YouSaid · the spoken record

De Soto

lines on the record: 195
first: 2003-04-10
most recent: 2007-02-13
sittings or episodes: 9
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“He is also grateful for the assistance of a team of some 50 United Nations experts, many seconded by the European Commission and other Governments and institutions, notably Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland and the United States of America; and the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, as well as the United Nations Development Programme/ United Nations Office for Project Services and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.”
2004-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4986 (2004) · source
“Its purpose would not be to afford recognition or assist secession, but, rather, to promote reunification and reconciliation. This is about assisting the people in the north of Cyprus. I wish to acknowledge the extensive and consistent efforts of many Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to reunify Cyprus. These have to continue. Civil society must play its role, and, no doubt, the European Union will give such efforts its support, as should the United Nations. I should also like to take this opportunity to reiterate the Secretary-General's praise for the efforts made by nearly 300 Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots involved in the technical discussions, without whom the settlement plan would not have been complete.”
2004-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4986 (2004) · source
“The Secretary-General has therefore recommended to the Council that it should encourage the Turkish Cypriots, and Turkey, to remain committed to that goal. The Secretary-General has called on the Council to give a strong lead to all States to cooperate, both bilaterally and in international bodies, to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development. The Secretary-General has chosen his words very carefully. The action that the Secretary-General recommends, I should emphasize, would be addressed to States. It is not meant to give State rights, State functions or State institutions to the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).”
2004-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4986 (2004) · source
“It goes without saying that, given that it is a rather lengthy letter, we have not had time to study it, but, obviously, we stand ready to respond to questions that members of the Council might have in that regard, either here and now or in another forum. The Secretary-General has also, in his report, welcomed the fact that the Turkish Cypriots, in approving the plan, have unequivocally signalled their commitment to reunification. This is more than a mere expression of goodwill for a solution to the Cyprus problem; the Turkish Cypriot people have clearly backed away from their search for a separate, sovereign statehood. This is a fundamental turnabout in the direction taken by the Turkish Cypriot side for more than two decades.”
2004-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4986 (2004) · source
“The sole purpose of that sentence was to emphasize that what was rejected on 24 April was a comprehensive plan for a settlement, ready for implementation, with nothing further to be negotiated, rather than a mere framework or set of principles for future negotiations. I should mention the fact that, late yesterday afternoon, the Secretary-General received from the Greek Cypriot side a letter outlining comments regarding the Secretary-General's report on his mission of good offices. I believe that has been conveyed also to members of the Council pending its circulation as an official document.”
2004-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4986 (2004) · source
“In particular, we need to know if questions of security and implementation were, indeed, the main concern, and if so, what can be done by the Security Council to address them. The Secretary- General has encouraged the Council to stand ready to do so if those concerns can be articulated with clarity and finality. I should like to take this opportunity to clarify the meaning of the sentence in paragraph 83 of the Secretary-General's report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/2004/437), which reads: "What was rejected was the solution itself rather than a mere blueprint".”
2004-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4986 (2004) · source
“In his report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/2004/427), he has therefore outlined his intention to conduct a review, to be completed within three months, of the mandate, force levels and concept of operations of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), in the light of the developments on the ground, the positions of the parties and any views the Security Council might have. The Secretary-General has also indicated his hope that Greek Cypriots will reflect on the outcome of this process in the coming months. We need to better understand the reasons for their strong rejection of the plan - which was based on the Vision of the Security Council as formulated over a quarter of a century - if future efforts are to have any hope of bearing fruit, and we need to know how the Greek Cypriot side sees the way forward.”
2004-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4986 (2004) · source
“Those achievements should be built upon, and a number of elements put in place, to keep alive the prospects of reconciliation and reunification in the future. The Security Council, which has so strongly backed the Secretary-General's efforts, has an important role to play in that regard. The Secretary-General, for his part, has made a number of observations in the concluding sections of his report. He has made clear that, as long as the current stand-off - as described in paragraph 91 - remains, he does not see any basis for resuming his active good offices. A broad and fundamental reassessment of the full range of United Nations peace activities in Cyprus - both good offices and peacekeeping - is timely.”
2004-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4986 (2004) · source
“It was rejected on the Greek Cypriot side by a margin of three to one and approved on the Turkish Cypriot side by a margin of two to one. The plan, therefore, did not enter into force. The final opportunity to ensure that Cyprus should accede to the European Union as a united, rather than a divided, country has thus been missed. Throughout the effort that began in late 1999, pursuant to Council resolution 1250 (1999), the goal has been to bring about a settlement through a decision of the people on each side. The people have at last decided for themselves. Their decision, on each side, must be respected. While the ultimate outcome of the effort of the past four and a half years has not been a success, a great deal has nevertheless been achieved.”
2004-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4986 (2004) · source
“Mr. De Soto: Thank you, Mr. President, for giving me the opportunity to say a few words by way of introduction of the Secretary-General's report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, which is before the Council in document S/2004/437, dated 28 May 2004. I will be brief, since the report is largely self- explanatory. As the report makes clear, the renewed effort that began on 10 February 2004 in New York and continued in Cyprus from 19 February to 22 March 2004 and in Switzerland from 24 to 29 March did not produce a settlement fully agreed between the parties. Therefore, as agreed between the parties with the support of Greece and Turkey, the Secretary-General finalized the plan on 31 March 2004. The Foundation Agreement contained in the plan was submitted to separate simultaneous referenda on 24 April 2004.”
2004-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4986 (2004) · source
“For the people of Cyprus, the next month will be the most critical in 30 years. They will have the democratic right to decide whether to reunite their country on the basis that has been suggested. We as the United Nations are proud to have been able to work with their leaders to give them this opportunity. We hope that they appreciate what a unique opportunity this is, and that they will seize the chance for a just and lasting peace in Cyprus. Before closing, I should like to commend the leaders of Greece and Turkey for their efforts and their strong support. I also wish to reiterate the Secretary- General's appreciation for the strong support that he has received throughout the good offices efforts that he has undertaken in recent years.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“All others will receive either reinstatement of their property or full and effective compensation, or a combination of both. Thirdly, the long-term objective of the plan is the demilitarization of Cyprus. In this regard, all troops in excess of those permitted by the 1960 Treaty of Alliance will withdraw from Cyprus over time, and thereafter the small number of troops remaining will be subject to regular review with a view to total withdrawal by mutual consent. The plan is inevitably a compromise. It does not meet all the demands of each side. But the Secretary- General believes it is a fair and balanced plan, and he hopes that, as they consider it, the people on each side will agree. The United Nations will be doing its best to make available to the public in Cyprus information about the plan.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“As is obvious, achieving a Cyprus settlement is a complex task - legally and politically. But there are certain points that should not be lost sight of. First, the process has been conducted in full conformity with the mandate provided to the Secretary-General by the Council. The product of the work is a bi-communal, bi- zonal, federal system - a State of Cyprus with a single international legal personality, sovereignty and citizenship. It is based on the principle of political equality between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Secondly, the plan is based on respect for international law and individual human rights. In this regard, a majority of Greek Cypriots who were displaced will be able to return to their homes and have their properties reinstated under Greek Cypriot administration.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“In this respect, I wish to inform the Council that the European Commissioner for Enlargement, who was at Biirgenstock, has confirmed to the Secretary-General that the European Commission is committed to submitting the act of adaptation of the terms of accession of the United Cyprus Republic to the European Union - which is provided for in the plan - for consideration by the Council of the European Union prior to 24 April 2004, and for its adoption after the successful outcome of the separate simultaneous referendums before 1 May 2004. Furthermore, the European Commission is also committed to bringing about a final outcome, without delay, which will result in the adaptation of primary law and ensure legal certainty and security within the European Union legal system for all concerned.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“Should the plan be approved on 24 April by each side, it will not enter into force until 29 April, and only after Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, as guarantors, have completed all the internal procedures necessary to sign into force on 29 April the treaty provided for in the plan. This revised mode of entry into force of the settlement was designed to ensure that the guarantors were legally committed to their obligations under it. The European Union would also have to move quickly to accommodate the terms of the settlement and make way for a reunited Cyprus to accede to the European Union two days later, on 1 May 2004.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“The Secretary-General will, in accordance with the plan, submit to the Council a detailed proposal for a revised United Nations operation in Cyprus, with the hope that the Council will act prior to the referendums, conditional upon their approval. Finally, the European Union is organizing a preparatory meeting on 15 April 2004 for a donor's conference that would take place after reunification. The United Nations urges donors to participate in that conference and to be prepared to commit the resources necessary to give Cypriots the confidence that the implementation of the plan will receive strong international support.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“They must each hand over to the Secretary-General lists of persons who will be citizens of the United Cyprus Republic upon entry into force, in accordance with the plan, and they must provide for mechanisms to identify the members of the transitional Government to take office for two months after entry into force. The guarantor Powers must confirm to the Secretary-General and each other in writing, no later than 7 April 2004, that they agree to the foundation agreement's being submitted to separate simultaneous referendums and that, upon its approval and completion of their internal ratification procedures, they will sign, no later than 29 April 2004, the treaty provided for in the plan.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“Secondly, the role of the Monitoring Committee envisaged under the plan has been strengthened, with the parties undertaking to act on its recommendations. Thirdly, the mandate of the United Nations operation has been strengthened not only to provide for the assumption of territorial responsibility for agreed areas and time periods prior to transfer of territory, without prejudice to local administration of the population, but also to provide for the United Nations to monitor political developments and provide advice and good offices as required. During April, a number of steps have to be taken. The parties need to work together to finalize plans for federal buildings, property and personnel.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“New details of measures to assist in relocation of persons who must move as a result of territorial adjustment have been introduced into the plan. Important refinements have been made regarding security in at least three respects. First, the provisions relating to troop withdrawal have been altered. Under the previous plan, 6,000 Greek and Turkish troops were permitted to remain in Cyprus on the proviso that all would leave should Turkey accede to the European Union. The revised plan provides for 6,000 to drop to 3,000 in 2011. It further provides for the 3,000 to drop in 2018 or upon Turkey's European Union accession - whichever is earlier * to the 950 Greek troops and 650 Turkish troops permitted under the 1960 Treaty of Alliance, and for three-yearly reviews of troop levels thereafter with a view to total withdrawal by mutual consent.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“Thirdly, voting for the Senate will be on the basis of mother tongue, rather than on the basis of internal citizenship status, to ensure that political equality cannot be undermined over time. A number of important improvements have been made regarding the economic and financial aspects of the plan, largely based on the agreed recommendations of experts from each side in the technical committees. The map in the plan has not changed, but an important new element has been introduced, which will be of direct interest to this Council. It is envisaged that, in the last months of each phased handover of territory, the supervision by the United Nations of the activities relating to the transfer of areas subject to territorial adjustment shall be enhanced in the relevant areas.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“There are no permanent derogations from the European Union acquis communautaire. The workings of the federal Government have also been revised in three important respects. First, the long transitional periods foreseen in the previous plan have been replaced by a much shorter period, with full elections to be held at the federal and constituent State level, along with European Parliament elections, on 13 June 2004. Secondly, the structure of the Presidential Council has been altered, with nine members rather than six and with provision for two persons not hailing from the same constituent State to rotate in the offices of President and Vice-President in three 20-month periods over the 60-month term of the Presidential Council.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“Certain non-discriminatory restrictions on the acquisition of property in the Turkish Cypriot State would be permissible, but only for a transitional period. The plan was also revised in the way that it deals with two issues that are distinct but related: the question of residency by persons from one constituent State in the other constituent State and the question of the establishment of residency by Greek and Turkish nationals in Cyprus. These transitional limitations are not designed to divide Cypriots. They are designed to prevent either side from being overrun by unrestricted establishment of residence, unrestricted immigration or unlimited property purchases in a transitional period, and to ensure that the identity of Cyprus and its constituent States is maintained.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“From the Secretary-General's written report to the Security Council of 1 April 2003, members have a detailed explanation of the main points of his plan. I will not repeat them. However, I would like to summarize the main improvements that have been made to the plan. This list is not exhaustive. By far the most important change that has been made to the plan relates to the question of reinstatement of property to people who were dispossessed. The revised scheme is fairer, simpler and more certain. It will increase the amount of land reinstated to dispossessed owners and it will also increase significantly the number of displaced and dispossessed persons who will be reinstated to some of their property. At the same time, it will give more certainty to current users.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“The Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, arrived on 29 March. On 29 March, the Secretary-General presented a fully revised text for consideration by the parties. In that revised text, the Secretary-General sought to address the key concerns that had been expressed by the two sides in the negotiations, while maintaining the overall balance of the plan. While not precluding the possibility that the parties might yet reach agreement, the process, from that point onwards, moved to the third phase of the effort envisaged in the 13 February agreement, in which the text was to be finalized by the Secretary- General. The Secretary-General wished to do so in the closest collaboration with all concerned - hence the consultations with the parties over the next 48 hours in the run-up to the presentation of a final text on 31 March.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“This meant that the negotiations in Biirgenstock took on a more informal character, with the United Nations engaging in consultations with the parties in an effort to broker areas of understanding. Since the Biirgenstock process was designed to achieve agreement, if possible, by 29 March, the United Nations sent to the parties on 25 March a proposed framework which, had agreement on the substance been reached, would have enabled the parties to sign an agreement. This was sent to the parties for their consideration, comment and negotiation, but in no way implied that signatures were required. As agreed on 13 February, should agreement not be possible, the Secretary-General will finalize the plan. The Secretary-General arrived in Bilrgenstock on 28 March, as did the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Kostas Karamanlis.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“Mr. Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, announced that he would not travel to Burgenstock, but in writing he gave Mr. Mehmet Ali Talat and Mr. Serdar Denktash full powers to negotiate in Biirgenstock on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot side. The talks at Biirgenstock began on 24 March 2004. As agreed on 13 February in New York, Greece and Turkey were present in order to lend their collaboration in a concentrated effort to agree on a finalized text by 29 March 2004. Greece and Turkey were represented by their Foreign Ministers. However, due to a difference of view between the parties on the appropriate format, it was difficult to arrange direct meetings either of the two parties or of the two parties together with the guarantors.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“However, the progress made at the technical level could not disguise the fact that, at the political level, the two sides were not able to reach agreement. After direct meetings yielded little progress, I suggested a change in format and began shuttling between the leaders starting on 15 March. However, that did not yield significant progress either. I will not go into the reasons why this was so, but I believe I should record the fact that each side expressed great frustration at the lack of progress on the island and believed that the other side was largely to blame for it. As the date for completion of the first phase approached, the Secretary-General invited the leaders to move to a location off the island that lent itself to the second phase. That location was Bijrgenstock, a hotel complex in the outskirts of Lucerne, Switzerland.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“The output of work at the technical level was nothing short of extraordinary and resulted in: agreed recommendations to the leaders on a flag and an anthem for a reunified Cyprus; the completion of 131 federal laws, constitutional laws and cooperation agreements, to be in force from the moment the settlement enters into force - they run to 9,000 pages and are part of the proposed foundation agreement; the completion of a list of 1,134 international treaties and instruments to be binding on the United Cyprus Republic, which are also part of the proposed foundation agreement; a package of agreed recommendations to the leaders on economic and financial aspects of implementation of the plan; progress in the identification of federal buildings, in finalizing a list of federal property and in preparing for the federal public service to be in place upon the entry into force of a settlement.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“The second level was negotiations by technical representatives of the two sides, appointed by the leaders, who met under United Nations auspices to resolve certain technical issues and to make recommendations to the two leaders.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“What is now before the people is a plan that embodies the key concepts and trade-offs that emerged from a long process of negotiation. The improvements made in it, while not agreed, reflect the material put forward in intensive negotiations that resumed on 19 February of this year. Those negotiations on the island occurred at two levels. The first was at the political level, where the two leaders - the Greek Cypriot leader, His Excellency Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, His Excellency Mr. Rauf Denktash - sought to agree on changes to the plan. Regrettably, aside from some secondary points, they were not able to do so. However, the talks allowed all the amendments proposed by the two sides to be aired.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“We are making available to Council members, in electronic format, the finalized plan, which can also be found on the United Nations web site - www.un.org - or directly at www.annanplan.org. We are also making available the text of the Secretary- General's remarks to the parties on 29 March 2004, when he presented a revision of his plan, and on 31 March 2004, when he presented the finalized version of his plan after further intensive consultations and negotiations. The plan that is now to be placed before the people may have been finalized, in the last resort, by the Secretary-General, but it is not an invention of the Secretary-General. The role of the United Nations has been to put things in writing where it was hard for the parties to do so.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“He hopes that the Council will be able to act speedily on that proposal in advance of the referendum date of 24 April. However, he has asked me to brief the Council orally today, before I return to Cyprus over the weekend. The comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem consists of the following appendices: a proposed foundation agreement; proposed constitutions of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot constituent States; a proposed treaty on matters related to the new state of affairs in Cyprus; a draft act of adaptation of the terms of accession of the United Cyprus Republic to the European Union; matters to be submitted to the Security Council for decision; and measures to be taken during April 2004.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“As a final resort, in the event of a continuing and persistent deadlock, the parties invited the Secretary-General to use his discretion to finalize the text to be submitted to referendums on the basis of his plan. The process agreed on 13 February was based on the conditions laid down by the Secretary-General in his report to the Council of 1 April 2003 (8/2003/398) to resume his good offices effort. That approach received the support of the Council in resolution 1475 (2003). That process has now resulted in a finalized text to go to referendum on 24 April 2004: the text presented by the Secretary-General in Biirgenstock on 31 March 2004. The Secretary-General will soon place before the Council a full report on the negotiations, including a proposal, as provided for in the plan, for a revised United Nations operation in Cyprus.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“Mr. De Soto: The Council will recall that on 13 February 2004, the two parties in Cyprus agreed to resume negotiations on the basis of the Secretary- General's plan to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem through separate and simultaneous referendums before 1 May 2004. To that end, the parties committed themselves in a first phase to seek to agree on changes and to complete the plan in all respects by 22 March 2004 within the framework of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices so as to produce a finalized text. The parties further agreed that, in the absence of such agreement, the Secretary- General would convene a meeting of the two sides, with the participation of Greece and Turkey, in order to lend their collaboration in a concentrated effort to agree on a finalized text by 29 March.”
2004-04-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4940 (2004) · source
“proposed that the leaders should discuss the amendments they want to present to it and, if agreed. put the plan to referendum. To our knowledge, Mr. Papadopoulos has not responded to that further letter at this time. As I said, the Secl'etal'y-General's report gives his views as to why the process was not successful and outlines what he believes should be the best way forward. The criteria contained therein will guide the Secretary-General in his good offices role in the future.”
2003-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4738 (2003) · source
“Mr. Papadopoulos restated in the most clear terms that he remains committed, even after 16 April, to finding a solution "within the parameters of the Arman plan", and called on Mr. Denktash to indicate that he accepts the Secretary-General's plan as the basis for a further negotiating process. Mr. Denktash responded by reiterating his conviction that a crisis of confidence has obstructed all efforts, including the most recent one, to resolve the Cyprus problem and said that his confidence-building proposals remain on the table. He reaffirmed a point made in his earlier letter, namely, that he continues to support the good offices mission of the Secretary- General. On this, he and Mr. Papadopoulos appear to be in agreement. However, Mr. Denktash, without accepting the Secretary-Generals plan as the basis for a further negotiating process.”
2003-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4738 (2003) · source
“The onus is on the parties and the motherlands to demonstrate the political will to solve the problem on the basis of his plan, in the manner which the Secretary-General has suggested. Since the events described in this report, Mr. Denktash has written to Mr. Papadopoulos proposing that they meet to discuss a range of confidence- building measures. Mr. Denktash's letter is in the public domain. He was motivated to do this, according to his letter, in order to address the deep crisis of confidence which he believes exists between the two sides and which, in his view, was a major cause of the stalemate at The Hague. Mr. Papadopoulos responded that, in his view, the stalemate was caused not by a crisis of confidence, but by Mr. Denktash and Turkey's not accepting the Secretary-General's plan as the basis for negotiating a final settlement.”
2003-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4738 (2003) · source
“Looking to the future, as his report outlines, the Secretary-General does not intend to take a new initiative unless and until such time as he has solid reason to believe that the political will necessary for a successful outcome exists. This would come about if there was an unequivocally stated preparedness on the part of the leaders of both sides, fully and determinedly backed at the highest political level in both motherlands, to commit to finalizing the plan, without reopening its basic principles or key trade-offs, by a specific date, with United Nations assistance; and to putting it to separate simultaneous referendums, as provided for in the plan, on a certain date soon thereafter.”
2003-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4738 (2003) · source
“The hope must be that, in time, the Turkish Cypriot side will come around to the same position that Mr. Papadopoulos took in The Hague. In the Secretary-General's view, the point had been reached where the leaders on each side should accept that the plan could not be significantly improved by further negotiation and, therefore, that they should be prepared to finalize it and put it to referendum. This is what the Secretary-General said to the leaders when he was in Cyprus on 27 February. Without that honest intellectual realization on the part of both sides, and without the leaders' being prepared to explain this to their people, it is difficult to see a settlement being achieved.”
2003-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4738 (2003) · source
“In the coming period, after the signature of the European Union accession treaty on 16 April, through the entry into force of that treaty on 1 May 2004 and in the run- up to the European Council of December 2004 - at which a decision is to be taken on accession talks with Turkey - the overwhelming need is for the parties to hew closely to the plan. To reopen its basic principles or key trade-offs would be to put the entire enterprise at peril. That is why Mr. Denktash's suggestion at The Hague that the parties should return to a discussion of principles did not, in the Secretary-General's view, give any hope that an agreement could be achieved, and equally why Mr. Papadopoulos's preparedness not to reopen the substantive parts of the plan, if Mr. Denktash responded in the same manner, was welcome.”
2003-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4738 (2003) · source
“It is based on a three-and-a- half-year process of unprecedented intensity and stands on the shoulders of four decades of United Nations peacemaking efforts in Cyprus. I urge members of the Council not to underestimate what an extraordinarily difficult task it is to achieve an overall balance on the range of issues that must be settled. Every word of the plan was worked on many times, carefully calibrated and weighed in the overall balance. One Turkish columnist wrote that the plan is like an Alexander Calder mobile. All aspects are interconnected. If any significant piece is removed and the balance is altered, it could fall to the ground. That is why the Secretary-General, in his report, speaks of the need in a future negotiation not to reopen the basic principles or key trade-offs in the plan.”
2003-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4738 (2003) · source
“If the failure of this effort tells us anything, it confirms something that all of us already knew: this is one of the most difficult diplomatic problems in the world. That is why the Secretary-General believes that it would be a great step backward if the plan were simply allowed to wither away. Of course, like all human endeavours, the plan presented by the Secretary-General, as revised finally on 26 February, is not perfect. No doubt, one can have different views about it, particularly in the details. But the plan represents the best effort of the United Nations to generate a balanced and truly comprehensive proposal that resolves all issues, leaves little to be negotiated and, above all, represents a fair and honourable settlement that meets the core interests and aspirations of both sides.”
2003-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4738 (2003) · source
“It seems attributable to failings of political will rather than to the absence of favourable circumstances. Obviously, towards the end of the process, when decisions had to be made, the crisis in Iraq loomed large and made it difficult, particularly for Turkey, to take bold decisions and bring the necessary influence to bear in order to achieve a settlement. Be that as it may, a unique opportunity has been missed, and the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots have been denied the opportunity to vote to reunite Cyprus. This the Secretary-General deeply regrets. The immediate losers are the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, but the Greek Cypriots and Greece are also losers; this is truly a lose-lose outcome. The Secretary- General's views as to why this opportunity was missed are contained in his report, so I will not dwell on them.”
2003-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4738 (2003) · source
“(spoke in English) The Cyprus problem is the oldest item continually on the Secretary-General's peacemaking agenda. It is difficult to see a set of circumstances for achieving a settlement as propitious as that which prevailed in the last three and a half years. In terms of the wider political environment in the region, all the conditions were in place. In addition, the Secretary-General himself was deeply and heavily involved in the effort, throwing his full backing behind it. The Council strongly supported him every step of the way. And, I believe, a fair and honourable package, comprehensive in approach and only needing technical finalization, was on the table. The fact that a solution has not been achieved in those circumstances is therefore deeply disappointing.”
2003-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4738 (2003) · source
“As you, Mr. President, have just said, the Security Council has before it the report of the Secretary-General (S/2003/398) on his efforts between late 1999 and ll March 2003 to assist the two sides in Cyprus to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. This is the first written report on the Secretary- General's mission of good offices since June 1999. It covers a long period of negotiations. It describes the Secretary-General's thinking underlying his comprehensive proposals. It makes a good number of observations on the process and on the way ahead. That explains its length. In a way, the report speaks for itself, and I only wish to add a few comments, for which, with your blessing, Mr. President, I will switch to the language of the Cyprus problem.”
2003-04-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4738 (2003) · source