YouSaid · the spoken record

Çevik

lines on the record: 354
first: 2012-11-30
most recent: 2022-02-17
sittings or episodes: 44
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We will continue to follow up the allegations that have reached us, but it is important to tell the sides to reduce tensions and cease fire and be mindful of the high level of tensions in the region.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“The increase in kinetic activity occurred along approximately 200 kilometres of the contact line, primarily in Luhansk oblast. Many SMM patrols are continuing to return and are in the process of reporting. SMM patrols have visited the sites of the alleged damage to a kindergarten and a railroad station in the Government-controlled part of Stanytsia Luhanska. At the kindergarten, the SMM saw fresh damage to its facade. Of course, details will be reported after all corroboration efforts have been completed. We will do that as soon as possible, as we are aware of the importance of the reports in reducing the tensions in the area. In Marinka and Kremenchuk, where there were allegations, the SMM itself did not register ceasefire violations.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“I should also like to provide some information on this morning’s developments. For the period from yesterday evening to 11.20 a.m. today, Kyiv time, the SMM recorded 500 explosions along the contact line. The vital disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote were particularly impacted. Since 11.20 a.m., we have recorded approximately 30 explosions. Tensions, therefore, seem to be easing. Around noon, the SMM asked the sides to strictly adhere to their ceasefire commitments. It is critically important to de-escalate immediately to avoid further aggravation of the situation. The SMM is aware of, and following up on, the reports of civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure along the contact line during the past 24 hours. We will continue to follow up the security situation to the extent that our resources allow.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“I earlier described the death and injury caused by continued exchanges of fire and by mines. Furthermore, allow me to also note that the contact line has been nearly completely sealed off for two years. People-to-people contacts have been greatly disrupted, and communities and families have been divided, owing to no fault of their own. That is taking place against the background of other developments that are further deepening the divide between people living on both sides of the contact line. The political challenges of the eight-year conflict should not eclipse the human costs. I implore the signatories to the Minsk agreements to be mindful of those costs and redouble their efforts. I also urge the members of the Council to work with the sides and support their efforts to that end.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“I remain convinced that the SMM’s role remains critical to the reducing tensions and supporting peace, stability and security. Yet our key challenge has been to ensure the space for the implementation of that mandate. Lacking any way to enforce its implementation, we need the strong and sustained support of the international community to urge the sides to implement their commitments and restore the SMM’s freedom of movement. Where there is political will, there is a way. I particularly remember the reconstruction of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge after so many years and the encouraging periods of quiet that briefly followed the 22 July 2020 package of measures agreement. Progress is possible. I am also compelled to highlight the continuing plight of civilians.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“The SMM should once again be able to cross the contact line without arbitrary conditions or denials. Its unimpeded and unconditional access through the contact line, especially in the Luhansk region, must be restored without delay. Attempts to redefine the Mission by accusing it of bias should also come to an end. The impasse in the exchange of security guarantees among the sides also requires an urgent resolution to daily crossings of the contact line. The capacity on the ground exists. The will to use it needs to be strengthened. This needs to be resolved for the sake of the needs of the long-suffering civilians. The SMM remains available to facilitate constructive efforts in that regard. Before concluding my remarks, I would like to highlight two points.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“At a time of heightened tensions on the ground and in public rhetoric, it is imperative for the signatories to the Minsk agreements to adhere to all their commitments. The first and foremost among them is strict adherence to the ceasefire regime. The political impasse and increased violence reinforce one another. I hope that the recent resumption of the Normandy Four consultations and other confidence-building efforts under the auspices of the OSCE will provide much-needed political impetus to relieve tensions in the region and for the conflict- resolution process to move forward. Meanwhile, the restoration of the SMM’s freedom of movement is paramount so that the Mission can do its job. The SMM should be actively supported by sides in installing new cameras and opening long-planned forward patrol bases.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“Those impediments continued to undermine the SMM’s operational unity and threaten the sustainability of its work in non-Government- controlled areas. Impediments to the SMM’s use of technical monitoring tools have also continued on both sides of the contact line. Instances of gunfire and the targeting of the SMM’s unmanned aerial vehicles have almost doubled. The intensity of GPS signal interference in 2021 reached unusually high levels. The degradation of our aerial environment in 2021 particularly affected the SMM’s long-range UAVs. That platform is the only one that can monitor the full length of the contact line and areas near the border outside of Government control on a 24/7 basis. However, more than 80 per cent of the flights encountered interference. The past year has been difficult on many levels.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“However, since I last briefed the Council (see S/PV.8726), the Mission’s work has continued to be undermined by persistent and escalating constraints on its freedom of movement, predominantly in areas outside of Government control. I need to underline that freedom of movement is what allows monitoring to take place, as foreseen in the mandate. It is essential for enabling the SMM to serve as impartial eyes and ears of the international community in Ukraine. I wish to recall that that freedom of movement is enshrined in the Mission’s mandate as well as in the Minsk agreements. In 2021, some 91 per cent of all freedom of movement restrictions experienced by the SMM took place in non-Government-controlled areas. The past year saw the Mission’s movement across the contact line increasingly denied and delayed or allowed with conditions.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“I would like to underline that the exchange of security guarantees, which are essential for conducting vital repairs, has not been linked previously to increased tensions on the ground. That process should not be politicized, as is being done now. In reviewing those challenges, it appears to me that never before has there been a greater need for impartial and objective monitoring delivered by the SMM. The sides also recognize the importance of the Mission’s work. Their reaction to the temporary relocation of some Mission members last weekend was a clear indication. Throughout the past year, the SMM has continued managing the challenges I described and performing its mandated tasks.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“All existing and new crossing points should be fully open and all restrictions on both sides of the contact line should be lifted without delay. In those challenging circumstances, it is also vital that critical infrastructure on which civilians depend for their basic needs remain operational and protected from armed violence. Last year, the SMM continued facilitating and monitoring repairs to gas, water and electricity infrastructure objects, thereby benefiting millions of civilians on both sides of the contact line. Regrettably, since February 2021, and especially in the wake of an incident inside the disengagement area near Zolote in October, the process of exchanging security guarantees between the sides has been at an impasse, particularly in the Luhansk region.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“Although some of the pandemic-related restrictions were eased last year, official data show that crossings in 2021 remain at a mere 5 per cent of pre-pandemic levels. Those are not just statistics. They represent the elderly, who can no longer access their pensions, as well as young people who are losing out on educational and economic opportunities. Access to other services, including health care and documentation such as passports, birth and death certificates is being seriously affected, while people — family, friends and communities — are being separated from each other. Estrangement between communities spanning the contact line should not become entrenched. The needs and rights of civilians should take precedence.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“It is imperative that the sides do their utmost to mitigate those constant threats, even unilaterally, in parallel with the negotiation of overall solutions. The challenges posed by the ongoing pandemic have also endured and continue to make daily life even more challenging for civilians on both sides of the contact line. The past year saw no improvement in the freedom of movement of civilians between the Government- and non-Government-controlled areas of Ukraine. Crossing the contact line remains limited to two of the five existing crossing points. Only the pedestrian crossing at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge is accessible on a daily basis. There has been no progress in the opening of the two new crossings at Zolote and Shchastya, although the agreement to open them opening was reached in July 2020.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“Since April 2021, participants have discussed a draft addendum to the measures to strengthen the ceasefire agreement of 22 July 2020, but common ground has yet to be found. As I underlined last year, such a mechanism would facilitate de-escalation, address the persistent issue of impunity and contribute to building confidence on the ground. It would demonstrate the sides’ political will to act in line with their commitments. I wish to underline the fact that the communities along the contact line are deeply traumatized by living in constant danger and uncertainty. I already mentioned the 48 casualties caused by small arms fire or shelling. In 2021, the SMM corroborated another 43 cases of people injured or killed by mines, unexploded ordnance and other explosive devices.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“The SMM recorded new trench extensions and improvements to positions, the presence of heavy weapons, military and military-type positions in residential areas and the increased use of non-SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). As the last point on this issue, it is worth mentioning that violations occur on both sides of the contact line. Regrettably, discussions in the Working Group on Security Issues have been at an impasse for the past year. Agreements in principle reached in 2020 on 19 demining areas, an updated mine action plan and four new disengagement areas that has been drafted and verified, as well as on some aspects of the framework decision on disengagement, have not been actioned. The security-related conclusions of the 2019 Normandy Four Paris summit require new political impetus to be translated into tangible progress.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“As I noted, the increasing levels of violence, with the use of heavy weapons, inevitably led to an increase in the number of corroborated civilian casualties, due to shelling and small arms fire. In 2021, the SMM corroborated more civilian casualties due to shelling and small arms fire — 48 casualties — than those caused by mines and other explosive objects. Nearly 60 per cent of the corroborated civilian casualties were as a result of shelling and small arms fire. In addition, nearly 70 per cent of all cases of damage to civilian objects and infrastructure sites were recorded between October and November of last year. Other violations of commitments undertaken by the sides have also continued.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“In that context, I also wish to share my deep concern about the sides’ holding of live-fire exercises inside the security zone throughout 2021 and since the start of 2022. Those ceasefire violations deserve our particular attention, as they violate both the comprehensive ceasefire regime and the specific decision of 3 March 2016, prohibiting the conduct of such exercises. Last month, they made up approximately 10 per cent of all ceasefire violations recorded by the SMM. Since the beginning of 2022, the Mission has already been recording, on average, twice as many ceasefire violations per day as it did over the same period in 2021, when the sides’ adherence to the ceasefire had already started fraying.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“On 3 December, the SMM recorded a violent exchange of fire inside and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement and crossing point. This was an especially dangerous situation, as civilians in transit, including children, were put at risk. This was the first time since April 2020 that SMM reported ceasefire violations inside this area. Importantly, the benefits of disengagement have been clearly demonstrated — as it allowed for the reconstruction of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, one of the symbols of discord — by underlining the significance of violence in those three areas and providing insight into the sides’ willingness or, at times, unwillingness, to adhere to their commitments.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“In November, the SMM reported levels of kinetic activity, including more destructive weapons, worryingly close to those recorded prior to the 22 July measures agreement. At the 22 December 2021 TCG meeting, the participants expressed a strong determination to uphold the ceasefire regime. The first month following that meeting saw a considerable decrease — by some 60 per cent — in the level of violence, but tensions nevertheless remain high, fuelled also by the wider discussions surrounding the security situation in and around Ukraine. Of serious concern is the fact that, in 2021, the SMM reported ceasefire violations in and near the three symbolically important pilot disengagement areas, including with the use of proscribed weapons. The Luhansk region, in particular the wider parametres of the Zolote area, consistently remain a hotspot.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“Silence along the contact line is of utmost importance for allowing space for negotiations; abstaining from inflammatory public rhetoric is also essential. Since I last briefed the Security Council, the overall security situation along the contact line in eastern Ukraine has remained volatile. After the unprecedented period of relative calm that followed the 22 July 2020 The agreement on measures to strengthen the ceasefire, throughout 2021 we saw a gradual but sustained increase in the level of armed violence. In 2021, between August and December in particular, the Mission recorded a high number of ceasefire violations, including the increased use of heavy weapons that the sides had committed to withdraw, as well as their consequences in civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“The Mission suffered temporary blockades of operations in the Donetsk region last October. In Luhansk region, the SMM is also subjected to a blockade. The SMM’s sustainability is at risk, as it has been deprived of its operational freedom and independence. In this context, I also wish to highlight my concern over the fact that the contact line remains exceedingly difficult to cross, both for SMM members and civilians. It increasingly looks like and feels like a border that transects and divides families and communities and provisional services. Before elaborating on these developments, I wish to stress that in such challenging circumstances, the political will of the sides to strictly adhere to the ceasefire and reduce tensions is imperative.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“The gradual fraying of the ceasefire, which I described to the Council last February (see S/2021/159, annex III), has regrettably accelerated, and inevitably civilians on both sides of the contact line continue to bear the burden of the tensions and resulting insecurities. I further have to acknowledge with deep concern that the impediments to the SMMs mandated freedom of movement have not only persisted, but also escalated in the past year. In times of heightened tensions in and around Ukraine, when the Mission’s impartial and objective reporting is vital, these restrictions are especially unacceptable, since they limit the Mission’s capabilities. The SMM has been vilified in public rhetoric and Mission members have at times been intimidated. Our technical monitoring tools are subjected to intense interference daily.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“Mr. Çevik: I would like to thank Council members for the opportunity to brief the Security Council today. In my capacity as Chief Monitor of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and as the Coordinator of the working group on security issues in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), I will update Council members on key developments on the situation in eastern Ukraine during the past year. These include the security situation along the contact line, the impact of nearly eight years of the conflict on civilians and the SMM’s increasingly challenging operational environment. The security situation remains fraught with tension.”
2022-02-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8968 (2022) · source
“Yet the Mission is often limited by obstacles to its freedom of movement, overwhelmingly in areas outside Government control, in particular in the southern part of the Donetsk region. These daily restrictions are unacceptable and need to cease. The key elements to address the security situation are set out in the Minsk agreements. The Normandy Four, in December, defined a number of steps that can pave the way to the full implementation of the agreements. Time is of the essence for the resolution of the conflict, which has now entered its sixth year. The active interest and support of the Council will remain crucial. In closing, I wish to express my appreciation for the close cooperation with United Nations agencies in Ukraine, both in Kyiv and in the field.”
2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source
“In 2019, according to the information gathered by the Mission, shelling with heavy weapons was the major cause of civilian casualties, with 75 people injured as a result of such incidents. However, mines and other explosive objects have been the cause of the majority of the fatalities; 11 people were killed by mines or unexploded ordnance in 2019. The Mission’s presence, monitoring and reporting are crucial to provide objective and impartial information on the situation on the ground. That presence is also important to support the sides in the implementation of their commitments. Freedom of movement, which is enshrined in the Mission’s mandate and the Minsk agreements, is therefore essential.”
2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source
“Participants also outlined proposals for disengagement in a number of other areas, with a view to completing the process by the end of March, as agreed by the Normandy Four. On demining, one of the other commitments undertaken in the Paris Summit, proposals for an updated plan still need to be discussed in detail. Similarly, detailed discussions are still needed on the possible opening of additional entry-exit checkpoints for civilians travelling across the contact line What lies ahead in the coming months is crucial. There is an urgency to maintaining the momentum and to meeting the deadlines set by the Normandy Four leaders. The Special Monitoring Mission is continuing to work to follow up on information concerning casualties among the civilian population.”
2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source
“In the other two pilot disengagement areas of Zolote and Petrivske, forces and hardware have been withdrawn. Other important activities, including mine clearance, are ongoing. In Petrivske, an area in which SMM’s access is significantly restricted, ceasefire violations are still taking place. The situation will continue to require attention. The summit of the Normandy Four in December agreed on a number of measures on the security track. In the working group on security issues of the Trilateral Contact Group, participants are engaging on the implementation of these measures, focusing in particular on disengagement, as a precursor to a more durable cessation of fire and demining. Discussions on the identification of three new disengagement areas are progressing, with a preliminary, overlapping interest on one specific area.”
2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source
“The sides have disengaged forces and hardware in all three pilot areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, as foreseen in the framework decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of September 2016. The disengagement process has had an important positive impact in Stanytsia Luhanska, enabling much- needed repairs of the bridge. The broken pedestrian bridge was a symbol of the conflict; we all remember pictures of the elderly struggling to cross. The new bridge is now an example of what can be achieved with political will. It is also a powerful reminder that, once again, with political will, progress is possible and that this progress can have a tangible positive impact on civilians.”
2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source
“Since the beginning of the year, the SMM has observed 647 ceasefire violations attributable to the use of artillery, including multiple-launch rocket systems, tanks and mortars. Since 1 January, the SMM has observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on approximately 200 occasions. The SMM reported the presence of artillery greater than 100 millimetres in calibre on 91 occasions, and multiple-launch rocket systems on 72 occasions. Not only do weapons located close to populated areas draw fire, but they — together with ammunition left in the area — pose a significant threat to the safety of civilians. Against the backdrop that I have just laid out, we have seen in recent months a renewed momentum, engagement and important steps for the implementation of some of the commitments undertaken.”
2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source
“During the summit of 9 December, the Normandy Four agreed that a full and comprehensive ceasefire needed to be implemented. The political commitment to a ceasefire, expressed at the highest level, has yet to be translated into concrete implementation on the ground. Since 1 January, the daily average number of ceasefire violations recorded by the SMM is around 520, which is still far too high to ensure a ceasefire regime that is manageable. Additional measures, if implemented in good faith, can help transform the situation where violations of the ceasefire become the exception. At the same time, weapons that should have been withdrawn according to the Minsk agreements continue to be used. They were also used today, during the incident I mentioned earlier.”
2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source
“It lasted for 40 days, before the number of ceasefire violations reached the pre-recommitment level. Since 1 January, the SMM has recorded another significant decrease in the average number of ceasefire violations. However, isolated spikes in violence have continued to occur. Today the SMM recorded a very serious incident in the western part of the Luhansk region, in the broader area to the east and west of Zolote, where there was a spike in the number of ceasefire violations, including over 2,300 explosions. The Mission is further analysing information gathered today, which we will include in our public reports. As in the past, these flare ups can lead to an erosion of the earlier positive trends and increase the risk of escalation.”
2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source
“Mr. Çevik: I thank you, Madam President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council for the first time in my capacity as Chief Monitor of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. I will provide Council members with an update on the security situation in eastern Ukraine, recent developments concerning the implementation of the Minsk agreements, and the impact of the conflict on civilians. A comprehensive ceasefire, which is the first point of the Minsk protocol, the Minsk memorandum and the package of measures, remains an essential element for progress. After the latest recommitment to the ceasefire, which the sides agreed to on 21 July 2019, the SMM recorded a significant drop in the level of violence.”
2020-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8726 (2020) · source
“These considerations should be taken into account as we prepare ourselves to review the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.”
2016-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7690 (2016) · source
“It is regrettable that this platform has once again been misused to distort facts. Turkey is actively supporting global efforts in countering the narratives and ideologies of terrorism, including within the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, and the Forum-inspired Hedayah Institute. Turkey is part ofthe Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, which has a separate Strategic Communications Working Group. In conclusion, Turkey is determined to maintain its approach to combating terrorism and violent extremism in all forms and manifestations. Only with an open- minded and just approach and cooperation at the global level, and, most importantly, by upholding the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms can we be successful.”
2016-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7690 (2016) · source
“It is in that understanding that Turkey has co-sponsored such initiatives as the Alliance of Civilizations and Mediation for Peace in order to promote dialogue, tolerance and religious and cross-cultural understanding to create an environment of mutual respect. It should not be forgotten that the suppression of the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people, divisive sectarian policies, war crimes and massive violation of human rights that have been and continue to be committed by the regime have created a fertile ground for radicalization, extremism and the recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters by Da'esh. In that regard, the representative of that regime, which is also responsible for the flourishing of Da'esh and cooperates with that terrorist organization, is not in a position to lecture anybody on counter-terrorism.”
2016-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7690 (2016) · source
“Any attempt to the contrary is wrong and dangerous, as it plays into the hands of terrorists. Victims of terrorism also cannot be treated selectively. Singling out the victims of a specific group and ignoring others also bears the risk of creating divisive perceptions. We believe that these messages should be embraced in words and in deeds by the United Nations system, including its Member States. Protecting our societies from toxic indoctrination requires conveying messages of peace and tolerance as part of our common struggle against discrimination, intolerance, racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and discrimination against Christians and members of other religions.”
2016-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7690 (2016) · source
“With regard to Da'esh, we encourage voices of reason and knowledge to speak up on the true meaning of religion, and we promote role models who can speak about alternatives to violence and terrorism. The role of religious leaders in contributing to these efforts is important. In Turkey, the Office of Religious Affairs, along with various Government agencies, plays a special role in ensuring that correct information on religion reaches the public and that religious teachings are interpreted appropriately. It endeavours to disseminate messages of non-violent and peaceful coexistence, dialogue and unity among peoples. The focus on the role of religious leaders should not lead us to assume that religions are part of the problem. Terrorism and violent extremism cannot be associated with any religion, ethnicity or nationality.”
2016-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7690 (2016) · source
“A communication strategy is therefore part of my Government's overall counter-terrorism efforts against Da'esh and other groups. A two-tier strategy is being implemented in this regard, consistent with human rights obligations. The firstpart ofthe strategy is to deny terrorist groups space for their propaganda, including measures to disable their communication networks. To date, we have closed down dozens of Da'esh-linked Internet sites, and in cases where the server is located outside Turkey we have banned access to online terrorist content. We are also conducting extensive operations against Da'esh facilitators, radicalizers and networks. More subtle strategies are also needed. We conduct content-specific counter-narrative policies against each terrorist group.”
2016-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7690 (2016) · source
“In this regard, we agree that a broader approach is needed in order to effectively counter terrorism, as stated by the Secretary General in his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, which will be given further consideration by the General Assembly in the upcoming review of the United Nations Global Counterterrorism strategy. Turkey's own experience reveals that enhancing fundamental rights and freedoms, strengthening the criminal justice approach, reforming law enforcement and the judiciary, and enhancing a lively public debate have a direct impact and an added value in this regard. On the other hand, specific counter-messaging is also essential. As terrorists increasingly exploit new information and communications technologies, our global counter terrorism responses should also have a stronger communications component.”
2016-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7690 (2016) · source
“Terrorist groups exploit frustrations, feelings of grievance, discrimination, social and political exclusion and socioeconomic marginalization, and target more vulnerable groups, such as women and youth. Protracted conflicts nourish conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. The lack of rule of law and good governance and violations of human rights also contribute to creating such conditions. Therefore, we should focus our energies on preventive efforts to counter violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism.”
2016-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7690 (2016) · source
“The latest bomb attacks in Ankara and Istanbul took the lives of 184 innocent people and left hundreds wounded. In recent days, more than 20 of our citizens in the town of Kilis lost their lives as a result of rockets fired by Da'esh from Syria. It is counter-productive to adopt a selective approach to global-counter terrorism efforts, focusing only on one form of terrorism, group or cluster of terrorist groups. This weakens our collective stance and will not defeat the scourge. The best way to counter the hateful ideologies of terrorists is to make our societies more resilient against extremist narratives. Preventing young people from being attracted by the lure of terrorist groups is a key factor.”
2016-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7690 (2016) · source
“Every terrorist organization produces its own narrative and uses different ideologies in order to recruit, attract sympathy and support, and legitimize violence. Common to all of them are their attempts to inflict pain and instil fear on our citizens, to create chaos and polarize societies, and to weaken Governments. A case in point is the counter-terrorism experience of Turkey. Today, my Government is fighting simultaneously three different terrorist groups: the Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi, an extreme leftist terrorist group; the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane/Yekineyen Parastina Gel, a Marxist-Leninist organization trying to exploit ethnic differences in Turkey and the turmoil in Syria; and Da'esh, which manipulates religion.”
2016-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7690 (2016) · source
“I would like to thank you, Sir, for organizing today's debate. Our thanks also go to the briefers for their presentations. We align ourselves with the statements delivered on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation today. I shall speak in my national capacity. Unfortunately, despite all the efforts of the international community, terrorists continue to perpetrate deadly attacks. Terrorist organizations continue to recruit, deploying a morbid rhetoric of hatred. In that regard, we strongly condemnt the heinous terrorism attacks committed today in Baghdad, extend our sincere condolences to the families of the victims, and reiterate our support for the Government and the people of Iraq.”
2016-05-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7690 (2016) · source
“Turkey perceives the United Nations as the primary platform for promoting a united stance against terrorism. As we approach the ten-year review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, I reiterate that Turkey is determined to maintain a decisive and consistent approach to combatting terrorism of any kind in cooperation with its partners and allies.”
2016-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7670Resumption1 (2016) · source
“In that regard, we should not forget that the regime's suppression of the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people, its divisive sectarian policies and its perpetration of war crimes and massive violations of human rights have created fertile ground for radicalization, extremism and Da'esh's recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters. It is regrettable that the representative of the regime, which long ago lost all its legitimacy, has once again chosen to misuse this platform to distort the facts. The international community should bear in mind that the ongoing atrocities and humanitarian disasters in Syria can be addressed only by tackling the root cause of the problem, which is the violent repression of Syrians' democratic aspirations.”
2016-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7670Resumption1 (2016) · source
“In the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which Turkey co-chaired from 2011 until yesterday, when the chairship passed to Morocco, the issue of radicalization has been our primary focus from the very beginning, and the Forum has developed a number of documents on good practices, some of which were referred to in the statement delivered on behalf of the EU. In doing so, we have tried to formulate and put in place durable solutions to the problems in our region. We cannot eradicate Da'esh or the Al-Nusra Front without addressing all the grievances and factors that have led to the emergence of those groups.”
2016-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7670Resumption1 (2016) · source
“At the same time, terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality or ethnic group. As thousands of young people are radicalized by the extremist narratives of Da'esh and other groups, leaving their home countries to travel to conflict regions to fight along such terrorist organizations, we fully support the view of the Secretary-General, in his Plan of Action for Preventing Violent Extremism, that the international community should adopt a comprehensive approach that encompasses not only security-based counter-terrorism measures but also those that address the drivers of violent extremism at the local, regional and global levels.”
2016-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7670Resumption1 (2016) · source
“It is certainly regrettable that Russia has tried to abuse today's meeting in order to advance its ill-intentioned political agenda against Turkey. Deliberations in the Security Council should abide by principles of responsibility and political maturity. We agree that there is an imperative need to avoid double standards in the fight against terrorism. There can be no room for moral relativism in that fight. Whether the organization in question is the Al-Nusra Front, Da'esh, Boko Haram, the PKK, the YPG or Turkey's Revolution People's Liberation Party- Front, we must be united in stance against terrorism's threat. Our counter-terrorism efforts are directed at all groups that resort to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.”
2016-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7670Resumption1 (2016) · source
“In sum, Turkey is at the forefront of the Da'esh threat, and our priority is making every possible effort to counter it. We are therefore extremely dismayed by recent speculation questioning Turkey's determination to combat Da'esh/ISIL and other terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq. The allegations made about Turkey today by the Russian Federation are baseless, and we reject them. Anyone making such ill-intentioned allegations should take into consideration the fact that Turkey has been attacked by Da'esh terrorists three times in less than a year. Through such allegations, the Russian Federation is trying to distract public attention from the enormous harm that its air operations have done to civilians in Syria, as well as from its involvement with individuals and companies linked to financing for Da'esh in Syria.”
2016-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7670Resumption1 (2016) · source
“It is worth mentioning here that under the coalition against Da'esh/ISIL, Turkey is a co-leader of the working group on foreign terrorist fighters and also takes part in the working group on countering financing. We have also reinforced our existing measures for preventing the illegal transfer of historical artifacts from their country of origin and have mobilized all the relevant institutions and agencies in accordance with our obligations under international instruments. The Turkish authorities are maintaining constant vigilance in this regard and have been handling the issue with all possible care and diligence. Turkey deplores and firmly condemns attacks resulting in the destruction of cultural property that is part of the common heritage of humankind.”
2016-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7670Resumption1 (2016) · source