YouSaid · the spoken record

Dauth

lines on the record: 265
first: 2001-09-10
most recent: 2005-10-27
sittings or episodes: 42
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“In this, Australia asks the Council to recall the vital and constructive role that the United Nations played in assisting East Timor during its historical transition to independence. Members of this body have the responsibility to ensure that the greatest possible flexibility is provided to United Nations agencies in Iraq in order to allow them to get their job done. We urge Council members to agree on tools that will allow rapid and effective delivery of immediate humanitarian assistance to Iraq and that will assist in longer-term rehabilitation and reconstruction. That applies most immediately to resolutions on restoring the oil for food programme and on longer-term reconstruction issues.”
2003-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726 (2003) · source
“We have provided an initial contribution of $17.5 million to United Nations humanitarian agencies, to the International Committee of the Red Cross and to other non-governmental organizations. We have two ships with 100,000 tons of Australian wheat food aid waiting offshore to start deliveries. And Australian navy divers have been helping to clear the port of Umm Qasr of mines, which will allow the safe delivery of humanitarian supplies and equipment. We will not stop at that. We are already positioned to play our part in longer-term reconstruction work to help Iraq return to its rightful place in the international community. But it is our strong preference that the Security Council play its part.”
2003-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726 (2003) · source
“It is worth observing that the situation in which the Council finds itself is one of its own making, and only its members can set it back on track. Australia is a part of the coalition to disarm Iraq because we believe an Iraq with weapons of mass destruction represents a grave threat to our security and to international security. Australia hopes that Iraq can be disarmed soon with a minimum of harm to civilians and to coalition forces. Our participation in the coalition is in complete accordance with international law. Existing Security Council resolutions - including resolutions 678 (1990), 687 (1991) and 1441 (2002) - provide authority for the use of force to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and to restore international peace and security to the region. We are matching our words with actions.”
2003-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726 (2003) · source
“The Security Council's inability to agree on how to deal with the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was a great disappointment to Australia and to many other nations - to nations that depend on this body to help maintain international peace and security. Let us be clear. The Council failed the international community; it failed to enforce its own resolutions. The question for Council members today is whether they will allow that situation to gather momentum - to become a trend towards impotence - or whether they can stop the Council from sliding towards irrelevance and can help Iraq get back on its feet after decades of abusive leadership. If Council members do not rise to that challenge, the Council will simply be bypassed by nations that believe the Iraqi people are deserving of their assistance.”
2003-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726 (2003) · source
“It is now time for the members of the Security Council to get beyond the acrimony, narrow political ambitions and separate agendas that have hamstrung the Council in recent months and to seize this opportunity to shoulder their responsibilities. It is time that the members of the Council look to the future for Iraq and the Iraqi people. It is time that the members of the Council focus on what is at stake and provide the guidance that the international community is waiting for on humanitarian needs, long-term reconstruction and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.”
2003-03-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4726 (2003) · source
“But even now, the best and perhaps last hope of achieving a peaceful solution is for the Security Council to send a clear message to Iraq through a new resolution that it must disarm fully. In September last year the Secretary-General addressed the General Assembly, urging Iraq to comply with its obligations and stressing that, if its defiance continued, the Security Council must face its responsibilities. Six months have gone by. Iraq has not complied with its obligations. Difficult though it is, it is time for the Council to face its responsibilities.”
2003-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4717 (2003) · source
“The threat of terrorism is made worse by the possibility that terrorists could get hold of chemical and biological weapons. For that reason, it is urgent that the Council confront this risk by disarming nations that build those weapons and defy international non- proliferation norms. Failure to do so will both increase the immediate threat and set a precedent that we will all come to regret. Creating a more secure world and underpinning our system of non-proliferation require resolve. The Security Council must mean what it says, and countries must live up to their obligations. The Council expressed its resolve when, in its eighteenth resolution on the issue, it decided to give Iraq one last chance in resolution 1441 (2002). Iraq has failed to take that chance.”
2003-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4717 (2003) · source
“Without full Iraqi cooperation, none of those and other questions will be adequately resolved. The inspectors will never be able to do their job properly. It is time that all the members of the Security Council acknowledge that. Giving inspectors more time, or giving them additional capabilities, will mean nothing unless Iraq genuinely cooperates. We all have a fundamental interest in strengthening the architecture of international security. We want to see the Security Council reinvigorated, not sidelined by the situation it faces. Avoiding a decision or delaying a decision will undermine that objective. The Security Council must recognize that threats to international security have changed. It must deal with the borderless scourge of international terrorism and with the risk of illicit trade in prohibited and dual- use items.”
2003-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4717 (2003) · source
“We have seen that pattern before, and no doubt will see it again unless the Security Council is united and acts decisively. The point is that the international community did not ask that Iraq should put on a display of piecemeal cooperation. The international community has demanded Iraq's unconditional disarmament, verified by inspectors. Very few outstanding disarmament questions have been resolved and many remain. We still do not know what Iraq has done with 6,500 chemical munitions, with a potential agent content of 1,000 tonnes of chemical agent; 8,500 litres of anthrax; 650 kilograms of bacterial growth media, which could be used to make 5,000 litres of anthrax; 360 tonnes of bulk chemical agent; 1.5 tonnes of VX and 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals.”
2003-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4717 (2003) · source
“The commencement of the destruction of Al Samoud 2 missiles is not a reason to relinquish the pressure on Iraq to disarm. Developing missiles with a range beyond 150 kilometres is something Iraq should never have done in the first place: this very body expressly forbade it. Iraq's belated discoveries of the R-400 bombs raise questions about why it was suddenly able to find weapons. Other developments, such as the handing over of some documents, are redolent of Iraq's tired tactic of seeking to pacify the international community, rather than signalling the beginning of true cooperation. Those reluctant offerings were only brought about through the enormous pressure on Iraq created by the massing of military forces in the region. Even that minimum cooperation would stop if the pressure were removed.”
2003-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4717 (2003) · source
“Four months after the adoption of resolution 1441 (2002), Australia does not believe that Iraq has shown a change of heart that will lead to its full and verifiable disarmament. In his report to this body on 7 March, Mr. Blix was unable to state that Iraq had taken the fundamental decision to disarm. In fact, no one, including United Nations weapons inspectors, has been able to describe Iraq's cooperation as immediate, unconditional and active. We believe that Iraq has therefore fallen short of what resolution 1441 (2002) required it to do. Its actions so far do not permit any other conclusion. The key question for the Council, as the primary multilateral instrument of international peace and security, is what it will do about this situation. Will it accept the small, belated steps taken by Iraq as adequate? We believe it should not.”
2003-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4717 (2003) · source
“Allow me to reiterate, Mr. President, the words that I was fortunate enough to be able to offer yesterday in congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month, as well as to express Australia's pleasure at the steady hand that we know you will bring to the Council at this crucial time. We are at a historic moment for the Council and for international security. The architecture of international peace and security, in which we - all of us - have invested so much over the past 50 years, hangs in the balance. The Council's decisions could either strengthen that architecture or gravely undermine it. Members of this body face a weighty responsibility to ensure both the disarmament of Iraq and the continuing relevance of the Security Council in global affairs.”
2003-03-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4717 (2003) · source
“Australia, for its part, remains committed to assisting the United Nations and the Timor-Leste Government in responding effectively to the current challenges, in order to ensure Timor Leste's transition to a secure and self-reliant statehood.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“We would welcome a further United Nations proposal on a less sharp adjustment to the phasing and numbers of the peacekeeping force drawdown. However, we reiterate that this approach will work only if it is accompanied by a vigorous and sustained effort to address the shortfalls in T imor-Leste's policing capacity. Australia recognizes the importance of ensuring that the significant achievements made by the United Nations in Timor-Leste are not undermined by a deterioration in the security situation. At the same time, we are concerned to ensure that UNMISET and interested countries implement appropriate responses to address these current problems.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“We also consider that the final report of the joint assessment mission on policing, which was released publicly last week, provides the framework for a renewed United Nations-led effort in police development. Australia is willing to make a strong contribution to these efforts, and we encourage other interested countries to do likewise. While Australia does not support a freeze in the peacekeeping force drawdown, we accept that security is an ongoing challenge. We would not wish the international community to unintentionally signal to elements within Timor-Leste that our focus on and commitment to security in Timor-Leste are wavering. Australia therefore supports a slower drawdown of the peacekeeping force than envisaged to ensure that the international community's commitment to Timor- Leste's security is well understood.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“We are concerned that a freeze would not address, and might deflect attention from, the more urgent issue of developing Timor-Leste's law- enforcement capacity. It is imperative that UNMISET address the shortfall in Timor-Leste's policing capabilities and UNPOL weaknesses. The recent security incidents make clear that law enforcement will be a continuing challenge for Timor-Leste, including beyond the period of UNMISET's mandate. We would therefore support a temporary freeze in UNPOL numbers and an amended schedule for the handover of policing authority from the United Nations to Timor-Leste. That would allow a major reorientation of UNPOL's approach and a redirection of resources to focus seriously and systematically on capacity-building within the Timor- Leste police service.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“We have no concrete evidence of an external direction in the commission of recent incidents, although indications are that some of the individuals involved were West-Timor-based ex- militia members. We note that senior members of the Government of Timor-Leste have rejected the notion of an external direction in these incidents. Australia is strongly of the view that the United Nations police (UNPOL) and the Timor-Leste police service - not the peacekeeping force - should be the primary actors in responding to internal security matters. It is in that context that Australia does not consider that recent internal security developments in Timor-Leste warrant a freeze in peacekeeping force numbers at this time.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“They indicate that Timor-Leste's transition to self-reliant statehood remains a difficult path that requires the continued attention and support of the United Nations and of interested States. It is our assessment that these incidents have been driven primarily by criminal motivations and by internal political, economic and social factors. Some incidents have involved individuals and groups taking advantage of spontaneous events for their own purposes. Some have had a political motivation and have involved the use of violence for political purposes. Others are likely to have involved the settlement of old scores. Poor law- enforcement capacity has allowed some incidents to spin out of control. These are all issues for law enforcement, both preventive and investigative.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“In addition, let me express my gratitude for the kind references made in today's debate to the recently concluded negotiations between my Government and the Government of Timor-Leste to open the way for development of the valuable petroleum resources in the Timor Sea. As Council members are aware, under the provisions of the Timor Sea Treaty, Timor-Leste will receive 90 per cent of Government revenues from the Joint Petroleum Development Area. That, of course, will be a crucial element in promoting the long-term stability and prosperity of Timor-Leste, to which - needless to say - my country is deeply committed. We are, however, seriously concerned by the recent security incidents in Timor-Leste.”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“First of all, as this is the first time I have met with the Security Council this month, I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council in this difficult month. It is a good thing for all of us that the presidency is in such steady and reliable hands. In addition, I should like to express the condolences of my delegation and of Australia to the Republic of Korea with regard to the sad losses that it has sustained in East Timor in recent days. Thank you, Mr. President, for convening this open meeting on an issue of fundamental interest to my country. I want also to thank my friend Under- Secretary-General Guehenno for his briefing today on the current security situation and on the proposals for a freeze in the peacekeeping force of the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET).”
2003-03-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4715 (2003) · source
“We encourage more proactive listing of terrorists and terrorist entities under resolution 1267 (1999). Australia welcomes the steps being taken by the CTC and the 1267 sanctions Committee to better coordinate their activities and to improve the exchange of information. Australia is acutely aware that winning the fight against terrorism will take long-term commitment. For its part, Australia will continue to shoulder its counter- terrorism responsibilities and can be counted on to support the efforts of the United Nations.”
2003-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4710 (2003) · source
“It would be entirely remiss of me not to mention the valuable work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) under the really quite exemplary, transparent and consultative leadership of Ambassador Greenstock, who in this area has demonstrated the great skill in this area that he brings to all the work that he does at the United Nations. In that context, I am pleased also to note that he is to be succeeded by another extremely able colleague of ours, the Permanent Representative of Spain. The CTC has played, and continues to play, a crucial role in global efforts to fight terrorism. We also commend the excellent work of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999), whose consolidated list is a key counter-terrorism tool.”
2003-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4710 (2003) · source
“The declaration also emphasized the need for full compliance with existing legal obligations in the field of disarmament, arms limitation and non- proliferation. In that context, we would recall that, as we stated in the Council on Tuesday, 18 February, Australia considers that this body should act decisively and resolutely to deal with Iraq's disarmament. Australia remains a strong proponent of the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism. We have made substantial efforts to achieve consensus on the convention, leading informal negotiations to resolve outstanding issues in relation to its scope. We welcome the encouragement in the ministerial declaration for the conclusion of the convention.”
2003-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4710 (2003) · source
“Globally, the United Nations must continue to play a key role in denying terrorists the opportunity to commit their appalling crimes. That is especially the case in relation to efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There is no greater danger for the international community than that of weapons of mass destruction finding their way into the hands of terrorists, who, with such weapons, would have the capacity to kill tens or hundreds of thousands of innocent people. Against that background, we welcome and endorse the ministerial declaration on terrorism annexed to resolution 1456 (2003), which highlighted the importance of tight controls over the use of and access to nuclear, chemical, biological and other deadly materials.”
2003-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4710 (2003) · source
“In December, Australia and Indonesia co-hosted a regional conference on combating money-laundering and terrorist financing in Bali. The conference raised awareness of the problem of terrorist financing and encouraged action to cut off funding of terrorist groups. Within the Regional Forum of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), planning is well advanced for a workshop that Australia will be co-hosting with Singapore on managing the consequences of a terrorist attack. In the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) association, we are exploring options to help countries in the region implement their commitments under APEC's Secure Trade in the APEC Region initiative, which will help secure the flow of goods and people.”
2003-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4710 (2003) · source
“The excellent cooperation between Australian and Indonesian police in investigating the Bali bombings has been facilitated by our arrangements with Indonesia, which have also served as a foundation for counter-terrorism capacity-building activities. At a regional level, Australia has been active in supporting counter-terrorism initiatives and programmes. Australia is strengthening its own and the Asia-Pacific region's defences against terrorism, working with our Asian and Pacific-island neighbours, and also with the United States and the United Kingdom and others. In cooperation with New Zealand and the United States, we are assisting Pacific island countries to implement their obligations under resolution 1373 (2001).”
2003-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4710 (2003) · source
“If anyone is short of bedtime reading, I will be happy to share a copy with him or her. Australia's approach to combating terrorism is comprehensive, covering bilateral, regional and multilateral activities, as well as political, economic, diplomatic, legal and, where appropriate, military initiatives. Bilaterally, we have concluded formal counter-terrorism arrangements with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. We are close to finalizing similar arrangements with other friends in our region, including the Philippines and Fiji. Those arrangements promote stronger cooperation in the fight against terrorism in key areas such as intelligence exchange, law enforcement, anti-terrorist financing and border controls.”
2003-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4710 (2003) · source
“Australia welcomes this opportunity to again address the Security Council on an issue of fundamental importance to the international community. As members know, on 12 October 2002 a terrorist attack on the Indonesian island of Bali took the lives of more than 200 innocent civilians from some 21 countries; 88 Australians were killed in that brutal attack, which, together with the attacks in Mombasa, Moscow and Bogota, demonstrated all too clearly terrorism's global reach and the threat it poses to peace and security. Those heinous attacks have only strengthened the Australian Government's resolve to protect Australian citizens and to confront the threat posed by international terrorism in our region and internationally. That was underlined, I should say, in our recently released foreign policy white paper.”
2003-02-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4710 (2003) · source
“If it does not, it places in jeopardy not only the cause of Iraqi disarmament, but also the very basis of our current system of collective security. Resolution 1441 (2002) gave Iraq a final opportunity to meet its obligations and promised serious consequences if it did not comply. Is the Security Council now saying that Iraq should be given yet more opportunities and can forget about the serious consequences? What message does that send to other States prepared to thumb their noses at international law and international norms? Delays and divisions in the Council will only play into Iraq's hands. We cannot allow a tyrant to evade Council decisions. The Security Council must stand united around what is fundamental, and must not be distracted. It must act decisively to ensure that, after 12 years, Iraq finally meets its obligations.”
2003-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4709 (2003) · source
“I have heard no one here say that doubling the number of inspectors or giving them more time and more resources will work without Iraqi cooperation. This is what the Council should be focusing on today. Yes, the Council could give Iraq more time. Yes, we could wait until March; we could wait another three months. But do we really think more time will make Iraq cooperate? Does Iraq really need three more months to make a decision that it should take in no more than three minutes? In Australia's View, the Security Council cannot wait forever to confront this issue. Either Iraq has complied or it has not. In our View, the Council should move quickly to consider a further resolution that deals decisively with Iraq's failure to comply with resolution 1441 (2002). The Security Council has a fundamental responsibility to assert its authority.”
2003-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4709 (2003) · source
“The question today is what the Security Council, as the primary multilateral instrument of international peace and security, is going to do about it. Last year the Council spent eight weeks putting in place a robust inspection regime. Resolution 1441 (2002) gave inspectors the tools they needed to verify Iraqi disarmament - and it is verifying Iraqi disarmament which is their job, not a game of catch as catch can. But that was only one part of the solution to this problem. Active Iraqi cooperation remains the other, more fundamental, part. And this is still missing. In the examples I have already listed - in everything we heard from Mr. Blix and Mr. ElBaradei - the one thing missing was immediate, active and unconditional cooperation, as demanded by resolution 1441 (2002). All of us understand the importance of this.”
2003-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4709 (2003) · source
“If some believe that that information was open to interpretation, that is of course their right. But given Saddam's record of deception, I am not sure why we should be giving him the benefit of the doubt. And on 14 February, after almost 80 days of inspections, UNMOVIC and the IAEA again reported to the Council. What did we hear? We heard that Iraq had been working to extend the range of its missile systems beyond prescribed limits. And what did we not hear? We did not hear that Iraq had finally decided to cooperate immediately, actively and unconditionally with inspectors. It is patently clear, by the criteria established under resolution 1441 (2002), that Iraq is in further material breach of its obligations.”
2003-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4709 (2003) · source
“As the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) noted, it provided no new information and failed to answer serious outstanding questions, including questions about the production of anthrax, VX and mustard gas. On 27 January, after some 60 days of inspections, neither UNMOVIC nor the IAEA were able to say that Iraq was actively cooperating. Serious questions about VX and about thousands of litres of chemical and biological agents remained unanswered. On 5 February Secretary of State Powell presented further evidence that Iraq was not cooperating, indeed, that it was actively trying to subvert the inspection process. Australia found the intelligence presented by Secretary Powell compelling.”
2003-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4709 (2003) · source
“But, sadly, 11 years and 10 months after the Security Council first demanded that Iraq disarm, Saddam Hussain still has not understood the message. Resolution 1441 (2002) set up two objective criteria of compliance: the provision by Iraq of a full and complete declaration of its programmes of weapons of mass destruction, and unconditional cooperation with weapons inspectors. More than three months later, by any objective reading of those criteria, Iraq has failed to meet its obligations. On 7 December Iraq delivered a declaration that was patently incomplete.”
2003-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4709 (2003) · source
“I did have a whole lot of nice things to say about you at the start of my address, Mr. President, but, following your instructions, I have withdrawn them. That is not to say that I do not mean them. We all know that on 8 November 2002 the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1441 (2002), affording Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations. That resolution came 11 years and seven months after resolution 687 (1991) demanded that Iraq give up its weapons of mass destruction. Given the amount of time that has passed, we had hoped that resolution 1441 (2002) would have been be the final step in resolving this issue. Given its unanimous adoption by the Council, we had hoped that the Government of Iraq would finally get the message.”
2003-02-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4709 (2003) · source
“UNPOB will need to consult closely and early with the Government of Papua New Guinea to ensure that its definition of "substantial compliance" is accepted by all parties, including the Papua New Guinea Government. 1 want to conclude by underlining Australia's support for the Bougainville peace process and for UNPOB, including through the Peace Monitoring Group. It is precisely because we want to see the process brought to a successful and durable conclusion that we have emphasized the need for a redoubling of efforts to make progress on weapons disposal. This will also enable the other downstream benefits of peace, not least, of course, economic development and autonomy, to begin to make a real and welcome difference to what have been the blighted lives of the people of Bougainville for far too long.”
2002-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4647 (2002) · source
“It will be difficult for the United Nations to depart while weapons remain in containers under its lock and key. The declaration by UNPOB that stage II has been completed is the trigger for the constitutional amendments giving force to the autonomy provisions of the Bougainville Peace Agreement. UNPOB has recommended a Bougainville-wide consultation process to determine the general level of security felt in the respective districts. That is a sensible proposal. It would be helpful, however, if the process were undertaken concurrently with stage II containments. It goes without saying, of course, that the views of the Papua New Guinea Government will also be a factor in the acceptance by all parties of the validity of any stage II declaration.”
2002-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4647 (2002) · source
“The target may be achievable, but it will require UNPOB, in consultation with the parties, to redouble its efforts to speed up stage II containment efforts and help bring about the earliest possible declaration that this stage of the weapons-disposal process is complete. The final fate of the weapons - stage III - is to be decided within four and a half months of the stage II declaration. We believe that, unless current rates of progress are lifted substantially, UNPOB will have little prospect of concluding its work until late in 2003. UNPOB has monitoring and verification responsibilities for contained weapons throughout stage III. It will be important for the success and integrity of settlement efforts that this process be advanced expeditiously.”
2002-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4647 (2002) · source
“The Group's presence cannot and should not substitute for committed implementation by the parties of peace and weapons- disposal measures. In this context, the recent slowdown in weapons disposal and the removal of weapons from containers has been, unquestionably, a setback. It risks undermining the confidence that the parties and the international community have in the peace process. That said, opportunities exist, and must be taken, to re- energize weapons-disposal efforts, especially through UNPOB and the parties urging all ex-combatants to conclude weapons disposal and destruction as soon as possible in 2003. Bougainvillean ex-combatants have identified 24 December 2002 as a target date for the conclusion of stage II of the weapons-disposal process. We welcome that decision.”
2002-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4647 (2002) · source
“Much has been achieved; nevertheless, a good deal remains to be done before the peace process will be complete. The involvement of the United Nations has been, and remains, an essential element of the overall process, and it will be important that the United Nations remain engaged well into 2003. But the presence of the United Nations needs to be genuinely catalytic; it should be a spur to the parties to re-energize and successfully conclude, for example, the weapons-disposal process. The parties must understand that the presence of the United Nations and that of the Peace Monitoring Group is of a limited duration. Every effort should be made while they are on the ground to accelerate progress. Under no circumstances should their presence - comforting though it might be - become the cause of delay or of putting back hard decisions.”
2002-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4647 (2002) · source
“I wish to thank you, Sir, for holding this open-format meeting on an issue which, obviously enough, is of deep interest to the countries of the Pacific Islands Forum. It is only appropriate, surely, that the countries of our region, as contributors to the resolution of the Bougainville conflict, should also be involved in the Security Council's deliberations. We also very much appreciate the very useful and comprehensive briefing provided by Kieran Prendergast this morning. We want to thank him and his team for the efforts they are making, in difficult circumstances, to bring this conflict to a close. Australia strongly supports the continued engagement of the United Nations Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB). We are encouraged by the progress achieved in the Bougainville settlement efforts.”
2002-11-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4647 (2002) · source
“As a number of world leaders have already noted, unless we step up to the mark to address the threat to the world posed by Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction today, we will all come to regret our inaction tomorrow.”
2002-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4625Resumption1 (2002) · source
“It is the risk that a regime that has been indiscriminate in its support for terrorist groups will one day hand one of those groups either a chemical, biological or nuclear weapon, or pass on the knowledge to build one. Some may debate the likelihood of either ofthose scenarios coming to pass. But can we afford to be wrong? Is what we are asking Iraq to do so unreasonable that we can afford to be wrong? On 12 October, an as yet unknown number of innocent Australians and other nationals were the victims of an attack of indiscriminate and indescribable savagery. It was a grim demonstration to us that we cannot hide ourselves from threats to international security; that in today's globalized world we act together or face the consequences together.”
2002-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4625Resumption1 (2002) · source
“It is also true that nothing has changed. For four years we have debated what to do about Iraq, and nothing has been done. Can we afford to allow this situation to continue indefinitely? Can we afford for Iraq's defiance to be rewarded by a slowly fading interest? What message would that send to others in the international community prepared to challenge international norms? That if they hang on long enough, eventually the international community will give up? The risks presented by inaction are very real. It is the risk that an Iraqi Government, which has shown no compunction about using weapons of mass destruction in the past, will once again be able to threaten its neighbours and the world, but this time with a full suite of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.”
2002-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4625Resumption1 (2002) · source
“Some 110 Australians served with UNSCOM. - we were the fourth-largest national contributor. Australians have been trained as inspectors by UNMOVIC, and Australia is ready to participate in the resumption of IAEA weapons inspections. I hope that Australians will again make a substantial contribution to the dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes. People ask why we must act on Iraq now. What has and what has not changed? In the wake of 11 September, of course, everything has changed. If one needed any more convincing, one need go only as far as the terrible events in Bali on 12 October - a tragedy which has struck deeply at the heart of my country. If there is one thing that 11 September and 12 October highlight it is that one cannot allow threats to international security to go unaddressed.”
2002-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4625Resumption1 (2002) · source
“For it is only through such inspections that the international community can be completely satisfied that Iraq no longer poses a threat to international security and that this almost-12-year-long saga can be brought to an end. Australia considers that the United Nations has been patient. It has worked hard to satisfy Iraq's concerns about the previous inspection body - the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) - by designing a new and more streamlined inspection body, UNMOVIC. The Secretary-General has been unstinting in his efforts to encourage Iraq to comply with Security Council resolutions. But we cannot afford to let Iraq's defiance stymie these efforts endlessly. Australia stands ready to do its part. We have a proud history of contributing to international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.”
2002-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4625Resumption1 (2002) · source
“Indeed, Australia congratulates the officials of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the practical steps they have taken towards the resumption of inspections. But this change has come about only because of concerted international pressure and because the Government of Iraq is finally starting to understand the looming consequences of continued defiance. We must not, as we say in Australia, drop the ball now. The members of the Security Council have a profound responsibility to ensure that the international community's recent pressure on Iraq does not go to waste. We urge the Council to pass a new and robust resolution which provides the strongest possible basis for unconditional and unfettered inspections of Iraq.”
2002-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4625Resumption1 (2002) · source
“It must make a full, final and frank declaration of its weapons of mass destruction holdings; give United Nations inspectors full, unconditional and unfettered access; and provide for ongoing monitoring and verification to prove that it has given up weapons of mass destruction once and for all. But if it lies in the Government of Iraq's gift to end the situation once and for all, the international community also has a responsibility. In recent months we have, on the surface at least, seen something of a change of approach by Iraq on the question of inspections - a change, to be sure, which is yet to be tested.”
2002-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4625Resumption1 (2002) · source
“But few - indeed none, I think - could argue that our concerns about Iraq's ambitions in the area of weapons of mass destruction are not real concerns; that our fears that Iraq has used weapons of mass destruction before and could easily use them again are not unreasonable; that in the aftermath of 11 September and, I say with the greatest sadness, the events of 12 October in Bali, the international community must be scrupulous in addressing threats to international security, or face the disastrous consequences. There is one way to end the debate, and that is for Iraq to do what it has refused to do for the past four years. The Government ofIraq has the power to resolve this issue peacefully.”
2002-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4625Resumption1 (2002) · source
“Australia is convinced that Iraq has made continuing attempts to procure equipment, material and technologies for its weapons of mass destruction programme; that it has been working to increase its chemical and biological weapon capability over the past four years; that it has worked to extend the range of its ballistic missiles; and that it has continued to work on uranium enrichment and weapons design for a nuclear device. We acknowledge that some Members of the United Nations family take a different view.”
2002-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4625Resumption1 (2002) · source