conflict but also agreeing on the changes that were necessary to the promotion of democratization in the country for the purpose of guaranteeing unconditional respect for human rights and re-uniting Salvadorian society - entailed maximum efforts on the part of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to encourage parties to modify their positions, and to overcome contradictions and the critical factors that endangered the process, with a view to achieving and formalizing agreements in accordance with the timetable of the negotiating process that was adopted in Caracas, Venezuela, on 21 May 1990.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  10. “The coming to power of a democratic Government in Nicaragua, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc in general, the process of worldwide democratization and the international community's constant support of peace were factors in making the negotiation process viable. Beginning in April 1990 and up to 31 December 1991, there were hard, complex and gradual negotiations. These culminated in the First Act of New York, which formally put an end to the armed conflict - a conflict that had been a tragedy for the people of El Salvador causing untold suffering and innumerable sacrifices and resulting in the loss of more than 75,000 human lives and the creation of more than | million refugees and displaced persons, as well as material destruction.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  11. “But this also meant greater responsibility for the Organization as it entrusted the Secretary-General with a good-offices function and asked him to make maximum efforts to contribute to bringing an end to the armed conflict. At this point I wish to emphasize that this stage was facilitated internally by the people of El Salvador expressing themselves through the majority of its political forces, which were tired of war, but basically because of the conviction of the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN that the armed struggle would not lead to a solution of the serious and profound national problems but, on the contrary, would make them worse, and, at the international level, because of the end of the cold war and its implications for the Central American region.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  12. “As of that time, the peace process in El Salvador entered a new stage, in which the United Nations would not only be an observer but also a major player and would, thereby, expand its presence and its contribution to the solution of conflicts in Central America in the interests of peace and democracy. This stage, which would develop under the auspices of the Secretary-General, would make the peace process irreversible, as it would test the political will and the credibility of the parties to the conflict - in particular, for having given assurances that they would act responsibly and in good faith to seek peace through negotiations, in compliance with their commitments, and to avoid abandoning the process.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  13. “Given that situation, at the beginning of 1989, on the initiative of the Government of El Salvador, the United Nations was approached to request the assistance of the Secretary-General to re-initiate the negotiating process in accordance with the agreement on a permanent dialogue. This allowed for the holding of separate consultations with representatives of the FMLN. On this basis, at the request of the Central American Presidents, agreed at the summit of San Isidro Coronado, Costa Rica, in December 1989, and in the framework of the mandate of good offices established in Security Council resolution 637 (1989), the Secretary-General undertook consultations with the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN to establish the format for promotion of the peace process that was formally reflected in the Geneva Agreement of 4 April 1990.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  14. “It was in this context that the process of dialogue was continued on the coming to power of the Administration of President Alfredo Cristiani, who upon taking office on 1 July 1989 expressed his determination and commitment to end the armed conflict by peaceful and democratic means, proposing a permanent, continuous and substantive dialogue. The resulting meetings between the Government and the FMLN in Mexico, in September of that year, produced favourable expectations, since agreement was reached on permanent dialogue, with a view to arriving at a solution to the conflict through political means as soon as possible. Unfortunately, however, the process again became bogged down.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  15. “It did so in particular by establishing the National Reconciliation Commission; by proposing a third Government-FDR-FMLN meeting which was then held in San Salvador on 6 October 1987, whose results were limited, but important, since both sides committed themselves to seek peace, achieve dialogue and support the Esquipulas II process; and by creating commissions to seek and prepare agreements to end the armed conflict and democratize the country. Unfortunately, internal and external conditions from 1987 to 1989 were not the most favourable to progress in the peace process. The polarization of society, increased armed activities and new acts of violence in El Salvador, as well as external support for and solidarity with the irregular forces, all had a negative effect on efforts to find a speedy end to the armed conflict.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  16. “It is important to mention these mechanisms, because their creation contributed to reducing tensions between the Central American Governments and to establishing a climate of trust between countries, something which, if followed, would promote conditions fostering peace through deterrence and preventive action. In El Salvador, in compliance with Esquipulas I and reaffirming the political will to seek peace through political means, dialogue and negotiation, the Government took steps to initiate its implementation of the commitments undertaken.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  17. “In this connection, it is important to emphasize that the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission to verify the election process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) in August 1989 meant that for the first time the functions of the United Nations in electoral matters would not be restricted to colonial cases. The same was true of the creation of the International Verification and Follow-up Commission as a joint United Nations-OAS mechanism for the demobilization, repatriation or resettlement of Nicaraguan resistance fighters, an operation that served to strengthen the links between the two Organizations, not only in areas under their mandates, but also with regard to electoral supervision.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  18. “Security Council resolution 644 (1989) of 7 November 1989 authorized the setting up of a United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), with a mandate to verify the cessation of aid to irregular forces and the non-use of the territory of a State to attack another State and to establish verification centres for that purpose in critical sectors of the region. Later the mandate was extended to allow for participation in the demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance and the monitoring of the cease- fire and the separation of forces in Nicaragua.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  19. “The call was elaborated upon at the Summits of Costa del Sol, El Salvador; Tela, Honduras; and San Isidro Cornado, Costa Rica. At these Summits, held in February, August and December of 1989, respectively, it was agreed, among other things, to call for a more active role for the United Nations and its accelerated participation in the Central American peace process in order to promote the implementation of the commitments entered into. With these demonstrations of sovereign will and the conviction of the Central American countries that the best way to achieve peace was through the peaceful settlement of disputes, the United Nations entered into a historic phase in Central America by becoming involved and participating in the solution of internal conflicts in sovereign States.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  20. “In addition, it called for the solidarity and the support of the international community so that Central American and extra-regional Governments with interests in the region would enter into commitments and shoulder responsibilities to respect the principles of self- determination and non-interference, avoid the introduction of external factors that, rather than contributing to peace, promoted confrontation and war, and especially the non-use of the territory to launch attacks on other States and the cessation of support for irregular forces. Immediate, unconditional and unilateral compliance with the Esquipulas II commitments was again called for by the Central American Presidents in the Joint Declaration issued at Alejuela, Costa Rica, in January 1988.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  21. “It opened up new political horizons and marked a new stage in relations between Central American States, moving from confrontation to intraregional cooperation, opening the way to the fostering and revitalization of the peace process in Central America and laying down obligations and responsibilities for Governments, in particular in those countries with serious political, military and social conflicts in which deep societal divisions existed and in which declarations and peace propaganda were to be translated into commitments entered into as faithful expressions of the political will to achieve peace, democracy and comprehensive development.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  22. “They also reiterated the existing commitments to be fulfilled to realize those goals and to initiate a process of national reconciliation and reconstruction as a precondition to promoting democracy and development in an environment of full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in keeping with the aspirations of the peoples of Central America. It was agreed that compliance with those commitments would be subject to verification by national and international mechanisms through the individual or joint participation of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations. Esquipulas II gave rise to new expectations for peace.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  23. “They led to what was to become the basic accord between the Central American Governments in their quest for peace, the "Procedures for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in Central America", better known as_ the Esquipulas II Agreements, adopted at Guatemala City on 7 August 1987. In those Agreements the Central American Presidents undertook to assume _ their responsibilities in the quest for peace and the elimination of war, as recognized in the Final Communique of the meeting of Central American Foreign Ministers and the Contadora Group, held on 1 August 1987, in which they reiterated that it was basically up to the Central Americans themselves to search for and arrive at those solutions.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  24. “This was of serious concern to the world community, since it could have led to a generalized conflict threatening international peace and security. This situation gave rise to internal and external initiatives and efforts to bring to an end, through dialogue and negotiation, the conflicts in the region. First steps in the quest for peace were taken by the Governments of Nicaragua and El Salvador between 1980 and 1987, and in 1983 efforts were begun by the Contadora Group, later supplemented by the Support Group. These Groups considered that a firm and lasting peace in the region could be achieved only if the fundamental causes of the conflict were addressed, a perception that was embodied in the initiative known as the draft Contadora Act of 6 June 1986 for Peace and Cooperation in Central America. Those efforts deserve our recognition.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  25. “Outside the region, the Central American and Salvadorian crisis grew from national and regional roots to become yet another scenario of the cold war, especially once external interests became involved and turned Central America into a prize in the struggle for supremacy between Power blocs at the international level, whose concern was to maintain or expand their respective areas of influence in total disregard for the deepening economic crisis and the sacrifices, suffering and hopes of the Central American nations. The deterioration of the armed conflict in El Salvador and the increased tensions between our Governments, which in turn exacerbated regional instability, for the first time brought Central America into the international arena.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  26. “At the regional level, the difficult and complex situation between the Central American countries was affected by the eruption of the Sandinista revolution, its close ties to the socialist countries and its attempt to establish in Nicaragua an ideological, political and economic system at variance with those of other Central American societies. It was also affected by the Sandinista movement's support of revolutionary movements in other Central American countries.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  27. “We must also recognize that, aside from the general violence throughout the country, there began a process that led to a greater understanding of the depth of the crisis and its causes and its effects on Salvadorian society. This opened up opportunities for dialogue and negotiation among the conflicting forces. From 1979 to 1992, El Salvador suffered a civil armed conflict. Its development was compounded by outside factors that internationalized it and modified its scope and dimensions, given the close relationship between the Central American countries. The crisis must therefore be analysed not only from a national perspective but also in the broader context of the Central American crisis.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  28. “Health, education, housing, employment, marginality, extreme poverty, the protection of human rights, the closing of political arenas and other factors were the underlying structural causes which, having gone unmet, gradually became sources of dissatisfaction and instability, leading to a profound political, economic and social crisis which, in the late 1970s, reached the boiling point in Salvadorian society. To be precise, on 15 October 1979, a coup d'etat took place which at first was claimed to correct the failings of the past. Instead, we experienced an institutional breakdown and the emergence of a struggle between the forces of change and the maintenance of the status quo by force of arms. Unfortunately, this produced an armed conflict that lasted over 10 years.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  29. “The crisis was not born out of thin air; its origins and evolution were the results of longstanding and profound social, political, economic and cultural imbalances. One negative aspect of our national life was the scarcity of forums and mechanisms for exercising ideological pluralism and respect for partisan coexistence, which hindered the full development of a democratic system. The prevailing system was economically and politically unable to meet the needs and demands for improved social conditions.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  30. “In speaking of the future of the peace process in El Salvador, of the consolidation of democracy, and of reconciliation and national development with a human face, we must recall the past and take into account the realities of the present with respect to our resources, capabilities and limitations in fulfilling our goals and objectives at the national, regional and international levels. The political, economic and social crisis in El Salvador is not very different from that of other developing countries when considered in _ relative proportion, but we must take into account the specific differences that emerge as factors of place and historical moment. In considering the magnitude of the crisis experienced in El Salvador, we must look at the past.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  31. “The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was created to observe and verify all political agreements between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN until such time as its mandate expired with the full political, economic, social and institutional democratization of the country. In making this statement, I hope for the understanding and patience of the members of the Security Council if I take more time than is customary. We believe, however, that this issue has deep historical significance, not only for El Salvador but also for Central America and the United Nations. It must therefore be addressed in its entirety and as the principal participants we must bear witness to it.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source

  32. “Mr. Castaneda Cornejo (El Salvador) (interpretation from Spanish): We are pleased to extend to you, Madam, our warmest congratulations on your presidency of the Security Council this month. The success of your leadership is guaranteed by your intellectual qualities and well-known diplomatic skills. At the outset, we wish to express our gratitude for this opportunity to share with members some thoughts and ideas on the peace process in Central America, particularly in El Salvador, and on the valuable participation of the United Nations in the search for such a desirable goal, especially as the Council is about to take one of the final decisions on a mechanism that has been extremely important in the verification of that process.”

    1994-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3465 (1994) · source