YouSaid · the spoken record

Dahlgren

lines on the record
246
first
1997-08-14
most recent
2003-02-25
sittings or episodes
45
sources
un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

  1. I think that we in the Stockholm Process have an additional task in that important effort: to make those guidelines known, not only in this Chamber in this city, but in capitals all over the world, and, perhaps, to use the resources that may be available to promote an understanding of the need to ensure not only the implementation of more effective targeted sanctions, but also the means to do so.

    2003-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4713 (2003) · source

  2. Thirdly, I agree with Jeremy Greenstock about the lessons that sanctions committees can learn from the Counter-Terrorism Committee with regard to the transparency that that Committee displayed, its effectiveness and, perhaps even more important, its relationships with Member States. The commitment that has been expressed by so many Council members this morning for improving targeted sanctions is, of course, very positive. But with all due respect, that is not enough. As several speakers have underlined this morning, there must be universal support for targeted sanctions if they are to be successful. Each Member State must do its share.

    2003-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4713 (2003) · source

  3. I would like to make just three brief points. First, I would like to express my gratitude for the kind words expressed to my Government for the part that it - together with many others - has played in this project. Secondly, I am of course heartened by the support expressed in the Council for many of the proposals in the Stockholm report. That goes both for the clear willingness of the Secretariat, as explained by Assistant Secretary-General Tiirk, to play a more active role in improving coordination and monitoring, and for all those members of the Council that have endorsed an improvement in the implementation of targeted sanctions. We look forward to turning some of those ideas into reality.

    2003-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4713 (2003) · source

  4. That respect may easily be eroded if the action decided upon cannot be well implemented. That is why sanctions that work, and sanctions that lead to results, will be so important for public support, and for the support that the United Nations itself would thereby gain. The Government of Sweden sincerely hopes that the concrete and practical results of the Stockholm Process will be of value for policy makers and implementers at all levels. Above all, I hope that they will be of some use to you, Mr. President, and your 14 colleagues, as you constructively carry out your immense responsibility, on behalf of all of us, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

    2003-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4713 (2003) · source

  5. The collateral effects of sanctions on third States have been highlighted, and rightly so. At the same time, many key actors - those that are intended to be the targets of sanctions - have evaded and circumvented such measures by various means. That is a problem that is increasing. It not only affects the effectiveness of sanctions themselves, but risks eroding the very legitimacy of the measures imposed. The Stockholm Process recommends a number of different strategies, depending on the type of sanctions, to counter sanctions evasion and maintain the accuracy of sanctions. How to target sanctions best may look to some like a technical question. To me, these issues are very political. When the Security Council takes a decision, it must be respected all over the world.

    2003-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4713 (2003) · source

  6. That is why the Stockholm Process has looked at different ways to enhance and support Member State implementation by strengthened national capacity. The report before the Council includes an elaborated model law for developing legal frameworks for sanctions implementation. Members will also find various national measures, listed according to the type of sanctions to be implemented. In addition, there is a recommendation to address a special questionnaire to Member States on their capacity to implement sanctions and on their ability to provide technical assistance to Member States that need it. While the use of these tools or sanctions has increased, there has been growing concern over the negative effects of economic sanctions on vulnerable populations and societies in general.

    2003-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4713 (2003) · source

  7. Members will also find that it suggests the idea of establishing a sanctions coordinator, or special adviser, to further improve and support coordination among sanctions committees, expert panels and monitoring mechanisms. My own conviction that more can be done within the United Nations system to improve the sanctions regimes goes back several years, to 1997, when I was chosen as the first chairperson of the Sierra Leone sanction Committee. Looking back at my work then, I clearly see missed opportunities - situations in which too little rather than too much was done. With better resources and better coordination, much more is now possible. But sanctions are only as strong as the structures within which they are implemented.

    2003-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4713 (2003) · source

  8. The main goal of the Stockholm Process has been to suggest ways to strengthen the capacity to implement such targeted sanctions, both here within the United Nations system and among Member States. One priority has been to identify measures to enhance the planning, monitoring, reporting and coordination among sanctions committees and monitoring bodies. In the booklet that is before members, which is full of suggestions for the implementation of United Nations policy options, there is a set of guidelines for how the work of United Nations panels and mechanisms that are tasked with the monitoring of sanctions can be improved.

    2003-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4713 (2003) · source

  9. That was followed, as the Council knows, by the Bonn-Berlin process on arms embargoes, travel and aviation-related sanctions. The Governments of Switzerland and of Germany recognized early on the need to make sanctions smarter. The Stockholm report is the result of a process that lasted for more than a year. It has engaged government officials, non-governmental organizations, regional organizations and international institutions, as well as academics and experts from various areas with expertise in the field of sanctions implementation. Targeted sanctions are designed to focus specifically on the individuals or other entities that are responsible for threats to and breaches of international peace and security. Ideally, such sanctions will leave other parts of the population, as well as international trade relations, unaffected.

    2003-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4713 (2003) · source

  10. This is about targeted sanctions, and how such sanctions can be developed into an even more important tool to help the Security Council fulfil its primary task of maintaining international peace and security. I am here to present to the Council the results of what we have called the Stockholm Process on the Implementation of Targeted Sanctions. That project has dealt with how to increase the efficiency of sanctions by reforming and improving their implementation, while also minimizing unintentional negative consequences. This is the third initiative in a growing international debate on the need for more efficient, more fine-tuned and more humane sanctions. The first was taken in Interlaken, Switzerland, and focused on targeted financial sanctions.

    2003-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4713 (2003) · source

  11. Let me first thank you, Sir, for your invitation and for organizing this session on sanctions. There could be no better time than this, I think, to focus on the need to improve the instruments for the maintenance of international peace and security. Many situations in the past, when words of condemnation have had little effect and military force has been seen as the last resort, have triggered a search for other means to influence behaviour and obtain compliance with the decisions of the Security Council. Something between words and war - that is how the instruments of sanctions can be described. Like other tools, they can be truly effective only if they are sharp enough, focused enough and designed for the particular operation they are intended to perform.

    2003-02-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4713 (2003) · source

  12. It accepted the challenge to help provide stability. If you travel now to any ofthe villages in Sierra Leone, you can see how people have returned to their deserted homes. You can see how they rejoice at being able to live normal lives again. Then you can understand how wise that commitment was. In order not to risk all that has been achieved in Sierra Leone it would be equally wise to work together towards conflict prevention in the entire Mano River region. That is a primary responsibility of the Security Council. It is an important assignment on the agenda of the ad hoc Working Group, and the European Union is ready to play its role in that joint effort.

    2002-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4538 (2002) · source

  13. That also means involving civil society groups, including political parties, in a fair and open dialogue on the future of each country. Our immediate attention these days may be focused on the crisis in Liberia. Again, fighting there has caused tens of thousands of innocent people to move, becoming internally displaced or refugees in other States. Immense human suffering has followed. There is obviously a clear need to get the warring parties to talk to each other and stop fighting. There is no military solution to this crisis either. And, therefore, last week's ECOWAS initiative to offer instant mediation is a welcome first step. In the long run, of course, Liberia also needs a process of national reconciliation with all stakeholders involved. The international community showed courage at a critical time for Sierra Leone.

    2002-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4538 (2002) · source

  14. This means finding joint solutions among all three States on dealing with the disarmament and demobilization of combatants; solutions to stop the illegal flows of small arms and light weapons; solutions to help reintegrate the hundreds of thousands of refugees who have fled. The European Union hopes to work closely with the new United Nations Office in West Africa, in Dakar, to promote such solutions. A third element could be to build a democratic culture in all three countries to support peace-building activities that involve the entire population, to build a culture of peace, as someone said in this debate. Sierra Leone has shown what can be done. We would like to see the same basic democratic values reflected when Guinea and Liberia prepare for their elections.

    2002-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4538 (2002) · source

  15. I suggest that one could focus on three elements to achieve regional stability in the Mano River Union - three concrete steps for conflict prevention. The first step is to build confidence through political dialogue at the highest level. One summit, organized by King Mohammed of Morocco, has already taken place in Rabat in late February. Hopefully, another one will soon take place. A good set of confidence-building measures has already been agreed upon. The European Union is ready to see how we can support their implementation, together with the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). We recognize the important contribution made by the Mano River Women's Peace Network in these efforts. A second element could be to find regional solutions to reverse the destructive trend of conflict and tension.

    2002-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4538 (2002) · source

  16. Through the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), almost 50,000 combatants have been disarmed and demobilized, and the United Nations troops have provided peace and security in Sierra Leone. That is good for the people of that country, but it is also a success story that is good for the United Nations. That success deserves to be sustained and must be sustained. Most of the weapons may be gone, but the country needs help to rebuild its infrastructure, its schools, its clinics and its roads. Only a fraction of what we are now spending every year on UNAMSIL would be a great help for the future rebuilding of Sierra Leone. And, equally important, peace and security will remain in Sierra Leone only if the region is stable. Conflict prevention will not succeed if fighting in neighbouring States threatens to spill over.

    2002-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4538 (2002) · source

  17. Mr. Dahlgren: I can think of no better example of both the opportunities and the difficulties of conflict prevention than what is happening right now in the countries of the Mano River Union - Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. In Sierra Leone, its entire people deserve to be congratulated upon last week's historic elections. The elections mark the end of a decade of the most gruesome domestic strife, and they took place basically freely, fairly and transparently in a non-violent environment. President Kabbah should also be congratulated on his decisive election victory; this will make it so much easier for him to continue the consolidation of peace and democracy through national reconciliation and through governing in an inclusive manner. But also the United Nations and the Security Council deserve ample credit.

    2002-05-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4538 (2002) · source

  18. If it were possible to find a clearer understanding within the international community of both the scope and the limitations of sanctions, then it might also be easier in practice to pursue a more effective sanctions policy. We shall look at how that might be done. My Government looks forward to an active interchange with other Member States and with other actors in this process. We hope that it can help us all to move on in the pursuit of making sanctions a more effective tool for the Security Council to use. It is to you, Mr. President, and to your 14 colleagues that we all look to make use of these tools, especially in the light of new and emerging threats. There is no better illustration of how well that can be done than the Council's historic decision to adopt, by consensus, resolution 1373 (2001).

    2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source

  19. One particular focus of that process will be on the implementation and monitoring of targeted sanctions, and on suggesting improvements, building on what has already been done in the processes so far. That includes the issue of how to achieve the more coherent and effective enactment of Security Council resolutions into national legislation. It includes how the United Nations and its Member States can better ensure truly effective monitoring of compliance and enforcement: there is much lacking there still. We will also look at how Member States can best be assisted in implementing sanctions regimes, and at what technical and financial support might be called for. Another theme will be more conceptual.

    2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source

  20. Yet we have also learned through the activities in Interlaken, in Bonn and in Berlin that much more can be done to develop the concept and the practice of smart sanctions. And I am pleased to announce that the Government of Sweden is now ready to continue the important work already done by Switzerland and Germany. Through what we will call the Stockholm process, we will invite a broad range of Government representatives, non-governmental organizations, regional organizations, academics and, of course, United Nations actors to participate in the endeavour. This is a project that will be carried out for a period of one year, with a concluding seminar next autumn.

    2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source

  21. I remember standing there on the border between that country and Guinea and seeing how easy it was to break the oil embargo just by taking another road through the jungle. So one question has been whether one can make these sanctions more effective and at the same time more humane. And that question has in turn triggered the search for smart sanctions. That search has been taken a good bit further through the excellent initiatives of the Governments of Switzerland and of Germany. What Ambassador Staehelin and Ambassador Kastrup have just reported are, to our mind, important contributions to the improvement of financial sanctions, travel restrictions and arms embargoes. That goes both for the theory behind them and for their practical applications.

    2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source

  22. The aim of sanctions, traditionally, has been to maximize their effects on the will, the capacity and the behaviour of decision makers - to the extent that they will change their behaviour - while minimizing the damage to others, such as innocent civilians. That is the theory. In practice, the story is often different. We have seen how Council decisions, even those with a substantial economic impact on the target, have led to little or no change in behaviour. We have seen too many sanctions being violated or circumvented. We have seen numerous side-effects, whereby vulnerable groups have been the hardest hit. It is no wonder that there is a sense of frustration here. I felt that frustration myself some years ago as Chairperson of the sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone.

    2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source

  23. This Security Council meeting on the use of sanctions is of direct relevance to the challenges that are on the minds of all of us these days. The search for effective tools in addressing threats to international peace and security is more urgent and more important than ever before. It can therefore only be right now to focus on the search for improved ways and means to deal with, and to contain, the sources of aggression and conflict. Sanctions represent an important part of the Security Council's set of instruments for carrying out its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. If sanctions can be improved and be made more effective, it will also strengthen the authority of the Council. It will make it easier for this body not only to say what is right, but also to do what is right.

    2001-10-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4394 (2001) · source

  24. The people around the Mano River should be able to develop their land, look forward to a prosperous future and leave civil strife behind. Their children should be able to go to school, not have to go to war. For the United Nations, as for the European Union and the world community at large, there could be no finer mission than to assist these people in making that come true.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  25. However welcome, stabilization in only one country is not sufficient for overall stability in the subregion. The European Union and its member States make up an important part of the donor community in this region. We would like to increase our coordination with others, in particular with the United Nations. We see scope also for more general cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations in West Africa and in the Mano River region in particular. This statement has dealt with a region far away from Europe, from our own continent. That does not lessen our concern over a political and humanitarian crisis that has led to so much unnecessary suffering. These are countries rich in natural resources, with the most beautiful scenery.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  26. We found in the Mano River countries a strong fear that the conflict there would spread to neighbouring countries. If instability persists in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, there is a clear risk that we will see an economy in the future dominated by illicit trafficking in arms and goods, by mercenaries and other elements with potentially destabilizing effects for the whole region. It is the View of the European Union that the humanitarian and political crisis in this area cannot be solved without a direct dialogue between the Governments concerned. President Kabbah's initiative to engage the countries of Mano River in a dialogue could be a first step, one that we would like to support. It is also vital that the international community - all of us - act in a coordinated manner in basic confidence-building measures.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  27. We welcomed the assurances on refugee security that were given to the new United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees when he visited Guinea in February. As regards the situation in northern Liberia, in and around Lofa County, the actual situation is still unclear to us. We hear estimates of very large numbers of internally displaced persons, but it is difficult to establish reliable statistics, since very few external actors are permitted access to the area. Just in the last few days, we have heard from refugees fleeing by sea of a deteriorating situation. Also the human rights situation in Liberia is getting worse and should be given increased attention. The European Union intends to conduct an open and frank dialogue with the Liberian Government on this and on the need for a global solution to the crisis.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  28. President Taylor particularly emphasized the need for an independent United Nations mechanism that could control sanctions. We, on our side, suggested that the best course for the Government of Liberia would be to cooperate fully with the sanctions Committee chaired ably by Ambassador Mahbubani. That Committee has an important responsibility in ensuring the effective implementation of the sanctions as long as they are in force. The humanitarian situation in the Mano River region continues to be extremely serious. Hundreds of thousands of refugees are still suffering from previous hostilities in Sierra Leone as well as from new clashes along the border between Guinea and Liberia. The European Union recognizes the substantial efforts made by the Government of Guinea in hosting most of these refugees.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  29. We also approve of the way these new sanctions have been structured, not only directly targeting arms transfers but also regulating the diamond trade and imposing travel bans. Meeting with President Taylor in Monrovia, we repeated to him our endorsement of these sanctions. We said that it was up to him and his Government to prove to the international community that they fully comply with the demands of Security Council resolution 1343 (2001). It is our understanding that the political and psychological impact of the sanctions is being felt quite strongly in Liberia. In that sense, these sanctions already work. President Taylor obviously thinks that they are unfair, but he said to us that he accepts the sanctions as a political reality and that he would comply with the demands imposed on him. That, of course, remains to be seen.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  30. President Konare also expressed a strong wish for increased cooperation in general between the European Union and ECOWAS, and we have responded in the same spirit. ECOWAS is becoming more and more involved in conflict prevention, but in many cases it lacks resources and capacity to implement all its own decisions. The European Union has started to support the building-up of such capacity here, and we encourage contributions from others as well. When the Security Council earlier this year adopted a new sanctions regime for Liberia, this was strongly endorsed by the European Union. We believe all efforts must be made to end Liberia's military and financial support for and contacts with the rebel groups in Sierra Leone and elsewhere in the region.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  31. He claims that Liberia was being attacked by Guinea, but that he nonetheless is open to talks with President Conte. ECOWAS is seriously considering putting up a border force between Guinea and Liberia, which could help prevent a direct military confrontation between those two countries. The European Union could support such a plan, provided that the mandate is reasonable and the countries concerned give their consent and cooperation. President Conte' said that he was not against a border force as a matter of principle, but he insisted that it should be deployed in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and not on his own territory. President Taylor in Liberia said that he accepted the force, while there was substantial scepticism in Sierra Leone towards the idea, based perhaps primarily on the limited size that is currently envisaged.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  32. President Konare said that he hoped that the international community would support the efforts of ECOWAS and assist in pressing for a dialogue between Liberia and Guinea. The European Union is ready to give such support. One of the main messages of the troika mission was to encourage the parties here to solve the conflict by political means. There are indeed serious differences that have to be overcome. President Conte of Guinea, for example, reiterated his position that he would not enter into a direct dialogue with President Taylor of Liberia as long as his own country was being violently provoked. It will not come as a surprise to the Council that President Taylor gave a different description of the conflict in the border area.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  33. That, as we see now, was indeed the right thing to do. The European Union troika came to Sierra Leone as part of a mission to the entire Mano River region. The political and humanitarian crisis there has long been of particular concern to the Union. We started our mission by going to Mali, to the presidency of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to express our support for what it and President Konare are doing to find a political solution to the crisis in the region. We found the President of Mali to be particularly concerned about the deterioration of relations between Guinea and Liberia. He has made several attempts to organize a meeting between the leaders of those two countries, but those have so far failed, despite the help given also by the President of Senegal and the President of Nigeria.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  34. We hope that the former rebels will be fully reintegrated, taking into account the need for justice to be served with respect to the atrocities committed. Civilian institutions and basic social services also need to be re-established in the former rebel territories. The European Union stands ready to support this peaceful and positive development in Sierra Leone, including the holding of free and fair elections, as we have supported the work of UNAMSIL. The European Union and its member States are now looking actively at the possibility of increasing our contribution to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. Let me also commend the Council and the Secretary-General for having responded to the challenging situation in Sierra Leone in the past not by withdrawing but by reinforcing in time of crisis.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  35. It speaks well for those who are participating in the dialogue, but it also calls for a special tribute to the men and women of UNAMSIL. Their efforts to stabilize the situation and to help with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration are indeed leading to results. We heard firsthand from the United Nations observers who are actively engaged in collecting and destroying weapons and ammunition about the steady progress of these efforts, with the possibility of concluding the disarmament phase perhaps as soon as this coming August. Of course, it is still too early to be sure, but it seems as if President Kabbah and his Government are on the right track. The plans for national elections can soon start to be implemented.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  36. When I visited this very same place two and half years ago on behalf of one of the Security Council sanctions committees, I remember that building being frighteningly empty. Some Nigerian soldiers were standing out in the hallways, but the rebels had been sighted just a few miles outside Freetown, and, a few weeks later, they had taken over the city. Coming back now, on behalf of the troika of the European Union, we found the ceasefire holding. We saw the beginning of the dialogue between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Government of Sierra Leone. The RUF, I understand, has even been offered one of the Government buildings for rent and has been issued a temporary registration as a political party. This is real progress.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  37. That is where some of the international non-governmental organizations are helping many of those who suffered from the worst atrocities of the rebels, those who lost their ears and their arms in the most cruel acts of terror, committed also on women and children. This is a reminder of what has occurred during the tragic civil war in Sierra Leone. To meet some of the children in this camp, deprived not only of their parents and their childhood but also of parts of their own bodies, is to feel not only sympathy but also outrage over these awful crimes. From this camp, it is just a few miles down the road to UNAMSIL headquarters. They also bustle with life. United Nations officials of many nationalities are hard at work there, and there is a feeling of confidence in the air.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  38. I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for allowing me to speak on behalf of the European Union and to report on a recent European Union mission to Sierra Leone and other West African countries. Arriving in Freetown, it is not far to go from the Hastings airport to the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) headquarters on the peninsula, but it is still far enough to see that things are changing in Sierra Leone. Freetown is a rapidly growing city, full of activities everywhere. One can see people returning who had to flee in the past, and refugees coming in from camps and elsewhere as well. But this involves also driving past another kind of camp - the camp of the mutilated.

    2001-06-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4340 (2001) · source

  39. Thirdly, the monitoring capacity on the ground must improve. That can be achieved through better cooperation, perhaps, with the regional organizations. United Nations peacekeepers themselves could probably also be more operational. And perhaps, in addition to regular peacekeepers, a case could be made for the deployment of personnel who could assist neighbouring States in the regular patrolling and checking of border crossings. Making a serious effort to implement arms embargoes will involve both political will and additional resources. Some will truly ask "Can the United Nations afford more expenses?" My answer is that if one can stop a war that takes the lives of thousands of people, primarily innocent civilians, by being better at implementing arms embargoes, that is a price well worth paying.

    1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081Resumption1 (1999) · source

  40. First, individual Member States have clear responsibility to prevent exports from and to prevent transfers through, their own countries. That common responsibility can in many cases be much better respected. Secondly, the sanctions Committees must be more active. Ambassador Fowler has shown clearly how these Committees can do much more than they have done before. Council members have given the Committees the very important task of monitoring and implementing arms embargoes, and they must be much better equipped to carry out that task, to improve information gathering, to get the best intelligence available, to follow every lead when breaches are reported and to act forcefully when breaches are confirmed. Only then, I think, will their actions be enough of a deterrent to help halt illegal arms transfers.

    1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081Resumption1 (1999) · source

  41. I will focus, Mr. President, on your question of additional instruments for the Council, in particular on the arms embargoes in Africa. My point is that the Security Council must be much more serious about ensuring that there are efficient mechanisms to implement these arms embargoes. Anyone who has travelled in an embargoed country, or who has sat on a sanctions Committee, knows how wide is the gap between what is said in Council resolutions and what is actually going on on the ground, including in these African States. That discrepancy is undermining the authority of this Council, and we have to deal with that also. As you yourself, Mr. President, said this morning, now it is time to make sanctions bite. The question is "how?" I will present three ideas.

    1999-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4081Resumption1 (1999) · source

  42. We urge the Security Council to continue to consider what further action will most effectively bring safety and dignity to the people of East Timor, while making clear that the process of its independence is irreversible.

    1999-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4043Resumption1 (1999) · source

  43. Indonesia must be made to accept the offers from the international community to assist in establishing order and security, after an endorsement by this Council. The rest of us should help to make clear to Jakarta that such acceptance must be given now, without delay. In giving such encouragement and in extending such pressure on the Government of Indonesia, we should be ready to use all possible means at our disposal, because if the leaders of Indonesia refuse, as the Secretary-General said yesterday, they will have to take responsibility for what - according to reports - could be no less than crimes against humanity. That time is gone when the rest of the world can stand idle while appeals for common sense are ignored and another humanitarian catastrophe is taking place.

    1999-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4043Resumption1 (1999) · source

  44. The Secretary-General was one of the signatories to the May 5 Agreement, and the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), which so successfully administrated last month's consultation. My Government is indeed pleased to see the Security Council so actively seized of this matter, which clearly could endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and we endorse its initiative of sending a special mission to the area. We also appreciate the opportunity given through this open debate for the international community to deliver a very clear message to Indonesia regarding its responsibility. It is still the duty of the Government of Indonesia to secure law and order in East Timor. It is also clear that it has failed to do so. That failure must not be allowed to persist.

    1999-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4043Resumption1 (1999) · source

  45. Mr. Dahlgren: Let me first state that my Government associates itself fully with the clear statement made earlier today by the representative of Finland, on behalf of the European Union. As we have heard all through this day, and even as we speak, horrendous crimes are being committed against the people of East Timor. After the clear expression of its wish for independence, the most terrifying acts have been carried out by armed elements in an effort to prevent that wish from being fulfilled, including, as we have heard today, the butchering of children. The eyes of the world are on East Timor and on Indonesia. But they are also on the United Nations, on what can be done in this very room. The United Nations has been instrumental in allowing for the people of East Timor to enjoy their right of self-determination.

    1999-09-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4043Resumption1 (1999) · source

  46. I would suggest that the Secretariat, through the very able representatives that the Secretary-General has in both Freetown and Monrovia, follow up on these discussions as quickly as possible in order to obtain more details. There are two parts to this, I suppose. The first part may be less difficult. Technical assistance could be envisaged to support these common border patrols. The second part relates to the positioning of United Nations observers themselves in the border zone. As I said, necessary security assurances must be obtained, and it would be supposed, I would assume, that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) or the Government of Sierra Leone had established control over the border areas on the ground.

    1998-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3957 (1998) · source

  47. Allow me also to thank all my colleagues around the table for their kind words addressed to me. I would like to comment on the two questions that were posed by the representatives of Japan and the United States on the proposal for joint border surveillance between Sierra Leone and Liberia and possible assistance in that endeavour by the United Nations. This proposal, as I understand it, still has to be elaborated by the two countries. It is my understanding that only this week the Vice-President of Sierra Leone was in Monrovia and spoke to President Taylor and gave him the positive reply from President Kabbah, and I take it that there will be an intensive consultation between those two countries.

    1998-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3957 (1998) · source

  48. As members will have gathered from what I have said, it is my hope that the sanctions Committee will continue to involve itself actively in doing its part to promote peace in Sierra Leone.

    1998-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3957 (1998) · source

  49. There are surely those individuals who make a good living out of the arms trade in West Africa, where, as is well known, diamonds are a handsome reward in return. To my mind, there is, of course, no excuse for such behaviour. Nor is there any excuse for sustaining the war in Sierra Leone by supporting the rebels with arms. The sanctions committee for Sierra Leone discussed these matters in detail yesterday, and when it delivers its formal report later this month, I believe it might include some observations that will be useful to build on in the future work of the Committee and of the Council itself in relation to this matter. This concerns the arms embargo, but also enforcement of the travel restrictions.

    1998-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3957 (1998) · source

  50. From our talks with President Kabbah in Freetown, we understood that this is a proposal that is seen as a good starting point also in Sierra Leone. I too believe that it could be very useful if the United Nations together with the international community were to consider supporting such joint operations. Such support could include technical equipment, but also actual border monitors or observers; this would serve as an important confidence-building measure, provided that the necessary security assurances could be obtained, and also as a way of safeguarding the Security Council sanctions. At the same time, I would like to reiterate a point which I made several times during the visit: that in the end it rests upon each and every State to do its utmost to ensure respect for United Nations sanctions. That cannot be taken over by anyone else.

    1998-12-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3957 (1998) · source