YouSaid · the spoken record

Elbaradei

lines on the record: 65
first: 2003-01-27
most recent: 2009-09-24
sittings or episodes: 4
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“By demonstrating their irreversible commitment to achieving a world free from nuclear weapons, the weapon States can greatly contribute to the legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime and gain the moral authority to call on the rest of the world to curb the proliferation of these inhumane weapons. To turn the ideas discussed today into action will require an environment of mutual trust, which I hope this summit will help to create.”
2009-09-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6191 (2009) · source
“This should include giving the Agency the additional authority it may need to deal with specific cases. A sixth issue is that the Security Council must put more emphasis on addressing the insecurities that lie behind many cases of proliferation, such as endemic conflicts, security imbalances and lack of trust. Finally, I am grateful to see nuclear disarmament back at the top of the international agenda. I would like to express my gratitude to the "four horsemen" - George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn and William Perry - for their pioneering work, their statesmanship and their contribution to making this environment a reality. I am also grateful to see a recognition of the intrinsic link between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, an idea that you, Mr. President, have expressed quite often.”
2009-09-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6191 (2009) · source
“We need to intensify our efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear and radioactive material. The Council's initiative to secure such material within four years could not be more timely. A fourth issue is the need to strengthen the IAEA. I should emphasize that, at the current level of funding, the IAEA will not be able to fulfil its mission in nuclear verification and security. The Agency infrastructure is dilapidated, and we lack state-of-the- art technology key to modern-day verification. A fifth issue is that the IAEA cannot do its work in isolation. It depends on a supportive political process, with the Security Council at its core. The Council needs to develop a comprehensive compliance mechanism to address, in a consistent and systematic manner, cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations or of countries withdrawing from the NPT.”
2009-09-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6191 (2009) · source
“As a first step, I have proposed the establishment of a low enriched uranium bank to assure States a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel for their reactors so that they might not need their own enrichment or reprocessing capability. A number of complementary proposals have also been made in that regard. Our ultimate goal, however, should be the full multinationalization of the fuel cycle as we move towards nuclear disarmament. A third issue is providing the highest level of security for nuclear and radioactive material. In my view, the biggest risk the world faces today is that of extremists getting hold of such material. More than 200 incidents of illicit trafficking, losses or thefts were reported to the IAEA last year. And this might be only the tip of the iceberg.”
2009-09-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6191 (2009) · source
“That means we often cannot verify whether or not a country is engaged in clandestine nuclear activities. Furthermore, our verification mandate is centred on nuclear material. If the Agency is to be expected to pursue possible weaponization activities, it must be empowered with the corresponding legal authority. A second issue is the growing number of States that have mastered uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. Any one of these States could develop nuclear weapons in a very short span of time, if, for example, it decided to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). To address this, I believe that we need to move from national to multinational control of the nuclear fuel cycle.”
2009-09-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6191 (2009) · source
“Mr. ElBaradei: Mr. President, thank you for inviting me to address this timely, and I hope groundbreaking, summit. I would like to thank you, Sir, for taking this courageous initiative, an initiative that rekindles hope for a world at peace with itself and a security system that is balanced, equitable and humane. I will limit myself to a few key issues. First, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is fragile and has many shortcomings. The legal authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is severely limited in some countries because many States have not concluded the required agreements with the Agency. As a result, in over 90 States the Agency either has no verification authority at all or its authority is inadequate.”
2009-09-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6191 (2009) · source
“The detailed knowledge of Iraq's capabilities that IAEA experts have accumulated since 1991, combined with the extended rights provided by resolution 1441 (2002), the active commitment by all States to help us fulfil our mandate, and the recently increased level of Iraqi cooperation - should enable us in the near future to provide the Security Council with an objective and thorough assessment of Iraq's nuclear-related capabilities. However credible this assessment may be, we will endeavour - in View of the inherent uncertainties associated with any verification process, and particularly in the light of Iraq's past record of cooperation - to evaluate Iraq's capabilities on a continuous basis as part of our long-term monitoring and verification programme, in order to provide the international community with ongoing and real-time assurances.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“I should note that, in the past three weeks, possibly as a result of ever-increasing pressure by the international community, Iraq has been forthcoming in its cooperation, particularly with regard to the conduct of private interviews and in making available evidence that could contribute to the resolution of matters of IAEA concern. I hope that Iraq will continue to expand the scope and accelerate the pace of its cooperation.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“As I stated earlier, the IAEA will naturally continue further to scrutinize and investigate all of these issues. After three months of intrusive inspections, we have to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear-weapon programme in Iraq. We intend to continue our inspection activities, making use of all the additional rights granted to us by resolution 1441 (2002) and all additional tools that might be available to us, including reconnaissance platforms and all relevant technologies. We also hope to continue to receive from States actionable information relevant to our mandate.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“First, there is no indication of resumed nuclear activities in those buildings that were identified through the use of satellite imagery as having been reconstructed or newly erected since 1998, nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities at any inspected sites. Secondly, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import uranium since 1990. Thirdly, there is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminium tubes for use in centrifuge enrichment. Moreover, even if Iraq had pursued such a plan, it would have encountered practical difficulties in manufacturing centrifuges out of the aluminium tubes in question. Fourthly, although we are still reviewing issues related to magnets and magnet production, there is no indication to date that Iraq imported magnets for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“In conclusion, I am able to report today that, in the area of nuclear weapons - the most lethal weapons of mass destruction - inspections in Iraq are moving forward. Since the resumption of inspections a little over three months ago - and particularly during the three weeks since my last oral report to the Council - the IAEA has made important progress in identifying what nuclear-related capabilities remain in Iraq, and in its assessment of whether Iraq has made any efforts to revive its past nuclear programme during the intervening four years since inspections were brought to a halt. At this stage, the following can be stated.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Many concerns regarding Iraq's possible intention to resume its nuclear programme have arisen from Iraqi procurement efforts reported by a number of States. In addition, many of Iraq's efforts to procure commodities and products, including magnets and aluminium tubes, have been conducted in contravention of the sanctions controls specified under Security Council resolution 661 (1990) and other relevant resolutions. The issue of procurement efforts remains under thorough investigation, and further verification will be forthcoming. In fact, an IAEA team of technical experts is currently in Iraq. It is composed of customs investigators and computer forensic specialists, and it is conducting a series of investigations, through inspections at trading companies and commercial organizations, aimed at understanding Iraq's patterns of procurement.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“The IAEA was able to review correspondence coming from various bodies of the Government of the Niger, and to compare the form, format, contents and signatures of that correspondence with those of the alleged procurement-related documentation. Based on a thorough analysis, the IAEA has concluded, with the concurrence of outside experts, that these documents - which formed the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions between Iraq and the Niger - are, in fact, not authentic. We have therefore concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded. However, we will continue to follow up any additional evidence, if it emerges, relevant to efforts by Iraq illicitly to import nuclear materials.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“With regard to uranium acquisition, the IAEA has made progress in its investigation into reports that Iraq sought to buy uranium from the Niger in recent years. The investigation was centred on documents provided by a number of States that pointed to an agreement between the Niger and Iraq for the sale of uranium between 1999 and 2001. The IAEA has discussed these reports with the Governments of Iraq and of the Niger, both of which have denied that any such activity took place. For its part, Iraq has provided the IAEA with a comprehensive explanation of its relations with the Niger, and has described a visit by an Iraqi official to a number of African countries, including the Niger, in February 1999, which Iraq thought might have given rise to the reports.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“In June 2001, Iraq signed a contract for a new magnet production line, for delivery and installation in 2003. The delivery has not yet occurred, and Iraqi documentation and interviews of Iraqi personnel indicate that this contract will not be executed. However, they have concluded that the replacement of foreign procurement with domestic magnet production seems reasonable from an economic point of view. In addition, the training and experience acquired by Iraq in the pre-l99l period makes it likely that Iraq possesses the expertise to manufacture high-strength permanent magnets suitable for use in enrichment centrifuges. The IAEA will therefore continue to monitor and inspect equipment and materials that could be used to make magnets for enrichment centrifuges.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“With respect to reports about Iraq's efforts to import high-strength permanent magnets - or to achieve the capability for producing such magnets - for use in a centrifuge enrichment programme, I should note that, since 1998, Iraq has purchased high-strength magnets for various uses. Iraq has declared inventories of magnets of 12 different designs. The IAEA has verified that previously acquired magnets have been used for missile guidance systems, industrial machinery, electricity meters and field telephones. Through visits to research and production sites, reviews of engineering drawings and analyses of sample magnets, IAEA experts familiar with the use of such magnets in centrifuge enrichment have verified that none of the magnets that Iraq has declared could be used directly for centrifuge magnetic bearings.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“The project languished for long periods during that time and became the subject of several committees, which resulted in specification and tolerance changes on each occasion. Based on available evidence, the IAEA team has concluded that Iraq's efforts to import those aluminium tubes were not likely to have been related to the manufacture of centrifuges and, moreover, that it was highly unlikely that Iraq could have achieved the considerable re-design needed to use them in a revived centrifuge programme. However, this issue will continue to be scrutinized and investigated.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“A thorough analysis of that information, together with information gathered from interviews with Iraqi personnel, has allowed the IAEA to develop a coherent picture of attempted purchases and intended usage of the 81mm aluminium tubes, as well as the rationale behind the changes in the tolerances. Drawing on that information, the IAEA has learned that the original tolerances for the 81mm tubes were set prior to 1987, and were based on physical measurements taken from a small number of imported rockets in Iraq's possession. Initial attempts to reverse- engineer the rockets met with little success. Tolerances were adjusted during the following years as part of ongoing efforts to revitalize the project and improve operational efficiency.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“With regard to aluminium tubes, the IAEA has conducted a thorough investigation of Iraq's attempts to purchase large quantities of high-strength aluminium tubes. As previously reported, Iraq has maintained that those aluminium tubes were sought for rocket production. Extensive field investigation and document analysis have failed to uncover any evidence that Iraq intended to use those 81mm tubes for any project other than the reverse-engineering of rockets. The Iraqi decision-making process with regard to the design of those rockets was well documented. Iraq has provided copies of design documents, procurement records, minutes of committee meetings and supporting data and samples.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“In the last few weeks Iraq has provided a considerable volume of documentation relevant to the issues I reported earlier as being of particular concern, including Iraq's efforts to procure aluminium tubes, its attempted procurement of magnets and magnet- production capabilities and its reported attempt to import uranium. I will touch briefly upon the progress made on each of those issues. Since my last update to the Council, the primary technical focus of IAEA field activities in Iraq has been on resolving several outstanding issues related to the possible resumption of efforts by Iraq to enrich uranium through the use of centrifuges. For that purpose, the IAEA assembled a specially qualified team of international centrifuge-manufacturing experts.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Recently, upon our insistence, individuals have been consenting to being interviewed without escorts and without taped records. The IAEA has conducted two such private interviews in the last 10 days, and hopes that its ability to conduct private interviews will continue unhindered, including possibly interviews outside Iraq. I should add that we are looking into further refining the modalities for conducting interviews to ensure that they are conducted freely and to alleviate concerns that interviews are being listened to by other Iraqi parties. In our view, interviews outside Iraq may be the best way to ensure that interviews are free. We therefore intend to request such interviews shortly. We are also asking other States to enable us to conduct interviews with former Iraqi scientists that now reside in those States.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Interviews have continued with relevant Iraqi personnel, at times with individuals and groups in the workplace during the course of unannounced inspections, and on other occasions in pre-arranged meetings with key scientists and other specialists known to have been involved with Iraq's past nuclear programme. The IAEA has continued to conduct interviews, even when conditions were not in accordance with the IAEA's preferred modalities, with a View to gaining as much information as possible- information that could be cross-checked for validity with other sources and which could be helpful in our assessment of areas under investigation. As the Council may recall, when we first began to request private unescorted interviews, the Iraqi interviewees insisted on taping the interviews and on keeping the recorded tapes.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“In addition, IAEA experts have taken part in many joint inspections of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA. Technical support for nuclear inspections has continued to expand. The three operational air samplers have collected weekly air particulate samples from key locations in Iraq that are being sent to laboratories for analysis. Additional results of water, sediment, vegetation and material sample analyses have been received from the relevant laboratories. Our vehicle-borne radiation survey team has covered some 2,000 kilometres over the past three weeks. Survey access has been gained to over 75 facilities, including military garrisons and camps, weapons factories, truck parks, manufacturing facilities and residential areas.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“At the outset, let me state one general observation, namely, that during the past four years, at the majority of Iraqi sites, industrial capacity has deteriorated substantially due to the departure of the foreign support that was often present in the late 19805, the departure of large numbers of skilled Iraqi personnel in the past decade and the lack of consistent maintenance by Iraq of sophisticated equipment. At only a few inspected sites involved in industrial research, development and manufacturing have the facilities been improved and new personnel taken on. This overall deterioration in industrial capacity is of course of direct relevance to Iraq's capability for resuming a nuclear weapons programme. The IAEA has now conducted a total of 218 nuclear inspections at 141 sites, including 21 that had not been inspected before.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“Mr. ElBaradei: My report to the Council today is an update on the status of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) nuclear verification activities in Iraq pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) and other relevant resolutions. When I last reported to the Council, on 14 February, I explained that the Agency's inspection activities had moved well beyond the reconnaissance phase- that is, re-establishing our knowledge base regarding Iraq's nuclear capabilities- and into the investigative phase, which focuses on the central question before the IAEA relevant to disarmament: whether Iraq has revived, or attempted to revive, its defunct nuclear weapons programme over the last four years.”
2003-03-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4714 (2003) · source
“More importantly, it will enable us to reach the high degree of assurance required by the Security Council in the case of Iraq, in view of its past clandestine programmes for weapons of mass destruction and its past pattern of cooperation. It is my hope that the commitments made recently in Baghdad will continue to translate into concrete and sustained actions.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“To that end, we intend to make full use of the authority granted to us under all relevant Security Council resolutions to build as much capacity into the inspection process as necessary. In that context, I would underline the importance of information that States may be able to provide to help us in assessing the accuracy and completeness of the information provided by Iraq. IAEA's experience in nuclear verification shows that it is possible, particularly with an intrusive verification system, to assess the presence or absence of a nuclear weapons programme in a State even without the full cooperation of the inspected State. However, prompt, full and active cooperation by Iraq, as required under resolution 1441 (2002), will speed up the process.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“As I have reported on numerous occasions, by December 1998 IAEA concluded that it had neutralized Iraq's past nuclear programme and that therefore no unresolved disarmament issues remained at that time. Hence, our focus since the resumption of our inspections in Iraq two and a half months ago has been verifying whether Iraq revived its nuclear programme in the intervening years. We have to date found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities in Iraq. However, as I have just indicated, a number of issues are still under investigation and we are not yet in a position to reach a conclusion about them, although we are moving forward with regard to some of them.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“Now that Iraq has accepted the use of all of the platforms for aerial surveillance proposed by supporting States to the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and IAEA - including U-2s, Mirage IVs, Antonovs and drones - we plan to make use of them to support our inspection activities, in particular with a view to monitoring movements in and around sites to be inspected. The Government of Iraq reiterated last week its commitment to comply with its Security Council obligations and to provide full and active cooperation with the inspecting organizations. Subject to Iraq's making good on this commitment, the measures to which I have referred will contribute to the effectiveness of the inspection process.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“We intend to augment the number of customs and procurement experts for the monitoring of imports by Iraq. We will also intensify and expand the range of technical meetings and private interviews with Iraqi personnel, in accordance with our preferred modalities and locations, both inside and outside Iraq. In addition, we intend to expand our capabilities for near real-time monitoring of dual-use equipment and related activities and to implement several additional components of wide-area environmental monitoring aimed at identifying fingerprints left by nuclear material and nuclear-related activities. We hope to continue to receive from States actionable information relevant to our mandate.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“The resolution of this long-standing legal matter is, in my view, a step in the right direction if Iraq is to demonstrate its commitment to fulfilling its obligations under Security Council resolutions. In the coming weeks, IAEA will continue to expand its inspection capabilities in a number of ways, including its already extensive use of unannounced inspections at all relevant sites in Iraq. To strengthen and accelerate our ability to investigate matters of concern, and to reinstate and reinforce our ongoing monitoring and verification system, which came to a halt in 1998, we intend to increase the number of inspectors and support staff. We will also be adding more analysts and translators to support analysis of documents and other inspection findings.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“Last week, Iraq also provided IAEA with documentation related to questions and concerns that, since 1998, have been in need of further clarification, particularly as regards weapons and centrifuge design. However, no new information was contained in that documentation. It is to be hoped that the new commissions established by Iraq to look for any additional documents and hardware relevant to its programmes for weapons of mass destruction will be able to uncover documents and other evidence that could assist in clarifying these remaining questions and concerns, as well as other areas of current concern. Finally, as Mr. Blix mentioned earlier, I was informed this morning by the Director General of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate that national legislation prohibiting proscribed activities was adopted today.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“They consist of technical reports; minutes of meetings, including those of the Standing Committee for Laser Applications; personal notes; copies of publications and student research project theses; and a number of administrative documents, some of which were marked as classified. While the documents have provided some additional details about Iraq's laser enrichment development efforts, they refer to activities or sites already known to IAEA and appear to be the personal files of the scientist in whose home they were found. Nothing contained in the documents alters the conclusions previously drawn by IAEA concerning the extent of Iraq's laser enrichment programme. We nevertheless continue to emphasize to Iraq that it should search for and provide all documents, personal or otherwise, that might be relevant to our mandate.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“However, given the nature of the use of high explosives, it may well be that IAEA will be unable to reach a final conclusion on the end use of this material. While we have no indication that this material was used for any application other than that declared by Iraq, we have no technical method of verifying, quantitatively, the declared use of the material in explosions. We will continue to follow this issue through a review of civilian mining practices in Iraq and through interviews of key Iraqi personnel involved in former relevant research and development activities. We have completed a more detailed review of the 2,000 pages of documents found on 16 January at the private residence of an Iraqi scientist. The documents relate predominantly to lasers, including the use of laser technology to enrich uranium.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“In addition, we have carried out follow-up inspections, during which we have been able to observe the use of such carbon fibre in non-nuclear-related applications and to take samples. IAEA will, nevertheless, continue to pursue this matter. We have also continued to investigate the relocation and consumption of the high explosive HMX. As I reported earlier, Iraq has declared that 32 tons of HMX previously under IAEA seal has been transferred for use in the production of industrial explosives, primarily to cement plants as a booster for explosives used in quarrying. Iraq has provided us with additional information, including documentation on the movement and use of this material, and inspections have been conducted at locations where the material is said to have been used.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“In response to IAEA inquiries about Iraq's attempts to procure a facility for the manufacture of magnets, and the possible link with the resumption of a nuclear programme, Iraq recently provided additional documentation, which we are now examining. In the course of an inspection conducted in connection with the aluminium tube investigation, IAEA inspectors found a number of documents relevant to transactions aimed at the procurement of carbon fibre, a dual-use material used by Iraq in its past clandestine uranium enrichment programme for the manufacture of gas centrifuge rotors. Our review of these documents suggests that the carbon fibre sought by Iraq was not intended for enrichment purposes, as the specifications of the material appear not to be consistent with those needed for manufacturing rotor tubes.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“IAEA is also continuing to follow up on acknowledged efforts by Iraq to import high-strength aluminium tubes. As members will know, Iraq has declared these efforts to have been in connection with a programme to reverse-engineer conventional rockets. The IAEA has verified that Iraq had indeed been manufacturing such rockets. However, we are still exploring whether the tubes were intended rather for the manufacture of centrifuges for uranium enrichment. In connection with this investigation, Iraq has been asked to explain the reasons for the tight tolerance specifications that it had requested from various suppliers. Iraq has provided documentation related to the project of reverse engineering and has committed itself to providing samples of tubes received from prospective suppliers. We will continue to investigate the matter further.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“I should mention that, shortly before our recent meeting in Baghdad, and based on our discussions with the Iraqi counterpart, Iraq provided documentation related to these issues: the reported attempt to import uranium, the attempted procurement of aluminium tubes, the procurement of magnets and magnet production capabilities, the use of the high explosive HMX, and those questions and concerns that were outstanding in 1998. I will touch briefly on each of those issues. Iraq continues to state that it has made no attempt to import uranium since the 19805. IAEA recently received some additional information relevant to this issue, which will be further pursued, hopefully with the assistance of the African country reported to have been involved.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“In response to a request by IAEA, Iraq has expanded the list of relevant Iraqi personnel to over 300, along with their current work locations. The list includes the higher-level scientists known to IAEA in the nuclear and nuclear-related areas. We will continue, however, to ask for information about Iraqi personnel of lesser rank whose work may be of significance to our mandate. I would like now to provide an update on a number of specific issues that we are currently pursuing.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“We will start helicopter-borne gamma surveys as soon as the relevant equipment receives its final certification for use on the helicopter model provided to us for use in Iraq. IAEA has continued to interview key Iraqi personnel. We have recently been able to conduct four interviews in private, that is, without the presence of an Iraqi observer. The interviewees, however, have tape- recorded their interviews. In addition, discussions have continued to be conducted with Iraqi technicians and officials as part of inspection activities and technical meetings. I should note that, during our recent meeting in Baghdad, Iraq reconfirmed its commitment to encourage its citizens to accept interviews in private, both inside and outside of Iraq.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“In this regard, we have been collecting a broad variety of samples, including water, sediment and vegetation, at inspected facilities and at other locations across Iraq, and analysing them for signature of nuclear activities. We have also resumed air sampling at key locations in Iraq. Three of the four air samplers that were removed in December 2002 for refurbishing have been returned to Iraq. One of these has been installed at a fixed location, and the other two are being operated from mobile platforms. We intend to increase their number to make optimum use of this technique. We are also continuing to expand the use of hand- held and car-borne gamma surveys in Iraq. The gamma survey vehicle has been used en route to inspection sites and within sites, as well as in urban and industrial areas.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“In the course of the inspections, we have identified certain facilities at which we will be re-establishing containment and surveillance systems in order to monitor, on a continuous basis, activities associated with critical dual-use equipment. At this time, we are using recurrent inspections to ensure that this equipment is not being used for prohibited purposes. As I mentioned in my last report to the Council, we have a number of wide-area and location-specific measures for detecting indications of undeclared past or ongoing nuclear activities in Iraq, including environmental sampling and radiation detection surveys.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“The reconnaissance phase was aimed at re-establishing rapidly our knowledge base of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, ensuring that nuclear activities at known key facilities had not been resumed, verifying the location of nuclear material and relevant non-nuclear material and equipment, and identifying the current workplaces of former key Iraqi personnel. The focus of the investigative phase is achieving an understanding of Iraq's activities over the last four years, in particular in areas identified by States as being of concern and in those identified by IAEA on the basis of its own analysis. Since our 27 January report, IAEA has conducted an additional 38 inspections at 19 locations, for a total of 177 inspections at 125 locations. Iraq has continued to provide immediate access to all locations.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“Mr. ElBaradei: My report to the Council today is an update on the status of the nuclear verification activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) and other relevant resolutions. Less than three weeks have passed since my last update to the Council, on 27 January, a relatively short period in the overall inspection process. However, I believe it is important for the Council to remain actively engaged and fully informed at this critical time. The focus of the IAEA's inspections has now moved from the reconnaissance phase into the investigative phase.”
2003-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4707 (2003) · source
“With our verification system now in place, barring exceptional circumstances and provided there is sustained, proactive cooperation by Iraq, we should be able within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme. These few months, in my view, would be a valuable investment in peace because they could help us avoid a war. We trust that we will continue to have the support of the Council as we make every effort to verify Iraq's nuclear disarmament through peaceful means and to demonstrate that the inspection process can and does work as a central feature of the international nuclear arms control regime.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“It is worth recalling that in our past experience in Iraq, the elimination of its nuclear weapons programme was accomplished mostly through intrusive inspections. It is also worth recalling that the presence of international inspectors in Iraq today continues to serve as an effective deterrent to, and insurance against, resumption of programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction, even as we continue to look for possible past activities. To conclude, we have to date found no evidence that Iraq has revived its nuclear weapons programme since the elimination of the programme in the 1990s. However, our work is steadily progressing and should be allowed to run its natural course.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“The international community will not be satisfied when questions remain open with regard to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; the world is asking for a high level of assurance that Iraq is completely free from all such weapons and is already impatient to receive it. The sooner such assurance can be provided by the inspecting organizations, the sooner the prospects that a peaceful resolution will translate into a plausible reality. Inspections are time-consuming. I should mention that even in the case of South Africa, where full and active cooperation was forthcoming, it took the IAEA approximately two years to complete the process in that country. However, if inspection is successful, it can ensure disarmament through peaceful means.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“While these documents do not appear to reflect new or current activities related to nuclear weapons in Iraq, they may enhance our detailed understanding of certain aspects of Iraq's pre-1991 nuclear programme. It is urgent and essential, therefore, that Iraq, on its own initiative, identify and provide any additional evidence that would assist the inspectors in carrying out their mandate. This proactive engagement on the part of Iraq would be - as we have told them - in its own best interest and is a window of opportunity that may not remain open for very much longer. Iraq should make every effort to be fully transparent - with a demonstrated willingness to resolve issues rather than requiring pressure to do so.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“In our discussions with Iraqi officials last week in Baghdad, we emphasized the need to shift from passive support - that is, responding as needed to inspectors' requests - to proactive support - that is, voluntarily assisting inspectors by providing documentation, people and other evidence that will assist in filling in the remaining gaps in our information. One example of how Iraq could be more proactive was illustrated by the inspection of a private residence just two weeks ago, which resulted in the retrieval of a sizeable number of documents, some of which were classified and related, in part, to Iraq's pre- 1991 efforts to use laser technology for enriching uranium.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source
“We have begun in the last few weeks to receive more actionable information from States - that is, information of direct and current value for inspection follow-up. I would continue to call on States that have access to such information to provide it to the inspecting organizations so that the inspection process can be accelerated and additional assurances can be generated. Finally, we have urged Iraq once again to increase the degree of its cooperation with the inspection process. In support of the IAEA inspections to date, the Iraqi authorities have provided access to all facilities visited, including presidential compounds and private residences, without conditions and without delay. The Iraqi authorities also have been cooperative in making available additional original documentation in response to requests by IAEA inspectors.”
2003-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4692 (2003) · source