YouSaid · the spoken record

Ero

lines on the record: 28
first: 2021-11-30
most recent: 2022-11-10
sittings or episodes: 2
sources: un-security-council

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“They are often rooted in concrete grievances with State authorities and elites whose members live in distant capitals and whose level of public legitimacy is dismal. The use of force should always be part of a wider political strategy. That is true from the Sahel to the Horn and wherever non-State armed groups exist. I hope today’s debate will be an opportunity to think about how to get that balance right in each case.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“There are risks to such approaches, but they should not be ruled out as an option. The International Crisis Group therefore encourages the Security Council to reinforce the United Nations mechanisms that support African-led missions in fighting non-State armed groups. But it also encourages the United Nations, the AU and other African actors, above all national and local actors, to keep an open mind about talking to those groups specifically, an approach that some authorities, notably in countries such as the Niger, have publicly adopted in recent months. That may seem provocative and perhaps contradictory. I agree that it may be provocative, but I do not actually think that it is contradictory. The conflicts that destabilize several African regions are not only about counter-terrorism.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“Finally, dialogue should be part of the counter- terrorism toolkit. The International Crisis Group’s research and interactions with non-State armed groups leave us convinced that dialogue with militant leaders is worth exploring. Talks about humanitarian access often happen already. In some cases, more political talks about violence-reduction measures and local governance, or simply testing whether such groups are open to wider compromise, might be feasible. At the International Crisis Group, we have pushed Governments in the Sahel to seek dialogue with armed groups that could for instance encourage local ceasefire accords that could ease suffering in rural areas, open up space for the restoration of State services and enable residents to return to their homes and rebuild their livelihoods.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“First, providing basic services is a crucial short- term counter-terrorism tool. Groups such as Al-Shabaab and local branches of Al-Qaida or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham thrive by occupying areas that Governments cannot control, and in some cases by providing basic services to inhabitants. We need to direct more funds to help Governments deliver such services alongside stabilization operations. Ousting jihadists from areas they control is not enough. It is crucial to win over the populations in those areas, too. Secondly, governance is an essential medium-term counter-terrorism tool. Building on service provision, the only effective way to close the space available to non-State armed groups is to show civilians that the State can govern in ways that respond to their needs.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“I heartily encourage the Security Council to take steps in that direction today. I want to conclude by reminding the Council that we cannot address the challenges of non-State armed groups and jihadist movements in Africa with technical fixes alone. And we cannot and should not ask Africa’s soldiers to try to solve those problems through military means alone. Military operations against non-State groups can secure territory, protect civilians, deter further violence and create space for non-military conflict resolution. But it is rare — in fact so far it is unheard of — that military operations alone can defeat movements that are quite deeply entrenched, if not necessarily popular, in parts of society. The question is, what can we do to complement military operations? Let me leave the Council with three points to consider.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“The United Nations and the AU still have a lot of work to do to define the rules that would govern the political oversight of future United Nations-funded, African-led operations, as well as the mechanisms for assessing their operational performance and accounting procedures to oversee their finances. As the International Crisis Group argued back in 2020, it is time for the representatives of the United Nations and the African Union to engage in a serious joint effort to work out answers to questions about how United Nations-AU funding will work. That is partly a job for the two organizations’ secretariats. But the members of the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council also need to make a political effort to agree on the terms for future funding and operations.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“Many studies have concluded that the only really credible option is a mechanism to enable the Security Council to direct United Nations assessed contributions to African-led stabilization missions. The Crisis Group agrees with that analysis, although, in every individual crisis and conflict, both the United Nations and the AU will need to explore whether an African-led mission is the right operational choice. In 2020 we published a report reviewing those debates. As we recognized in the report, entitled The Price of Peace: Securing United Nations Financing for AU Peace Operations, there are numerous obstacles to establishing a solid mechanism for channelling United Nations funding to African-led operations. Cash is not the only issue.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“In the case of Somalia last year, the Crisis Group looked at both African and Western perceptions of stabilization operations in the country. We found that European donors in particular appreciated the risks African troops took, but feared that they were funding an expensive status quo. It therefore behoves the Council to ask how to offer missions authorized by the African Union more systematic and predictable funding in order to allow them to plan, operate and deliver better. That topic is hardly new. Members know that the Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council have been debating how to provide AU missions with reliable funds for years.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“When African officials and military planners look at how to tackle non-State armed groups in situations such as in the Sahel and Somalia, they do not just have to think about threats on the ground, they also have to worry about whether the partners who back their missions will keep providing the necessary financial and other resources they need to deliver on their mandate. That makes the medium- and long-term planning that is crucial for such operations very difficult. Policymakers in the countries — often but not exclusively in North America and Europe, and often members of the Council — that fund those missions face a mirror image of the same problem. For those donors, it is hard to assess whether the resources they offer will have a real impact.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“Between 2011 and 2012, and at great cost to Ugandan, Burundian, Kenyan and Somali partner forces, AMISOM ended Al-Shabaab’s formal control of Mogadishu and Kismayo, the country’s second-largest city, prised swathes of territory out of militants’ hands and provided much-needed security for two electoral cycles. We can now add that Somalia’s most recent electoral cycle was also a success. It is hard to imagine that vote happening without the AU Mission holding the line against Al-Shabaab. Missions of that type often face challenges. These include not only tough opponents, but also tense relations with the national Governments and local populations they aim to assist. One of the most serious headaches for missions of that type is donor fatigue.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“Such operations are not formally part of Blue Helmets’ mandates, but often other components of the mandate, such as the protection of civilians, inevitably entail confrontation with militants. As the Crisis Group has recently argued, the Council should do a serious stock-taking of whether United Nations forces such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali are fit for purpose in such cases. But if Blue Helmets cannot do the job, who can? African-led stabilization operations are at least one potential answer. As the Crisis Group noted more than a year ago, African Union (AU) forces in Somalia can claim some success in the battle against the Al-Shabaab jihadi group.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“The case for investing in stability in Africa hardly needs repetition here. The continent is now the centre of civil wars in the world, and jihadi groups are often actors in those wars. Non-State armed groups and jihadi organizations both fuel and profit from those conflicts, building power bases in places where State control is minimal or non-existent owing to violence. Jihadis have tended to gain strength in places where the State has collapsed, often moving in to exploit opportunities in existing war zones. In some cases, notably Mali, the Security Council has sent Blue Helmet peacekeepers as part of the response to such threats. But United Nations peacekeeping forces are not designed or equipped to fight extended counter- terrorism campaigns, as we have seen in Gao and Kidal.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“The military operations that come as part of robust stabilization and counter- terrorism missions are a crucial component of any effort against such groups, but those operations must be subordinate to a political strategy. They should be part of a broader set of responses, including projects to provide basic services and better governance to populations in areas in which non-State armed groups have gained influence. At times, although it is hard, that political strategy must contemplate engaging in dialogue with non-State armed groups — something often seen as a taboo — to resolve both humanitarian and political issues. I will return to that call for dialogue at the end of my remarks, but let me first make the case for supporting regionally led stabilization operations to counter non-State armed groups.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“We have focused on those missions for three reasons. First, we believe that conflicts involving non-State armed groups, including jihadi groups, will be a source of instability in Africa for some time to come. Secondly, we assess that robust, African-led missions are well positioned to counter those threats, but that they can be effective only if they are properly and reliably resourced. Like it or not, the best way to resource those missions is through some sort of United Nations mechanism. Thirdly — and perhaps provocatively in the context of this debate — the Crisis Group also believes that those stabilization missions alone cannot stem the threat of non-State armed groups. There is a role for the use of force against jihadis.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“Ms. Ero: I thank Deputy Secretary-General Mohammed, Chairperson Faki and Ms. Von Seherr- Thoss for their remarks. The International Crisis Group is an international conflict prevention organization that has long had a special focus on Africa. I was Director of the Africa programme from 2011 to 2021. The issues before us today are therefore of particular interest both to me personally and to the Crisis Group. The Crisis Group has published analysis of the African-led stabilization and counter-terrorism missions under discussion today, including the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad basin. A year ago, we published a briefing on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), reflecting on the Security Council debates at the time.”
2022-11-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9188 (2022) · source
“The present approach, in place since 2006, has empowered Hamas while obstructing Palestinian reconciliation and political renewal. The laws are on the books. The tools are in the Council’s hands. What is lacking is the willingness to use these laws and tools to advance peace in Israel-Palestine.”
2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source
“More immediately, the international community should push for the following: a long-term truce in Gaza; a return to the historical status quo arrangement at Jerusalem’s holy sites, as it was conceived in 1967 when Israel conquered Jerusalem’s Old City, with modifications only by agreement of all relevant parties; a halt to eviction orders in East Jerusalem; an end to settlement activity in the occupied territories; rescission of the order banning the six Palestinian civil society organizations; holding Palestinian elections as soon as possible, with the participation of East Jerusalem Palestinians; and revision of the international conditions known as the Quartet principles so as to allow Hamas to participate in a Palestinian unity Government.”
2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source
“Regarding that solution, this organ should make clear that, should Israel continue to obstruct the establishment of a fully sovereign and viable Palestinian State, any alternative that emerges in the future will have to respect the right to full equality and enfranchisement of all those in any space controlled by Israel.”
2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source
“The third condition is a reversal of on-the-ground, legal and political measures enacted by Israel that have cost Palestinians many of their most basic rights. For many years, the protection of people and advancing their well-being were subordinated to the goal of a two-State solution. Today, among global and regional Powers, pessimism about the possibility of achieving a two-State solution is having a similar effect, leading to inaction rather than action. This is not the right way forward. It is incumbent on this organ to undertake concrete action to protect the rights of all people in Israel-Palestine and Palestinian refugees, even in the absence, for now, of a viable peace process and regardless of whatever form an eventual political solution may take.”
2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source
“We at Crisis Group strongly believe that the international community, for now, should focus less on political paradigms and more on what is happening on the ground. Ultimately, this conflict will be settled only through political negotiations, but they will not succeed until certain basic conditions are in place. The first is Israeli willingness to engage Palestinians both individually as equals and as a collective with aspirations to national self-determination and an external incentive structure designed with this in mind. The second is a coherent Palestinian polity with a leadership that can chart a path forward and challenge the status quo by non-violent means and in ways consistent with international law.”
2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source
“The international community is not an innocent bystander. Through its passive stance, it gives cover to Israeli Government practices. Yesterday, the world marked the seventy-fourth anniversary of General Assembly resolution 181 (II), more commonly referred to as the United Nations partition plan. It was thus that the United Nations gave its imprimatur to the notion of two States for two peoples. For some three-quarters of a century, the world has failed to deliver on its promise. In the tenth preambular paragraph of resolution 2334 (2016), adopted in 2016, the Council referred to “negative trends” that are “steadily eroding the two-State solution and entrenching a one-State reality”. These words reflect the overall re-evaluation of the partition paradigm that is taking place in many quarters.”
2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source
“These measures give the impression that Israel’s policy of “shrinking” the conflict and strengthening the Palestinian Authority in practice goes hand in hand with de facto annexation. At the same time, there has been no serious effort on the Palestinian Authority’s part to refresh Palestinian politics through elections, which President Mahmoud Abbas promised earlier this year but then abruptly cancelled. In the absence of a new popular mandate, Palestinian politics have become dangerously ossified, turning the PA — like Hamas in Gaza — into a governing body with limited powers that is unresponsive, unaccountable, authoritarian and repressive. Palestinian governing authorities in both the West Bank and Gaza have added to restrictions on the freedoms of their own civil society to organize and speak out.”
2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source
“In reality, these organizations have been active for years, if not decades, in providing essential services to people in need — services that Israel, as the occupying Power, has not provided — and in documenting, reporting on and advocating for international accountability regarding Israeli violations of human rights in the occupied territories. They receive external funding, especially from European Governments and others, and have been active in lobbying the United States Congress and European capitals, as well as the International Criminal Court in The Hague, to advance their cause. According to all available evidence, those organizations have been carrying out their work in a lawful manner to the benefit of Palestinian society and in defence of basic principles of human rights.”
2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source
“Unfortunately, we have seen little concrete action in that direction since then. Arguably, the opposite has happened. In June, a new Israeli Government came into office. This Government has given indications about its willingness to engage on daily measures and security with the Palestinian Authority, in finding ways to do what it calls “shrinking” the conflict by improving economic conditions in the occupied territories and marginally strengthening the PA itself. Yet the new Government has continued to expand illegal settlements in the West Bank and has taken repressive measures against Palestinians in ways no different from its predecessors. In October, the Government outlawed six highly respected Palestinian civil society organizations on specious charges of being terrorists.”
2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source
“In August, we released a report lamenting the continuing conflict and the high casualty numbers and destruction, notably among Palestinians and in Gaza. We urged all parties to the conflict — Israel, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas — to take steps to at least staunch the bleeding. We challenged the international community not only to work urgently to lower the temperature by pressing all sides to cease violent and provocative actions, but also to undertake a serious effort to rethink the entire edifice of the peace process. Such a rethinking must acknowledge the structural power imbalance between an occupying State and an occupied people, and the necessity of challenging the impunity Israel has come to take for granted in its conduct towards the Palestinians.”
2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source
“And it has consistently rejected anything resembling a plausible two-State outcome, including explicitly under its present Government. Palestinians have seen Israel entrench its control under the cover of the peace process, denying them their rights and freedoms at a gathering pace. Yet no supplementary or alternative approach has emerged. For over a decade, my organization has urged the international community to eschew the Nobel-prize winning push for a peace deal. Instead, we believe the international community should work to put in place the building blocks of a more peaceful and just future for the generations of Israelis and Palestinians to come. In the wake of the violent events of last spring, we renewed that call.”
2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source
“Palestinians— whether in Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem, Israel itself or in the diaspora — have acquiesced to neither territorial fragmentation nor political marginalization. To the contrary, alongside rockets from Gaza, they raised a collective, if amorphous, voice. Their protests stressed the dispossession and repression of Palestinians, with the question of Jerusalem at the core. Among Israeli Jews, the combination of falling rockets and protests in their streets furthered hardened their conviction that there is no political deal to be had. On both sides of this conflict, as well as among many Council members, faith in the Middle East peace process has waned. Israel has grown comfortable with the status quo. It is imposing its own realities on the ground in violation of this body’s resolutions.”
2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source
“Ms. Ero: The International Crisis Group is an organization dedicated to the prevention and resolution of deadly conflicts. This past year, we noted with alarm a new outburst of violence in Israel-Palestine. We believe that the Security Council, and the international community broadly speaking, has done little to steer this tragic conflict into calmer waters, to protect its victims and to push Israelis and Palestinians towards a just solution. We thank the Council, and the Mexican presidency in particular, for giving me this opportunity today to present some ideas about a way forward. The violence in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories in April and May serves as the latest reminder of the instability of the status quo.”
2021-11-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8913 (2021) · source