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Chumakov

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49
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2021-09-15
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2023-06-12
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  1. We view this verdict as an open mockery of the provisions of the core international legal instruments in the area of the protection of human rights, specifically the right to expeditious and fair judicial proceedings, which is reflected in the statute of the Mechanism. We believe that with rulings of this quality, the achievement of lasting national reconciliation is simply impossible. I thank the interpreter for her good interpretation.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  2. As a result of such “creativity”, the acquittal was reversed and turned completely on its head. Appeals proceedings then dragged on up until very recently, namely, 31 May 2023, resulting in a sentence for both individuals, that increased the term from 12 years to 15 years. This probably happens only at the ICTY and the Mechanism. With each new trial, the situation of the accused only worsens. Perhaps it merely boils down to the fact that they have already served their appointed sentences, given the time spent in the detention facility, and there was a need to tack something on at the last minute.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  3. It was only on 30 June 2021 that the Trial Chamber found both individuals guilty on all charges and sentenced them to 12 years of incarceration. The insufficient evidentiary basis was disregarded, as if the appellate judges had never heard of the core principle of criminal law that all doubts in a case are to be resolved in favour of the accused. Nevertheless, they eagerly embraced legal innovations penned by the ICTY, namely, that the joint criminal enterprise concept could be applied to the alleged expulsion of persons not ethnically Serb from the territories of Croatia and of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This concept had, in practice, already allowed the ICTY to identify as guilty not just those persons who physically did not commit crimes, but also persons who had simply no knowledge that those crimes had been perpetrated.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  4. On 31 May, it denied the appeal of Serb security service representatives Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, who had been found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated in 1992 in connection with the seizure of Bosanski Šamac, in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The trial of Stanišić and Simatović will probably go down as one of the most protracted and contradictory in the history of international justice. The trial began with an indictment way back in 2003. In 2013, the ICTY Trial Chamber acquitted both accused of all charges because their direct involvement in the tragic events on the territory of the former Yugoslavia was not established. On appeal, proceedings led to the ICTY Appeals Chamber overturning the acquittal, on 15 December 2015, and calling for a second judicial proceeding, which the Mechanism commenced in 2017.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  5. It is important to get to the bottom of this and ascertain why it is taking place. The reasons for Serb dissatisfaction are not hard to grasp. The anti-Serb bent in the rulings of the ICTY and the Mechanism is impossible to deny, for the absolute majority of persons convicted are Serbs. Representatives of other parties to the conflict have received a minority of guilty verdicts, and of some parties just a handful of such verdicts. There are double standards and politicization in the work of the bodies of international criminal jurisdiction. These double standards and politicization have hampered the achievement of lasting national reconciliation, which is one of the main objectives of transitional justice mechanisms. In this regard, the Mechanism has become a “worthy descendant” of the ICTY case.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  6. On the whole, the ICTY and the Mechanism have for now mentioned what has been explicitly stipulated in their founding documents, namely, the commutation of sentences, only when the sentenced or convicted persons were literally at death’s door. Indeed, Radoslav Brdjanin, who was gravely ill, received an early release literally days before his death. It is not about humanity. It is a mere attempt to evade responsibility and avoid uncomfortable questions about inappropriate conditions in detention facilities and failure to provide medical assistance. This is a practice that needs to be fundamentally revised. We draw attention to the growing concern in the statements of the Prosecutor of the Mechanism about the glorification of war criminals and the failure of all countries in the region to recognize the rulings of the ICTY and Mechanism.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  7. At the same time, we wish to stress that, in this specific instance, it would be well advised to take into account not just the humanitarian component, but also the specific procedural features that are linked to the well- known shortcomings in the work of the Mechanism and its predecessor, the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The handing down of a final ruling in the case of the Serb general took unacceptably long and was accompanied by a disregard of the basic rights of an accused person that have been enshrined in core international legal human rights protection instruments, key Security Council resolutions and the Mechanism’s rules of procedure and evidence.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  8. Karadžić and other sentenced Serb persons must be allowed to serve their sentences under appropriate conditions. The following issues are related to the Serb general Mr. Ratko Mladić. We remain uncertain as to whether Mr. Mladić is receiving quality medical assistance while at the Mechanism’s detention facility. Given Mr. Mladić’s advanced age and the state of his health, we wish to recall article 26 of the statute of the Mechanism, which empowers the President to decide issues of pardoning or commutation of sentences in the interests of justice and the general principles of law.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  9. Specifically, the Orthodox priest who recently visited him was subject to the undignified procedure of a body search and had to remove his garments. Mr. Petronjevic has been following the conditions of other Serbs serving sentences. In addition to the violations reported to have been committed by the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, there have been violations reported to have been committed by Germany, Poland, France and Estonia. Further, the magnitude of the problems related to prison conditions are eloquently attested to by the fact that 14 Serb convicts serving sentences died while proceedings were being carried out by the ICTY and the Mechanism. We demand that the Mechanism adopt urgent measures to remedy this unacceptable situation, and Mr.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  10. The leadership of Parkhurst does not even deny this but does refer to a lack of financing. Mr. Karadžić’s daughter, Sonja Karadžić- Jovičević, also shed light on the conditions of detention of her father. As she puts it, those conditions are simply inhumane. He has had all forms of communication, including books and personal correspondence, confiscated from him. He has been prohibited from speaking in his mother tongue, allegedly due to security concerns related to the fear that Muslim cellmates may try to take his life. Similar information has emerged from Goran Petronvjevic, Mr. Karadžić’s lawyer, who has also drawn attention to the fact that the sentenced person was not given the right to meet his basic cultural and religious needs.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  11. The question of respect for the basic rights of convicted persons remains acute. At the previous meeting of the Security Council (see S/PV.9217), we mentioned the case of an open letter from Serbian intelligentsia defending the rights of Mr. Karadžić, who is serving a sentence in the United Kingdom. Having failed to receive information on that matter from the Mechanism, we attempted to make enquiries of Parkhurst Prison, where the convicted person is being held. It emerged that, among local human rights activists, that prison has a notorious reputation because of the conditions of detention, which are “unacceptable and detrimental to the health of detainees”. The January report of the specialized British government commission notes that the prisoners in this prison are deprived of medicine and psychological care.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  12. In that connection, we call on the Office of Internal Oversight Services to develop a set of recommendations and scenarios for the Mechanism to help it finally comply with the Council’s instructions, as set out in resolution 1966 (2010) which established it, to come to terms with its temporary nature and transition to an active closure of its activities. Those recommendations should be aimed at, above all, a fundamental reduction in staff and budgetary expenditures. To summarize, we are awaiting specifics on what will be closed, transferred or reduced and when. We also would like to know the date for the completion of the functions of this structure, which was originally created as a temporary structure. Moreover, we would like to comment on some issues related to the current activities of the Residual Mechanism.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  13. In fact, the President acknowledged the rectitude of the Russian delegation, which for all these years has stated that the Mechanism failed to comply with the parameters of the resolution that established it to begin with and had simply ignored the Council’s instructions regarding its residual, temporary and compact nature. In that regard, given that the transformation of the Mechanism into a genuinely residual structure has been delayed by at least a decade, a significant acceleration in the pace of the efforts to draw down its work is required from its current leadership.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  14. Against that backdrop, no amount of rhetorical balancing acts in its reports can justify the preservation of a huge bureaucratic machine comprised of 388 people. Since many of the positions are part of the inordinately inflated staff of the Mechanism, we demand that the Registrar undertake robust measures to reduce superfluous staff as quickly as possible. The intention expressed by President Gatti to implement a strategy to transform the Mechanism into a genuinely residual body is appropriate. We are surprised that this appropriate idea was first voiced 10 years after the Mechanism’s establishment.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  15. As we have repeatedly stated, the Mechanism should not multiply cases under that category to artificially prolong its existence. National courts can manage those perfectly well. The referral of such cases is permitted under article 1, paragraph 4, of of the statute of the Mechanism. In a recent decision, Mr. Kabuga was declared unfit to stand trial for health reasons. The trial of facts initiated by the Trial Chamber in his case, which will take place without the participation of Mr. Kabuga, is not based on the founding documents of the Mechanism and therefore its status is completely unclear to us and raises questions in terms of its practical expediency. The Mechanism appears to have invented yet another way to prolong its existence. In that sense, the Mechanism’s judicial docket is effectively empty.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  16. At the same time, we note some initial steps have been taken in the right direction, namely, the closure of the detention centre in Arusha and the Sarajevo office, as well as some reductions in temporary and permanent positions. However, the number of reduced positions has not even reached that set out in the plans of the Mechanism itself, which were presented to the Council previously. Let us recall that they stipulate the reduction of at least 46 more positions by the end of 2023. We await full implementation in that regard, and we will continue to closely monitor the Mechanism’s fulfilment of its pledges. Until recently, the Residual Mechanism had essentially only one case pending against Kabuga. We will not count the so-called case of contempt of court.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  17. Mr. Chumakov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We have carefully reviewed the reports of the President and the Prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism on the activities of that body over the past six months. The situation of the Residual Mechanism is still best described by the Russian proverb: “Nothing is more permanent than a temporary solution.” In that regard, we continually remind its leadership of resolution 1966 (2010), which established the Mechanism as a small, temporary and efficient structure, whose functions and size will diminish over time, with a small number of staff commensurate with its reduced functions.

    2023-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9344 (2023) · source

  18. The Russian Federation takes into account such needs in its development assistance project activities and stresses the importance of discussing such issues, but only at specialized platforms in the context of the development system, within which we can not only treat the symptoms of that condition, but also address its root causes.

    2023-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9260 (2023) · source

  19. We count on Tokyo to demonstrate due transparency, report actions that may pose a genuine radiation threat and, if necessary, allow for the monitoring of the radiation situation in areas in which such wastewater discharge takes place, as well as take measures to minimize the negative impact on the marine environment and environmental degradation. In conclusion, I would like to point out that it is completely justified for island States to seek to draw the international community’s attention to their most pressing environmental and development challenges.

    2023-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9260 (2023) · source

  20. Conflict resolution is dealt with by Member States in the Security Council, while development issues, including environmental protection, should be considered in the context of the work of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the high-level political forum on sustainable development and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which is the specialized platform for climatic discussions. Since we are meeting today to discuss environmental issues, we would specifically like to join our Chinese colleagues, who expressed concern over Japan’s plans to dump radionuclide-contaminated wastewater from the Fukushima-1 nuclear power station into the ocean. When making that decision, our Japanese colleagues did not think it necessary to discuss the issue with the neighbouring States.

    2023-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9260 (2023) · source

  21. For 77 years now, the United Nations system has been evolving based on this princicple. It has been proven that the division of labour in society leads to a more efficient economic system, capable of producing more high-quality innovative goods. By analogy, the division of labour at the United Nations was not envisaged by chance by the founding States of the United Nations, and, in seeking better and innovative solutions to the challenges facing us, we should use the proper tools.

    2023-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9260 (2023) · source

  22. However, we emphasize that legal experts have not yet reached a consensus, and the results will be presented only after the thorough consideration of each of the three sub-topics, namely, issues pertaining to the law of the sea, statehood and the protection of persons affected by sea level rise. The topic is also being dealt with in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. We therefore believe that it is premature to discuss the issue, particularly in the Security Council, which is not a dedicated platform for the topic. We once again underscore the importance of the division of labour within the United Nations system. Three equal pillars, namely, peace and security, human rights, and development, are enshrined in the first lines of the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations.

    2023-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9260 (2023) · source

  23. Such socioeconomic challenges can become drivers of instability, but linking their root causes only to the climate aspect is misleading and even harmful. It deflects from seeking solutions and discussing donor commitments. Attention should be paid to the entire range of sustainable development challenges. We are grateful to the Secretary-General for highlighting the whole gamut of problems today. We would like to make a separate point about the legal aspects. The International Law Commission is currently discussing sea level rise from the perspective of international law. We believe that that discussion is critically important.

    2023-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9260 (2023) · source

  24. We once again emphasize that there is no scientific basis to the climate-security nexus. According to a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “compared to other socioeconomic factors, the influence of climate on conflict is assessed as relatively weak”. Let us once again take a close look at the components of our agenda today. Indeed, changing sea levels have economic implications, such as the destruction of critical infrastructure, reduced fish catches, flooded farmlands and worsening food security and access to drinking water. The social impacts of the increasing number of natural disasters are also a concern, as is the failure of countries to put in place modern early warning systems and other technologies.

    2023-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9260 (2023) · source

  25. Mr. Chumakov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank the presidency for having convened today’s debate. We also thank our briefers today. Sea level rise is a global challenge that calls for the particular attention of many States, including ours. Russia has the world’s third-longest coastline. Our territory ecompasses more than 1,300 islands. Sea level rise is a potential challenge, which should be taken into account in socioeconomic development planning. No one disputes the scientific consensus that the rapid sea level rise seen over the past century is directly linked to climate change. However, we note with concern that, in our view, the securitization of the climate agenda, which includes the challenges posed by rising sea levels, is counterproductive.

    2023-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9260 (2023) · source

  26. Low-income and lower- middle-income countries received less than one quarter of the exports — slightly more than 2 million tons in three months. The amount delivered through the World Food Programme was only 255,000 tons, or 2.3 per cent of the total. Nor have we had any confirmation from the countries of the European Union of their claim that they are rerouting or reselling part of the foodstuffs that they are buying from Ukraine in order to send it to poor countries. We still find it difficult to understand why the World Food Programme is playing such an insignificant role in this area.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9176 (2022) · source

  27. Mr. Chumakov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): There are different interpretations of the statistics. I would like to draw members’ attention to the content of the website managed by our United Nations colleagues and the data of the Joint Coordination Centre. As of 29 October, the grain corridor in the Black Sea had granted passage to 409 ships, more than 40 per cent of them bound for European countries. Altogether, approximately 9.5 million tons of food were exported, of which 43 per cent was corn and only 29 per cent was wheat. Today wheat was often the only staple grain mentioned, which only represents one third of the grain exported. We also recall that not all Ukrainian wheat is of food grade. Furthermore, more than half of the recipients are high-income countries, mostly European Union countries.

    2022-10-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9176 (2022) · source

  28. Mr. Chumakov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Accusations were levelled against the Russian Federation that distort reality. We have responded to them repeatedly, and therefore we will not spend time on them today. We would like to underscore that a number of States have once again demonstrated that they have been exploiting Africa and the African agenda. Contrariwise, the Russian Federation has not been exploiting Africa and has instead been listening to Africa. We stand ready to work with its agenda. The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  29. Combating climate change and its negative social and economic consequences falls exclusively within the framework of sustainable development. We call for enhanced cooperation in the relevant multilateral forums dealing with climate change, in general, and its negative manifestations in the economic and social spheres, primarily under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The United Nations development system can make a practical contribution to adaptation, the elimination of the consequences of cataclysms and strengthening early- warning systems with the help of international project activities — the much-needed work of the United Nations operational agencies. Russia pays attention to the climate agenda in our interaction with the United Nations agencies for the benefit of African countries.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  30. And now they are continuing to roll back compliance with their own climate obligations, making a deliberate choice to sacrifice the global climate agenda for the benefit of the political agenda. Meanwhile, Africa, whose vital interests have once again been sidelined by the global agenda dictated by the West, risks being further harmed by climate-related natural phenomena, as well as the ill- conceived unilateral decisions of so-called climate champions. Such double standards and approaches must be eliminated from future international cooperation on climate. We are convinced that the division of labour enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations must be preserved for the effective functioning of the United Nations system. The Security Council cannot and should not duplicate the work of other United Nations entities.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  31. In parallel, it is vital to expand our efforts on the humanitarian assistance and social and economic development fronts, since most countries affected by conflict find themselves in difficult socioeconomic circumstances. There is a hidden agenda in the so-called securitization of climate. The main apologists for decarbonization and the green economy are developed countries that have achieved their economic prosperity through their exploitation of natural resources, including fossil fuels, and much of that wealth came from Africa and still does. The result is that in advocating for increased ambitiousness on climate, the developed countries are starting from intentionally advantageous positions.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  32. Unfortunately, many such country-specific topics have been on the agenda of the Security Council for decades. We see no added value in piling on yet another general criterion. In our experience, the inclusion of new generic topics at best leads to wasted resources and at worst becomes yet another tool for putting pressure on host States. I want to emphasize that if there is a specific problem in a particular country or region and the Security Council has the tools to resolve it, it must take action. But the mandates adopted by the Council should not constitute a set of priorities that are most popular at the United Nations and largely promoted by the West.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  33. We have given particular attention to the African policy documents that address the links between sustainable development and security, that is, the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the Silencing the Guns initiative, which notes the importance of effectively combating drought, desertification, deforestation and climate change in the context of the connection to sustainable development. That is precisely the missing link in the efforts to forge a chain that ties climate to security, and in fact it is the main area where action should be taken. As far as the Security Council is concerned, we believe it is important to focus on analysing the reasons for each conflict. There should not be a single yardstick, since any errors in defining the specific issues that exacerbated the differences makes the responses less effective.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  34. Indeed, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says in its report Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, which has already been cited today, “[c]ompared to other socioeconomic factors the influence of climate on conflict is assessed as relatively weak”. We believe that, if we are to successfully address those challenges, we need sustainable socioeconomic development that is based on national priorities and takes into account local specifics. We need infrastructure, effective social services and early- warning and response mechanisms.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  35. In that regard, we believe it is appropriate not only to step up global efforts to combat climate change, but also to help the countries affected adapt to its negative consequences, and especially with a view to bringing about qualitative change in their socioeconomic situations. We believe that solidarity on the part of the international community is essential to addressing issues of long standing that continue to beset Africa, such as problems of access to clean drinking water, food security, the restoration or strengthening of industry and agriculture and early-warning systems. However, it is important to avoid fragmenting assistance for development and for addressing the degradation of the environment but rather to focus on comprehensive and effective measures.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  36. Mr. Chumakov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Ms. Pobee, Mr. Gahouma-Bekale and Mr. Youssef for their briefings. The Russian Federation considers the problem of climate change a top priority, especially in regions such as Africa that are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters. It is an undeniable fact that climate-induced droughts, floods, forest fires, desertification, hurricanes and other natural disasters have serious economic and social consequences. We share the concerns expressed in the concept note (S/2022/737, annex) of the Gabonese presidency of the Council in connection with the fact that in certain regions, and particularly on the African continent, the effects of climate change create conditions that lead to intercommunal clashes and violence.

    2022-10-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9150 (2022) · source

  37. Mr. Chumakov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I am forced to comment on the statement delivered by my esteemed colleague, Mr. Richard Mills. The freedom of the press and the opposition are indeed very interesting topics in Russia and in all other countries. Indeed, we have quite a lot to say about this, but that is not the topic of today’s meeting. In fact, we heard no substantive answers to the questions that we asked, and we hope that the questions that we raised will continue to be followed carefully by Council members.

    2022-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8958 (2022) · source

  38. Mr. Chumakov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): I apologize for taking the floor again. We listened very carefully to what has been said today. We are very concerned about the problems occurring in the region. However, we are against generic discussions because they can be used for politicization. Specifically, the delegation of Ukraine made that mistake just now. We are convinced, and see, that for our Ukrainian neighbours any Security Council meeting is now used as an excuse to present a distorted picture of the world, where Russia is guilty of all ills. I am sure that everyone has had enough of that. We can see that in today’s vote in the General Assembly, which had nothing to do with the actual situation regarding Ukraine. Despite Kyiv’s efforts, the support significantly decreased and did not even achieve a third of the votes.

    2021-12-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8923Resumption1 (2021) · source

  39. We again emphasize that resolution 2585 (2021) does not provide for any automaticity in that regard; everything will depend upon progress in implementing its provisions.

    2021-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8861 (2021) · source

  40. We urgently draw donors’ attention to that and call on them to provide the necessary support to the United Nations for implementing the relevant provisions of resolution 2585 (2021). In conclusion, we would like to commend the Secretary-General on his new approach to reporting on the humanitarian situation in Syria. However, much work lies ahead of us. In order to ensure that the Council avoid difficulties this winter in renewing the mandate of the cross-border humanitarian assistance mechanism, we call on the United Nations and all Council members to work on ensuring smooth cross- line deliveries, as well as to do their part to normalize the humanitarian situation in Syria and strengthen its territorial integrity.

    2021-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8861 (2021) · source

  41. A similarly dangerous situation can be seen in the Al-Tanf region. We recall that the occupying party bears responsibility for everything that is taking place in those areas. We are also very concerned about the issue of water supply in the northern part of Syria and the Euphrates region. In those areas, 70 per cent of the population is currently encountering difficulties in accessing drinking water. The grain harvest is at serious risk. The problem lies not only in the reduced levels of the Euphrates River, but also the continuous interruptions at the Allouk water station, which, like a large share of infrastructure and facilities in Syria, requires serious repairs and subsequent maintenance.

    2021-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8861 (2021) · source

  42. The data published by USAID demonstrates the true extent of the impact of anti-Syrian sanctions by the United States on every individual Syrian. Some of our European colleagues are following close behind in making life difficult for ordinary Syrians and shifting blame onto Damascus despite the glaring statistics and international calls, including from the Secretary- General. We are also extremely dismayed by the situation in the Al-Hol camp for internally displaced persons, in which the majority of residents are women and children. Since the beginning of the year, 74 premeditated murders have been committed there. The situation risks spiralling out of control. Against that background, according to reports we have received, active efforts to radicalize residents in the camp are being made.

    2021-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8861 (2021) · source

  43. I should like to cite the following passages from the report: “[t]he United States sanctions, which came into effect in June 2020, significantly contributed to the devaluation of the Syrian pound and the spiraling economic crisis; “[t]he combined effects of COVID-19 related restrictions imposed from March to May 2020 and in June, along with the US Caesar [act] sanctions led the exchange rate to devalue even more; “[i]n January 2021, the United States administration announced the continuation of sanctions against Syria to reduce flows of funding to the Government ..., which led to even further devaluation; “coinciding with the implementation of the US economic sanctions and the end of a two-month lockdown, inadequate food consumption rates kept increasing sharply; “[t]rade was also further limited by US sanctions, resulting in an increase in criminal activity and unofficial trade in the black market instead; “COVID-19 precautionary measures and fuel shortages, currency depreciation and economic sanctions, importation constraints, and high transportation costs, all contributed to a general rise in the prices of key agriculture inputs and products from March 2020”.

    2021-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8861 (2021) · source

  44. Meanwhile, in August, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) published a curious report analysing the situation in Syria during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic for the period from July 2020 to July 2021.

    2021-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8861 (2021) · source

  45. We note with satisfaction the normalization of the situation in the Dara’a province, in particular in the area around Dara’a Al-Balad. That was made possible thanks to the efforts of Damascus and the assistance of Russian troops. Civilians are already returning to their homes, and unimpeded humanitarian assistance is being delivered to the governorate both by the United Nations and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent. I do not believe that we need to belabour the issue any further. The Syrians have other more important issues to deal with. In particular, we continue to hear in the Council from representatives of Western States about the so- called targeted impact of the sanctions introduced against certain Syrian officials and how they in no way affect the lives of ordinary Syrians.

    2021-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8861 (2021) · source

  46. At the same time, they are absolutely unforgiving towards Damascus for delays in issuing authorization to United Nations workers to operate in territory under its control. Our Western colleagues have a clearly equivocal attitude with regard to the legitimate authorities and the remaining terrorists in Idlib, who have not been held accountable despite the fact that, according to the United Nations Population Fund, the number of early and child marriages in the Idlib enclave is on the rise. Indeed, when it comes to the Idlib enclave, the rights of women and girls appear to be of far less concern to our colleagues than the rights of women and girls in, say, Afghanistan. Once again, we are facing double standards.

    2021-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8861 (2021) · source

  47. Is there any chance that it will be dispatched to Atareb and Daret Izza, as was agreed with Damascus in April last year? What efforts are being made by the United Nations to achieve that end? We would also like to reiterate our firm position on the need to establish reliable crossline deliveries of humanitarian aid in the north-west. Half-measures will not solve this problem. It is an extremely important task, and it is enshrined in the unanimously adopted resolution 2585 (2021). Nevertheless, with regard to this task, Western members of the Security Council, as far as we can tell, continue show a lack of due enthusiasm it. They are in no hurry to put pressure on the terrorist groups operating under their auspices in Idlib.

    2021-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8861 (2021) · source

  48. It was a modest outcome because the WFP mission has only been partially completed; in the absence of a distribution mechanism, the task has not been completed. The assistance has not reached those who need it, and it continues to be stored in a warehouse under the supervision of unnamed but so-called reliable partners. We would like to understand whether or not these partners are listed among the 80 non-governmental organizations that appear in the latest report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/784). How, then, can we be sure that the humanitarian assistance will not be stolen or actually sold out to those who need it? We would also like to ask Mr. Griffiths about the fate of the joint convoy of the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Syrian Arab Red Crescent.

    2021-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8861 (2021) · source

  49. Mr. Chumakov (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): We thank Mr. Martin Griffiths for his briefing and for providing a detailed account of the outcomes of his trip to Syria and its neighbouring States. We commend the active and constructive position of the new head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs for the Syrian track. We also note the input of Ms. Amany Qaddour to this discussion. We welcome the first successful humanitarian campaign of the World Food Programme (WFP) in Idlib, which was carried out through the crossline mechanism. We realize that there were major difficulties in endorsing the dispatch of this humanitarian convoy to the warehouse in Sarmada. At the same time, we call on all the stakeholders not to be satisfied with the modest and one-time result.

    2021-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8861 (2021) · source