YouSaid · the spoken record

De] Ponte

lines on the record: 38
first: 1999-11-10
most recent: 2004-11-23
sittings or episodes: 2
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“If some of the most important indictees, like Karadzic, Mladic and Gotovina, are not arrested and transferred in the months to come, it may be necessary to revise the target dates of the completion strategy. The year 2005 will also mark the tenth anniversary of three key events: the Srebrenica genocide, the Dayton Agreement, and the indictments against Karadzic and Mladic. If the international community could not prevent the genocide, it should at least not allow that and other very serious crimes to be left unpunished.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“All of the six remaining investigations will be completed before 31 December, with a number of new indictments issued. However, since two of those indictments could be joined with two existing cases, that would result in a maximum of only four additional trials to be carried out in The Hague. On the prosecution side, efforts are being made continuously to support the judges in their efforts to streamline the procedures and increase the efficiency of trials. My Office is currently ready to begin five trials, and it is involved in five other ongoing trials. Those efforts will have no effect, however, unless all accused are brought to The Hague in time to be tried before the end of 2008. As we enter the second phase of the completion strategy, 2005 will be crucial.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“Due to the hiring freeze, they can be replaced only through internal promotion, and that creates additional problems, as it is becoming increasingly difficult to continue to promote internally to senior levels without compromising professional standards. The vacancy rate in my Office is now close to 25 per cent. That situation is already impeding the work of the Office and could soon impact on the efficiency of the trials. The lack of cooperation of States, the state of preparedness of domestic jurisdictions and the financial crisis are the three major factors impacting negatively on the completion strategy. I remain committed, however, to the completion strategy and to its time frame. The first major milestone in the implementation of the completion strategy will be the closure of all investigations by the end of this year.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“The third area of concern impacting on the completion strategy which is beyond our control is the provision of adequate resources to my Office. As members are well aware, the Secretariat imposed a freeze on new recruitment in May 2004. Moreover, the 2005 budget for the Investigations Division was not approved. Those measures have been taken at a time when other bodies, including United Nations bodies, are offering very competitive packages to investigators and prosecutors of my Office. Over the past year, the Office of the Prosecutor has lost over 40 per cent of its senior investigators and almost 50 per cent of its senior legal staff.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“When selecting the jurisdiction to which it intends to refer cases back, the ICTY will have to consider the general climate in the countries concerned. It will also have to take into account the interests of the victims. In accordance with the principle that justice should be rendered as close as possible to the victims and to the place where the crimes were committed, the Prosecutor's policy is that, where possible, a case should be referred to the authorities of the State where the crimes took place. By the end of the year, 11 indicted cases concerning 20 accused will have been proposed to the Chambers for transfer to domestic jurisdictions in accordance with rule 11 bis of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“The networks supporting persons accused of war crimes are so powerful there that they can interfere with the judicial proceedings, including by intimidating witnesses and by exerting political pressure on judges and prosecutors, or even by threatening the stability of the country. Both in Serbia proper and in Kosovo, aggressive nationalist rhetoric is being used in smear campaigns against the Tribunal and its Prosecutor. The message is the same: if the authorities cooperate with the ICTY, it will destabilize the country. The groups orchestrating such propaganda are talented at threatening or causing violence and at blaming the ICTY, incarnated by its Prosecutor, for it. The international community and the democratically elected authorities in the region should taken further decisive measures against those networks.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“The ICTY has been actively supporting the establishment of specialized war crimes courts throughout the region. The Prosecutor's Office has contributed its expertise to training seminars for prosecutors and judges so as to enhance the capability of national jurisdictions to try war crimes in fair and credible trials. We continue to support the efforts of the Office of the High Representative to establish a war crimes chamber within the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina to try accused of lower and intermediate rank who were originally indicted by the Tribunal. However, ultimately, the proper functioning of those institutions is beyond our control. There is a legitimate concern that a country like Serbia, which is not willing to arrest indictees, will not be either interested in or capable of trying alleged war criminals domestically.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“Should international pressure recede in this case, it will be perceived as a signal that the international community may not be interested anymore in having the most senior leaders responsible for the most serious crimes, including Karadzic and Mladic, appear in front of the ICTY. The arrest of all fugitives is also a measure of the ability of States to proceed with domestic trials, as it is indicative of their commitment to the rule of law. The second key component of the completion strategy is the deferral to the States of the former Yugoslavia of indicted and non-indicted cases concerning medium- and low-level indictees. However, the ICTY must be cautious that the States to which cases are transferred are able and willing to proceed with trials, and that those trials are led in accordance with the highest judicial standards.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“On the other hand, there are strong indications that Gotovina, whose public image as a national hero is not denied by anyone, has enjoyed, and continues to benefit from, a well-organized support network, including within State structures. It is of paramount importance for the completion strategy and for the overall achievements of the ICTY that Gotovina be brought to justice in The Hague. That is the only remaining obstacle to the cooperation of Croatia with the ICTY. As soon as Gotovina is in The Hague, it will be possible to say that Croatia is indeed cooperating fully with the Tribunal. The failure to locate Gotovina, either inside or outside of Croatia, and to transfer him means that the networks protecting war criminals are more powerful than the part of the Government that genuinely wants to cooperate fully with the Tribunal.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“The seal was lifted on 12 October 2004, and he was surrendered in Bosnia and Herzegovina just one month later. Whereas most of the fugitives are in Serbia or in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is one senior accused who has been seen repeatedly in Croatia, as recently as last summer. Ante Gotovina disappeared in June 2001, just after he had been informed by the Croatian authorities of a sealed indictment against him. This spring, Croatia apparently stepped up its efforts to locate and arrest Gotovina. However, doubts may be raised concerning the effectiveness of those measures, or even their seriousness, as they have not produced any concrete results so far, not even relating to his whereabouts inside or outside of Croatia.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“It will soon have completed its mandate, which should be taken over by the European Union-led peacekeeping force (EUFOR) and NATO. It is a great frustration for me that SFOR has to leave while Radovan Karazdic is still at large, especially since all SFOR commanders promised that they would arrest him during their tenure. In my View, success will come only when the relevant authorities in Serbia and Republika Srpska finally work together with international forces. That type of transborder cooperation needs to be further encouraged throughout the region. In this context, the transfer of Miroslav Bralo on 12 November is a positive development. The accused had been indicted on a sealed arrest warrant in 1995. There were strong indications that he was in Croatia, although this was denied by the Croatian authorities.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“It also now confirms, I believe, the fact that there are fundamental, systemic weaknesses built into the law enforcement and security structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular the Republika Srpska. They must be tackled so that the structures finally help, not hinder, the country in cooperating with the Tribunal. The Ministries of Defence and of the Interior of Republika Srpska cannot by any reasonable standards be judged to have helped in this regard. The report of the Srebrenica Commission imposed upon the Republika Srpska by the international community, once published, should help raise awareness of the genocide and of the necessity to punish those responsible. The Stabilization Force (SFOR) has supported the Tribunal over the years.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“Whereas most fugitives have found safe haven in Serbia, some still reside in Bosnia and Herzegovina or travel regularly to that country. They continue to enjoy the protection of powerful networks. The High Representative has taken energetic measures against those networks that include the beginning of structural reform at the State and entity level. But the fact remains that, nine years after Dayton, the authorities of Republika Srpska have not apprehended a single individual indicted by the ICTY. That raises fundamental questions about the willingness of Republika Srpska leaders to fulfil their pledges to cooperate with the ICTY by taking firm action.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“There is, however, some progress to report in the areas of cooperation that are within the competence of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Thanks to the effective work of the National Cooperation Council, the huge backlog of waivers authorizing officials or former officials to be interviewed has been dealt with. There is also a desire to resolve issues related to access to documents, but many difficulties remain, principally because the documents requested are in the hands of authorities who are blocking cooperation with the Tribunal. All in all, the lack of cooperation on the part of Belgrade remains the single most important obstacle faced by the Tribunal in the implementation of the completion strategy.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“Furthermore, for their own domestic political reasons, the Serbian authorities presented that arrest as a voluntary surrender. They underlined thereby their official policy, which is that all fugitives should voluntarily surrender. But that policy has not produced any results so far, and it blatantly contradicts the country's international obligations, namely under article 29 of the ICTY Statute and numerous Security Council resolutions. The Serbian Government has deliberately chosen to ignore its legal obligations. Serbia's consistent failure to cooperate was once again brought to the attention of the Council on 4 May 2004 in a report forwarded by the President. In the meantime, the Serbian Government's attitude of defiance towards the Tribunal, which also challenges the Council, has not changed.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“Only hours later, my investigators observed that he had been informed and left immediately. He has since disappeared. On 8 October, detailed information about the location of Ljubisa Beara, a close aide to Ratko Mladic indicted in 2002, was forwarded to the Serbian Prime Minister. Beara did not resist arrest, and he was transferred to The Hague on the night of 9 October. Obviously, that arrest happened only because my Office provided full information on the fugitive's location, and because Belgrade knew that we were monitoring Beara's residence. Furthermore, I was due to address the Ministers of the European Union two days later. Only such immediate pressure seems to produce results. However, my Office cannot be expected to do the same for each and every fugitive.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“It is therefore of crucial importance for the completion strategy timeline that those arrests be made as soon as possible so as to avoid duplication of efforts and waste of resources. The Governments of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina bear the main responsibility for bringing those fugitives to The Hague. A vast majority of them, probably more than a dozen, live freely in Serbia. Prime Minister Kostunica has made it clear that he is not willing to arrest fugitives - only to try to convince them to surrender voluntarily. On 13 July, the sealed indictment against Goran Hadzic, the former President of the so-called Republika Srpska Krajina, in Croatia, was handed over to the relevant authorities in Belgrade, which were also provided with the precise whereabouts of Hadzic.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“Furthermore, delays in the arrest and transfer of those fugitives make the planning of the trials more complicated and undermine judicial efficiency, as it is not possible to join similar cases in one trial. For instance, Karadzic could have been tried together with Momcilo Krajisnik, another former senior leader of Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose trial is ongoing. Lukic, Lazarevic, Pavkovic and Djordjevic could still be tried together with Milutinovic, Ojdanic and Sainovic, who are awaiting trial in the Tribunal's detention unit. The situation is similar for Gotovina. His two co- accused, Cermak and Markac, are also awaiting trial. Borovcanin, Pandurevic, Popovic and Nikolic should be tried with Beara, who was arrested and transferred recently.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“In addition to those three key indictees, the other most senior fugitives are Borovcanin, Pandurevic, Popovic and Nikolic, who have been indicted for the Srebrenica genocide, and also the four generals - Lukic, Lazarevic, Pavkovic and Djordjevic - indicted for their direct individual responsibility, as well as for their command responsibility in the crimes committed in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999. The objectives of the Tribunal, as established by the Security Council, will not be fulfilled until those accused are tried in The Hague. The Ministers of the European Union made the same assessment when they stated, on 12 July 2004, that "the work of the ICTY would not be completed without the arrest and transfer to The Hague of key indictees such as Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and Ante Gotovina".”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“The first such obstacle is the lack of cooperation on the part of States, mainly in the arrest and transfer of persons indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). There are still 20 fugitives at large, and most of them should be tried in The Hague. A few of them, however, could be tried by domestic jurisdictions, and the relevant motions for their transfer have already been filed, or will soon be filed. Among the fugitives are three individuals mentioned repeatedly in Security Council resolutions, unfortunately to no avail so far: Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and Ante Gotovina.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“Ms. De] Ponte: It is a great honour to be here again to provide an assessment of the progress made in the implementation of the completion strategy. A written assessment has already been distributed, and I intend to concentrate now on the major concerns. The completion strategy has two components: the trial in The Hague of the most senior leaders responsible for the most serious crimes, and the referral of mid- and low-level perpetrators to domestic courts. Although significant progress was achieved on both fronts in the reporting period, it has to be stressed that a number of obstacles which are outside of the Tribunal's control may still derail the completion strategy.”
2004-11-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5086 (2004) · source
“(spoke in French) The Council is the executive body of the International Tribunal when States do not comply with their duty to cooperate. I am here today precisely in order to ensure that the Security Council intervenes in this urgent matter to make certain that Croatia collaborates and cooperates with us on the documents which we urgently need in order to complete these very important investigations. These are the most important points which I wish to raise and I would be happy to answer any questions that the Council may have.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“As I have said, we have this year confirmed finding over 2,000 bodies out of a total of 11,334 reported to us. With the same level of resources next year as we have had this year, we can finish the whole forensic programme in a single season. My goal is to complete the task we have begun, and I therefore intend to seek the continued assistance of States contributing gratis personnel for the remainder of the forensic work next year. We cannot leave the job only half-finished. We therefore still have a lot of work to do, but I do not intend to allow our Kosovo investigations to detract from other prosecutions relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Croatia. The year 2000 will see a full range of activity from the Office of the Prosecutor.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“Our work therefore helps in the sad process of confirming identification, although, again, that is not the primary objective of my Office. To sum up, we now have in our possession, invaluable documentation of what happened to many people in many places in Kosovo. There is no substitute for this kind of accurate information, because it is evidence that eventually will stand up in a court of law. We are preparing now for next year, when we would like to be able to complete the investigation of crime scenes and mass graves. I want to complete the forensic examination of all remaining sites as soon as possible. There is a continuing risk that some of the remaining sites may be disturbed before we can examine them. The imperative to work quickly that drove our exhumations this year still exists. We do not know how many bodies we may find.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“Even so, our work can help establish the total number of dead, and we are already building up the overall pattern of the killing. That pattern is of a large number of relatively small sites. We do not typically find hundreds of people buried together. A few sites did contain the remains of approximately 100 people, but often the number is much smaller; and sometimes the reports of victims buried are not borne out at all. For the Council's information, I have prepared a detailed list of sites and figures for distribution. I am afraid that I cannot give a more detailed breakdown of the age or sex or other characteristics of the deceased. Many of the bodies, including those of women and children were positively identified, and often the names of individual victims were well known.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“As of today, approximately one third of the 529 grave sites have been examined. Work has been completed at 195 sites. In total 4,266 bodies had been reported to be buried in those sites. To date 2,108 bodies have been exhumed. This figure does not necessarily reflect the total number of actual Victims, because we have discovered evidence of tampering with graves. There are also a significant number of sites where the precise number of bodies cannot be counted. In these places, steps were taken to hide the evidence. Many bodies have been burned, but at those sites the forensic evidence is nevertheless consistent with the accounts given by witnesses to the crimes. The figures themselves may therefore not tell the whole story, and we would not expect the forensic evidence in isolation to produce a definitive total.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“Our primary task is to gather evidence relevant to criminal charges. Our initial focus, understandably, had to be to investigate those places listed as crime scenes on the indictment against President Milosevic, and other leaders. Our work has, of course, expanded since that early list, but it is still not our mission to compile a complete census of the dead. Nevertheless, my staff have collected some reliable statistics. It may be some time before all the evidence is presented before a court, and there is a legitimate public interest in my giving some indication of the nature of our findings even at this early stage, so I think it is important for me to give the Council some numbers. We have received reports of 529 grave sites, including sites where bodies were found exposed.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“Secondly, I would like to say something about Kosovo. Much of our effort this year concerned Kosovo, because we know we had to act quickly before evidence was lost. I can tell the Council that for the past five months we have been working with forensic personnel from 14 countries, who contributed forensic pathology and "scenes of crime" teams. The last of these teams left Kosovo on 31 October. I have now received a preliminary analysis of the first findings, although not all the forensic reports have been completed. I would like to give accurate details today, because some statistics are beginning to appear in the media. There has been a lot of general speculation about the number of people killed in Kosovo. Some people expect the Tribunal to give the definitive answer. But our task is not to prepare a complete list of war casualties.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“I therefore need the Council's help, as well as the support of national Governments and all other key international institutions. My predecessor was here in this Chamber in September; in their remarks on that occasion, Council members recognized the obligation of the Council, as the parent body of the International Tribunal, to support it. One member went so far as to remark that the Council does not have a very effective record in that regard and that it could be more active on that front. I cannot emphasize enough the importance of the support the Security Council can give the Tribunal. We do not seek it lightly, and I therefore urge the Council to put its full weight behind our efforts when we ask for its assistance and to be creative in finding ways to bring to bear the sort of pressures that will produce results.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“Today, I would prefer to restrict my remarks to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and I would like to speak about two matters. The first is the issue of arrests. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, where international forces are present, 14 accused have been detained by SFOR since July 1997. Four of these were detained this year. I hope that the momentum will last and that the figures will continue to rise. This record of success is most encouraging, so I will work hard to maintain our level of cooperation with SFOR, and I will continue to press for increasingly strong action against all those accused persons who have not yet been arrested, including those at the highest level. But there are accused who are beyond the reach of SFOR. Their arrests pose quite a different question. The Tribunal itself can do only so much.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“That was the first time Rwandan officials had visited The Hague, but since then our relations with the Rwandan Government may have been affected by their reaction to an important decision of the Appeals Chamber to release one of the accused and to dismiss the charges against him. I am very concerned about the circumstances of that case and about the court's findings of delays and violations of the accused's rights. I very much regret that the Office of the Prosecutor has been criticized for not having acted diligently in that prosecution, but until I have spent some time in Rwanda itself, it would be better for me to reserve any further comments about the work of that Tribunal. I would be happy to come back on another occasion to address the Council specifically on Rwanda.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“It was an important visit for me, because seeing the many different aspects of our investigations in the field helps one understand the magnitude of the undertaking in which we are engaged. I was pleased to see that the work was being done in a professional manner, even when the conditions were very hard for the teams. So, I am learning. Very soon I will do the same thing for Rwanda. I will travel to my office there, and I will spend several weeks in Kigali and Arusha. My Rwanda work has begun, and I have already met the Deputy Prosecutor and the Chief of Investigations in The Hague. I have also met the Chief Prosecutor and the Military Prosecutor of Rwanda, as well as the Rwandan Ambassador in Brussels.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“I draw it to the Council's attention simply to illustrate that the requirement of State cooperation is a constant one and that it underpins the day- to-day work of our institutions. Over the last few weeks, I personally have been busy. As the Council may know, I have completed my first visit to the former Yugoslavia; I saw my offices in Skopje, Pristina, Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Zagreb; I met officials in all those locations; I met the Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) Commanders; and I met the Secretary-General's Special Representatives in Bosnia and Kosovo. I went to an exhumation site in Kosovo and to our mortuary in Bosnia, where I saw the results of our exhumations programmes: the human remains of Victims.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“That principle applies with particular force to States that have themselves been involved in the armed conflicts in question, on whose territory the investigations must be carried out. The Council is already aware of the refusal of Croatia to cooperate over Operations Storm and Flash; and it should also be aware that other requests will also test the attitude of Zagreb towards the Tribunal's work. In connection with a different investigation, my Office is required to conduct certain on-site investigations in Croatia and has requested the Government of Croatia to make the necessary security arrangements in order to provide a safe environment to allow that work to proceed this year. I hope that Security Council intervention will not become necessary for that exercise.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“Further, we cannot allow, to take another recent example, the Republic of Croatia to withhold its cooperation because of its unilateral decision that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to investigate the actions of its armed forces in Operation Storm and Operation Flash. It is essential for the success of the Tribunal that States not be permitted to dictate to the independent Prosecutor what events shall and shall not be investigated. The power to initiate investigations bestowed upon the Prosecutor by this Council is fundamental. It must be preserved; and the judicial process has to be protected from the tyranny of political or ethnic manipulation. The subjects of international criminal law are individuals, not States or entire peoples, and decisions about individual investigations and prosecutions must lie with the Tribunal's Prosecutor.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“The Tribunals will turn to the Council from time to time when its full weight must be brought to bear on those who refuse to honour the international obligations imposed on them by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Indeed, the Tribunal has already reported to the Security Council the total defiance on the part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in surrendering indicted accused. I fear that as a result, Serbia is becoming a safe haven for indicted war criminals who have been accused of serious crimes in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. This situation cannot be allowed to continue.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“There can be no doubt that the success of the two International Criminal Tribunals depends upon the active support of the Security Council of the United Nations. The effectiveness and strength of international criminal justice ultimately lies in the Council's hands. The Council expresses the political will of the international community, and it embodies the determination of all civilized peoples to bring to justice those individuals responsible for crimes which are among the most horrible and massive the world has seen in recent years. In creating the two Tribunals, the Council has designed a powerful enforcement mechanism of international humanitarian law.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source
“Ms. De] Ponte: Thank you, Mr. President, for inviting me to attend this meeting today. I welcome the opportunity, and hope that during my time in office there will be regular occasions on which the Security Council will find it useful for me to address it. First, I would like the Security Council to know that I am very proud to have been appointed Prosecutor of the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. I have only been in office for less than two months and have been generally impressed by the work being done in my own offices and by the activity of the Tribunals as a Whole. As Prosecutor, I am, however, acutely aware of my responsibilities. The task before me is a daunting one, and I need the Council's assistance and its continued support in order to achieve successfully the objectives it has set for me.”
1999-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4063 (1999) · source