YouSaid · the spoken record

David Hannay

lines on the record: 845
first: 1992-01-06
most recent: 1995-07-12
sittings or episodes: 138
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“Nor can United Nations forces remain in Bosnia for ever. We must all recognize that continued fighting in Bosnia could put a question mark over the presence of United Nations forces, which requires a minimum level of consent from the parties. My Government's very full support for UNPROFOR is none the less demonstrated by our decision to make troops available to form the rapid reaction force which is being deployed at this moment. We look to the authorities in the region to cooperate fully in ensuring that that deployment is completed without delay. But UNPROFOR cannot impose a settlement in the absence of the parties' willingness to negotiate. The structure for a political solution already exists. We must recognize that negotiating time is running out.”
1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source
“My Government fully supports the Co-Chairmen's efforts to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict in Bosnia and, in particular, the efforts of Mr. Bildt with those in the region who have a role to play in reinforcing United Nations efforts to re-establish the Srebrenica safe area. It is essential that the parties demonstrate their readiness to return to the negotiating table to reach a political solution. It is fashionable in some areas to belittle UNPROFOR's achievements. The fact is that the United Nations, through UNPROFOR and UNHCR and together with other agencies, has saved tens of thousands of lives over the past three years. So far, the conflict, which threatened a wider Balkan war, has been contained. But by itself UNPROFOR cannot impose a peace that the parties are not prepared to accept.”
1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source
“It is through demilitarization of the area that the civilian population who wish to do so will be able to remain without fear. This Council has reaffirmed that objective. We hope that UNPROFOR, acting within its mandate, can bring the parties once more to recognize that full implementation of the April 1993 Agreement represents the best way forward. We demand that the Bosnian Serb forces, who claim to respect soldiers carrying out their duty, immediately and unconditionally release all detained UNPROF OR personnel, cooperate fully with UNPROFOR and allow full access for resupply of the Dutch contingent so that it can carry out its mandate. We have set out the immediate priorities. But we also need to consider the wider implications of recent events.”
1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source
“We are now faced with an immediate humanitarian crisis in Srebrenica. Many of the people there have already been displaced from the surrounding areas owing to Bosnian Serb attacks. It is essential that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) be given immediate access to cope with these people's needs and to facilitate the departure of those who wish to leave. My Government has already offered assistance to UNHCR, and we look to the international community to play its part in dealing with this humanitarian crisis. We also look to the parties to cooperate fully. This Council has now requested the Secretary-General to use all resources available to him to promote the restoration of the status of Srebrenica as a safe area, as agreed by the parties in April 1993.”
1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source
“It is a matter of great regret to my Government that from the very beginning the Bosnian Serb forces violated that cease-fire repeatedly. We also regret that the demilitarization of Srebrenica was not implemented by the Bosnian Government. But let me make it clear that, whatever the excuses given by the Bosnian Serb authorities, there can be no justification whatsoever for their recent actions. I should like to take this opportunity to pay particular tribute to the Dutch United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) personnel in Srebrenica for the bravery with which they have withstood attacks by Bosnian Serb forces which greatly outnumbered them. Attacks on United Nations peace-keepers by any party are unacceptable. We express our condolences to the Dutch Government and to the family of the Dutch soldier who gave his life.”
1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source
“The actions of the Bosnian Serbs over the past few days in the Srebrenica area represent the latest in a long line of failures by them to keep faith with the international community. Their actions, both in their attacks on the civilian population in Srebrenica and in their intimidation and violence against United Nations peace-keepers there, are totally unacceptable. By the adoption of this resolution, of which my Government was a sponsor, the Council has made clear its condemnation of such actions in the strongest possible terms. Srebrenica was established as the first safe area precisely to afford protection to the civilian population by the presence of United Nations peace-keepers. The basis for this was the parties' agreement in April 1993 to a total cease-fire in the Srebrenica area and to its demilitarization.”
1995-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3553 (1995) · source
“The Council has made clear on numerous occasions the importance it attaches to early mutual recognition between the States of the Former Yugoslavia within their internationally recognized borders. We hope that the Council will in the near future be in a position to consider additional sanctions relief in the context of the Belgrade authorities having decided to take that further step - mutual recognition between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. My Government strongly commends the efforts so far of the new European Union Co-Chairman of the ICFY, Mr. Carl Bildt, and of his United Nations counterpart, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, to that end. Time is short: we urge Belgrade to take that further step without delay and to move towards mutual recognition.”
1995-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3551 (1995) · source
“And we look to the international community to join us in providing support, in terms of finance, manpower and equipment, to the ICFY Mission. It is particularly important that Governments bring to the attention of the ICFY Mission any information concerning suspected border violations, so that the Mission can follow up as appropriate. Belgrade's closure of their border with Bosnia was an important step, but nevertheless it was only a first step. The logic of Belgrade's decision to isolate the Bosnian Serb leadership until they embrace the Contact Group's proposals as a starting point should, we believe, lead them to a further, very significant, step - that is, the recognition of Bosnia.”
1995-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3551 (1995) · source
“We believe that this step is justified in response to the actions of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to date. Closure of the border has already brought very real material pressure to bear on the Bosnian Serb leadership in terms of its economic, political and military impact, and it is important that this pressure be maintained. We therefore expect the authorities in Belgrade to make further efforts to enhance the effectiveness of that closure and, in particular, to ensure that there is no provision of military assistance for the Bosnian Serb forces. We also look to the Governments in the region to play their part in ensuring that Bosnian Serb isolation is intensified, by taking steps to prevent trade diversion to Pale, whether by land or sea.”
1995-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3551 (1995) · source
“The second important step taken by Belgrade last August was to close their international border with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs. The Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) have reported that Belgrade continues to meet its commitment to close that border, and that cooperation between the ICFY Mission and Belgrade remains good. My Government endorses that assessment, and continues to have the fullest confidence in the work of the Co- Chairmen and of the ICFY mission. The resolution which the Council has just adopted, of which my Government was a sponsor, allows for the limited renewal of the suspension of sanctions on Belgrade.”
1995-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3551 (1995) · source
“May I first extend to you the congratulations of my delegation, Sir, on your assumption of the Presidency of the Security Council for the month of July. We look forward to working with your delegation. I should also like to express our appreciation for the way in which your predecessor, Ambassador Graf zu Rantzau, presided over the Council's work in the month of June. Last August, the Belgrade authorities took two important steps towards encouraging the emergence of a peaceful settlement in Bosnia. The first was to support the Contact Group proposals as a starting point for negotiations between the parties. The Bosnian Serb leadership, however, have not yet taken this essential step. We urge them to do so and thus to open the way for their participation in negotiations.”
1995-07-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3551 (1995) · source
“That is why it is essential to reinvigorate diplomatic efforts, to inject new momentum into the search for a negotiated settlement and to bring about the Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Contact Group plan as a starting point. We call upon Belgrade to take further steps to promote the peace process. We welcome the recent appointment of Mr. Bildt as European Union Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and we call upon all parties to cooperate unreservedly with him and with Mr. Stoltenberg in their efforts to reach a settlement.”
1995-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3543 (1995) · source
“The General Assembly will then exercise its Charter responsibilities under Article 17, paragraph 2, in the normal way. UNPROFOR is a means to an end, not an end in itself. The overriding objective must remain a political settlement to the conflict in Bosnia. UNPROFOR, even with its increased rapid reaction capability, cannot impose peace against the parties' will if they are determined to pursue war. There are alarming reports of a build-up of Bosnian Government troops to the north of Sarajevo. We acknowledge the Bosnian Government's frustration. For months progress towards a political settlement has been blocked by the intransigence of the Bosnian Serbs and their refusal to accept the Contact Group plan as a starting point for negotiations. But we are convinced that neither side will ultimately be able to impose a military settlement.”
1995-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3543 (1995) · source
“The Secretary-General said in paragraph 3 of the financial addendum to his letter of 9 June that he will recommend to the General Assembly that the costs relating to the reinforcement of UNPROFOR should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States, in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. It is the understanding of my delegation that the Secretary-General will proceed in the well-established manner and present to the General Assembly at the earliest opportunity, in accordance with his statement in the financial addendum, estimates for the cost of the activities of the reinforcement which we are approving in today's resolution. Indeed, paragraph 9 of the resolution makes it clear that we are approving this reinforcement on the terms set out in the Secretary-General's letter.”
1995-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3543 (1995) · source
“My delegation has been able to accept the addition of the words at the end of that paragraph both because it understands the domestic political difficulties which the delegation of the United States is facing at this moment and also in order to avoid any conceivable interpretation that today's decision has in itself imposed an exact and specific financial obligation on any State. But it must be clear to all of us that the Security Council has no locus to take decisions in financial questions. The Charter reserves to the General Assembly the responsibility for budgetary and financial matters. In our view, therefore, the amendment of paragraph 10 does not and cannot change the financial procedures followed by this Organization.”
1995-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3543 (1995) · source
“If the parties instead insist on embracing the military option, if UNPROFOR is prevented from carrying out its tasks or if it faces unacceptable risks, then there may be no choice but to withdraw UNPROFOR. But let us be very clear: UNPROFOR's withdrawal will not be an easy or a pain-free option. Those who contemplate withdrawal must think very carefully about the humanitarian consequences and the wider implications for the security of the region. We applaud the efforts of the United Nations commanders on the ground and their troops in maintaining a firm line throughout the current crisis. We also salute the fortitude of those peace-keepers who have been detained. I must now refer to the amendment to paragraph 10 of the resolution.”
1995-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3543 (1995) · source
“It is there to assist the delivery of humanitarian aid, to assist the parties in developing and implementing cease-fire agreements on the ground and to help provide a breathing space for the political process. It is not there to go to war with either side. Some have suggested that the decision by my Government and others to send reinforcements reflects a hidden agenda: to bring about the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Withdrawal is not our objective. We are determined to do everything possible to ensure that UNPROFOR is able to remain in Bosnia. But, ultimately, whether it does so is up to the parties themselves. UNPROFOR can only be successful if it has the continued consent and cooperation of all sides.”
1995-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3543 (1995) · source
“These reinforcements mean that for the first time the United Nations commanders will have at their disposal a credible rapid reaction capability. It will strengthen UNPROFOR'S ability to defend itself, increase the range of options open to the United Nations commanders to respond robustly against attacks on UNPROFOR, and facilitate UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mandate effectively, including to resupply its own troops. These reinforcements will be an integral part of the existing United Nations peace-keeping operation and will be under the existing United Nations chain of command, functioning within the existing mandate. But let me make it clear that UNPROFOR'S mission remains one of peace- keeping.”
1995-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3543 (1995) · source
“We strongly condemn the taking of hostages and other actions against UNPROFOR personnel which obstruct it from doing its job. We demand the immediate and unconditional release of all remaining hostages and call for UNPROFOR to be given full freedom of movement throughout its area of operations. It is against this background that my Government and those of France, the Netherlands and other countries have decided to offer reinforcements to UNPROFOR. We therefore welcome the adoption of this resolution, of which my country was a sponsor, authorizing the necessary increase in the UNPROFOR force ceiling to allow those reinforcements to deploy. The adoption of this resolution is a clear demonstration of international resolve and commitment to the work of the United Nations in Bosnia.”
1995-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3543 (1995) · source
“Two and a half months ago this Council voted to continue the presence of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. At that time I said that my Government was increasingly concerned by the slide towards an intensified war, that this would increase the difficulties that UNPROFOR faced and that it might even call into question its ability to remain. The events of the last few weeks have shown all too clearly how easy it is for matters to escalate rapidly. UNPROFOR has been blocked at every turn from pursuing its mandate - the mandate which both parties had previously accepted. It has been intimidated and attacked; its personnel have been taken hostage. It is even being denied the ability to resupply its own troops in the eastern enclaves.”
1995-06-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3543 (1995) · source
“We believe this is an important message for the Israeli Government, and we hope it will consider its future actions carefully in the light of it. We note the intention of the Israeli Cabinet, expressed at its meeting on 14 May, not to carry out additional expropriations of land in Jerusalem for housing purposes. Throughout the consultations which have taken place over the past few days, my delegation has had as its overriding objective the protection and the furtherance of the peace process. That is the priority. We look to all parties to continue, and to redouble, their efforts to make progress. The peoples of the region deserve no less.”
1995-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3538 (1995) · source
“We very much understand and sympathize with the attachment to Jerusalem of the Israeli people, which was expressed by the Permanent Representative of Israel during the debate. But we believe that the Government of Israel should recognize that others feel equally strongly about the city, and should refrain from taking actions which seek to change the status quo on this most sensitive of all issues before the conclusion of the final-status negotiations. We very much regret that this issue has caused divisions in the Council. We do not believe this will be helpful to the peace process. That is why we worked hard to avoid that outcome. We welcome the fact that during the debate earlier this week all members of the Council expressed concern about the Israeli expropriation orders.”
1995-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3538 (1995) · source
“My Government's position on the substance of the question of the Israeli expropriation of land in East Jerusalem was made clear in the statement I made on 12 May, which complemented the statement you yourself, Mr. President, made later that day on behalf of the members of the European Union. I would like to explain briefly why the United Kingdom has just voted in favour of the draft resolution before us. In our View the draft resolution represents a calm but clear statement of the legal position. The cosponsors of the draft resolution accepted all the amendments proposed by the European Union members of the Council, and, as a result, the text avoids any reference to wider issues, apart from a clear declaration of support for the peace process.”
1995-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3538 (1995) · source
“The Security Council will need to consider at that stage how best to ensure full deployment of UNCRO in accordance with its mandate. My Government is very conscious of the understandable frustration in Zagreb at the slow pace of progress towards a political settlement. We have made clear on numerous occasions our full support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia and our view that this must be the basis of any political settlement. The local Serb authorities cannot evade their responsibility in this respect. But there are no short-cuts towards this goal: securing reconciliation requires commitment and patience on both sides. A negotiated settlement is the only way to achieve a lasting peace.”
1995-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3537 (1995) · source
“It is welcome that there has been real progress towards the withdrawal of troops from the zones of separation in the various United Nations sectors, but it is essential that this withdrawal be completed forthwith. Otherwise, there is little chance of getting the political process back on track, and only when withdrawal has been completed will UNCRO be able to redeploy so as to begin its task of implementing the mandate the Council established two months ago. It is also essential that the United Nations and other international bodies be given full access to Western Slavonia so as to lay to rest the concerns that have been expressed about human rights. The report from the Secretary-General, expected within the next two weeks, on the implementation of this resolution will be an important one.”
1995-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3537 (1995) · source
“Events since then have given my Government cause for very grave concern. Much of that earlier progress has now been placed in jeopardy by recourse to military action, and in the process the lives of United Nations peace-keepers were put at risk. The resolution we have just adopted, of which my country was a co-sponsor, condemns in the strongest possible terms any actions, by whichever party, directed against United Nations personnel, and we demand that status of UNCRO and the safety of its personnel be respected without exception. The United Nations, with support of my Government, is willing to help both parties resume the process of reconciliation and cooperation. We warmly commend the efforts of Mr. Akashi to prevent any further escalation.”
1995-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3537 (1995) · source
“Two months ago this Council adopted resolutions 981 (1995) and 982 (1995), which addressed, among other issues, the situation in Croatia. On that occasion I expressed my Government's satisfaction with the signs of progress in building confidence between the Government of Croatia and the Serb communities in Croatia. Stability had been achieved in what had been a very tense and volatile situation. The Economic Agreement was being implemented, step by step, by both parties. I also stressed the importance that we attached to the role of the new force, the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), in securing that peace and promoting the start of talks on a political settlement. I acknowledge that progress had not been as great as the Croatian Government had a right to expect, but the prospects were encouraging.”
1995-05-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3537 (1995) · source
“The further we get into the implementation of the Declaration of Principles, the more crucial it is to carry that process to a successful conclusion and the greater the need to avoid any action which could prejudice or undermine it. It is in that spirit that we are speaking today, and in that spirit that we will continue to address this item on our agenda.”
1995-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3536 (1995) · source
“4) and called upon Israel to refrain from taking any further such measures in the future. But we also consider that the decision is contrary to the spirit of the Declaration of Principles agreed by Israel and the PLO in 1993, which reserves the issues of settlements and Jerusalem for the final status negotiations. This decision in a sense prejudges the outcome of those negotiations. If it pursues this course of action, the Government of Israel would, we believe, undermine the peace process and play into the hands of those who oppose it. We therefore strongly urge Israel to reconsider its decision. We also encourage both parties to press on with the negotiations on an interim agreement in a flexible and constructive manner, leaving to one side, for the time being, highly sensitive final-status issues.”
1995-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3536 (1995) · source
“On that occasion, we reiterated our position that settlements in the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, are illegal, contravene the Fourth Geneva Convention and are an obstacle to peace. That remains our view. Our concerns about the latest decision to expropriate 131 acres of land in East Jerusalem have been raised with the Israeli authorities by European Union representatives in Tel Aviv. We consider that the decision is contrary to Security Council resolutions and in particular to resolution 267 (1969), which was adopted unanimously on 3 July 1969 and confirmed that " . all legislative and administrative measures taken by Israel which purport to alter the status of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties thereon, are invalid " (resolution 267 (1969), para.”
1995-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3536 (1995) · source
“May I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption for the fourth time of the presidency of the Council; it is a pleasure to see you in the Chair. I thank the Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic for his very splendid performance last month. My Government's views will be reflected in the statement to be made later in this debate by you yourself, Sir, speaking on behalf of the members of the European Union. I would like simply to make a few additional and complementary remarks. The British Government regrets that the problems caused by Israel's settlements policy have arisen again less than three months since the last time the Council discussed the subject.”
1995-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3536 (1995) · source
“But the office will form part of a wider effort by the United Nations and the international community to consolidate the achievements of ONUSAL, to help with the rebuilding of El Salvador's institutions and to address El Salvador's development needs. My Government will continue to make a significant contribution to all these efforts.”
1995-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3528 (1995) · source
“The British Government welcomes the reduction in human rights violations since the peace process began. We remain concerned, however, that some violations have continued and we are also concerned at the recent resurgence of political violence. The Human Rights Ombudsman appointed by the Government of El Salvador will have a key role for the future. We hope he will get the full support of all political forces in El Salvador. We welcome the Secretary-General's proposal to set up a small political team with verification responsibilities and a good-offices function. As the Council has made clear, this office does not represent a continuation of the peace- keeping mission which comes to an end this weekend.”
1995-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3528 (1995) · source
“The moderation, vision and courage shown by both sides in the sometimes difficult implementation process since the Peace Accords were signed has been critical to the success of the process, and will remain so in the future. It is as important as ever that both parties to the Accords keep that process on track to make possible the speedy completion of all elements of those Accords. We welcome the commitment made by President Calderon S01 and by the leadership of the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) to full implementation. Perhaps the most innovative contribution by ONUSAL has been in the field of human rights observance in El Salvador. ONUSAL has helped Salvadorans to consolidate the institutions needed to uphold human rights once the Mission concludes.”
1995-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3528 (1995) · source
“The resolution the Security Council has just adopted marks the end of a United Nations peace-keeping operation which, since July 1991, has played a vital role in bringing El Salvador along the path to national reconciliation, peace and democracy. The United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) has shown what can be achieved with a clearly defined mandate, wide international support and the necessary political will of the parties. The British Government congratulates the Secretary-General, successive ONUSAL Heads of Mission and the dedicated personnel who have participated in the operation on a job well done. But, above all, we congratulate the long-suffering people of El Salvador.”
1995-04-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3528 (1995) · source
“The fact is that the status quo in Bosnia is not acceptable or sustainable and that United Nations peace- keeping forces cannot be expected to remain there forever, in the absence of progress towards a political settlement and if there is not the requisite degree of cooperation from the parties. Additional sanctions relief would be justified only if the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) made further commitments to advancing the peace process. The Council should support the Contact Group's efforts to persuade Belgrade to take these steps immediately.”
1995-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3522 (1995) · source
“We remain concerned over the Mission's continued financial crisis, which has necessitated a reduction in its strength. My Government wants to see a fully financed ICFY Mission with its strength increased to 250 personnel. Denying the Mission the support it needs serves only to undercut efforts to bring about a settlement in Bosnia. We hope that other Governments will join the United Kingdom in responding to the Mission's urgent need for resources, and that they will bring forward the timing of their contributions. A limited suspension of sanctions remains in our View the appropriate response to Belgrade's cooperation to date. The renewal of this suspension is justified. Furthermore, it is right to use sanctions flexibly and imaginatively to encourage initiatives in the interests of securing a peaceful settlement.”
1995-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3522 (1995) · source
“The first is to ensure that border closure is really tight; in this connection, we are particularly concerned about reports of cross-border helicopter flights. The second is to reinforce the ICFY Mission so that it is able to continue carrying out its task effectively. As far as helicopter flights are concerned, my Government has made personnel available to participate in a team which will shortly begin the detailed analysis of available data and thereafter report authoritatively. We must be clear as to whether serious breaches of the border closure are occurring, over it, in the air. Such breaches would be unacceptable. As for reinforcing the ICFY Mission, it is essential that the international community provide the necessary finance, manpower and equipment.”
1995-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3522 (1995) · source
“This closure must be maintained and intensified - not only by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) authorities but also by the Bosnian and Croatian Governments - to ensure that trade diversion, whether by land or by sea, is stopped. The Bosnian Serb leadership must understand that there is no alternative to resuming peace negotiations, with the Contact Group plan as the starting point. The ICFY Co-Chairmen have reported that the border is generally closed and that cooperation with the Belgrade authorities remains good. My Government fully endorses that assessment and has the fullest confidence in the work of the Co-Chairmen and of the ICFY Mission. We are grateful for their efforts. There are two important issues that now need to be addressed without delay.”
1995-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3522 (1995) · source
“Secondly, the isolation of the Bosnian Serbs as a result of their refusal to accept the Contact Group plan has been confirmed, in particular by the decision of the Belgrade authorities to close their border with Bosnian Serb-held territory. Central to the international community's response to the Belgrade authorities' decision was the establishment of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) Mission to monitor this closure. These two developments have brought benefits, but both need to be nurtured and developed further if the Bosnian peace process is to move forward. Closure of the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia has had an economic, military and political impact upon Pale.”
1995-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3522 (1995) · source
“My delegation would also like warmly to welcome you to the Council, Mr. President, and take the opportunity of your presence to express our appreciation of your country' s presidency of the Council in what has been a very busy month so far. The United Kingdom also expresses its shock and sympathy with the United States over the bomb outrage in Oklahoma. We echo entirely Ambassador Albright's words about the universality of terrorism, which calls for a united condemnation and response. No one, certainly not the British Government, is happy with the state of discussions on the peace process in the former Yugoslavia. But there have been two important gains over the last year. First, there has been the establishment of the Bosnian Federation, which my Government regards as an essential building block towards an overall settlement.”
1995-04-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3522 (1995) · source
“We now look to Iraq to cooperate in this scheme's implementation. If it fails to do so, it will have demonstrated once again its lack of concern for the welfare of its own people.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“It is our earnest hope that Iraq will decide to cooperate in the implementation of this resolution. It is a reasonable and workable scheme. It should enable Iraq to import substantial amounts of food, medicines and other humanitarian goods to meet the needs of its people. But in case there are shortcomings we have provided for a review of all aspects of the scheme just three months after it starts. If the Secretary-General reports that there are problems - for example, that the amount of money available for humanitarian relief is insufficient, or that the Iraqi oil industry is incapable of exporting enough oil to generate the revenues provided for in this resolution - we will be ready to look again at the details of the scheme and to consider making the appropriate adjustments.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“It is not intended to substitute for the action that will be taken on sanctions when Iraq complies with all its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions. The recent reports of the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency make it clear that such compliance by Iraq with the provisions of the Council's resolutions relating to weapons of mass destruction is not just round the corner. The continuing problems over the missing Kuwaiti and other nationals, over the return of Kuwaiti property and over Iraq's repressive record on human rights demonstrate very clearly that Iraq is still far from fulfilling the conditions that could justify lifting sanctions: all the more reason, therefore, for the Council not to ignore the suffering of the Iraqi people.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“We do respect Iraq's sovereignty and its territorial integrity, even if Iraq itself has not always been so respectful of its obligations in this respect towards its neighbours; and we have made our respect for those principles clear in this resolution. But it is Iraq itself that imposes an economic blockade against its three northern Governorates. The provision for the North is simply intended to ensure that the inhabitants of the three northern Governorates receive an equitable share of the humanitarian goods to be purchased with the proceeds of the oil sales. It is not politically motivated. It is simply intended to ensure that all Iraqis, and not just some of them, benefit from the sale of oil provided for in this resolution. We have also made it clear that this resolution is a temporary measure.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“That is why we have provided for independent inspection agents to ensure that Iraq does not export more oil than it is entitled to under the provisions of this resolution and does not under-price it. That is why we have insisted that all the proceeds of the oil sales should be deposited in an escrow account. That is why we have asked the Secretary-General to ensure that there is equitable distribution of the humanitarian assistance to all the Iraqi people. We have been compelled in this resolution to allocate between $130 million and $150 million to be spent in the three northern Governorates of Iraq by the United Nations. This is not because the Security Council does not respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“In drafting this resolution we took careful account of the concerns expressed by the Government of Iraq during the abortive negotiations they held with the United Nations Secretariat on implementing resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991). We have also listened carefully to views expressed by other Council members. The text we have just adopted represents a serious attempt to meet those concerns. The scheme it establishes is more generous and more flexible than the earlier arrangements provided for in resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991). Iraq will remain subject to a regime of sanctions imposed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter until it complies fully with all the Security Council's relevant resolutions. That is the reason for the detailed provisions of this resolution.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“The aim of the co-sponsors of this resolution is purely humanitarian; no more and no less. We have devised a system which could substantially alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people, with whom we have never had any quarrel. My Government has been concerned about the humanitarian situation in Iraq since 1991, when the Council adopted resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991), which offered Iraq the possibility of exporting oil in exchange for humanitarian supplies. We deeply regret the refusal of the Government of Iraq to operate that scheme. It bears a heavy responsibility for the suffering of its people. Our determination to do something about this major humanitarian problem led us to see whether there were ways in which we could improve the earlier scheme.”
1995-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3519 (1995) · source
“We urge all States parties to the Treaty to support such an extension at the forthcoming Review and Extension Conference in the long-term interests of international peace and security and to enable nuclear- weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to continue working together to achieve a safer and more prosperous world.”
1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source
“It has already made an invaluable contribution to international peace and security. Its very existence has been crucial in encouraging and enabling the nuclear- weapon States to act together to cosponsor the resolution now adopted by the Council. Without it, it would have been far more difficult, if not impossible, for the nuclear-weapon States to have acted as they have done. The United Kingdom is accordingly convinced that it is in the interests of all countries that the Treaty be extended indefinitely and without qualification.”
1995-04-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3514 (1995) · source