YouSaid · the spoken record

De Mistura

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707
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2008-01-21
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2018-12-20
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  1. In Vienna and beyond, I also maintained close consultations with a number of other States at that time. Accordingly, the Secretary-General asked me to attend Sochi. The Congress took place over one day on 30 January. I attended the opening address by Foreign Minister Lavrov, and senior representatives of Turkey, Iran and other States were present. Afterwards, all internationals left the gathering to enable the discussion to proceed among Syrians. Only Russia's special presidential envoy for Syria, Mr. Lavrientev, remained in the room as host to facilitate the debate, which he accomplished effectively, alongside senior Syrian figures and a presidium of Syrians. I was later officially informed by the hosts that the final statement had been adopted, and was made aware of its content.

    2018-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8181 (2018) · source

  2. After intensive consultations with the Syrian parties and key States, I made a final statement regarding the constitutional committee to be formed, and stressed that the final agreement on the composition, mandate and terms of reference of the constitutional committee must be reached in Geneva. For its part, the Russian Federation, which had invited the Secretary-General, also on behalf of Turkey and Iran, to the National Dialogue Congress in Sochi, affirmed that the outcome in Sochi would be brought to Geneva as a contribution to the United Nations-led intra-Syrian talks, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015). There were intensive consultations among the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the Secretary- General and myself regarding such an understanding.

    2018-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8181 (2018) · source

  3. What we are seeing in Syria today not only imperils de-escalation arrangements and regional stability; it also undermines the efforts for a political solution. Yet we will not be deterred from pursuing the Geneva process, which is the only sustainable path towards the solution mandated by the Council. Members will recall that in December 2017, when I briefed the Council (see S/PV.8142), I laid out a number of parameters and observations regarding baskets 2 and 3 of the agenda - the constitutional and electoral baskets. Then, on 25 and 26 January, I convened a special round-9 meeting of the intra-Syrian talks in Vienna, focused specifically on the constitutional basket.

    2018-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8181 (2018) · source

  4. A few minutes ago, we learned that 7,200 people in besieged Nashabiyeh received a partial delivery today. That is encouraging but let us think about it - they account for a mere 2 per cent of the 390,000 people in besieged areas. We need much more sustained humanitarian assistance. We must also never forget - as underscored by the people in Syria - the need for concrete steps on the release of detainees and abductees, and for the disclosure of information about those who have been missing since March 2011. The United Nations will leave no stone unturned to press the issue, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015). We also remind the Astana guarantors of their own commitment agreed last December to establish a working group. We urge them to move ahead on this important issue when they meet next.

    2018-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8181 (2018) · source

  5. Last week, together with Senior Adviser Jan Egeland, I warned the Humanitarian Task Force of the International Syria Support Group in Geneva of a collective failure to enable effective humanitarian action. At the time, I urged the co-Chairs - the Russian Federation and the United States - as well as other States to take urgent action to ensure immediate and unfettered humanitarian access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas in particular. A series of urgent consultations are under way in Geneva. Thus far, no concrete results have been reached, except the one convoy I mentioned earlier. We urgently need genuine de-escalation in order to protect civilians, evacuate the sick and wounded - in particular sick children - and allow humanitarian aid to reach the 390,000 people in besieged and hard-to- reach areas.

    2018-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8181 (2018) · source

  6. I strongly reiterate the Secretary-General's appeal to all concerned in Syria, the region and beyond to de-escalate immediately and unconditionally, and urge all stakeholders, including the Astana guarantors, to use their influence to help reduce the level of violence. I also urge that continued attention be given to maintaining the Amman de-escalation arrangements in place in the south. Not only are Syrian civilians being killed and displaced in large numbers - even greater than before. They are also being deprived of the humanitarian assistance they need. There has not been a single United Nations humanitarian convoy to any besieged area since 28 November, two and a half months ago.

    2018-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8181 (2018) · source

  7. Last weekend, there were Israeli reports of an Iranian drone entering Israeli airspace, which have been denied by Iran; Israeli jets striking targets inside Syria; an Israeli jet shot down by Syrian Government anti-aircraft fire; and of what Israel calls large-scale strikes against the Syria air defence system and Iranian targets. In short, we see developments that raise questions about the sustainability of the Astana de-escalation arrangements, in which we placed a great deal of hope, and threaten wider regional stability. I have been Special Envoy for Syria for four years now, and this situation is the most violent, worrying and dangerous I have observed during my tenure.

    2018-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8181 (2018) · source

  8. Meanwhile, there are reports of heavy mortar shelling in residential Damascus, wounding and killing civilians, damaging infrastructure, such as Embassies, and falling close to the hotel in which United Nations personnel reside. The conflict is also spilling over Syria's borders in more than one direction, and there have been increased military intervention from multiple sources. Over the past several weeks, a new cross-border conflict in Afrin has emerged, with no clear end in sight. There are reports of exchanges of fire between Turkish and Syrian Government forces in Idlib, and between the United States-led coalition and pro-Syrian Government forces in the Euphrates valley, with major loss oflife. A Russian aircraft was shot down over northern Syria and its pilot was killed.

    2018-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8181 (2018) · source

  9. Civilians have been killed on a horrific scale - reports suggest that more than 1,000 have died in the first week of February alone - and strikes have continued to hit hospitals, schools and markets. There have been several allegations of chlorine attacks, in Ghouta and Idlib and now recently also in Afrin. We cannot independently verify those allegations, but such acts, if confirmed, are outrageous and should not go unpunished. In just two months, 320,000 people have been displaced due to fighting in Idlib - an area that already hosts more than 1.2 million internally displaced persons. Hay'at Tahrir al- Sham - Al-Nusra i is active in Idlib.

    2018-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8181 (2018) · source

  10. Mr. De Mistura: I have come to New York to convey to the Security Council in person - although I could have done it by video, as we have many times - the Secretary-General's grave concern about the escalation of violence in Syria, and to urge the Council to focus on de-escalating that violence and on finding a political path forward for the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015). We have seen a string of dangerous and worrying escalations, including both inside and outside the de-escalation zones established by the Astana guarantors. There has been a gradual return to back- and-forth competition over territory in ldlib and Hama. We have seen heavy and sustained air strikes across the North-West and in besieged eastern Ghouta, including today.

    2018-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8181 (2018) · source

  11. The question is how much we all will do to help achieve this vision. I can assure the Council that Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and myself will spare no efforts. We look forward to an active and, I hope, proactive start to 2018 in that regard. I thank the Council for its patience. My statement was longer than average, but we are at the end of the year.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  12. They demanded the release of detainees and abductees and that those who left and became refugees not be punished upon their return, because they are afraid of that. They also demanded information on the missing and for the United Nations and the international community to create conditions conducive to the voluntary return of refugees. They desperately wanted to see the United Nations-Geneva process move forward. I think that nobody in this Chamber finds those requests or pleas unreasonable, but trust, confidence and political will are the hardest commodities to find when I hold my intra-Syrian talks. I hope that, by liberating ideas, the parties and all Syrians can see that resolution 2254 (2015) can actually be implemented, even in the context of the realpolitik of 2018, in the interests of all Syrians.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  13. We held a discussion via video-teleconference with Syrian refugees - because sometimes we forget that there are 5 million of them and they are there and they want to be part of the future, but they also want to be reassured that, if they decide to come, there is a future - in Jordan and Lebanon, as well as with civil society representatives in hard-to- reach areas across Syria and with those who are present also in Turkey. They had inputs and thoughts on every issue on the agenda, and my team and I have learned a lot from them. However, most of all they called without any doubt for a political solution, for dignity, for the protection of civilians, for maintaining Syrian territorial integrity and for unconditional access to health care, support and education, which they reminded us are pillars of counter-terrorism.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  14. Let me conclude by reminding the Council of something else - something I have always stressed and, as the year comes to a close, should perhaps do so again. These past three weeks, while the negotiations did not proceed, Syrians made their own voices heard and their views known to us. The Syrian Women's Advisory Board provided valuable insights and ideas on the 12 principles in baskets 2 and 3. We hosted 130 civil society representatives. These included experts on constitutional legal matters, human rights, grass-roots dialogue and social cohesion.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  15. According to the instructions I have received so far, the Secretary-General will continue to view this and all other initiatives in the context of a simple test. Do they support the mandated political process under United Nations auspices and the full implementation ofresolution 2254 (2015)? According to the Secretary-General, the bottom line is, if any entity relevant to constitutional review were to be established outside Syria and there were a desire for it to work under the aegis of the United Nations, either it would have to emerge directly from the intra-Syrian talks in Geneva or the United Nations would need to retain the prerogative to review such a body, in consultation with the Council. I would be guided by resolution 2254 (2015) in this regard and, obviously, the guidance of the Secretary-General.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  16. They come out of intense engagement with the parties and Syrians across the board, far beyond the people we have been meeting in the official meetings. What I have presented is designed to show how resolution 2254 (2015) could be implemented credibly and in full in a way that is genuinely responsive to the needs of Syrians and the realities of the moment. We intend to present some of the ideas and approaches I hjave outlined in a non-paper or a mediator statement early next year. I will see the Secretary-General this afternoon, so I am not at present in a position to update the Security Council on further developments regarding proposals to hold an early national dialogue congress in a location outside Syria.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  17. I need hardly repeat that the process of establishing a favourable environment would be greatly enhanced by tangible progress on unhindered humanitarian access and confidence-building measures, in particular action on detainees, abductees and missing persons in a nationwide sustainable ceasefire. Forgive me for speaking at great length, but this is an important moment for actually setting some clear parametres before us when we talk about important next steps. These propositions are advanced in good faith by the United Nations in order to promote fresh thinking in all quarters, in particular in relation to the constitution and elections and their relations to governance and counter-terrorism.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  18. Eleventh, if a meaningful and inclusive constitution-making process is to take place in Syria, a secure, calm, neutral environment would need to be established to enable Syrians from all segments of society to participate safely and freely. That in turn would require the sides in Geneva to identify relevant and appropriate counter-terrorist, security, governance and confidence-building measures, as well as credible, all inclusive, non-sectarian Government arrangements that would need to be agreed and put in place via negotiations. A tough approach to governance would also help identify milestones and performance indicators.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  19. Ninth, such aconstitutional review would have to be inclusive and contain a national dialogue that is well- structured, conducted transparently and broadly-based, ensures opportunities for the dissemination of drafts, debate and revision, and has full contact and consultation with civil society, political parties, universities, academia and the public on the draft constitution. Tenth, the United Nations stands ready, if authorized by the Security Council, to provide good- offices support to any constitutional commission and national conference as described, and as agreed by the parties in the intra-Syrian talks, as well as the provision of international expertise.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  20. Seventh, both institutions should have their mandate, terms of reference, powers and rules of procedure agreed in United Nations-facilitated intra-Syrian talks in Geneva. Eighth, the United Nations would ensure that any composition agreed would be consistent with resolution 2254 (2015) and based upon any inclusive and objective selection criteria determined and agreed in Geneva. At the very least, both institutions would have to consist of representatives of the Government, the opposition in the intra-Syrian talks, and additional components of Syrian society, including religious, political, intellectual, economic, union figures, Syrians from the diaspora and legal experts, with provisions made for including civil society, independent people and women.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  21. However, if such a constitutional drafting body were to be credible, any drafting process would also likely need to address how power is to be shared, decentralized and exercised in Syria at the national, provincial and local levels. Sixth, the two institutions that have so far emerged from discussions for the purposes of drafting and revising a new constitution and instituting a national dialogue process are a constitutional commission and a national conference. The constitutional commission could prepare and refer an initial draft of a new constitution to a national conference in Syria, which could oversee a national dialogue and review, revise and then refer any draft constitution for popular approval, in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015).

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  22. To that end, we believe that such a constitutional review process could be guided by the principles contained in resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communique (S/2012/522, annex), and be informed by the 12 living essential intra-Syrian principles, which offer a perspective of a vision of a future Syria that can be shared by all. Fourth, as I indicated earlier, those principles give important assurances to the people Syria as to the purpose of any constitutional review, which must meet the legitimate aspirations of the people of Syria. Fifth, such principles, while not supra-constitutional unless otherwise agreed by the Syrian people, could be developed and embodied by a constitutional drafting body.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  23. It should not be written by any country or any ofus; we can help, but it should be theirs. Second, any constitutional review must be Syrian- owned, Syrian-led and conducted in accordance with resolution 2254 (2015), which, as I have indicated, provides that the setting of a schedule and process for the drafting of such a new constitution must take place in the context of United Nations-convened and facilitated intra-Syrian talks. Third, such a scheduling process should attempt to identify and contain guiding principles and a sequenced timetable, and identify all relevant institutions that need to be established, including their mandate and composition and the manner of establishment.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  24. Resolution 2254 (2015) calls for a United Nations-facilitated process to set the schedule and process for drafting a new constitution before United Nations-supervised elections are held. The United Nations has therefore sought at every turn in our meetings to understand the feelings of the various parties on that matter. Based on this, let me offer 11 observations to set some parametres and help produce further discussion, if we want a constitution process, as per resolution 2254 (2015), and thus the blessing of the United Nations. First, it would appear that both parties have accepted that Syria requires a review of its constitutional order, culminating in the popular approval of a new constitution. We all agree and they all agree that it is for the people of Syria alone to determine the future constitution of Syria.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  25. Specific provisions would have to be made to promote women's participation, and United Nations supervision could include roles in support of the legal electoral framework, electoral institutions and operations, including diaspora voting. This would also involve reporting to the Security Council on the implementation of the electoral processes, as related to the highest international standards of inclusivity, transparency and accountability. Those are issues surrounding elections. If we want the United Nations to be involved, that is what United Nations involvement comes with. Ready to respect sovereignty and ready to work hard - that is what United Nations-supervised elections mean. Basket 2 concerns the constitution.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  26. Provisions would need to be made to ensure equal opportunity for all to participate in public life, not to be terrorized or scared to be involved in it. Principles would need to be agreed for a legal electoral framework that meets the highest international standards and ensures independent electoral management. Parametres would be required on voter eligibility so that all Syrians, irrespective of their religion, ethnicity or gender - including members of the diaspora - can vote with special procedures to ensure the participation of refugees, internally displaced persons and other Syrians impacted by the conflict.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  27. There is therefore clearly a need to fully respect Syria's sovereignty - no question of that - and its own national electoral process, while at the same time facilitating United Nations supervision that the Council has stated it supports. Bearing in mind resolution 2254 (2015) and insights obtained from parties - because we were able to talk to each side a little bit prior to this round about elections, as well as with civil society and the average Syrian people - in order to hold free and fair elections to the highest international standards, there must be a clear timeline and sequencing agreed, as per resolution 2254 (2015), for United Nations-supervised elections, both presidential and parliamentary.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  28. In its paragraph 4, the resolution expresses the Council's support for "free and fair elections, pursuant to the new constitution administered under supervision of the United Nations and [held] to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability, with all Syrians, including members of the diaspora, eligible to participate". What do we mean when we say that we should be involved and that those elections should be internationally legitimate? The United Nations has provided electoral assistance to the majority of Member States, including around one-third of them in the past two years alone, so we do have experience, often in post-conflict situations and across the full spectrum of electoral assistance.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  29. Since we have been hearing and talking about the constitutional process and elections, and we were not able in the intra-Syrian talks to actually engage both sides on the matter, I will engage the Council. I believe that the time has come for the United Nations to provide some specific elaborations on the constitution and electoral baskets 2 and 3, and how they relate to governance, counter-terrorism, security governance and confidence-building measures, and develop agreed and clear modalities for the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015) and thus stimulate broader consultation. Let me share our thinking at this stage on basket 3 - elections.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  30. The 12 living intra-Syrian essential principles, published in round 8, which seek to embody end-state commonalities and offer an enduring perspective on the vision ofa future that can be shared by all Syrians, are consistent with and reflect many of the end-state principles contained in resolution 2254 (2015) and can serve to inform the parallel discussions of the four baskets, which remain on the agenda of the talks. Thus, the principles constitute an important assurance about the ultimate purpose of any political settlement process under resolution 2254 (2015). Let me shift now from the slightly theoretical to the pragmatic and practical.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  31. That is why the Council has mandated the United Nations to facilitate the political process. I appreciate the support extended by permanent members of the Council when they assembled in Geneva at the opening and closing of this round of talks. Let us also remind ourselves that despite the failure to negotiate in round 8, the front-loading of the living essential principles I mentioned for a future constitution, the identification of details of processes under the constitution/electoral basket - while working to build a safe, calm and neutral environment under the governance and security baskets, which are two important elements for a constitution/electoral basket - remain the most feasible approach to the implementation of resolution 2254 (2015).

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  32. There was also no progress on the critical issues of detainees, abductees and missing people, a topic that had been raised Via the Astana process but had not yet been delivered, either in Astana nor in Geneva. In view of the fact that we now have a new Astana opportunity, I strongly urge Iran, the Russian Federation and Turkey, in their capacity as guarantor States, to address the issues of the detainees, the abductees and the missing persons during the next meeting in Astana and not to miss that opportunity at the end of the year. That will probably happen towards the end of this week. Whatever the frustrations - and I recognize that there are many and on all sides - let us recall that only a United Nations-brokered process will be seen by the Syrians as impartial and attract the needed regional and international legitimacy.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  33. I should add that for the whole time we were in Geneva, no progress was made on the most urgent humanitarian issues. I had hoped some progress could be reached during that period. It was the perfect moment to give some good news, and I must say I have to congratulate the entire Council - whatever each member's position has been - for moving forward on an important resolution. At this time of year, that gives me a feeling that the Council can move forward when people are in need. There was no progress made on the most urgent humanitarian issues, but Under-Secretary- General Lowcock will brief the Council on that topic, so I will not even touch upon that subject.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  34. Meanwhile, I also counselled the opposition to depersonalize and broaden their thinking on governance, not to constantly refer to that type of personalization of the political solution, and indeed to publicly clarify that they had no preconditions. The opposition pointed out that the Government was setting a precondition to talking to them. Nevertheless, the opposition responded to my appeal about its public messaging by making clear that they are calling for the implementation of Security Council resolutions and "a tough negotiation with different goals" but not attempting to actually persuade the Government to engage with them or me on anything other than terrorism. The opposition regarded that as a sign that the Government was avoiding the negotiating table. In other words, the opposition was ready for negotiations.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  35. For instance, I counselled the Government that the opposition had set out its own negotiating position in Riyadh and that, as we all know, any opposition in the world can and sometimes does call for a change of Government as an ultimate goal. I further explained that a negotiating position was not the same as a precondition. I said that the Government should also test the other side in negotiation, confront them and talk to them. The Government found my position unconvincing, arguing that the mentality of the opposition, as expressed in the Riyadh 2 statement, revealed that the opposition was pursuing unattainable demands.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  36. Then they also started calling for the Riyadh 2 statement to be withdrawn as a precondition. The Government therefore declined to meet directly with the opposition or to negotiate indirectly with them through me until and unless the Riyadh 2 statement were withdrawn. The Government also further declined to explore any item of the agenda with the United Nations other than counter-terrorism, which we call basket 4 and which, frankly, is very important and affects us all, but is not the only important issue. They also received an updated version from us of the 12 living intra-Syrian essential principles, but did not comment on them or engage with them any further. As a mediator, I naturally tried to help both sides to think creatively and overcome any perceived barriers to negotiation.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  37. It also stated, through a video on YouTube, that until full Syrian sovereignty was restored and terrorism defeated in all parts of the Syrian territory, it would not be possible to entertain real movement on a constitutional review process or elections. That, to me, was a new condition that I had never heard before. It made me very worried about any other initiative besides that of Geneva, because if we all have for the whole country to be in a different geographic and political environment, with no foreign or terrorist presence at all, it might mean that any intention of generally addressing a constitutional review or election would be set aside for a long period, ifthe Government's position were confirmed. And it was confirmed to us; I have it on record.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  38. In all fairness, the Council should know that both I and the Saudi authorities in Riyadh - and I think the Special Envoy of the Russian Federation and many others from various countries as well - advised the opposition not to emphasize that aspect, precisely because it would potentially be considered a precondition. They told us that it was important for them to do so because it has been a party line since the beginning and that it was not a precondition but a position - an opinion. The Government also regarded the language in the Riyadh 2 statement on the role of the Islamic Republic of Iran as unacceptable, and it further questioned whether the opposition delegation - although now unified - including the Moscow platform and the Cairo platform, as well as the old or renewed Riyadh platform, was not sufficiently representative.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  39. For the first time, frankly, they also engaged on all four baskets in very in-depth and relevant discussions, sometimes welcoming and sometimes disagreeing with ideas that the United Nations had developed or proposed, while also sharing their own ideas with us. The Government delegation, which I met seven times and which was not in Geneva on some of the same days - or not for exactly the same length of time as the opposition - considered that the Riyadh II statement implied "a precondition in its call for President Al-Assad to depart at the start of any transition period".

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  40. They publicly affirmed their position, as indicated in the Riyadh II statement, calling for direct negotiations with the Government, which they emphasized was a position, not a precondition. They also stated their willingness to engage in indirect negotiations through me and my team if direct negotiations were not possible. The opposition received from us an updated version of the 12 living intra-Syrian essential principles, translated into English, which are the principles that we have been working on for more than a year now, and which we have discussed with everyone, including civil society, the Government and the opposition, as the potential basis for principles for a future constitution. The opposition gave concrete input in response to our presentation of the updated version of the essential principles.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  41. I will try to do it as objectively as possible, although I cannot help showing my feelings, even in my body language - I am Swedish and Italian, and am supposed to maintain my Swedish-style calm and not show my emotional Italian side - but while I am a United Nations diplomat with 47 years of experience, and trained to keep my emotions in check, I cannot hide my disappointment. So I will explain why by quoting from the perspective of each delegation. The opposition delegation, which held 11 meetings with me, came to Geneva almost directly from the so-called Riyadh II conference, about which I think I briefed the Council the last time. They were therefore unable to prepare themselves, but in spite of that they were able to maintain one line and one voice.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  42. Lowcock will talk about, and the issue of detainees, abductees and missing persons, with the active support of outside players. How did the eighth round go? The agenda I just outlined, which I though was quite ready to start moving forward, for the reasons I mentioned, did not in fact move forward. The opportunity to begin real discussion or negotiation was not taken. A golden opportunity was missed, for many reasons. One is psychological, because we are at the end of the year; another is political, because we are at the end, or want to believe we are, of a major military operation; and another is grounded in a human point of View, since most ordinary Syrians have been asking and waiting for this because they want to see the situation change for them. Let me explain why.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  43. Through a clear and realistic work plan focused on the full implementation of resolution 2254 (2015) - which, as the only resolution that is guiding us on a political process and legitimizing that process, is all we have and all that we have been able to bring together - and with a particular focus on the so-called 12 principles, a constitutional process and United Nations-supervised elections, both presidential and parliamentary, which in our internal jargon we refer to as basket 2 and basket 3. The process would play out while also exploring the very important issues of governance and counter-terrorism - basket 1 and basket 4 - and while pushing for confidence-building measures, such as humanitarian access, which Mr.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  44. Secondly, significant international diplomacy had taken place just before the talks - in Da Nang, where an important statement was made; in Riyadh, where a second process was established, which was considered almost unthinkable a year ago, so that now three different opposition groups, which had not really been talking to each other, are now united in one group and have one voice; and in Sochi, where an important meeting took place between Presidents Putin and Al-Assad. There have also been important meetings between Presidents Putin and Erdogan. Thirdly, both the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition Syrian High Negotiations Commission had given some public signals that they were interested in committing to a real discussion in Geneva. How would that take place?

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  45. I did so because, first, we saw developments on the ground, including de-escalation and major strides being made against the territorial control of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL)/Da'esh. That provided logical impetus for the political track. ISIL is almost gone from the territory, although Al-Nusra is still there. But now it is time to talk about a political future.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  46. Mr. De Mistura: At the outset, let me say how much I and my entire team appreciate the support we have been receiving this year in particular. As this may be the last occasion this year for me to brief the Security Council - and the end of the Security Council cycle for some members - I would like to say thanks, because I have felt that Council members supported us and understood our challenges. I count on that for next year as well. The eighth round of the intra-Syrian talks in Geneva concluded last Thursday. During my previous briefing (see S/PV.8113)I indicated why and how I was planning to try to facilitate some real negotiations and discussions, not just pre-negotiations.

    2017-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8142 (2017) · source

  47. This crisis - one of the worst in the history of the United Nations - now has the real potential to move towards a genuine political process. A clearer map of the de-escalation, ceasefire and de-confliction arrangement has emerged, largely enabled by the Astana and Amman processes. We now see the emergence of international consensus. We must begin to stitch the process together into concrete results, thereby enabling Syrians to determine their own future freely. The united support of the international community, centred in the Council, will be vital for negotiations to move forward in a concrete way.

    2017-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8113 (2017) · source

  48. I will continue to view this proposal and all other initiatives through the same prism - does it contribute to effective United Nations-led intra-Syrian negotiations in Geneva to implement resolution 2254 (2015)? Syria has been at war for the past six years. Half of its population has fled their homes. Reconstruction will cost at least $250 billion. There have been myriad obstacles to this settlement: a constellation of actors, a variety of shifting agendas, and a real and continuing danger of soft but concrete fragmentation of Syrian territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. We have also witnessed the largest terror group in history, bringing terrorists from over 100 countries, and the use of force against civilians on a horrific scale. All of that has transpired before our eyes over the past six years.

    2017-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8113 (2017) · source

  49. As Council members are aware, the Russian Federation has continued to pursue plans for a large gathering related to Syria, on a date in the relatively near future to be confirmed. It has been reported that the Presidents of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and Turkey met recently in Sochi. The Russian Federation has indeed sought United Nations support for this conference. I have been in continuous and open consultation with them. I have also continued to assess the views of Syrians and the wider international community, including all members of the Security Council, bearing in mind the mandate entrusted to the United Nations by the Council. It is therefore, as far as I can see, premature for me to say anything regarding this initiative at this stage.

    2017-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8113 (2017) · source

  50. I count on their commitment to the political process, sense of citizenship and real contact with the real problems on the ground and their own insights and ideas in order to strengthen our ongoing mediation efforts. I note the initiative of France to bring together in Geneva representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council for a preparatory meeting tomorrow, in which I have been invited to participate and give further detail on the agenda of this round. I warmly welcome any expression of support by the international community, including in particular the Security Council, for efforts to implement resolution 2254 (2015) through a United Nations-led political process in Geneva.

    2017-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8113 (2017) · source