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DeLaurentis

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961
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2007-11-28
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2023-10-02
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un-security-council

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  1. We extend particular thanks to the leadership of the Caribbean Community and countries such as Jamaica, the Bahamas, Barbados and Antigua and Barbuda, which have all publicly pledged personnel to the Mission and more, as in the case of Kenya. Today’s resolution under Chapter VII is a legal requirement for many of those countries and others that are willing to contribute and participate. As President Biden said in his address to the General Assembly last month, “The people of Haiti cannot wait much longer”. With the adoption of this resolution, we can collaborate to realize that vision as we work to help the Haitian people in their time of dire need.

    2023-10-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9430 (2023) · source

  2. The Mission will give the Haitian National Police additional support to secure Haiti’s streets, but it is only one part of the larger effort to address the multidimensional crisis in the country, including acute food insecurity as well as other humanitarian, economic and political challenges. As part of that effort, the Mission will coordinate closely with the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti and relevant United Nations agencies. The Mission is an example of multinational action to address this grave security crisis. It is designed to be truly multinational in its resourcing and nature and requires a collective effort if it is going to succeed. The response from the region and much of the world has been united and strong.

    2023-10-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9430 (2023) · source

  3. The resolution makes clear that the Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti will operate in strict compliance with international law and include dedicated expertise in anti-gang operations, community-oriented policing, children and women’s protection and preventing and responding to sexual and gender-based violence. The Mission must take necessary action to ensure appropriate conduct and discipline and to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse. It was a year ago that the Secretary-General called on the international community to send a mission to Haiti. It took us one full year to get to where we are now. But let us be clear: our work is far from finished. Our focus now turns to making the Mission operational and successful in restoring the security conditions the Haitian people have called for.

    2023-10-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9430 (2023) · source

  4. With participation from countries all over the world, and with many thanks to Kenya for positively considering leading the Mission, the international community can now move forward with the Multinational Security Support Mission for Haiti. This Mission comes at the request of the Haitian Government and Haitian civil society to address the insecurity and dire humanitarian crisis the country has faced for far too long. The deployment of the Mission will help to support Haiti’s critical near-term needs and to foster the security conditions necessary for the country to advance long-term stability. Importantly, the resolution recognizes the need to learn lessons from past missions and calls for safeguards to promote respect for human rights and accountability.

    2023-10-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9430 (2023) · source

  5. Today Security Council made history in authorizing the Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti. We have stepped up to create a new way of preserving global peace and security, answering the repeated calls of a Member State facing a multidimensional crisis amid alarming, spiralling gang violence. I would like to acknowledge the presence of Haitian Foreign Minister Généus, who joins us today, and to thank Haiti for its partnership. And I welcome the participation of the representatives of Jamaica, Guyana and Kenya in today’s meeting. I would also like to thank Ecuador as the co-penholder for its tireless work on resolution 2699 (2023).

    2023-10-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9430 (2023) · source

  6. We look forward to the opportunity to support UNITAD’s important work with the Government of Iraq as both Iraq and the international community bring Da’esh perpetrators of violence and genocide to justice.

    2023-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9419 (2023) · source

  7. UNITAD has already assisted 21 investigations in the United States, helped lead to successful convictions in Sweden and Portugal and facilitated the first-ever conviction in Germany of a Da’esh member for an international crime — genocide against Yazidis in 2021. We urge the Government of Iraq and the United Nations to protect that essential cooperation and quickly to develop modalities for continued sharing of information in according with this resolution. It is clear that UNITAD’s work is not done. I would like to emphasize that this resolution should not be understood to predetermine future action with regard to any future renewal of UNITAD’s mandate. We will be ready to continue the work beyond the upcoming year, should the demand remain.

    2023-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9419 (2023) · source

  8. To that end, information-sharing with third States for those investigations in accordance with the terms of reference agreed between UNITAD and the Government of Iraq is one of the most important outcomes of cooperation to date. That cooperation has been absolutely essential in the efforts of United Nations States Members to hold foreign terrorist fighters accountable in their countries of origin and to repatriate them from detention centres of concern. To date, 18 Member States have requested that UNITAD share evidence to support prosecutions over 300 alleged Da’esh members and affiliates.

    2023-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9419 (2023) · source

  9. That is why the Security Council heeded Iraq’s own request in 2017 to partner with the United Nations to establish UNITAD. The United States has consistently supported this effort, and we will continue to do so. United States support has helped UNITAD and the Government of Iraq lay the foundation for future prosecutions based on comprehensive evidence, including advanced forensics and battlefield evidence in some of the world’s toughest locations. Indeed, UNITAD is an essential component of the international community’s broader effort to ensure that Da’esh members and their affiliates are held accountable for their crimes, wherever they reside. Our support for UNITAD is support for the idea that international crimes should be investigated and prosecuted in accordance with established legal standards.

    2023-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9419 (2023) · source

  10. The United States welcomes the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD) for another year. I would like specifically to thank the United Kingdom for its tireless efforts to achieve Security Council consensus on resolution 2697 (2023). We also thank the Government of Iraq for its commitment to UNITAD’s important mission and for working with the Council to continue that important work for another year. Finally, we would like to thank Special Adviser Ritscher and his staff for their efforts to carry out UNITAD’s mandate. While we have made great strides, the fight against Da’esh will not be complete until perpetrators of atrocities are held accountable.

    2023-09-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9419 (2023) · source

  11. The draft resolution received 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 2694 (2023). I now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements after the vote.

    2023-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9391 (2023) · source

  12. The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. Members of the Council have before them document S/2023/571, which contains the text of a draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now. A vote was taken by show of hands. In favour: Albania, Brazil, China, Ecuador, France, Gabon, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Russian Federation, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

    2023-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9391 (2023) · source

  13. I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to Her Excellency Dame Barbara Woodward, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for her service as President of the Council for the month of July. I am sure I speak for all members of the Council in expressing deep appreciation to Ambassador Woodward and her team for the great diplomatic skill with which they conducted the Council’s business last month. Adoption of the agenda The agenda was adopted. Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/53)

    2023-08-02 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9391 (2023) · source

  14. We must also work together to ensure that AI and other emerging technologies are not used primarily as weapons or tools of oppression but rather as tools to enhance human dignity and help us achieve our highest aspirations, including for a more secure and peaceful world. The United States looks forward to working with all relevant parties to ensure that the responsible development and use of trustworthy AI systems serves the global good.

    2023-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9381 (2023) · source

  15. We encourage all Member States to endorse the proposed declaration. Here at the United Nations, we welcome efforts to develop and apply AI tools that improve our joint efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance, provide early warnings of issues as diverse as climate change and conflict and further other shared goals. The International Telecommunication Union’s recent Artificial Intelligence for Good Global Summit represents one step in that direction. Within the Security Council, we welcome continued discussions on how to manage technological advances, including when and how to take action to address Governments’ or non-State actors’ misuse of AI technologies to undermine international peace and security.

    2023-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9381 (2023) · source

  16. We are now working with a broad group of stakeholders to identify and address AI- related human rights risks that threaten to undermine peace and security. No Member State should use AI to censor, constrain, repress or disempower people. The military use of AI can and should be ethical and responsible and enhance international security. Earlier this year, the United States released a proposed political declaration on the responsible military use of AI and autonomy, which elaborates principles on how to develop and use AI in the military domain in compliance with applicable international law. The proposed declaration emphasizes that the military use of AI capabilities must be accountable to a human chain of command and that States should take steps to minimize unintended bias and accidents.

    2023-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9381 (2023) · source

  17. On 4 May, President Biden met with leading AI companies to underscore the fundamental responsibility we all have to ensure that AI systems are safe and trustworthy. Those efforts build on the work of the United States National Institute of Standards and Technology, which recently released an AI framework providing organizations with a voluntary set of guidelines for managing risks from AI systems. Through the White House’s October 2022 blueprint for an AI bill of rights, we are also identifying principles to guide the design, use and deployment of automated systems so that rights, opportunities and access related to critical resources and services are enjoyed equally and are fully protected.

    2023-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9381 (2023) · source

  18. We therefore welcome this discussion with a view to understanding how the Council can find the right balance between maximizing AI’s benefits while mitigating its risks. The Council already has experience in addressing dual-use capabilities and integrating transformative technologies into our efforts to maintain international peace and security. As those experiences have taught us, success comes from working with a range of actors, including Member States, technology companies and civil-society activists, through the Security Council and other United Nations bodies and in both formal and informal settings. The United States is committed to doing just that and has already begun such efforts at home.

    2023-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9381 (2023) · source

  19. I thank the United Kingdom for convening this discussion, and I also thank the Secretary-General, Mr. Clark and Mr. Yi Zeng for their valuable insights. Artificial intelligence (AI) offers incredible promise for addressing global challenges such as those related to food security, education and medicine. Automated systems are already helping us to grow food more efficiently, predict the paths of storms and identify diseases in patients. Used appropriately, AI can therefore accelerate our progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. However, it also has the potential to compound threats and intensify conflicts, including by spreading misinformation and disinformation, amplifying bias and inequality, enhancing malicious cyberoperations and exacerbating human rights abuses.

    2023-07-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9381 (2023) · source

  20. We call on all Council members today to join us in denouncing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s unlawful behaviour and fully implementing all Security Council resolutions in order to curb the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s generation of revenue for its WMD and ballistic-missile programmes. We hope that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s direct participation today demonstrates that it is ready to engage in meaningful diplomacy without preconditions. But if not, the Council should unite, as we did in 2017. Let us return to the era when we used our collective voice to address nuclear proliferation as a threat to international peace and security.

    2023-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9376 (2023) · source

  21. We have made it clear that we have no preconditions for engagement and that we are prepared to discuss any topic of concern to Pyongyang. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has not responded to our offers. That status quo is untenable. I do not want us to be back here next month for another briefing in response to a ballistic-missile launch or nuclear test by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, but I fear that if the Council continues to remain silent, that is very likely where we will be. In 2017 the Council’s unity stopped the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from launching another ICBM for five years, and that is what we should aim for again.

    2023-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9376 (2023) · source

  22. With its repeated launches, Pyongyang is demonstrating that it feels emboldened, perhaps even encouraged, to continue in this manner because China and Russia have consistently prevented the Council from taking action to halt those transgressions. None of that should be acceptable. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea dismisses the Council, threatens its neighbours and refuses the humanitarian assistance offered to its people. Those are not the actions of a responsible Member State, and the United States will not allow the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and its defenders to make a mockery of the Council. I want to reiterate that the United States remains committed to diplomacy. Publicly and privately and at senior levels, we have repeatedly urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to engage in dialogue.

    2023-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9376 (2023) · source

  23. The sheer number of those ballistic- missile launches over the past year and a half should not erode our capacity to meaningfully respond to nuclear proliferation. In fact, it should strengthen the Council’s resolve to reject the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s attempts to expand its WMD and ballistic- missile programmes. Countering nuclear proliferation should be an issue that unites us. It certainly was in 2017, when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea last joined us for a meeting (see S/PV.8137). However, two Council members now appear to disagree. Russia and China have prevented the Council from speaking with one voice.

    2023-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9376 (2023) · source

  24. They have raised tensions in North-East Asia and beyond and they are designed to help refine and further develop the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic- missile programmes. Let us be clear about what that is — 20 tests of nuclear-weapon delivery systems. That launch follows a series of threatening statements from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including the most recent ones from Pyongyang against United States aircraft operating in international airspace. But as I said before, that is unfortunately unsurprising. As Council members, we all have a mandate and responsibility to confront the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s unlawful and unjustifiable development of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

    2023-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9376 (2023) · source

  25. I thank Assistant Secretary-General Khiari for his briefing. The United States condemns in the strongest possible terms the 12 July intercontinental ballistic-missile (ICBM) launch by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It is alarming, if hardly surprising, that we find ourselves back in the Security Council responding to yet another unlawful intercontinental ballistic-missile launch by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It is alarming because the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has already launched 20 ballistic missiles in 2023, including four ICBMs. The launches are violations of multiple Security Council resolutions.

    2023-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9376 (2023) · source

  26. The international community maintains an unrelenting commitment to individual criminal accountability and will not rest until those who stand accused of committing atrocities face justice. We urge all States to cooperate with the ICC in the Darfur situation and to deliver the justice promised to the people of Darfur. We urge all nations to join us in supporting efforts to hold accountable those responsible for past and present atrocities in Darfur and in standing with the people of the Sudan in their quest for peace.

    2023-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9375 (2023) · source

  27. Ali Kushayb, despite many challenges, and we acknowledge the courage of the witnesses and victims who have come forward. We also support efforts to bring to justice the four other current suspects with outstanding warrants in the Darfur situation: former President Omar Al-Bashir, former Minister Ahmed Harun, former Minister Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein and Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain. It is critical that the present whereabouts of these individuals be determined so that they can face the serious charges against them. Let this be a warning to these and other fugitives, as well as to all others who would consider committing war crimes and other atrocities, including those involving acts of sexual violence, in the Sudan and elsewhere.

    2023-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9375 (2023) · source

  28. The Sudan’s failure to follow through on its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and its obligations to cooperate with the ICC over the past two decades under Security Council resolution 1593 (2005) reveals a disturbing pattern of disregard for international legal obligations, the rule of law and human life. We therefore welcome the Prosecutor’s announcement that alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the current fighting may be subject to ICC investigation and prosecution and that his Office has commenced focused investigations on recent events. We commend the efficient progress that has been made over the past six months in the trial of former Janjaweed commander Mr. Abd-Al-Rahman, also known as Mr.

    2023-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9375 (2023) · source

  29. As we have said before, the fighting must stop immediately and, with it, the unconscionable killing of civilians. We condemn the atrocities committed by both parties throughout the country in the strongest terms. We call on the leadership on both sides to immediately stop the violence, enable the provision of humanitarian aid, medical care and appropriate services to survivors, and submit to a genuine process of dispute resolution. There is no acceptable military solution to this conflict. We concur with Prosecutor Khan’s conclusion that the violence is the product of years of impunity, including the failure to hold those responsible for the most egregious crimes accountable and the failure to provide justice to the people of Darfur.

    2023-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9375 (2023) · source

  30. I thank Prosecutor Khan for his report and his briefing today on the ongoing investigations and prosecutions of the International Criminal Court (ICC) concerning the situation in Darfur. We appreciate the unwavering commitment of the Court’s judges, attorneys and staff to the pursuit of justice for the people of Darfur. The situation in Darfur is deeply disturbing. We hear credible reports of mass violence by the Rapid Support Forces and allied forces, including horrific forms of sexual violence, killings based on ethnicity and attacks that target civilians. That such violence is being perpetrated against the people of Darfur, who have already experienced the genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes that prompted the ICC’s investigation in the first place, is particularly devastating.

    2023-07-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9375 (2023) · source

  31. We note that the Colombian Government suspended the ceasefire with the Central General Staff of the FARC-EP in four departments in May, following the killing of four indigenous miners. For the Security Council to consider expanding the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, negotiations must progress; ceasefires must be respected; protocols must be fully developed, financed and adhered to; and these groups must halt all criminal and terrorist activities, in particular those impacting civilian populations. Very careful consideration must be taken. The United States remain supportive of efforts to help Colombia achieve a real and lasting peace and a demonstrable reduction in violence from illegal armed groups.

    2023-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9374 (2023) · source

  32. The United States continues to closely monitor the Colombian Government’s efforts to expand its total peace plan through negotiations with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the dissident groups of the former Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP). We are encouraged that the ELN agreed to a six-month ceasefire, although steps must be taken to outline the protocols to ensure that the ceasefire takes place in August, as intended. We make special mention that the ELN must halt all acts of violence, extortion, kidnapping and forced recruitment for that ceasefire to result in a genuine improvement to citizen security in Colombia.

    2023-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9374 (2023) · source

  33. Making full use of the High-Level Forum of Ethnic Peoples is essential to ensuring that implementation is shaped by the views and priorities of indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. As the latest report from the Secretary- General’s notes, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP) is making clear, through its decisions, that a commitment to upholding victims’ rights is the only way forward. The United States welcomes further cooperation between the SJP and the Government and looks forward to the first restorative sentences that will bring justice to the victims.

    2023-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9374 (2023) · source

  34. The United States is committed to supporting Colombia as it seeks to deepen the implementation of the 2016 peace accord. The United States remains the top international donor to the 2016 peace accord, dedicating over $1.5 billion towards its implementation since 2017. As the first international accompanier to the ethnic chapter of the 2016 peace accord, the United States demonstrated its desire to help Colombia address inequality and political and socioeconomic exclusion, issues that have disproportionately affected indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities. Making tangible progress on those issues is essential for a durable peace. The United States joins the Secretary-General in urging the Government to redouble efforts to address historic exclusion and inequality.

    2023-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9374 (2023) · source

  35. I thank Special Representative of the Secretary- General Carlos Ruiz Massieu for his briefing and his presentation of the Secretary-General’s report (S/2023/477). We appreciate the vital role that the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia continues to play in supporting peace in Colombia. I would also like to thank Ms. Diana María Salcedo López for sharing her perspective — not only as a representative of civil society, but more importantly, for amplifying the cross- cutting role that women’s rights must continue to have in the implementation of the 2016 Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace. That perspective is necessary and invaluable. I also welcome the participation today of Colombian Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva Durán in today’s briefing.

    2023-07-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9374 (2023) · source

  36. Russia’s agenda here is simple: it is to overwhelm the Council with meetings on the Nord Stream pipeline issue, undermine ongoing investigations and distract from its ceaseless attacks against Ukraine’s power stations, hospitals, schools and apartment buildings. Ongoing national investigations must be allowed the space to carry out their work. The Council should reject repeated meetings with no purpose other than to waste time, spread disinformation and distract from the Kremlin’s indefensible war of aggression against Ukraine.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9373 (2023) · source

  37. Russia also claims to want an impartial investigation, as long as that investigation upholds Russia’s spurious accusations that the United States was behind the attacks. We again categorically refute any allegations that the United States bears any culpability for those attacks. As Russia continues its theatrical hand-wringing and selective concern regarding the protection of critical infrastructure, it is razing entire cities with relentless attacks against Ukraine. It is importing unmanned aerial vehicles from Iran in flagrant violation of resolution 2231 (2015) and deploying them in attacks that kill civilians in Ukraine.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9373 (2023) · source

  38. Russia’s unabating, unsubstantiated so-called concerns about the transparency and impartiality of those investigations ring as hollow as its assertions that it had no relationship with the Wagner Group and had no plans to invade Ukraine. The countries directly involved should be permitted to conclude their investigations without undue pressure and specious allegations. Russia cannot and should not be allowed to prejudge or prejudice the results of those investigations prior to their conclusion. The hypocrisy is on full display. Russia claims to respect sovereignty and territorial integrity while invading its sovereign neighbour and attempting to annex its territory. Russia now disregards the jurisdiction of competent national authorities carrying out and concluding investigations within their exclusive economic zones.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9373 (2023) · source

  39. As others have noted, this is the third time in less than a month that Russia has called for the Council to discuss the Nord Stream pipeline issue. Russia’s efforts to try to use the Council as a platform for its disinformation are as cynical as they are transparent. Bludgeoning the Council with repetitive meetings will not change the facts on the ground. As we have emphasized many times, we do not condone that attack on critical infrastructure. We remain confident in the ongoing, competent and credible investigations under way by Germany, Sweden and Denmark. We thank those countries for their commitment to diligent and impartial investigations into the attack, and for their recent letter on the topic to the Council (S/2023/517).

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9373 (2023) · source

  40. The United States will continue to demand accountability for chemical-weapons attacks and are even now pursuing investigations and prosecutions of crimes involving chemical weapons. We ask the Members of the Council to join us in such efforts. The stakes are far too dire for us to do less.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  41. We support the work of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011, and other entities collecting information and evidence that may assist investigations and prosecutions of members of the Al-Assad regime and of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham who were responsible for chemical-weapons attacks in Syria. We also support the efforts of third countries exercising jurisdiction over international crimes committed by former Al-Assad regime officials and Da’esh members.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  42. This issue will continue to demand our attention at the OPCW and in the Security Council until Syria fully declares its chemical-weapons programme and completely and verifiably destroys its stockpiles and production facilities and until there is accountability for the use of chemical weapons in Syria and justice for the victims of those attacks. Anything less than serious full compliance is a threat to the global norm against chemical-weapons use and against the very purpose of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  43. While the Al-Assad regime and its enablers sought to ignore or undermine the legitimacy of the OPCW’s efforts on Syria, including the work of its Declaration Assessment Team, Fact-Finding Mission and Investigation and Identification Team, we worked with a broad coalition of partners during the Review Conference to stand firm in refusing to accept anything that would undermine those efforts. And indeed, the critical work of the OPCW on this file will continue. It remains quite clear, including through the proceedings of the Review Conference, that the Al-Assad regime and its enablers are on the wrong side of history and will be judged accordingly.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  44. It blatantly disregards its obligations under resolution 2118 (2013) and remains in violation of the Convention. The United States condemns in the strongest terms the Syrian regime’s repeated use of these horrific weapons, as documented, most recently, in the OPCW’s 27 January 2023 report, which attributed the use of chemical weapons to the Al-Assad regime during the 7 April 2018 attack on Douma. Syria may wish to delay and obstruct efforts to address its non-compliance and avoid accountability in hopes that it can do so long enough that the international community will lose interest. But we are committed to working with our partners to make sure this does not happen. We were successful in this effort at the recently concluded fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, in The Hague.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  45. I thank Mr. Ebo for his briefing this morning and for the continuing efforts of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on this important issue. As we meet again to discuss serious, numerous brazen violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Security Council resolutions, we are reminded of the many lives the Al-Assad regime has taken through its chemical-weapons attacks, which have been well documented in the OPCW’s reports, and we are reminded of the sheer length of time we have worked to address this issue and seek accountability. We are approaching the 10-year mark since Syria acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, yet Syria continues to hide details of its chemical-weapons programme.

    2023-07-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9372 (2023) · source

  46. Together with our co-penholder, Ecuador, we are addressing ways to strengthen BINUH’s capacities as the Security Council discusses its mandate renewal.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9368 (2023) · source

  47. The Haitian Government and its people have asked for international support — for our help. The United States continues to work with a growing number of international partners to support the urgent security needs in Haiti. For those reasons and, as Secretary- General Guterres requested most recently during his trip to Haiti on 1 July and reiterated today, the United States supports the deployment of a multinational force to Haiti in order to help its police restore security. I will close by reiterating the important work of the special political mission, under the leadership of Special Representative Salvador. The support of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) for the national political forum, recruitment support to the HNP and legal assistance to judicial authorities are examples of its invaluable work.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9368 (2023) · source

  48. The United States determination to address firearms trafficking led to the creation of a new position in our Department of Justice — Coordinator for Caribbean Firearms Prosecutions — which will maximize information-sharing among countries in the region in order to support the prosecution of traffickers. The United States also stood up a Haiti transnational criminal investigative unit in collaboration with the Haitian National Police in order to facilitate investigation and prosecution of crimes with the United States nexus, particularly firearms and human trafficking. The Security Council will also need to do its part in assisting Haiti, including by advancing additional sanctions against those who finance and foment violence and instability in the country.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9368 (2023) · source

  49. The United States has provided more than $110 million in humanitarian aid for Haiti this year, and we continue to work closely with partner organizations to meet urgent needs. However, without improved security, the humanitarian situation in Haiti will continue to deteriorate. The illicit flow of firearms enables gangs to carry out their crimes and to stockpile weapons that can surpass the firepower of the Haitian National Police (HNP). We also know that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons can be linked to conflict-related sexual violence.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9368 (2023) · source

  50. As we also heard today, conflict-related sexual violence in Haiti continues to fuel further violence, induces displacement and often occurs alongside other abuses against civilians. Survivors lack access to support services and risk reprisals for reporting abuses. The rampant gang violence has also reduced access to livelihoods and health-care services, kept children out of school and created a food security emergency. We welcome the recent visits to Haiti — not only by Secretary-General Guterres, but also by World Food Programme Executive Director Cindy McCain, UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell and the new Independent Expert on Human Rights in Haiti, William O’Neill, which have brought much needed attention to the worsening humanitarian crisis.

    2023-07-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9368 (2023) · source