YouSaid · the spoken record

Cohen

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977
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2008-01-22
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2023-10-24
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un-security-council

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  1. Secondly, it must ensure that United Nations cross-border humanitarian aid deliveries authorized by resolution 2449 (2018) continue to reach populations in Idlib, including in the demilitarized zone, with regular, sustained and unimpeded access. Thirdly, it must encourage Damascus to take all steps necessary to ensure the safe and unhindered access of relief personnel to the affected areas in Idlib. Fourthly, it must finally ensure that the Syrian regime does not deploy chemical weapons in Idlib. The United States strongly supports Turkey's efforts to de-escalate the situation and preserve the Sochi ceasefire agreement. The United States is not alone in its calls for Russia and the regime to live up to their commitments to maintaining the ceasefire.

    2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source

  2. The Syrian people are in grave risk of a catastrophic humanitarian crisis if Russia and the Al-Assad regime do not immediately halt their escalation and immediately recommit to the ceasefire. The United States reiterates that any escalation in violence in north-western Syria would destabilize the region, and we call on the Russian Federation to take the following steps with immediate effect, in recognition of its ability to influence the behaviour of the Al-Assad regime. First, it must ensure the de-escalation of all military activity in the Idlib demilitarized zone and recommitment to the full implementation of the 17 September 2018 Sochi agreement. This means a full cessation of all hostilities in the area - full stop.

    2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source

  3. Under-Secretary-General Lowcock has been equally clear in the past and again today about the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe that would result from a military assault on Idlib. The Russian Federation, on behalf of the Astana group, has assured the Security Council, as well as my country bilaterally at the highest levels, that it is committed to maintaining its own ceasefire. However, Russia and the regime justify their attacks on civilians and hospitals as counter-terrorism. The strikes have destroyed 18 health facilities. Most alarming is the fact that several ofthese facilities were on deconfliction lists set up by the Russian Federation and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

    2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source

  4. Recent fighting has forced civilians to seek safety closer to the border of our NATO ally Turkey, and the new wave of displaced persons has overwhelmed the capacity of camps for internally displaced persons in the area. The offensive has put aid workers and humanitarian facilities in danger. Turkish military forces on the ground to monitor and implement the ceasefire agreement are also in danger, with some having already been injured, as we have heard. For a year, the United Nations and many in this Council have issued grave warnings about the scope of the tragedy that would result from a military offensive in Idlib. The Secretary-General was crystal clear in September 2018 when he said that a military assault on Idlib would unleash "a humanitarian nightmare unlike any seen in the blood-soaked Syrian conflict".

    2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source

  5. I thank Under-Secretaries-General DiCarlo and Lowcock for their deeply concerning briefings today. The United States believes that the September 2018 ceasefire agreement between the Russian Federation and Turkey in Idlib and neighbouring areas is absolutely essential to maintaining international peace and security. Millions of civilian lives are in jeopardy due to increased hostilities by Russia and the regime over the past two weeks in Idlib and Hama governorates. These intensified military operations continue to destabilize the region. The escalation has killed or injured at least 100 people and driven more than 180,000 from their homes, as we have heard - some for the third or fourth time in eight years of war, fleeing the Al-Assad regime's barrel bombs and Russian and regime air strikes.

    2019-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8527 (2019) · source

  6. The sustainability of those improvements will depend on the progress of the G-5 Sahel States towards effective governance, the creation of access to opportunity and respect for human rights, accountability and inclusiveness. It is also critical to increase the roles for women, young people and marginalized groups in decision-making. Together, such combined endeavours can achieve durable peace and stability and unleash the potential of this vital region and its people.

    2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source

  7. The dire security situation demands that the international community focus its collective efforts in the Sahel in a smart, deliberate and collaborative way. As others have noted, that requires that the region and its partners continue to pursue more than security responses alone and address the root causes of conflict through coordinated humanitarian, health, agricultural, governance and development assistance. As I have stated before, through our effective coordination with the security and development actors in the region and the leadership of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States in solving regional and local disputes, significant improvements in security are achievable.

    2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source

  8. Some of our briefers and Council colleagues have expressed an interest in exploring possible ways to deliver reimbursable support to the Joint Force outside Mali. I urge our colleagues to recall that in resolution 2391 (2017) the Security Council encouraged that the technical agreement constitute a temporary measure towards full self-sufficiency of the Joint Force. In addition, the Council emphasized that any facilitation of support through the technical agreement should not adjust or adversely impact MINUSMA's own operations or put its personnel at undue risk. The United States believes that the international community should focus its collective support on the G-5 Sahel Joint Force as an African-owned, African-led response to regional instability.

    2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source

  9. As I noted in my remarks last November (see S/PV.8402) and as the United States has repeatedly stated, Chapter VII authorization is not needed to accomplish the Joint Force's mission, as the G-5 Sahel States already have existing agreements in place for military operations in their respective territories. We note with regret that, as highlighted in the Secretary-General's recent report (S/2019/371), the G-5 Joint Force in Mali is not sufficiently leveraging the established technical agreement with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the European Union. We call on the Joint Force, the Malian Government and partners to find ways to help the Force to use that opportunity more efficiently.

    2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source

  10. We call on the Joint Force and Member States to continue to take the necessary steps to become fully operational, including through adherence to the compliance framework to prevent, investigate, address and publicly report violations and abuses of human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law. The United States continues to believe that bilateral assistance remains the best way to support the Force and is disappointed that other members of the Council and beyond continue to call for Chapter VII authorization and United Nations-assessed funding for the Joint Force.

    2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source

  11. The United States honours the two fallen French soldiers and their families for their loss and their great sacrifice. The international and peacekeeping forces alone will not resolve the security crisis in the region. That is why it is critical to work on the long-term goal of fully operationalizing the Joint Force ofthe Group ofFive for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel). The United States recognizes that and, thus far, has committed approximately $111 million to the G-5 Sahel States to fill capability gaps by providing equipment, training and advisory support. We are encouraged by the resumption of operations of the Joint Force and we pay tribute to the sacrifices that Member States are making in order to bring stability to the region.

    2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source

  12. I would like to thank today's briefers and to give a warm welcome to Foreign Minister Barry. The past six months in the Sahel have been concerning. The security situation continues to deteriorate. Radical elements have driven intercommunal violence to an all-time high. The massacre in Ogossagou points towards potential widespread intercommunal violence throughout the region. Meanwhile, terrorist groups and criminal organizations continue to thrive, moving across borders, attacking civilian communities and Government and international security forces. Such insecurity impacts all West Africa. The heroic rescue of four kidnapped civilians last week, during which the two French soldiers lost their lives, reminds us all of the danger.

    2019-05-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8526 (2019) · source

  13. They, their staffs and the international humanitarian community are working to help the parties reach a resolution to the conflict and save Yemeni lives. The Council must use all means to help.

    2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source

  14. Iran's violations of the Yemen arms embargo not only flout the Council's resolutions, but they are also prolonging the war. As we heard from Mr. Lowcock and Ms. Fore, limited progress on a political and military settlement has meant even less progress in addressing the dire humanitarian crisis. Huge amounts of critical grain supplies at the Red Sea Mills have been lost. As the toll of hunger and cholera rises, we once again call on all parties to safeguard humanitarian infrastructure and allow for unfettered humanitarian access. That includes access to food and medical care for migrants and displaced people throughout the country. Our support for Special Envoy Griffiths and Lieutenant General Lollesgaard remains steadfast.

    2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source

  15. Such attacks threaten to expand the conflict and undermine the United Nations-led process and the work of Special Envoy Griffiths. During its trip last month, the 2140 Committee reiterated the need for all Member States to adhere to the arms embargo contained in resolution 2216 (2015). We cannot ignore the fact that, since the war began and the Council imposed its arms embargo, the Houthis have used more sophisticated weapons to threaten Yemen's neighbours. The Houthis did not develop long-range ballistic missiles and UAVs on their own. They did not develop them, and the Council's own Panel of Experts for Yemen has repeatedly said that those weapons have Iranian design characteristics. When asked about how its weapons keep ending up in Yemen, Iran has never presented a credible explanation.

    2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source

  16. Obstruction of the United Nations process cannot be tolerated. For months, apparent breakthroughs have happened just in time for Security Council briefings; then progress stalls once we leave this Chamber. We have seen enough of that pattern, and we should insist that it end today. Council members must consider how to hold parties responsible if they do not implement the Stockholm Agreement. Fighting around the country, not just in Al-Hudaydah, needs to stop. The Houthis must cease unmanned aircraft (UAV) attacks against their fellow citizens and neighbours. Iran needs to stop supplying the Houthis with weapons to do so. Attacks this week against Saudi infrastructure are just the latest example of how destabilizing that is.

    2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source

  17. They certainly have done so for the members of the Council. We appreciate the first signs of progress on the Stockholm Agreement since December 2018, and we commend the parties and thank the United Nations for doing everything possible to press for the redeployments. Houthi withdrawals from the ports of Saleef, Ras Isa and Al-Hudaydah are a significant first step. Today's good news must not break our focus on how much remains to be done. The parties must keep working in good faith to reach an agreement on local security forces in order to fully redeploy. They must exercise restraint so that fighting does not threaten the ceasefire, and they must enable the United Nations efforts on the ground. Whatever other actions it takes, any party failing to allow United Nations monitors entry into Yemen is failing the Yemeni people.

    2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source

  18. I thank the briefers for their presentations today and the tireless effort of their teams. I also thank the Ambassador of Peru, in his capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014), for his work and for leading a very successful Committee trip to the region. The Security Council acknowledges the tragedy of the man-made crisis in Yemen every time we meet. For the fifth year in a row, that tragedy is being compounded as the crisis continues into the holy month of Ramadan. Like other members of the Council, we worry that the world has grown numb to that suffering. If it has, let us hope that today's alarming briefings by Executive Director Fore and Under-Secretary-General Lowcock rekindle broad attention to the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

    2019-05-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8525 (2019) · source

  19. Adding a civilian Deputy Head of Mission expands UNISFA's capacity to manage reconciliation efforts at the local level and to engage with the parties as they seek to address outstanding challenges. The United States encourages the parties to capitalize on the rapprochement between Khartoum and Juba and to make more progress in resolving their disputes related to Abyei. That includes implementing the Council's adjustments to UNISFA within the mandated timelines, engaging constructively in the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and working with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to resolve border-related issues.

    2019-05-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8524 (2019) · source

  20. The United States thanks the Council members for their efforts to ensure that the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) is appropriately configured for the current security situation in Abyei, creating space for the parties to seek a political solution to outstanding disputes. The Council has shown its commitment to helping the Sudan, South Sudan and, most important, the people of Abyei to find lasting peace, security and stability. The changes in the mandate are modest but they are important. Increasing the number of police in UNISFA while decreasing the number of peacekeepers helps to address criminality, which is the primary security concern in Abyei. Police forces trained to address law enforcement challenges are best equipped to support the local residents.

    2019-05-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8524 (2019) · source

  21. Our position on the ICC in no way diminishes the commitment of the United States to supporting accountability for atrocity crimes.

    2019-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8523 (2019) · source

  22. The United States has historically been, and will continue to be, a strong supporter of meaningful accountability and justice for the victims of atrocities, through appropriate mechanisms. The perpetrators of atrocity crimes must face justice, but we must also be careful to recognize the right tool for each situation. However, I must reiterate our long-standing and principled objection to any assertion of ICC jurisdiction over nationals of States that are not party to the Rome Statute, absent a Security Council referral or the consent of such States. Although we note the recent decision not to authorize an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan, we remain concerned about illegitimate attempts by the ICC to assert jurisdiction.

    2019-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8523 (2019) · source

  23. We remain concerned about abuses that human traffickers and smugglers have perpetrated against migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers in Libya. We support efforts to hold those individuals, including Government officials found to be complicit, accountable. The United States will continue to work to end impunity for human rights abuses, including the persistent problem of human smuggling and trafficking, which has plagued the region. We strongly condemn attempts by terrorists, including the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham in Libya and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, to use violence against innocent Libyans and key institutions to sow chaos. They must not be allowed to succeed. We will continue to work to defeat those groups.

    2019-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8523 (2019) · source

  24. The United States is deeply concerned by the instability in Tripoli, which is endangering innocent civilians. Lasting peace and stability can come only through a political solution. All parties should rapidly return to United Nations political mediation, the success of which depends upon a ceasefire in and around Tripoli. We support the ongoing efforts of Special Representative of the Secretary-General Ghassan Salame and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya to help avoid further escalation and chart a path forward that provides security and prosperity for all Libyans. This briefing is an important reminder that accountability not only provides justice for victims of past violations and abuses, but also signals that future violations and abuses will not be tolerated.

    2019-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8523 (2019) · source

  25. I would like to thank the Prosecutor for her briefing. Eight years ago, the Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Resolution 1973 (2011) addressed a dangerous moment in Libya's history. Al-Qadhafi's horrific abuses stunned the world. Now, as then, we stand against impunity and support efforts to bring to justice those responsible for atrocities in Libya. We reiterate our call for SaifAl-Islam Al-Qadhafi and Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled, former head of Libya's notorious Internal Security Agency, to be held to account for their alleged crimes against humanity, torture and the murder and persecution of hundreds of civilians in 2011. We also renew our call for Libyan authorities to hold Mahmoud Al-Werfalli to account for alleged unlawful killings.

    2019-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8523 (2019) · source

  26. Until that day, the United States will continue to fully support Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Office of the High Representative in realizing the Security Council's vision for the country as a peaceful, stable and multi-ethnic democracy fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community.

    2019-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8522 (2019) · source

  27. Expanding cooperation, strengthening the rule of law, making institutions more functional, and tackling corruption are vital steps to ensure a bright future for the country. The United States looks forward to a time when the Office of the High Representative is no longer essential, but the current state of affairs indicates that we are not there yet. Only when the 5+2 conditions established by the Peace Implementation Council are met can we in the international community confidently say that Bosnia and Herzegovina will have fully implemented its responsibilities under the Dayton Peace Accords and can responsibly take care of its own affairs. When it becomes clear that State-level institutions are viable and respected, international supervision through the Office of the High Representative will no longer be required.

    2019-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8522 (2019) · source

  28. There are calls for the closure of the Office of the High Representative from some who wish to see the country less stable, less secure and more divided. A common characteristic among those who seek division is their resentment of authorities or institutions that prevent them from exploiting the country's tumultuous political landscape for personal gain. The United States is concerned about recent rule of law developments in the Republika Srpska that are inconsistent with democratic norms and a European future. We are also troubled by the lack of local elections in the city of Mostar since 2008, as the High Representative has pointed out. The United States encourages greater engagement on the part of his Office on resolving these and other issues and to facilitate confidence-building and collaboration among stakeholders.

    2019-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8522 (2019) · source

  29. Bosnia and Herzegovina has several opportunities on the immediate horizon to achieve its goals and strengthen its relationship with the Euro-Atlantic community. We are pleased that Bosnia and Herzegovina is completing the necessary steps towards European Union candidacy. Separately, in December NATO allies agreed to allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to submit its first annual national programme, proving that progress towards Western integration is possible by making difficult but necessary reforms. We encourage the country's leaders to take advantage of this opportunity soon. While there are opportunities, many challenges remain. Nationalist rhetoric exacerbates divisions among the three constituent peoples.

    2019-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8522 (2019) · source

  30. I thank High Representative Inzko for his leadership and for his presence in the Chamber today. The United States reiterates its strong support for the Office of the High Representative's mandate as the final authority on the interpretation of the civilian implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords and reaffirms, as other speakers have also done, that the option to use the Bonn powers remains a legitimate right of the High Representative. We welcome the progress made towards Government formation following the October elections, urge the new parliamentarians in the Federation and the new entity Government in Republika Srpska to begin the hard work of implementing reforms, and encourage the Presidency to agree on policy priorities allowing formation of the State-level Government.

    2019-05-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8522 (2019) · source

  31. Through that effort, we will further strengthen peacekeeping, including with tailored, targeted training and capacity-building. In turn, that will enhance the safety and security of peacekeepers and the communities they protect so that we can arrive at lasting conditions for the political solutions that we seek.

    2019-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8521 (2019) · source

  32. However, safety and security are not just about training and capacity-building. They str primarily about improving peacekeeper performance. That is why we drafted resolution 2436 (2018), adopted by consensus last September, and why we welcome the Secretary-General's commitment to implementing an integrated performance policy. Resolution 2436 (2018) makes it clear that the Security Council needs better information on performance in order to make better decisions. From training and capacity-building to ensuring accountability for underperformance, we cannot fix what we do not know. As the representative of the United Kingdom also noted, better reporting on peacekeeping will help us make better decisions in the Council. We will therefore continue to work with partners towards the full and speedy implementation of resolution 2436 (2018).

    2019-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8521 (2019) · source

  33. More than 11,000 female military and police personnel have participated in United States peacekeeping training events, through the United States Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the International Police Peacekeeping Operations Support Programme. As part of our efforts to achieve the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all stages of the peace process, we have further integrated gender-related topics into training for all peacekeepers. In GPOI partner countries, we are investing in infrastructure, such as building female barracks and latrines, to accommodate female peacekeepers at training sites. We do those things because we know, as you pointed out, Madam President, that having qualified women in meaningful roles makes peacekeeping missions more effective.

    2019-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8521 (2019) · source

  34. Our long-term partnerships help enable troop- and police-contributing partners to prepare, deploy and sustain fit for purpose peacekeepers. We hope that other training and capacity-building partners will follow suit. Our assistance activities further aim to address mission shortfalls that might undermine the performance or effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation. For example, we have provided training and equipment to 41 partner countries to develop 82 distinct critical enabling capabilities - such as engineering companies, level-2 hospitals and riverine units - for deployment to peacekeeping operations. Our training also aims to increase the number of qualified civilian and uniformed women in peacekeeping.

    2019-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8521 (2019) · source

  35. Police trained in conjunction with the United States regularly pass United Nations predeployment assessments and United States-trained Rwandan police units in both the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic received United Nations medals of service excellence in recognition of their leadership and efforts to protect civilians - qualities we should demand from all deployed uniformed personnel. On the military side, we are working with a partner troop-contributing country to pilot a predeployment certification exercise to validate the readiness of deploying battalions. Through our peacekeeping initiatives, the United States does more than conduct training courses.

    2019-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8521 (2019) · source

  36. There are many troop- and police-contributing countries that may have the political will to help peacekeeping operations achieve lasting solutions and seek partnerships to fulfil their peacekeeping potential. That is where the United States excels. We will continue to answer the call to help, as the largest bilateral training and capacity-building partner in the world. Our commitment to the effective development and delivery of peacekeeping training and capacity- building is long-standing and our efforts are working.

    2019-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8521 (2019) · source

  37. I congratulate you, Madam President, on Indonesia's Security Council presidency this month. I also thank our briefers and Indonesia for organizing today's debate on how training and capacity-building can strengthen United Nations peacekeeping. In that regard, the United States is engaging with partners to provide innovative approaches to improving peacekeeping. We know that high-quality training and accountability can directly contribute to the safety and security of uniformed peacekeepers. Just as importantly, qualified professional troops and police can deliver more effective and efficient missions that better protect civilian populations. Uniformed personnel must also have an understanding of the mandate, the background and the conditions of their peacekeeping environment.

    2019-05-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8521 (2019) · source

  38. However, the token prisoner swaps between the Al-Assad regime and Syrian opposition groups brokered by the so- called Astana guarantors do not represent credible or significantly meaningful steps towards building the trust and confidence necessary to achieve a political solution. Hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women and children remain imprisoned without cause, and the regime continues to arbitrarily arrest, torture and execute detainees. The United States believes that the United Nations is the only appropriate arbiter for ensuring progress on the release of detainees and missing persons from the Al-Assad regime's prisons.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8520 (2019) · source

  39. More than 120,000 people have fled their homes, moving closer to the Turkish border in order to seek safety. That must end. In north-eastern Syria the United States is working hard to guarantee the security of our NATO ally Turkey, while also securing the enduring defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It is vital that security conditions remain stable in order to consolidate our hard-won gains and ensure that ISIL is not able to regain momentum or control of territory. Finally, progress on the release of civilian detainees and missing persons is a vital component in achieving a political solution under resolution 2254 (2015).

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8520 (2019) · source

  40. The United States insists that the Syrian opposition and the United Nations reach agreement on the membership and procedural elements of the constitutional committee before it is formally established, which is the only way to ensure its credibility and legitimacy. The political transition outlined in resolution 2254 (2015) cannot succeed as long as violence remains an ever-present threat in northern Syria. The United States reiterates its calls on Russia and the Al-Assad regime to halt their recent military escalation in Idlib province and uphold the September 2018 Russian-Turkish ceasefire. Despite Russia's claim to be targeting terrorists, since February those operations have killed more than 200 civilians and targeted first responders as they attempted to save lives on the ground.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8520 (2019) · source

  41. We commend the Special Envoy and the Syrian opposition for their efforts to ensure that any committee formed to draft a new constitution will be balanced and credible. The United States position on the constitutional committee is clear. First, the committee, if formed, would represent only a symbolic first step towards achieving the political solution envisioned in resolution 2254 (2015), and could potentially serve as a confidence-building measure upon which the parties could secure progress on other benchmarks. No matter how close the parties may be to agreement on a constitutional committee, the United States expects United Nations diplomatic efforts to continue along the other tracks established for detainees and missing persons, counter-terrorism, elections and the creation of a safe, calm and neutral environment.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8520 (2019) · source

  42. The Al-Assad regime seems determined to end the conflict by waging war on the Syrian people, rather than by implementing principled political reform. The Security Council and the international community are united, and must remain united, in our recognition of the United Nations- led political process in Geneva as the sole legitimate forum for achieving a lasting, inclusive and credible political solution to the conflict. That is why the United States and our Syria small group partners - Egypt, France, Germany, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom - will convene in Geneva on 3 May for consultations with the Special Envoy on the way forward towards implementing resolution 2254 (2015). The United States also continues to support Special Envoy Pedersen's focus on constitutional reform.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8520 (2019) · source

  43. Unfortunately, and despite the Special Envoy's intense diplomacy, the political process remains stalled by the Russian Federation and its supporters, as evidenced by the latest round of Astana process meetings held in Nur-Sultan on 25 and 26 April. Once again, the so-called Astana process has failed to produce tangible steps towards securing serious commitments to advance the political process, the release of civilian detainees, the approval of a humanitarian convoy to deliver food and medicine to thousands of starving people in Rukban or a nationwide ceasefire. The Russian Federation and the Al-Assad regime have consistently sought to stall United Nations efforts to launch a credible political process.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8520 (2019) · source

  44. At the outset, the United States is compelled by the urgency of the humanitarian conditions in the Rukban camp to reiterate in the strongest terms our call on the Al-Assad regime and the Russian Federation to permit deliveries of United Nations assistance from Damascus and lift its restrictions on commercial routes to the encampment immediately. The last United Nations- Syrian Arab Red Crescent convoy delivery reached the camp in February. People are starving. We count on Special Envoy Pedersen's assistance to secure the approvals from Damascus and Moscow as soon as possible. A third convoy to Rukban could represent a gesture by Damascus and its allies of goodwill and seriousness towards United Nations efforts to relaunch the political process.

    2019-04-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8520 (2019) · source

  45. Instead, Russia further fuels a conflict that has already claimed over 13,000 lives. Despite that deeply disturbing development, we stand ready to support the efforts of Ukraine to restore Ukrainian Government control over all territory within its internationally recognized borders. United States Special Representative Kurt Volker is prepared to engage intensively with Ukraine, Russia and our partners here at the United Nations to de-escalate the conflict and advance the implementation of the Minsk agreements, including through an international security force that would facilitate their implementation. Once again, we affirm that our Donbas-related sanctions will remain in place until Russia withdraws its forces from eastern Ukraine and implements the Minsk agreements.

    2019-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8516 (2019) · source

  46. Russia signed the Minsk agreements in 2014 and 2015, and President Poroshenko and President-elect Zelensky have reaffirmed that those agreements are the best vehicle for ending the conflict in eastern Ukraine. It is unacceptable that Russia would take steps to stymie the peace process just four days after Ukraine's presidential elections. We welcome President-elect Zelensky's expressed commitment to implementing the Minsk agreements and redoubling efforts to support Ukrainian citizens living in territories controlled by Russia. If Russia were truly interested in the well-being of the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine, it would seize this moment to chart a new course in Russian-Ukrainian relations and seek to work with President Poroshenko and his successor to promote peace.

    2019-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8516 (2019) · source

  47. The United States, too, condemns Russia's decision to grant expedited Russian citizenship to Ukrainians living in Russia-controlled Donbas. Through that highly provocative action, Russia is clearly intensifying its assault on Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Donbas is in Ukraine and the people there are Ukrainian, regardless of the language they prefer to speak. Conferring citizenship en masse to the citizens of another State undermines and violates the principle of sovereignty. Russia's actions subvert the principles on which the Minsk agreements are based ~ that Donbas is an integral part of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Government must re-establish its control over that territory.

    2019-04-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8516 (2019) · source

  48. They should be able to reclaim their property and, when that is not possible, be given appropriate compensation; and they should be free from fear that they will be victims of disappearances, unlawful detention or forced conscription. Finally, the United States is alarmed by the surge this month in Russian and regime air strikes in Idlib governorate that have killed scores and displaced more than 110,000 people. The United States position on Idlib is clear. The September 2018 Russian-Turkish-brokered ceasefire must hold. Any military escalation, including any use of chemical weapons by the regime and its allies in Idlib, would be catastrophic for the millions of people there and for the stability of Syria's neighbours and the broader region.

    2019-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8515 (2019) · source

  49. Those delays of regime approvals for routine humanitarian access requests underscore the importance of cross-border operations to continue unimpeded from all four border crossings, including the Al-Ramtha crossing from Jordan, which represents a direct route to reach the hundreds of thousands in need in south-west Syria. The United States remains committed to the guiding principles for the voluntary and safe return of IDPs and refugees in dignity. They should return only at a time of their choosing. They should be able to choose where they go. They should have access to the proper civil documentation necessary for the exercise of their legal rights.

    2019-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8515 (2019) · source

  50. No one should politicize or try to dictate United Nations operations for cross-border aid delivery in Syria - not the Al-Assad regime, not the Russian Federation, no one. The Al-Assad regime continues to prioritize the provision of humanitarian assistance, including cross-border assistance, only to areas controlled by regime forces. Yet even areas under regime control, like Quneitra and Dara'a governorates in south- west Syria, are struggling and reliant on approvals that are purposefully delayed by regime officials in Damascus.

    2019-04-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8515 (2019) · source