YouSaid · the spoken record

Choi

lines on the record

93

first

1996-02-06

most recent

2011-07-18

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16

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un-security-council

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1. “We feel confident, as President Ouattara and his team, who showed remarkable patience and sangfroid during the crisis, are working day and night to successfully meet the post-crisis challenges for the benefit of the Ivorian people.”

   2011-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6584 (2011) · source

2. “UNOCI has also begun work to set up a military camp in Aboisso, along the Abidjan-Accra axis road, given the presence of former pro-Gbagbo supporters in Ghana. UNOCI intends to complete that project before the end of the month. Once completed, the nine military camps will be reinforced, with UNOCI civilian staff working on human rights, the rule of law, civil affairs, child protection, gender equality and HIV/AIDS with their colleagues from the United Nations country team. The second safeguard measure relates to the rehabilitation and equipment of a number of prefect and sub-prefect offices in the west. UNOCI has been consulting with the United Nations Peacebuilding Office for the Peacebuilding Fund to finance the project with around $5 million dollars.”

   2011-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6584 (2011) · source

3. “That would allow for the effective deployment of police and gendarmerie elements throughout the country, which, in turn, would allow the military elements to be rolled back to their barracks. The Ivorian authorities are doing their best to expedite the restoration of law and order throughout the country. The appointment, on 7 July, of all top 11-41823 commanders of the Ivoirian security structure, including the military, the gendarmerie and the police, was quite an encouraging sign. To accompany the Ivorian Government, UNOCI has taken two safeguard measures in the western part of the country, where we see a certain degree of security deficit. The first measure relates to the establishment of eight new UNOCI military camps in the west, including four in the border area with Liberia.”

   2011-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6584 (2011) · source

4. “Fourthly, with regard to the country's economic recovery, despite some concerns, most experts bank their optimistic views for a positive economic recovery in Cote d'Ivoire on the resourcefulness of the Ivorian people, the fundamental robustness of the Ivorian agricultural sector and the willingness of the international community, including the Bretton Woods institutions, to cooperate with the Ouattara Administration. All such efforts related to those four tasks appear to be moving in the right direction. However, there is a need for a rapid restoration of law and order throughout the country, as that is the precondition for the other tasks to be carried out successfully. For that, a clear vision for the establishment of a national security structure, including command and control, has to be developed.”

   2011-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6584 (2011) · source

5. “However, as Ivorian protagonists envisage a somewhat ambitious plan for the legislative elections, including an increase in National Assembly seats and the inclusion of people who have now attained the age of majority on the voters list, a strong commitment by the electoral management body is necessary to meet the challenge of holding the elections before the year is out. It goes without saying that the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), with the international community, is ever ready to assist the Electoral Commission.”

   2011-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6584 (2011) · source

6. “Although challenges remain in the Yopougon district of Abidjan, as well as in the western 2 part of the country, by and large, the former pro- Gbagbo armed elements and supporters are not likely to mount a substantial challenge to law and order. Secondly, with regard to national reconciliation, it benefits from the deep-rooted Ivorian political culture, characterized by tolerance, non-violence and compromise. The appointment of the Chair of the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the meltdown of Mr. Gbagbo's supporters augur well for the achievement of reconciliation in the country. Thirdly, the legislative elections are planned to take place before the end of the year. Preparations began as the Independent Electoral Commission Chair, Mr. Youssouf Bakayoko, started work towards the end of last month.”

   2011-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6584 (2011) · source

7. “Mr. Choi: The Ivorian people demonstrated unfailing determination during the post-electoral crisis. With the contribution of the international community, a painful chapter in the history of Cote d'Ivoire has now been closed. At the same time, a new chapter, with multiple challenges, has been opened. There exists a very fortunate window of opportunity for the Ouattara Administration and the international community. Efforts are now under way to address the following four major post-crisis tasks: the restoration of law and order; national reconciliation; the holding of legislative elections; and economic recovery. First, the restoration of law and order in the south of the country is of primordial importance. Currently, the Forces republicaines de Cote d'Ivoire provide the security environment, with some gendarmerie and police assistance.”

   2011-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6584 (2011) · source

8. “Gbagbo's entourage, against reprisals; continuing documentation of committed human rights violations; and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Yet, in the end, it must be the Ivorian people who shall forge their destiny. I remain hopeful. The Ivorian people organized a most impressive election; they succeeded largely by themselves in resolving the post- electoral crisis, which allowed for the will of the people to prevail; and now they will march forward towards national reconciliation and reconstruction, with the assistance of the international community.”

   2011-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6513 (2011) · source

9. “The fourth measure pertains to the organization of legislative elections which, in a certain sense, would mark the real end of the post-electoral crisis by creating a democratic Parliament that would be active across the country. With regard to those tasks, UNOCI will do its utmost to provide its support and assistance to the Ivorian people and authorities. In the meantime, UNOCI is currently focusing on helping the efforts to re-establish a secure environment and prevent a security vacuum; collecting weapons and disarming surrendering former pro-Gbagbo forces; securing vital lifelines and strategic installations, such as the airport, the seaport, bridges, and the presidential palace and residence; protecting civilians, including Mr.”

   2011-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6513 (2011) · source

10. “11-29790 Among other concrete measures, there are four that must be taken urgently. The first is the swearing-in of President Ouattara and the completion of the organization of his Government. During the crisis, President Ouattara could nominate only 13 of some 30 ministers. Many important Government posts also need to be filled urgently. The second, or perhaps concomitant, urgent task would be the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the security sector reform programmes. The third measure, which is intimately connected to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the security sector reform programmes, is the reunification question, including the extension of State authority to the northern part of the country and the centralization of the Treasury.”

    2011-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6513 (2011) · source

11. “The first challenge is the restoration of peace and law and order throughout the country, particularly in Abidjan. The second is the prevention of any further human rights abuses and violations, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, especially in the western part of the country, where several serious problems have already been reported. The third challenge is national reconciliation. On that score, President Ouattara has taken a very clear stance in favour of reconciliation over retribution. The fourth, and perhaps most formidable, challenge awaiting the Ivorian people appears to be national reconstruction, particularly with regard to the promotion of education, the creation of youth employment, addressing the land ownership problem, poverty eradication and economic development.”

    2011-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6513 (2011) · source

12. “Before I proceed, let me pay tribute to the French Licorne Force for its most helpful cooperation, including its crucial protection of the headquarters of the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) at various moments during the crisis, as well as for its timely restoration of the functioning of the water distribution system in Abidjan, which relieved the besieged UNOCI headquarters from 10 days of water deprivation. Let me now focus on the challenges that lie ahead in Cote d'Ivoire. I would count four major challenges as needing urgent attention from President Ouattara's Administration, with the assistance of the international community. They are related to the protection of the civilian population and national reconstruction.”

    2011-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6513 (2011) · source

13. “From that perspective, one may say that Cote d'Ivoire represents a success story of a people managing their own affairs with international support. Yet, the major credit for bringing the post-electoral crisis to an end must go to the Ivorian people. They succeeded in making the will of the people, as expressed during the presidential elections, prevail largely by their own efforts. The date of 11 April must therefore be remembered as the end of a demagogic and Orwellian perversion by a regime that tried to cling to power by military means, bringing about serious pain and damage to Cote d'Ivoire.”

    2011-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6513 (2011) · source

14. “Mr. Choi: One of the world's most open, free, fair and transparent elections, which took place in Cote d'Ivoire on 28 November 2010, has been forfeit to the greed of the outgoing President, Mr. Laurent Gbagbo. Thus, an utterly unnecessary post-electoral crisis erupted and lasted more than four months. Now, with the taking into custody of Mr. Gbagbo, on 11 April, by pro-Ouattara forces, we have witnessed the end of a chapter in the history of Cote d'Ivoire. Unlike some crises that have required massive international military intervention, the Ivorian crisis has been dealt with largely by Ivorians themselves. The Economic Community of West African States, the African Union and the Security Council have been providing the necessary framework within which the Ivorian people themselves have faced their own destiny.”

    2011-04-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6513 (2011) · source

15. “It was requested to play the certification role by Ivorian leaders themselves by virtue of the 2005 Pretoria Agreement. It is a solemn responsibility that the United Nations has towards all the Ivorian people, who deserve peace, stability and prosperity. Considering the distance that Cote d'Ivoire has travelled, ignoring the will of the people at this stage would be a let-down of the people of Cote d'Ivoire and a waste of significant resources invested over the past eight years by the international community. 10-67740”

    2010-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6437 (2010) · source

16. “I must stress that the conduct of my certification was done without regard to the methods used and results proclaimed by either the IEC or the Constitutional Council. The result I obtained through my certification methods was very clear. There was only one winner, by a clear margin. Even if all the complaints submitted by President Gbagbo's camp to the Constitutional Council were taken into account in terms of the numbers of tally sheets, and consequently of votes, the outcome of the second round would not change, with Mr. Alassane Ouattara being the winner of the presidential election. 10-67740 As such, I certified the results of the second round of the presidential election on 3 December. The United Nations did not seek this responsibility.”

    2010-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6437 (2010) · source

17. “Paul Yao N'Dre, declared that the IEC's proclamation was null and void, as the IEC had passed the legal limit of three days for pronouncing itself on the provisional results. Then, on 3 December, the President of the Constitutional Council proclaimed the final results, with the cancellation of voting in nine northern departments. According to this proclamation, candidate Laurent Gbagbo garnered 51.45 per cent of the vote and candidate Alassane Ouattara 48.55 per cent, with an overall participation rate of 71 per cent. Meanwhile, I, as a certifier of the Ivorian elections, had completed the analysis and evaluation of 20,000 tally sheets provided to me by the Ivorian authorities for the purposes of certification. All the work was completed by 2 December.”

    2010-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6437 (2010) · source

18. “At this critical juncture, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) began to show signs of internal divisions. The IEC internal divisions were further exacerbated when the Ivorian security authorities reinforced their protection at the IEC headquarters beginning on the morning of 30 November. In the end, this led the IEC President, Mr. Youssouf Bakayoko, to proclaim the provisional result of the second round in the afternoon of 2 December at the Golf Hotel. According to the IEC, the participation rate in the second round was over 81 per cent, with candidate Alassane Ouattara garnering 54.1 per cent of the votes and candidate Laurent Gbagbo garnering 45.9 per cent. The Constitutional Council immediately reacted to the announcement made by the IEC. In the evening of 2 December, the President of the Constitutional Council, Mr.”

    2010-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6437 (2010) · source

19. “Mr. Choi: For the first time in its history, C6te d'Ivoire had a second round of presidential elections on 28 November. Despite the tense environment that preceded it and some incidents, which were sometimes violent, in the West and the North of the country, the second round was generally conducted in a democratic manner. The participation rate was actually quite high, attaining over 81 per cent. It was also quite encouraging to note that, all along the five observation routes established by the United Nations Operation in C6te d'Ivoire (UNOCI), representatives of both candidates were present in all the polling stations. Based on these findings and analysis, on 29 November I implicitly certified the conduct of the election through a press conference in Abidjan. Following that phase, the moment has come for us to safeguard the result.”

    2010-12-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6437 (2010) · source

20. “According to the current electoral timetable, electoral campaigning for the second round would begin on 12 November, and the second round of the presidential election would be held on 28 November.”

    2010-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6415 (2010) · source

21. “Beginning on the evening of 2 November, the Independent Electoral Commission began announcing partial preliminary results. As of this morning, more than 2.5 million voters had been publicly counted by the Independent Electoral Commission. The United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) has provided and continues to provide technical and logistical support to the Independent 10-61808 Electoral Commission, including the transport of the crucial voting reports to the central Independent Electoral Commission in Abidjan. The final result of the election is planned to be proclaimed by the Constitutional Council by 10 November. Should no candidate receive a majority of votes in the first round, a second round will be necessary.”

    2010-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6415 (2010) · source

22. “The population responded massively to the call of the political leaders to cast their votes. The turnout was over 80 per cent - one of the highest in the world. The voting itself took place in a calm and orderly manner, 10-61808 and no major human rights violation was recorded, which is impressive given that reunification is yet to be realized. The Ivorian people rose to the occasion, showing the international community their political maturity and determination to put an end to the crisis. According to the electoral timetable published by the Independent Electoral Commission, the provisional result of the election is to be announced today but is yet to materialize. Here in Cote d'Ivoire, people are eagerly awaiting the result of the election.”

    2010-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6415 (2010) · source

23. “Meanwhile, electoral campaigning was launched on 15 October and was conducted in a commendable manner, with the Ivorian presidential candidates adhering to the provisions of the code of good conduct signed by the political parties in April 2008 in the presence of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The candidates travelled in the various regions of Cote d'Ivoire to present their electoral platforms. Electoral campaigning aroused passions and emotions, but was conducted in a peaceful environment throughout the country thanks to the good sense of discipline and mutual respect demonstrated by all. After two weeks of campaigning, the presidential election was held on 31 October, as planned. Election day was marked as much by the enthusiasm of the population as by the respect for democratic principles.”

    2010-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6415 (2010) · source

24. “Mr. Choi: During my most recent briefing to the Security Council, I highlighted a major breakthrough in the Ivorian electoral process: the establishment on 9 September of the voters list comprising over 5.7 million people, which I certified explicitly on 24 September. Starting on 7 October, Ivorians began collecting their voters and identity cards from distributions centres throughout the country. The distribution operation was conducted successfully and most of the people were able to collect their cards. Everywhere, Ivorians were thrilled to finally be able to have their identity and voters card, as the issue of identification had been at the centre of the Ivorian cr1s1s.”

    2010-11-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6415 (2010) · source

25. “In particular, with regard to the first point, UNOCI and the United Nations country team in Cote d'Ivoire will continue their efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy for the protection of civilians. This strategy, once developed, shall allow UNOCI to fully implement the mandates given by the Security Council.”

    2010-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6329 (2010) · source

26. “These are, first, 10-38676 maintaining peace and stability in Cote d'Ivoire, including the protection of civilians as mandated by the Security Council in its resolutions 1894 (2009) and 1911 (2010); secondly, safeguarding past achievements in both the elections and reunification domains and continuing to provide support towards the implementation of these two crucial processes; and, thirdly, helping to establish the definitive electoral list as expeditiously as possible. This list constitutes a sine qua non not only for the holding of elections but also for the completion of the identification operation and the subsequent distribution of the national identity cards.”

    2010-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6329 (2010) · source

27. “Amid this complex and delicate situation, and after much reflection, it is recommended, as indicated in the twenty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (S/2010/245), which is before the members of the Council, that UNOCI maintain the current strength of its military and police components until the end of 2010. Should this recommendation meet with the approval of the Security Council, the Secretariat would conduct a review of the Ivorian peace process and submit further recommendations on the future of UNOCI before the end of this year. Meanwhile, UNOCI shall maintain three priority objectives for the immediate future, as reported in my previous briefing (see S/PV.6284).”

    2010-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6329 (2010) · source

28. “The second option, the withdrawal of 10-38676 UNOCI, has been recommended by some observers who claim that the perennial delays of elections and reunification would no longer justify UNOCI's presence in C6te d'Ivoire. The third option, the status quo, has been recommended by the Forces nouvelles and the Facilitator on the grounds that, despite the failure to produce elections, the Ouagadougou Political Agreement has made a considerable contribution to the stabilization of the situation in Cote d'Ivoire and to significant achievements, such as the mobile courts operation, the identification operation and the production of the provisional list, among others. The fourth option, the rationalization of UNOCI's mandate and configuration, has been recommended by some informed experts on Cote d'Ivoire.”

    2010-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6329 (2010) · source

29. “The events of February and March 2010 demonstrated that the continuing failure to hold elections in Cote d'Ivoire and to materialize the reunification of the country contributes to heightening tensions and hampers constitutional, political, economic and social normalization. It is against this backdrop that a technical assessment mission visited Cote d'Ivoire in April with a View to formulating options for the future of the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI). The mission considered four options: first, strengthening UNOCI's mandate to organize elections; secondly, withdrawing the Operation; thirdly, maintaining the status quo; and, fourthly, rationalizing the Operation's mandate and configuration. The first option, the organization of elections by UNOCI, has been strongly recommended by the opposition.”

    2010-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6329 (2010) · source

30. “Moreover, by virtue of their ambiguities, the provisions of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement allow each of the three major protagonists to claim legitimacy in support of their respective position. This political stalemate is hardly encouraging. Indeed, during the eight years since the outbreak of the crisis, perennial delays in implementing the various peace agreements have been a source of deep frustration for the Ivorian people as well as the international community. They are all the more so since the elections appeared to be within our grasp until several months ago. The full ownership of the peace process by the Ivorian parties, as defined in the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, comes with an obligation to make it work.”

    2010-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6329 (2010) · source

31. “Mr. Choi: During the recent Security Council consultations on Cote d'Ivoire on 17 March, I reported that, for the immediate future, two issues - reunification and elections - were likely to dominate the Ivorian peace process. Indeed, since last March, the pairing of reunification and elections has emerged as the governing dynamic of Ivorian politics. Unfortunately, it has produced a political impasse, which has proved to be as complex as it is delicate. The reason for this impasse is that the three major protagonists of the Ivorian crisis are now dealing with their core interests. The presidential camp wants reunification before elections; the opposition wants elections before reunification; and the Forces nouvelles wants identification before reunification.”

    2010-06-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6329 (2010) · source

32. “In the meantime, in the security domain, President Laurent Gbagbo and President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso jointly proposed the deployment of a 500-man-strong Burkinabe battalion during a three-month electoral period within the framework of UNOCI's military contingent. UNOCI deems that this proposal deserves to be supported. In conclusion, if solutions are to be found on the issues of the second electoral list and of reunification, we shall finally have the long-awaited presidential election in spring 2010.”

    2010-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6263 (2010) · source

33. “This 10-21493 timetable would still lead us to spring 2010 for the presidential election in Cote d'Ivoire. Beyond the current dispute on the electoral list, there is one possible obstacle to this electoral timetable, which is the issue of the country's reunification. In terms of the fourth supplementary agreement to the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, which is known as Ouaga IV, signed in December 2008, a de facto reunification is to be completed two months prior to the presidential election. The progress in this regard has been very slow. Yet all of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement protagonists have so far taken the position that the lack of progress on the reunification issue should not hamper the electoral process.”

    2010-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6263 (2010) · source

34. “The United Nations Operation in C6te d'Ivoire (UNOCI) will do its utmost with the Ouagadougou Political Agreement protagonists, especially with the Office of the Facilitator, with a view to minimizing the delay and establishing the definitive electoral list as soon as possible. Once the definitive electoral list is established as planned, in February 2010, only three additional steps in six weeks are needed to arrive at the presidential election. The first step requires two weeks for the production of around 6 million identity cards and 5.8 million voters' cards. The second step requires two weeks for the distribution of these cards and the transportation of electoral material to about 10,000 voting sites. The third and final step will require two weeks for the official presidential campaign.”

    2010-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6263 (2010) · source

35. “This should provide the basis of a definitive electoral list of 5.8 million people. However, a contentious problem emerged unexpectedly regarding the appeals process as the Independent Electoral Commission cross-checked the 1 million non-traced persons and produced a second list of 429,000 traced people. A controversy arose regarding this semi-official second list. The Independent Electoral Commission explains that this list has been created purely for the internal consumption of the Commission's 31 regional supervisors. The presidential camp contests this explanation, saying that this semi-official list has been used to distort the official appeals process. The dispute surrounding the second list of 429,000 persons is yet to be resolved. It may take several weeks before the electoral process gains speed again.”

    2010-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6263 (2010) · source

36. “Mr. Choi: Since my last briefing to the Security Council, in September 2009 (see S/PV.6168), the Ivorian electoral process has made remarkable progress in a peaceful environment. The data processing of voter registration for around 6.3 million people was successfully completed in November. This resulted in the publication of the provisional electoral list by the Independent Electoral Commission on 23 November, with about 5.3 million persons confirmed and around 1 million persons remaining to be confirmed. This provisional list was well balanced, credible and consensually agreed by the major Ivorian political protagonists. The appeals process launched on 24 November 2009, which allowed the non-traced persons to have their status verified, was completed on 9 January 2010. It resulted in over 500,000 additional persons being traced.”

    2010-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6263 (2010) · source

37. “Now that the electoral process is predicated on the reunification issue, we may have to engage in some deep reflection on the Ivorian reunification problem, with a view to making some meaningful contribution to the reunification of the country and, by extension, accelerating the electoral process.”

    2009-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6113 (2009) · source

38. “Money being fungible, that input will lessen the financial burden of the C6te d'Ivoire Government in the field of elections and the identification process. This complicated and mixed picture of the Ivorian political and electoral map requires some hard thinking on our part. It is now necessary for us to focus our attention both on progress in the elections process 09-31542 and on the negotiations on reunification. The international community and UNOCI, by Virtue of their significant contribution, including my certification mandate, have been deeply engaged in the electoral process. On the other hand, in the field of reunification, our involvement has been much less, principally because of the sensitivity involved in military and security matters.”

    2009-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6113 (2009) · source

39. “Although hampered by the transitional and coalition nature of the Government, various ministries and State institutions remain in place, and there exist around 40,000 State security forces, supported by about $200 million out of a total annual budget of over $5 billion. The international financial institutions have made a positive move. Cote d'Ivoire has begun to benefit from the financial support programme of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Already in April 2009, a first batch of over $200 million of direct budget support was delivered to Cote d'Ivoire. In addition, a Heavily Indebted Poor Countries debt cancellation process for Cote d'Ivoire has been initiated by the World Bank and the IMF.”

    2009-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6113 (2009) · source

40. “In Cote d'Ivoire, we are witnessing an ever higher degree of return to normalcy of daily life, including of commercial activities. The restoration of peace is also evident in that not a single major incident has so far occurred in the identification process, which to date has crossed the threshold of 6 million people. In that respect, the contribution made by the impartial forces in providing the general framework for security is important. Yet, within that framework, it is the Ivorian Government and the Ivorian people themselves who have made the real difference with their refined political culture of compromise.”

    2009-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6113 (2009) · source

41. “UNOCI has been assisting, as best it can, to 09-31542 move the reunification issue forward. Unfortunately, however, critical elements of the reunification, such as the transfer of authority from zone commanders to prefets and the centralization of the treasury, are not progressing as envisioned in Ouaga IV. Deadlines and target dates have repeatedly been missed. The main reason for that can be found in the difference in the vision for and strategy of reunification among the protagonists of the Ouagadougou Agreement. In sum, as it stands now, the prospect for early elections and reunification cannot be described as encouraging. However, this rather sombre reality regarding elections and reunification should not eclipse the continuing positive developments that have occurred in the field of peace and stability.”

    2009-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6113 (2009) · source

42. “Consequently, any new electoral timeline is now predicated on the progress of the reunification process. The experience of the year 2008 has proved that, given the electoral management body's slow pace, speedy progress in the electoral process would be possible only if there were strong political encouragement and urging. The events of 2009 so far have confirmed such a pattern. For the past four months, since the signing of Ouaga IV in December 2008, the protagonists of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement have been focusing on the reunification issue. As a result, the electoral process has been struggling with a slower pace, which has resulted in further delays. To repeat, progress in the electoral process is now contingent upon the evolution of the reunification issue.”

    2009-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6113 (2009) · source

43. “The fourth supplementary agreement to that Agreement, known as Ouaga IV, has reversed the priority between elections and the reunification of the country. Under Ouaga III, which provided the political framework for the electoral momentum in 2008, elections were to take place before reunification. Under Ouaga IV, to the contrary, the de facto reunification is to take place before the elections. Within the framework of Ouaga IV, the measures to be taken at least two months prior to the elections include, inter alia, the transfer of authority from zone commanders to pre'fets, the centralization of the treasury, the completion of the profiling and integration of Forces nouvelles elements into the military, police, gendarmerie and ex-combatants, and the payment of about $1,000 to each ex-combatant and militiaman. Those are tall orders.”

    2009-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6113 (2009) · source

44. “Mr. Choi: In 2008, the United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) focused much of its attention on the electoral process in Cote d'Ivoire, in particular with regard to the identification and voter registration operation, for which it has provided technical, logistical and financial support. Despite the slow pace of the electoral management body, strong political will among the Ivorian political leaders for early elections enabled the electoral process to move forward. Yet, at the outset of 2009, the momentum for an early election appears to have considerably weakened. In the background is the change of political priority among the protagonists of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement.”

    2009-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6113 (2009) · source

45. “In principle, the identification operation is to conclude by the coming spring. At that point in time, I will be in a better position to report on the progress made in the other two critical issues of disarmament and elections.”

    2009-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6071 (2009) · source

46. “Perhaps more significant is the fact that this historic and strategic progress has been made with no major incidents to date. Only a year ago, who could have imagined such a development in the conduct of the identification process? Millions of Ivorians will very soon receive national identity cards for the very first time in their lives, allowing them to participate freely in economic activities and to circulate freely within their own country and in neighbouring States. It is moving to see people line up outside the identification centres as early as 4 am. in order to be identified. In parallel with the peaceful conduct of the identification process, peace and stability have been largely restored in Cote d'Ivoire, allowing UNOCI to propose reducing its military force by one battalion beginning in March 2009.”

    2009-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6071 (2009) · source

47. “In that regard, while there is a danger that it could further complicate the electoral process, the fourth supplementary agreement, by placing disarmament before the elections - and despite the possibility that it may be used as a pretext to delay the elections - could be seen as a mechanism to help resolve those issues. 09-21513 As to the identification process, I am pleased to bring the Security Council encouraging news. More than 3.5 million people have now been identified throughout the national territory. That figure is particularly noteworthy given the fact that most Ivorians appear to agree that a realistic figure may be much higher than the original ll million persons originally foreseen. Moreover, the process is almost complete in two of the most important political centres of Cote d'Ivoire, Abidjan and Bouake.”

    2009-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6071 (2009) · source

48. “It is too early to assess the scale of that impact, but it could complicate managing the electoral timetable. I hope to be able to provide a detailed report at the next Security Council meeting on Cote d'Ivoire. I cannot be silent about the frustration that we all share because of the delays experienced in the holding of the Ivorian elections. However, I should like to suggest that we put things in perspective. For the Ivorian people, the peace process will remain incomplete unless the three issues of identification, elections and disarmament are resolved. The United Nations will be unable to design an exit strategy unless credible elections are held and the effective reunification of the country is achieved on the basis of credible disarmament.”

    2009-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6071 (2009) · source

49. “The agreement contains two important points: the first concerns the completion of disarmament two months before the presidential election, and the second deals with the restoration of State authority in the North by 2 February 2009, at the latest. The provision concerning the completion of disarmament before the presidential election is a crucial change with regard to the third supplementary agreement of November 2007, which provided only for arms control - not for their elimination - before the elections. The restoration of State authority in the North, which also includes the judiciary, would then be linked, inter alia, to the settlement of disputes concerning the electoral list. Thus, the impact of the fourth supplementary agreement on the peace process in general and on the electoral process in particular could be decisive.”

    2009-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6071 (2009) · source

50. “The Framework's decision mentions the possibility of establishing the new electoral timetable in January 2009. President Laurent Gbagbo has publicly requested the Independent Electoral 09-21513 Commission to establish an electoral period. Henri Konan Bedie and Alassane Dramane Ouattara also believe that a new electoral timetable must be provided to the Ivorian people and to the international community. Given that unanimous position, I believe that the Commission should provide an electoral timetable with specific stages as soon as possible. That was the first important event. What was the other? It was the signing of the fourth supplementary agreement on 22 December 2008.”

    2009-01-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6071 (2009) · source