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2002-03-27
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2005-02-24
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un-security-council

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  1. As far as Belgrade is concerned, we are at the Council's disposal for any kind of constructive cooperation. But we must be very realistic. No politician in Belgrade is ready or willing to participate in the independence of Kosovo.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  2. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has said that it would be possible to have both the old country code and the new country code in place, as well as a sub-code that is part of the current country code for Serbia and Montenegro, 381. It would be possible to do that through Monaco, as has been done thus far. We are available for any talks with the Special Representative and UNMIK to come up with an economical solution. But I appeal to all not to misuse the ITU country code issue. I also ask that the Secretary-General not prejudge the resolution of the issue of Kosovo's final status. Any change in the current "standards before status" policy - such as a change towards "both standards and status" - would basically be a recognition that the international mission in Kosovo had failed.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  3. Let me briefly address the question of power outages. I agree that they constitute a technical problem, and I shall provide members with a transcript of our meeting with the Kosovo Energy Company at Prolom Banja in December 2004. All that was said is true, but it should be added that in the past there were 8,000 Serbs among the company's 15,000 employees; today, there are only 28. Parallel structures were also mentioned. Such parallel structures provide a livelihood for 35,000 people who live and work in Kosovo. Let us be open and frank about all the issues. I know that Kosovo and Metohija poses a major twenty- first-century problem, but I am here to work constructively to resolve it. Lastly, let me refer to the country dialling code, which was also mentioned by the Special Representative.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  4. But we have also promised that we would not accept an arrogant approach on the part of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). We can cooperate in the process, but it must be on an equal footing. I request the Council's support in that regard, which would help both us and Mr. J essen-Petersen. Encouraging Serbs to participate in the Institutions is no easy matter. I regret that no speaker today mentioned the fact that at one point Serbs did indeed participate in the work of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. They left, however, because they viewed them as lacking credibility and as being a step towards an independent Kosovo. Such a Kosovo would be without Serbs, but it would not bring peace and stability to the region. We have to be serious politicians and consider matters in the long term.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  5. We also heard today that security conditions have improved. How can that be measured? Is it measured by a smaller number of Serbs being killed or injured? It is just that they have learned to keep out of harm's way: that is the reality of Kosovo. Perhaps no one wishes to see that reality, but we must work to improve the situation. We heard that the situation can be seen to have improved because President Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica have visited Metohija. If that is an indication of improved security, then I agree. But this assessment should not be misused with respect to political processes. We have said that Belgrade would not impinge on any such processes; as long as I am in my present position, we will place no obstacles in their way.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  6. Belgrade will accept responsibility, but only where it bears blame. The Contact Group needs to be able to influence the assessment of standards implementation. Here, let me speak of the standards relating to returns. Assessments of progress cannot be limited to intentions or desires. When we assess progress on returns, we need to know how many people have returned and how many of them have remained in their homes. We know that many will not return, and we do not wish to be biased in that regard. I know that some will respond that numbers are not that important. But they are indeed important. I was encouraged by the most recent report of the Secretary-General (S/2005/88), because it has begun to make use of figures and percentages: that is the only way that progress can be assessed.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  7. For nearly six years, more than 200,000 people have been unable to return to their homes. Some speakers today, with the best of intentions, spoke of the lack of good will on the part of Kosovo Serbs. What sort of good will must the Serbs demonstrate when their houses are set on fire, when they must go to work in armoured vehicles and when their children need armed escorts to go to school? Does that reflect the multi-ethnic society and the standards we are all fighting for? I do not think that this is an easy problem. I do not think that Mr. Jessen-Petersen has an easy job. But I appeal to Council members to stop accusing Belgrade of things for which it bears no blame. If the international community is to blame any party for the failure and incompetence of those who should be addressing the Kosovo issue, that party is not Belgrade.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  8. We are in an environment that limits our options. Our choices have been reduced to the following. If the status quo remains, there will be violence. If the status quo cannot continue, some Council members have said that Kosovo and Metohij a will never come under Belgrade's rule or that the situation will never revert to that of 1999. Some members have also said that the partition of Kosovo is unacceptable. I appeal to them to take that one step further and say whether or not they would view independence for Kosovo as acceptable. Perhaps we should attempt to have such an exchange of views, because the problem of Kosovo and Metohija has gone beyond the constraints of diplomatic exchanges of views that focus on great achievements, impressions and so forth.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  9. I am very grateful for the statements made at this meeting. I have just a few comments to make on what the Council has heard today. I must make it clear that the Serbs are not Victims of misinformation; their sense of insecurity is a consequence of the horrific reality that for nearly six years they have faced in Kosovo and Metohija. Since 2001, I have had the opportunity to observe and participate in the ongoing process. I have attended a number of Security Council meetings on this subject, including meetings that took place before 17 March 2004. At that time, we were full of optimism and we hailed the great achievements that had been made. Then came the events of 17 March. Everyone said that they amounted to a mere incident, but after all that has happened I will leave it to Council members to decide whether that was indeed the case.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  10. There should be no stops at side stations, where bad compromises are made in reaching for the standards of a truly multi-ethnic society and where the borders of a mono-ethnic State are drawn. If its destination is Europe without compromises, Belgrade will be on that train.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  11. I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate that Belgrade stands ready to participate fully in all processes in Kosovo and Metohija - however, on an equal footing, from beginning to end of each individual process, including the process of decentralization. Let us return, in the end, to the popular metaphor that has been often used recently to describe the unfolding of the process in Kosovo and Metohija. Where is the train - which I mentioned at the beginning of this statement - heading? If the final destination is Europe rather than it being a local train, the train should allow us to travel steadily towards the full implementation of all standards of modern European States and to full membership in the European Union.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  12. In view of the above, we raised the issue of revitalizing the working groups for missing and abducted persons and for energy with the Special Representative, and we sought to initiate the process of reconstruction of the churches and monasteries damaged or destroyed in last year's wave of violence. The meeting of the working group for missing and abducted persons will be held in Belgrade on 10 March, and we hope that it will contribute to the resolution of this sensitive and, above all, humanitarian issue. Some steps have also been taken in order to start the work of the high-level group on security, as well as of working groups for decentralization, transport and returns. We hope that initial results will already be seen in the next few weeks.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  13. We believed then, as we do now, that the question of the survival of the Serbs is directly connected to more efficient and more reliable institutional protection for them as a community in Kosovo and Metohija. That is why we have focused our activities on decentralization as a crucial issue of security and institutional transformation of Kosovo and Metohija. In doing so, we did not want to diminish the importance of the so-called technical issues. However, in conditions of physical endangerment of the Serbian national community those issues were objectively less important. We do not believe that by placing some of these technical issues back on the agenda, the problem of decentralization has lost its crucial importance in the province.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  14. Immediately after the democratic changes took place in Belgrade, in 2000 and 2001, with the assistance of and in partnership with the international community, we jointly achieved great success in defusing the crisis in the south of central Serbia. However, when we tried to apply a similar approach in Kosovo and Metohija, we were blocked and all our initiatives were immediately rejected, since they came from Belgrade. We are firmly committed to helping in a constructive manner so that the months-long deadlock in relations with Pristina are overcome as soon as possible. I would like to recall that this deadlock was a consequence of a mass organized pogrom against the Serbs carried out by the Albanian extremists in March last year.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  15. At the same time, there are suggestions that the "standards before status" will be reformulated into a "both standards and status" policy, which actually implies the recognition of the failure on the part of the international community and a search for a quick exit strategy, deliberately embracing a detrimental compromise as regards the creation of a truly multi- ethnic and democratic society in Kosovo and Metohij a. I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize that since the democratic Government took over in October 2000, Belgrade's approach has remained the same. We have been sincerely trying, as partners with the international community, to contribute to the establishment of a multi-ethnic society and to confidence-building.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  16. Three years ago, that approach to the resolution of the problems of Kosovo and Metohija was defined and officially called "standards before status", which Belgrade supported. Despite the negative assessment of the implementation of these standards - also indicated in the report of the Secretary-General unjustifiably optimistic assessments were made that after six years of poor results, a turnaround and major progress would occur in just a few months, thus creating the conditions for negotiations on the future status of the province.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  17. For almost six years now, the new reality of Kosovo and Metohija has been that one national community, the Serbian one, has been disappearing under pressure from, and violent acts by, the majority community. If this is an important yardstick for measuring the standards in the implementation of the rule of law, democracy and minority protection, not only do we have a status quo in Kosovo and Metohija, we have a general regression. These facts cannot possibly be hidden in any way. In light of these facts, how can we contemplate the perspective of a future status of Kosovo and Metohija at all? Since their deployment in the province in June 1999, the international forces have been trying to put in place the standards of a modern multi-ethnic and democratic society.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  18. Despite such a situation, an inappropriate decision to open the question of the future status of Kosovo and Metohija has been made under the pretext that the perpetuation of the status quo is no longer possible. Understandably, no one is in favour of perpetuating the status quo in Kosovo and Metohija, least of all Belgrade. But we should be aware that the implementation of key provisions of resolution 1244 (1999) would be a major step forward, a move away from the status quo. Clearly, with regard to the most sensitive issue related to Kosovo and Metohija - the preservation of its multi-ethnic character - not only has there not been any headway in the implementation of the resolution, but the situation has worsened.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  19. Serb and other non-Albanian national communities have practically no confidence in the political and administrative system in Kosovo and Metohija; they are totally prevented from taking part in all political processes, having been fully marginalized as second-class citizens. Since October 2000, Pristina and Albanian leaders have been consistently evading the necessary dialogue with Belgrade, shifting the blame to Belgrade. The media in Kosovo and Metohija are promoting hate speech on a regular basis and are broadcasting falsehoods about Serbian and other non-Albanian communities; they have been engaged in a campaign for the province's independence, and carry hardly any Serbian-language broadcasts. There is no rule of law, and Serbian and other non-Albanians do not have access to the judicial system.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  20. Serbian property continues to be looted without any protection by the local authorities and police. There have been no returns of expelled and displaced persons nor any efforts to encourage returns. No municipality in Kosovo and Metohija has worked out a plan or a strategy for returns. No efforts have been made to reconstruct the Serbian cultural heritage, and the Serbian Orthodox Church has been falsely blamed for that. All forms of organized crime continue to thrive in Kosovo and Metohij a, not only multi-ethnic but also multinational. The Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) is a training ground for Albanian extremist groups committed to violence; the KPC is preparing to become an army, in direct violation of resolution 1244 (1999).

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  21. There is no protection for non-Albanian communities from being out-voted. There is no strategy to resolve the massive unemployment or to embark upon economic recovery. There is a lack of opportunity for Serbs and other non-Albanians to find employment in the public sector, and a lack of elementary security for Serbs and other non-Albanians, whose freedom of movement is limited to the "humanitarian bus service" and the "freedom of movement" train. The ongoing illegal privatization serves as a basis for the further ethnic cleansing of Serbs and other non-Albanians by economic measures. The constant attacks and incidents against Serbs are neither isolated, nor condemned, nor countered by efficient measures by the local political leadership. Serbs and other non-Albanians are deprived of all linguistic rights.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  22. On this occasion as well, I would like to express my appreciation to the Special Representative who, despite the aggressive Albanian and international campaign to portray the achievements of the newly-elected Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in a more favourable light than the actual situation warrants, has consistently insisted that none of the standards was even close to being fulfilled. The pretext for such a situation should be sought neither among the Kosovo Serbs nor in Belgrade, but in the general environment prevailing in the province, characterized by a lack of political maturity on the part of the leaders of the majority community. Let me offer some examples that convincingly illustrate the reality in Kosovo and Metohija. The Parliament and Government of Kosovo and Metohija are not truly multi-ethnic.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  23. In recent talks with international officials, I have been told that the world is tired of repeatedly coming back to this issue, that Kosovo and Metohija will never be like Switzerland in terms of the standards of a modern democratic society, and that it is necessary for Belgrade to change its approach in order to board the train which is leaving the station, with or without us. Even at the risk of being reproached again, I cannot but repeat that the conditions of life of Serbs and other non-Albanians in the province are unacceptably poor. The Secretary-General has also unambiguously noted that fact in his latest report on the situation in Kosovo and Metohij a.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  24. Mr. Covie (Serbia and Montenegro) (spoke in Serbian; English text provided by the delegation): First of all, I would like to greet the Council on behalf of the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro and of the Republic of Serbia and express my appreciation for being able to participate in today's meeting of the Security Council on Kosovo and Metohija. I would also like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for his comprehensive report. Time and again, I have tried to draw the attention of the Security Council to the difficult position of the Serbian and other non-Albanian communities in Kosovo and Metohija, which has not often been properly addressed in the official reports coming from the province.

    2005-02-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5130 (2005) · source

  25. But a solution made without the active participation of Belgrade would not be sustainable because it would only sweep the problem of the security and the stability of the region under the carpet for a brief period of time. That brings me back to the question I have asked already: do we want to solve the problem for good, in a thorough and sustainable way, or just have it formally off the agenda?

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  26. The authorities in Belgrade have showed on many occasions that they sincerely support the idea of establishing a modern, multi-ethnic society in the province and that they are willing and open to engage in cooperation with the international community and the Provisional Institutions. I would like to reiterate today that the international community has a sincere and reliable partner in Belgrade. However, cooperation is a two-way process in which both parties respect each other and in which commitments made and words given are important. Unilateral attempts to change the name of the game, failure to fulfil what has been agreed on and a one-sided approach cannot be considered cooperation. Of course, any solution can be forced on all parties, and I will not attempt to deny it.

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  27. Kofi Annan, presented to the Security Council in his report of 17 November - which reiterate the need to comply fully with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), and the position that it is unacceptable to begin talks on the status of the province until the prescribed standards have been fully met - raise hope but are at odds with what has been going on in the field. In that context, reducing the role of Belgrade to an advisory or even an observer's role cannot be seen as a constructive approach in compliance with resolution 1244 (1999) and the Common Document, which would speed up the processes that are vital for finding a sustainable solution.

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  28. Along with the increased engagement of Belgrade in the process of harmonizing UNMIK's decentralization plan and the plan of the government of the Republic of Serbia, that is the only solution that will lead to normalization and stabilization of the overall situation in the province. And since decentralization is not a local issue, direct participation of Belgrade representatives in those talks will be the best guarantee for reaching a successful solution, with the full reconciliation of the two existing plans. Recent statements that the countdown has already started and that the process will go on with or without Belgrade and with or without the Serbs are most disconcerting. The recommendations on the process in Kosovo and Metohija that the Secretary-General, Mr.

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  29. Given the reality in Kosovo and Metohija and the fact that the basic rights of the Serbs and other non- Albanians are arrogantly violated, the government of the Republic of Serbia firmly believes that the decentralization of the government in Kosovo and Metohija is the best way to secure the survival and security of the Serbs and other non-Albanians and their return to the province. Only additional and enhanced institutionalization of the position of the Serb community can guarantee the survival of the multi- ethnic character of Kosovo and Metohija. If the Serbs could autonomously decide on a number of their vital interests, their participation in the work of all other self-government institutions would be easier and more certain.

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  30. Do we want to solve the problem for good, in a thorough and sustainable way, or just have it formally off the agenda? Does the international community need the Serbs in the Assembly of Kosovo just as evidence that the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government are multi-ethnic? The previous three years showed that the Serbs were not able to improve the elementary living conditions by working through the institutions. Will Kosovo and Metohija Serbs, by non-participating in the elections and in the work of the Provisional Institutions, manage to draw the attention of the world to their position and prevent a positive assessment to be made of the progress achieved in the democratization process, or will a positive assessment be made in any case and the Serbs be blamed again for undermining the multi-ethnic society?

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  31. What I know is that of 1,500 families that were planned to return before 17 March, only 120 have returned. In light of everything that has happened in Kosovo and Metohija for years, for decades, it is an indisputable fact that it will take years, perhaps decades, to create a truly multi-ethnic society in the province. Look at Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the inter-ethnic strife before the conflict was negligible in comparison with the situation in Kosovo and Metohij a; however, it took years for the people in Bosnia and Herzegovina to learn to live with each other again. Is there willingness in the international community to remain actively engaged in this problem as long as it is necessary - for 10 years, 15, or perhaps 20? This brings us to the following questions.

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  32. Half of the houses damaged have not been reconstructed yet, not to mention the churches and the monasteries. Throughout this time, all efforts have been directed almost exclusively towards settling the consequences of the March violence. The program of the return of over 200,000 people internally displaced before 17 March has been totally neglected, partially due to UNMIK's inability to work simultaneously on both programmes, and partially because of the fact that the funds earmarked for the regular returns program have been lent to the Provisional Institutions of Self- Government to enable them to reconstruct the houses damaged on 17 March. Was it necessary to use the funds that were set aside for returns? I do not know the answer to this question.

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  33. Not only did the events of 17 and 18 March destroy all their hopes, but they also brought to ashes the credibility of the reports on the progress made in building the multi-ethnic Kosovo and Metohija. These events, what preceded them and What followed, forced us in Belgrade to use all possible arguments to call the Serbian community once again to participate in the elections. The 17 March violence, despite all harsh condemnations and declared determination to have everything restored to its pre-violence condition, continues even today. A couple of days ago, eight full months had passed since the March events took place. It is late November now, the winter is here already, and more than 2,100 people are still out of their homes. Almost 500 Serbs and other non-Albanians internally displaced on 17 March still live in collective centres!

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  34. Although it has continued to be treated declaratively as an active participant in the process of finding a solution to the Kosovo and Metohija problem, Belgrade has been, in fact, gradually shut out of the process, and the position of the Serbs has further deteriorated. United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo reports have swept this situation under the carpet for months, even years. And then, the murders of Serbs in Obilic and Gorazdevac were committed, and then the violence of 17 March took place. Throughout this time, the Serbs continued to participate in the work of the Provisional Institutions with stoicism and hope that things would change. Alas, there were no results whatsoever.

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  35. After the necessary guarantees had been provided by the Common Document, signed on 5 November 2001 between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the Serbs took part in the elections and joined the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Intensive talks followed, as well as signing of a number of agreements that were to improve everyday living conditions of all citizens in Kosovo and Metohija. However, as time went by, it became clear that the Serb representatives were only window dressing in the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, and every new Special Representative additionally ignored UNMIK's commitments made in the agreements that had been signed.

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  36. Is this the way one should build confidence? Is it not one of the basic principles of a multi-ethnic democratic society that a majority ethnic community should provide protection to minorities or at least refrain from threatening them? Regrettably, this has not been the case in Kosovo and Metohija. Let us go back briefly in time, to the period before the first elections in the province in November 2001, when Belgrade, in the spirit of good will and a constructive approach and out of the belief that all parties to the process should do their best in building a truly multi-ethnic society with equal rights for all people, encouraged Kosovo and Metohij a Serbs to take part in the electoral process.

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  37. Simply, the position of the Serbian community in Kosovo and Metohija is such that they have no confidence whatsoever in the Provisional Institutions of Self- Government nor do they have any hope that they can realize their interests through these institutions. The human rights of the members of the Serbian and other non-Albanian ethnic communities are still violated in Kosovo and Metohija. There is no security and freedom of movement for these communities. They are still subject to intimidation and persecution. Their property is snatched and set on fire. The only message they could hear from the Albanian political leaders before the elections was that Kosovo and Metohija would inevitably be independent and that it was up to them to decide whether they would live in an independent Kosovo and Metohija or not.

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  38. I would like to remind you that only around 0.3 per cent of Kosovo and Metohija Serbs participated in the elections, after which Belgrade and the Serbian Orthodox Church were accused of undermining the multi-ethnic society in Kosovo and Metohija. Such accusations are a classic case of misconstrued truth, since Kosovo and Metohija Serbs' abstinence was not the consequence of Belgrade's public position that there were no elementary democratic conditions for the Serbs to take part in the elections. Their non-participation in the elections was the consequence of the failed efforts in establishing and achieving the standards of a truly multi-ethnic society in the province.

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  39. Mr. Covie (Serbia and Montenegro) (spoke in Serbian; interpretation provided by the delegation): On behalf of the Council of Ministers of Serbia and Montenegro and the Government of the Republic of Serbia, I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to extend to you assurances of the highest consideration and express pleasure for being able to take part in today's session of the Security Council on Kosovo and Metohija. Of course, I would like to extend my appreciation to Mr. Jessen-Petersen for his interesting statement. Let me start by describing briefly the circumstances following the recent parliamentary elections in the province.

    2004-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5089 (2004) · source

  40. I will be at these countries' disposal to help them out. And I am sure UNMIK will do the same. Mr. President, thank you very much for allowing me to speak in the Security Council. I hope that we shall meet again soon, and that we will discuss the temporal dimension of these problems.

    2002-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4592 (2002) · source

  41. As for Macedonia, we are very glad that there was progress, and we hope that Macedonia will respect the border demarcation agreement. We believe that this is a very important task. Finally, I am grateful for your support. However, I did not come to the Security Council to listen to your praise. This is my job. I will strive, with your help, to continue being successful in this job. I like compliments, but we cannot live on compliments. The half-empty, half-full glass may still not quench your thirst. There are many people who have problems. There are Serbs, Albanians, Romas, people from different ethnic communities, and I am very glad when I saw that certain countries in the region were inspired by what we were doing in Kosovo and Metohija. I am very glad our efforts are used as a model to solve problems in other regions.

    2002-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4592 (2002) · source

  42. Everything we achieved was achieved not by pressure, but by agreement. We will solve the problems of Mitrovica and we will continue our progress. However, I have a suggestion. "Bandits" or "gangs" are not good words for just any group. I have had the opportunity to sit with members of the former Kosovo Liberation Army in southern Serbia, but I never used the term "bandits". The reason is that I wanted to solve the problem. This is the case even though those people were less educationally advantaged than those who are at the bridge in Mitrovica. This is a problem we have inherited from Yugoslavia. Parallel structures and gate- watching are the consequence of fear and of the violation of basic human rights of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija. I am glad that we are making progress every day.

    2002-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4592 (2002) · source

  43. I applaud what the Norwegian delegation suggested, that we should coordinate our efforts with regard to the return of displaced persons to Kosovo and Metohija. As far as the benchmarks are concerned, we gave them full support when Mr. Steiner presented them, and we still give them our support. We want to improve them, and the biggest improvement in that regard would be a temporal dimension, a temporal plan for their realization. I am grateful for the opinion that we should not talk about the final status of Kosovo and Metohija until we achieve certain standards. Mitrovica has been mentioned several times, and this is a question and a problem for all of us. However, we are slowly making headway in this respect, and I am sure that you understand all the facts that were brought by the Yugoslav delegation.

    2002-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4592 (2002) · source

  44. Mr. Covie (Yugoslavia) (spoke in Serbian; interpretation provided by the delegation): I would like to comment upon some remarks that were made. I would like to thank you for your warm words, which were directed towards me and towards the Government of the Republic of Yugoslavia. I would like to say that return cannot be one of the 30 projects that are in the process of being realized. The situation of the displaced persons in Yugoslavia is very difficult and dramatic indeed. We have around 700,000 refugees and displaced persons. We have twice managed to prevent people from raising barricades on the roads to Kosovo. We really believe that financial support is necessary in this respect.

    2002-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4592 (2002) · source

  45. Let me briefly add that the Council has at its disposal an addendum to my presentation entitled "Construction and Development of Local Self- Government in Kosovo and Metohija", contained in Attachment 1.

    2002-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4592 (2002) · source

  46. The process of the transfer of power, taking into consideration all the relevant documents, and, above all, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), the Constitutional Framework for provisional self- government in Kosovo and Metohija, and the joint document between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and UNMIK, will promote general and local democratization, as well as raise general awareness of individual and communal responsibilities. In order to accomplish decentralization efficiently, it is necessary to provide convincing security, political, economic and cultural guarantees for the Serbs, the Albanians and the other national communities in Kosovo and Metohij a.

    2002-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4592 (2002) · source

  47. Paragraph 4 of chapter 5 of the Constitutional Framework, on the prevention of defamation and hate speech in the Kosovo media, should be respected. This is vital in view of the forthcoming elections. Political and security stability in Kosovo and Metohija requires the formation of stable institutions. The establishment and strengthening of local democracy is a precondition for the accomplishment of that goal. The decentralization of power, which is now centralized in Kosovo and Metohija at the level of UNMIK - i.e., the creation of conditions for building the institutions of local, communal and regional self- government - is an issue of vital importance.

    2002-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4592 (2002) · source

  48. There is deep distrust between the Serbian and Albanian people today. However, they must ask themselves whether the differences between them are unbridgeable and whether joint actions can be taken in the context of an economically backward society. These questions are of particular importance at this time, when local elections in Kosovo and Metohija are approaching. In these elections, Albanians should demonstrate that their goal is a tolerant society and safe coexistence among all ethnic communities. I expect the international community to exercise its right to dispute the participation in the elections of those parties without a clearly defined democratic orientation. In the field of information, it is necessary to give minorities a presence in public electronic media, and not only in certain special programmes.

    2002-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4592 (2002) · source

  49. Taking into consideration our contacts with the representatives of the Institute of Peace and of the International Crisis Group, as well as my active dialogue with Mr. Steiner, we believe that the main prerequisite for the process of integration to take place in a positive climate is the inclusion of bridge watchers in the Kosovo Police Service, once they have completed the necessary tests and training. Let me quote the following statement: "Except for passers-by and busy citizens of Kosovska Mitrovica, the majority of people on the bridge used to be homeless beggars. When I was studying for one of my last exams at the Faculty of Civil Engineering, my mother would tell me: 'Keep studying, my son, so that you do not end up on the bridge.' Today, I am one of the bridge watchers." This is but one of many statements.

    2002-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4592 (2002) · source

  50. In those few cities which are still inhabited by the Serbs, the latter occupy only a few buildings, in which children play behind locked doors, since the streets are too dangerous for them. Kosovska Mitrovica, which is central in terms of education, health services and economic links with other parts of Serbia, is therefore of vital importance for their survival. The local population of Mitrovica should assume responsibility in areas in which language and religious beliefs may present an obstacle, such as local self-government, health services and education. This is not an attempt to divide a city. Local communities in other parts of the world have similar rights and obligations. The local population of Mitrovica should also assume responsibility for its own safety.

    2002-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4592 (2002) · source