YouSaid · the spoken record

Elhouderi

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89
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1992-03-31
most recent
1994-03-01
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3
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un-security-council

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  1. Hence the Security Council is in duty bound to adopt forthwith the following measures to guarantee to that people its right to live in peace and security: firstly, the organization of an international enquiry within the framework of the Security Council to ascertain the identities of the perpetrators of the crime; secondly, protection of the Palestinians from attacks by settlers; thirdly, confiscation of the settlers' weapons and withdrawal of the Zionist army from Palestinian towns and villages; fourthly, the dismantlement of Zionist settlements, which are in fact citadels of terrorism and provocation. If the Security Council fails to assume its responsibility with resolve and persists in its hypocritical policy, it will mean that Arab and Palestinian blood is cheap and does not merit the interest of the Council.

    1994-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3341 (1994) · source

  2. The Security Council must shoulder its responsibilities with the same enthusiasm and determination it has shown in other cases which have been considered to be threats to international peace and security. The Council is therefore faced with a difficult test today. It has but two options open to it: to continue with the policy of double standards imposed by most of the permanent members, a policy which has brought about inequality and destroyed the Council's credibility or to shoulder its responsibility for safeguarding international peace and security by implementing the Charter of the United Nations. The peace of the Palestinian people and its security are seriously endangered.

    1994-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3341 (1994) · source

  3. There are trade agreements to ensure the security of that State, whereas the Palestinian people only finds destruction, death and expulsion. The Arab peoples in general and the children with stones in particular cannot believe in such a process; they cannot accept a peace based on inequality and oppression. The Arab peoples will support a just peace, one which is aimed at freeing Palestinian and occupied Arab territories from occupation and extremism so that Muslims, Christians and Jews may live together in a democratic State, as is possible today in South Africa. That is the only solution likely to bring about a just peace, and not these false and shameful initiatives. The Security Council is today considering a flagrant act of aggression - a barbaric terrorist act which threatens international peace and security.

    1994-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3341 (1994) · source

  4. This was a premeditated and organized criminal act, carried out with sophisticated weapons. It was a flagrant, violent act of aggression that typifies what the Palestinians have to endure every day. While the Zionist entity denounces these acts today, others remain silent and even join the funeral cortege of their victims. One may rightly wonder whether we are really on the road to peace, because, so far, that road leads only to the interests of the Zionist entity: To speak of peace and security is to speak of the peace and security enjoyed by that entity. But there is no security or peace for the Palestinian people. The Zionist entity, thanks to American support, is already enjoying the fruits of peace, even before peace has been established. There are agreements to provide American weapons.

    1994-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3341 (1994) · source

  5. Such horrible carnage could not have been brought about without premeditation and without protection from the Zionist entity in occupied Palestine, because we know that Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi is under the protection of the Zionist army. Where was that army at the time this barbarous act was committed? The Zionist army did not remain idle: it opened fire on the Palestinians who had gathered in the courtyard of the local hospital in Hebron to give blood or to seek news of their loved ones. The Zionist entity could not commit such terrorist criminal acts without the moral and material support of the United States of America, which turns a blind eye to the Zionist entity's violations of human rights and, indeed, impedes efforts to bring it to heel. The United States is interested only in the continuation of the peace talks.

    1994-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3341 (1994) · source

  6. This propaganda reiterates that the criminal was a madman; we are accustomed to hearing such claims following each crime. But the evidence shows that the perpetrators are part of a gang of the followers of Rabbi Meir Kahane, a terrorist, extremist Jew. This gang has a long history of attacking places of worship. They were the ones who set fire to the holy mosque of Jerusalem in an attempt to blow it up. They are also the ones who attacked Al-Haram Al-Ibrahimi several times in the past, opening fire on worshippers and stealing its historic wealth. If they are indeed madmen they should be kept in hospitals to prevent them from bringing about such suffering.

    1994-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3341 (1994) · source

  7. The events the Council is considering today constitute a crime of collective extermination that in a brief moment resulted in 60 deaths and some 300 injuries among Palestinians. A Zionist gang led by an extremist American Jew committed this crime. This gang is motivated by the hatred that infects their hearts so deeply that they are blind to the holiness of a House of God. This gang preyed upon the trust and serenity of the worshippers in order to overwhelm them with gunfire, and thus achieved their premeditated criminal aims. Following the crime, the malevolent masters of propaganda announced that the crime had been committed by a single criminal. That constitutes an attempt to harbour criminals and save them from punishment, and to conceal the plans to terrorize and exterminate the Palestinian people.

    1994-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3341 (1994) · source

  8. Mr. Elhouderi (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (interpretation from Arabic): Let me begin, Sir, by saying how pleased I am to see you presiding over the work of the Security Council for this month, which coincides with the holy month of Ramadan. It is a time when the holy places are filled and Muslims - their faces glowing with a sense of trust and serenity - seek, through prayer, fasting and good works, to come closer to God. I am sure, Sir, that your ability and diplomatic skill will enable the Council to do a remarkable job in the face of these tragic events. I wish also to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Olhaye of Djibouti, who guided the work of the Council last month with great skill.

    1994-03-01 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3341 (1994) · source

  9. Does this not constitute an interference in the minute internal affairs of States and does it not, therefore, constitute an obstruction of justice in those States in addition to being an imposition of a strange kind of tutelage over them, all because of a dispute over the venue where two accused persons should stand trial? In operative paragraph 16 what then is the meaning of the phrase: " the Libyan Government has ensured the appearance of those charged with the bombing of Pan Am 103 for trial before the appropriate United Kingdom or United States court ..."? Once again we should like to draw attention to the dangers of involvin

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  10. The sponsors of the draft resolution insist on ignoring the decisions of regional and other organizations on the matter and turn a deaf ear to their points of view by stating in operative paragraph 15 that all Member States should encourage Libya to respond fully and effectively to these requests. The States we refer to have already expressed their views in the resolutions adopted by the Arab Maghreb Union, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Non-Aligned group. None the less, there is an insistence on ignoring all these decisions and resolutions. We would like to know the relationship between the maintenance of international peace and security and the contents of operative paragraphs 8, ll and 12.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  11. It is an attempt to destroy the Libyan economy by adversely impacting on our people's only source of income, as well as on the civil aviation structure on which my country depends for transportation. The paragraphs of the draft resolution include provisions which prove beyond doubt that its sponsors do have a hidden agenda. Otherwise, what is the meaning of operative paragraph 4, which calls for depositing the financial revenues from the sale of oil and agricultural produce in separate bank accounts? And what is the meaning of operative paragraph 16 which refers to the suspension of sanctions and their reimposition within 90 days?

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  12. This constitutes an a priori judgement that has not been substantiated by any evidence up to this point. They want the draft resolution to be adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter on a matter which should have been dealt with by the Council under Chapter VI, due to the fact that the issue in question is a legal dispute over which country has competence to try the two accused, a dispute which is essentially settled by the provisions of the 1971 Montreal Convention. This draft resolution has no justification whatsoever, especially since we are approaching the final phase in the settlement of the dispute. Moreover, it contains more unprecedented sanctions.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  13. The United States of America and the United Kingdom intentionally refused to answer Libya's specific questions related to international terrorism and the lifting of the sanctions. Even when one of the two countries hinted at the possibility of suspending or lifting the sanctions, the answers have been vague and conducive to suspicion rather than to confidence. The bottom line is that the whole issue remains the preserve of the two countries. The draft resolution now before the Council, document S/26701, repeats the very same grave legal mistake of both resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992) in that it links Libya to international terrorism on no other basis but the suspicions that have been created regarding two Libyan nationals on the basis of reports by intelligence agencies.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  14. Selection of the harshest sanctions, which are not commensurate with a legal dispute, attempts by the three countries to expand them, and to exert continuous pressure on the Security Council to impose yet more sanctions, prompt us to wonder about the real reasons behind this ferocious campaign against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The three Governments, while closing every door that could lead to a solution to the crisis either in regard to the trial of the two accused or to the verification of the allegations that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya supports international terrorism, declared, in their tripartite statement of 12 August 1993, that they had no "hidden agenda".

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  15. The repeated refusal of requests for permission to move seriously ill persons - arbitrary refusals, with no reasons given to justify them - nullifies the resolution's only humanitarian gesture. Furthermore, these repeated refusals continue to severely harm innocent people. This can be neither the intention nor the objective of the United Nations. The three countries have not limited themselves to expanding the scope of the sanctions, but have extended this behaviour to include the Committee's methods of work, putting it on a consensus basis that runs counter to the provisions of the Charter and the Security Council's provisional rules of procedure.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  16. One of them was a young girl of six, named Safaa Ali Abdel Rasoul, who died at Tripoli Central Hospital as a result of complications arising from her illness. In view of the Committee's abuse of its mandate, the competent authorities had to move other emergency cases, using various modes of conveyance, including land, sea and air transport. This resulted in patients' having to endure long, hard journeys, as is outlined in the memorandum sent to the Committee by the Libyan mission on 18 August 1993. One of the Council's main reasons for the establishment of this Committee was to facilitate consideration of the requests submitted by countries for approval of flights for essential humanitarian purposes.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  17. This includes the success of the two countries in widening the scope of the sanctions through the Committee's rejection of cooperation between the International Atomic Anergy Agency and Libya for the establishment of a laboratory at the Centre for Agricultural Research in Tripoli to analyze the effects of agricultural insecticides on the health of human beings, animals and plants. It includes also the Committee's refusal, without explanation, of the humanitarian request concerning the transport of Libyan citizens to locations abroad - using Libyan aircraft - for medical treatment. These patients included cases of coma, quadruple paralysis, brain concussion resulting from traffic accidents and sudden health deterioration necessitating advanced medical treatment.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  18. We have submitted to the Security Council 14 documents detailing the harm caused to various sectors. I shall not repeat the contents of those documents, but I should like to refer specifically to the adverse effects of the prohibition on the export to Libya of spare parts, engineering services and maintenance required for Libyan aircraft and their components. These adverse effects impact ona vital sector that is indispensable to a vast country that depends largely on air transport. The United States of America and the United Kingdom are not satisfied with the sanctions contained in resolution 748 (1992). They have been trying, under the auspices of the Committee established by that resolution, to widen the scope of the sanctions, using transparent pretexts and rigid positions.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  19. Thus they hope to keep the terrorism charge hanging over Libya like the sword of Damocles and to justify the continuation and intensification of the sanctions. They base their case on the pretext that Libya has not complied with Security Council resolutions, and they rely on an enigmatic phrase to the effect that Libya knows what is required of it. What more can Libya do? What should Libya do to persuade the three countries to stop levelling such allegations and accusations? Will the three countries respond to Libya's request for a mission to verify that there is no basis for such allegations? The sanctions, which have been imposed because of a legal dispute, into which the question of terrorism was deftly inserted have severely hurt our people in all aspects of their lives and have had a negative impact on our development plans.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  20. The Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement confirming the contents of this letter, and the statement was circulated as an official Security Council document (S/23917). My country reaffirmed its position in its letter dated 8 December 1992 (S/24961) to the Secretary-General. Ina letter dated 28 July 1993 to the Secretary-General, Libya stated its readiness to receive a mission of the Secretary-General's choice to verify the non-existence of alleged terrorist training camps on its soil. In addition, my country actively cooperated with Britain in respect of that country's special requests. However, none of this has been sufficient for the three countries, which have refused to send a mission to verify the non-existence of camps and other facilities.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  21. My country, which has endured terrorism in the recent past and still suffers today, declared, ina letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 11 May 1992 (S/23918), its unequivocal condemnation of international terrorism in all its forms, regardless of its source. Libya confirmed that there are no terrorist training camps, terrorist organizations or terrorist groups on its soil. We called for the dispatch of a committee of the Security Council, the United Nations Secretariat or any other competent United Nations body, to verify this at any time. My country also declared that it will never permit the direct or indirect use of its territory, citizens or institutions in the perpetration of any terrorist acts and that it is ready to punish severely those who are proved to have been involved in such acts.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  22. It is obvious that the three countries succeeded in making the Council compress the whole phenomenon of international terrorism into the Lockerbie and UTA incidents. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has been linked intentionally with the phenomenon of international terrorism so that the three countries may be able to achieve their goals. If it is claimed that the Security Council wants to devote special attention to civil-aviation incidents, the Council should also have looked into the incidents involving the Korean, Iranian, Libyan and Cuban civil aircraft, to avoid appearing selective in its work or being accused of applying double standards. However, let us look at the position of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on this matter.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  23. Contacts between the two countries are already under way with a view to enabling the French judge to complete this endeavour. I believe that had the French judge not chosen a military destroyer as a means of transport to Libya our response to the French demands would have led to encouraging results. Only three months and a few days after the adoption of Security Council resolution 731 (1992), the three countries managed to get the Security Council to adopt its resolution 748 (1992), in which the guestion of terrorism was widely and artificially included. It contained an exceptional accusation, on which was based an unprecedented air and diplomatic embargo. All of this was done with unprecedented speed and decisiveness, and in violation of many provisions of the United Nations Charter.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  24. No one should forget that we received answers to some of our questions on 24 September 1993 and that the defence lawyers for the suspects met on 8 and 9 October 1993. As for the French demands, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya did not see in them anything that runs counter to the law. Intensive contacts and talks between the judicial authorities of both the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and France were held with a view to reaching a determination of responsibility for the explosion of the aircraft on UTA flight 772. The Libyan and French investigative judges met several times, and the French judge saw the minutes of the investigation undertaken by the Libyan judge. It was agreed that the French judge would come to Libya to continue his investigation.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  25. In addition, the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation - the Foreign Minister of Libya - during his stay in New York, conducted wide consultations involving most members of the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Our Foreign Minister explained the developments of the crisis and confirmed our determination to implement Security Council resolution 731 (1992). All of this demonstrates that serious efforts are being made in relation to the trial of the two accused. It also proves that we are not procrastinating or marking time, as the two countries claim. Marking time is not in our interests, as it is our people who are suffering the adverse effects of the sanctions. We are interested in seeing this trial held as soon as possible.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  26. The negative impact of media publicity surrounding the case is not limited to prospective jurors but has also been extended to defence attorneys. We have witnessed a ferocious attack against an American lawyer when it was thought that he might participate in giving council to the two accused. Obstacles were also put in the way of another American lawyer who participated in the Tripoli meeting of the defense counsellors. It thus becomes clear that the concerns of the defence attorneys are rational and justified. The Secretary-General of the United Nations and members of the Security Council have been informed of the results of these meetings.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  27. These are rights included in the legislation of all countries and contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. All of us are parties to this Covenant, which entered into force on 23 March 1976. The defence attorneys were deeply concerned over the possible prejudicial effect the publicity in the United States and Scotland would have on the prospective jurors and about the absence of the usual arrangements for extradition because of the prosecution's refusal to reveal the evidence it intends to use in the trial. The defence attorneys believe that this refusal greatly limits their ability to defend the case properly. On the basis of a request made by the defence counsel, my country contacted Switzerland for permission to hold the trial there, and contacts between Libya and Switzerland are continuing to that end.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  28. As the Council knows, the defence team, which includes legal counsellors of several different nationalities, including British and American attorneys, held several meetings in Tripoli on 8 and 9 October 1993. The two accused themselves attended some of those meetings and confirmed their intention to appear before a fair court based on valid legal procedures and a comprehensive investigation, notwithstanding their right, under national and international law, to remain in Libya. The counsellors discussed the inalienable rights of any defendant: the right to a fair trial before an unbiased court, the right to be presumed innocent and the right to have sufficient time to prepare a defense after being notified of the charges and the evidence the prosecution intends to present in support of those charges.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  29. We confirmed to him that the safeguards he offered were sufficient and acceptable, and that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, following the receipt of those guarantees, would not object to the appearance of the two suspects before the Scottish judiciary and would even urge them to appear. We expressed to the Secretary-General our belief that only one step remained in order to resolve this crisis that has gone on for several years: the acceptance by the two suspects, their families and their attorneys of the necessity of appearing before the court. In those two letters, contained in document S/26523, we emphasized that we would deal with the French demands with the same determination with which we had been dealing with the American and British demands.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  30. Within the context of our efforts to address this problem, my country submitted to the Secretary-General, on 11 September 1993, a memorandum that contained points relating to its legal position vis-a-vis resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992). In that memorandum, Libya asked questions based on the assumption that the two accused would challenge the charges levelled at them and voluntarily agree to stand trial before a foreign court. The memorandum also asked for clarifications and safeguards relating to the foreign country concerned. On 24 September 1993, my country received the Secretary-General's answers to the questions concerning the two accused. Although we have not received all the answers, the Secretary-General was notified on 29 September 1993 that we had given the two suspects the answers to the questions about them.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  31. The third operative paragraph of the resolution reads: "Expresses its grave concern at the escalation of the crisis and the threats of additional sanctions and the use of force as a pattern of relations among states, in violation of the Charters of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations as well as international laws and norms". (A/48/322, annex I, p. 47) In paragraph 5 of the same resolution, the OAU Council of Ministers urges the Security Council to reconsider its resolution and lift the embargo imposed on Libya, in recognition of the positive initiatives Libya has taken in handling the crisis.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  32. All of them expressed their deep concern at the escalation of the crisis between Libya and the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, as well as at the threat of the imposition of additional sanctions and the use of force in relations between countries. They called for a peaceful settlement of the crisis and appealed to the Security Council to review resolution 748 (1992) and, in recognition of Libya's initiatives aimed at settling the crisis, to lift the embargo imposed on Libya. In this respect, I should like to recall the resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its fifty-eighth ordinary session, which was held in Cairo. That resolution expresses appreciation for the efforts and initiatives taken by Libya in order to settle the crisis peacefully.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  33. In its search for a satisfactory solution, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya did not stop at invoking the law and calling for recourse to judicial authorities. It unilaterally resorted to the International Court of Justice, which is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It also talked to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, confirming to him its full readiness to cooperate with him and asking that he play a bigger role in helping all the parties to find a reasonable and satisfactory solution. Libya also contacted other countries and other organizations to which it belongs.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  34. This begs the question: who would decide that such effective and full compliance has taken place? The answer: no one other than the two countries themselves. There is no logic or legal process. It is clear that force, and force alone, is the logic and the process. Added to this are the Draconian demands aimed at portraying Libya as a country that does not comply with Security Council resolutions and that violates international laws. Consequently, sanctions may be imposed and tightened against Libya. Notwithstanding the strange character of these demands, my country has shown extreme flexibility and has declared its readiness to pay proper compensation if it is proven responsible for this incident.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  35. It was demanded also that Libya should take full responsibility for the acts of the two Libyan officials, submit all information it has on the crime and pay appropriate compensation. Do these demands conform to the principles included in various human-rights instruments? Could these two countries treat their own citizens in the same manner they want Libya to treat the Libyans? What logic and what legal system would call on a defendant to submit self-incriminating evidence, bear the responsibility for an allegation made against him and pay compensation, all before any investigation or trial had been undertaken? Then we are told that the sanctions will not be lifted unless the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya fully and effectively complies with these demands.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  36. In its letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 28 July 1993, my country confirmed that it was willing to discuss the procedures and arrangements relating to the trial of the two accused, with the mission the Secretary-General was about to send to Libya. It thus becomes clear that out of our desire to reach a reasonable solution and despite the fact that the 1971 Montreal Convention gives Libya the right to try the two suspects before Libyan courts - a question that is still pending before the International Court of Justice - the Libyan position has been extremely flexible. On the other side, there is the rigid and intransigent position based on nothing more than the logic of force. The extradition of the two accused was one of the demands made by the three countries.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  37. They raise no objection to the conduct of the investigation and the trial through the seven-member Committee established by the League of Arab States or through the United Nations before a just and impartial court to be agreed upon." On this basis, my country declared its readiness to enter into negotiations, under the supervision of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with the countries concerned, with a view to holding the trial in a neutral country which could be agreed upon by the parties to the dispute and which could provide all the necessary guarantees. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was notified of this step on 8 December 1992, but, like previous attempts, this one was rejected by the parties concerned.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  38. Is it strange then, in light of the obvious legal nature of this issue, that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya refuses to surrender the two suspects? And in view of the clear evidence and the definitive facts, is it strange for Libya to call for the trial to be held in a neutral country? Despite all of this, Libya submitted the guestion to the People's Basic Congresses (which has the power to take decisions) in their second session for 1992. Following detailed discussions, the People's Congresses adopted the following decision in relation to the extradition of the two suspects: "The Basic People's Congresses affirm their adherence to the Libyan Criminal Code and the Libyan code of Criminal Procedure.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  39. Another example of the fallibility of the information gathered by the agencies of those countries can be found in United Nations General Assembly document (A/48/477) concerning the United States insistence on inspecting the Chinese ship "Yin He" in order to look for two chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical weapons. The document states that "The 'Yin He' incident is the sole making of the United States Side as a result of its erroneous act based on its false intelligence." (A/48/477, annex I, para. 2) China's insistence that the ship did not carry the two chemicals was to no avail. The United States insisted on inspecting the ship and China insisted that that should be done only in a neutral country. A careful inspection of all containers on the ship proved categorically that the two chemicals were not in the ship's cargo.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  40. A trial later proved that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had nothing to do with the incident and completely exonerated it. You may also recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations condemned that aggression in its resolution 41/38 (1986), which acknowledged the right of the families of the victims to receive compensation, something which the United States has thus far refused to do. This was an instance of blatant aggression in which military force was used and which jeopardized international peace and security. As such, the Security Council should have considered it. The Council failed to do so because the three States, sponsors of the draft resolution before you today, resorted to the power of veto.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  41. Indeed the Libyans receive even more publicity than the Old Bailey defendants whenever the politicians and journalists rehash the Pan Am incident over Lockerbie. The paper went on to say that the Libyans have indeed compelling reasons to complain. Moreover, the information gathered by the two countries should not be accepted at face value as irrefutable facts. The United States had previously claimed, on the strength of its own information gathering, that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was responsible for the Berlin nightclub incident. On the strength of that information, the United States sent its state-of-the-art planes, at night and carrying the most advanced weapons of destruction, to bomb the cities of Tripoli and Benghazi and the home of the Leader, killing dozens of innocent people.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  42. A recent trial in Old Bailey, in Britain, also disclosed another aspect of the British judicial system when a judge suspended the trial of three detectives because of the amount and intensity of publicity surrounding the case, and because the media had portrayed the defendants as the perpetrators of the crimes for which they were being tried. This prompted the British newspaper The Guardian to ask on 12 October 1993, in an editorial entitled "Fair Trial, Fair Sense", "Why do the Libyan suspects in the Lockerbie incident fear trial in Scotland, although British ministers and officials confirm that they would receive a fair trial?" The paper called on the ministers to look into the ruling of the Old Bailey judge and said that the two conditions related to the Old Bailey case apply to the two Libyans.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  43. The pretext used by the two countries to circumvent the 1971 Montreal Convention is that they have no faith in Libya's ability to try its own citizens. This claim gives the impression that only their judicial systems are trustworthy, despite events and evidence which suggest the contrary. Suffice it to recall areas of deficiency in the American judicial system which were revealed by the Rodney King trial in Los Angeles. Furthermore, a report issued by the Gallup Institute and published by a European newspaper reveals that 61 per cent of Britons do not think they could get a fair trial in Britain.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  44. There are no bilateral treaties between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and either the United States or the United Kingdom. There is, however, a multilateral convention that clearly and accurately regulates actions related to attacks against international civil aviation, namely the 1971 Montreal Convention. All of us are parties to that convention. Regrettably, the United States and the United Kingdom declined to comply with the provisions of the said convention and insisted, merely on the basis of their own personal wishes, on the extradition of the two accused to either one of the two countries. We wish to draw attention here to the gravity of involving the Security Council in this game whereby States are forced to surrender their own citizens to other States.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  45. Libya declared that if the Secretary-General concluded that the accusations were justified, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya would not object to the extradition of the two accused, under the personal supervision of the Secretary-General, to a third party, on condition that they may not be re-extradited to any other party. All these proposals fell on deaf ears and were met by insistence on extraditing the two accused - without any legitimate justification, be it in law or in treaty provision - to either the United States of America or Scotland. We did not extradite the two accused because that is against our laws. The laws of most countries, if not all countries, prohibit such extradition unless there is a treaty or convention regulating such matters between the countries concerned.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  46. My country had proposed to request the International Court of Justice to ascertain the validity of the accusations levelled at the two Libyan nationals and suggested that they be surrendered to the office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Tripoli for investigation. Libya also proposed that the Secretary-General form a legal committee composed of fair and neutral judges to investigate the facts of the case, make sure that the allegations against the accused were serious ones and conduct a comprehensive investigation.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  47. The two countries also refused to submit the case to arbitration, as the Convention stipulates for disputes arising over the interpretation or application of its provisions. As a result, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya took the question of the application of the Convention's rules to the International Court of Justice. The matter is still pending before the Court. Notwithstanding my country's repair to the International Court of Justice and the natural need to await its verdict, we have spared no effort in seriously seeking a solution that would be in consonance with the provisions of the law.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  48. Vasiliy Safronchuck, the personal envoy of the Secretary-General, during his visit to Tripoli on 26 January 1992, that the two countries send their own judges, or that the Secretary-General call on judges from certain countries, as well as representatives from the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, to observe the trial. However, the American and British authorities refused to cooperate with the Libyan authorities. The intransigence of the two countries, their refusal to apply the provisions of the 1971 Montreal Convention and their insistence on the extradition of the two persons to either one of them hampered the proper procedure of the trial of the two accused.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  49. The United States and the United Kingdom were accordingly notified and were requested to cooperate with the Libyan judicial authorities either by allowing the Libyan judge access to the records of their investigations or by fixing a date for carrying out the necessary investigation. In order to create an atmosphere of trust, to ensure that the proper procedures be followed during the investigation and the trial and to underscore fairness and neutrality, Libya proposed to Mr.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source

  50. That was the view of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya from the very beginning. Accordingly, it acted within that competence as soon as it received the indictments issued by the three countries, which have been circulated as official documents of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Libya announced at the time that it would deal with the indictments constructively and, forthwith, referred them to the Libyan judicial authorities. A judge was appointed to investigate the matter and he started his preliminary investigation by placing the two accused under preventive custody.

    1993-11-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3312 (1993) · source