YouSaid · the spoken record

Ewi

lines on the record
15
first
2022-08-09
most recent
2022-08-09
sittings or episodes
1
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un-security-council

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  1. “In conclusion, I believe that the Council can do more to mobilize support for civil society in Africa so that it can be the interlocutors between the Council and the people. To this end, the Council may wish to consider convening a meeting with civil society organizations to empower them and strengthen their role in the implementation of Security Council resolutions.”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source

  2. “The absence of the Council means that even sanctions are not implemented. Most blacklisted terrorists do not know that they are blacklisted because, apart from the Council, no one else tells them anything. The Council must find a way to ensure that the resolutions that it adopts are communicated to those concerned on the ground, particularly at the community level. I also believe that the solution lies at the community level, where terrorists obtain support by manipulating the people. The Council must therefore work closely with the African Union and regional economic communities to provide the political centre and generate the necessary momentum for revitalizing the fight against terrorism on the continent.”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source

  3. “I want to conclude by highlighting that, to defeat Da’esh in Africa, the strategy must extend beyond the group and include its alliances with Al-Qaida and the nexus with other criminal groups, including bandits, herders, gangs and various organized crime groups. The Council can mobilize support for counter- terrorism in Africa, particularly equipment and funds for the many ongoing peace support operations in various regions. The Council would need to be closer and more involved. There is a feeling in Africa that the Security Council, in New York, is too far away. As a result, many Council decisions are not implemented. I believe that situations like the one that escalated in Cabo Delgado merited a visit of the Council to Mozambique to show solidarity and enforce international law.”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source

  4. “The eighth factor is the divorce between the fight against transnational organized crime and counter- terrorism in Africa. Despite the increasing linkages and convergence between terrorism and organized crime, those who are fighting them in Africa do not speak to one another. The lack of a political centre for counter- terrorism in Africa has led to fragmented and disjointed responses. In the past, the Organization of African Unity provided a political centre for the anti-colonial struggle, which ultimately was won. We need a similar political centre in the fight against terrorism. What can the Security Council do?”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source

  5. “The seventh factor is the overwhelming reliance on narrow-minded militaristic strategies that are not well- equipped. The multiplicity of peace support operations to fight terrorism in Somalia, the Lake Chad basin, the Sahel and now in Mozambique have yet to show concrete results. These strategies have produced untold human suffering and human rights abuses. They also lack the resources and funding they need in order to do effective work. There is a need for military and security strategies, but they must be part of a broader strategy that addresses the root causes of terrorism, especially the political, economic, social and ideological roots of the phenomenon. The marginalization of civil society means that there is no one to speak to those in the communities and no one to hold States accountable.”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source

  6. “But we have all seen the fallacy of the ostrich approach. The lack of early response to early warning about terrorism in Africa is one of the factors that continues to nourish Da’esh and Al-Qaida. Sovereignty is used to shield the threat until it incubates and becomes uncontrollable. Once the threat gets out of hand, the international community is then called upon to help. We are seeing this phenomenon play out in Benin and Togo, which are the latest coastal countries in Africa to experience concentrated attacks carried out by Da’esh and other terror groups. We also saw this phenomenon in Mozambique when terrorism erupted. We saw it in Nigeria, in Cameroon and many other countries, where the threat was misdiagnosed and the responses were also inadequate.”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source

  7. “These days, we no longer hear about conferences or new initiatives taken by African countries to fight terrorism, even at the level of the African Union, where such efforts are declining. The momentum that was generated by 9/11 with regard to the fight against terrorism is rapidly declining. The sixth factor is an approach taken by African countries in response to terrorism, which I refer to as the ostrich approach. It is particularly true in cases of early warning regarding terrorism. In many countries, when terrorism erupts, there is a tendency to ignore it, to not recognize it, to not call it terrorism and to claim that there is nothing happening. We have also seen that even if countries say that something is happening, they tend to believe that it is a threat that can be eliminated by local means.”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source

  8. “The fourth factor is the inconsistency in State responses, or what I call international double standards. That is seen in the upstream-downstream effect. After the declaration of the caliphate in Syria and Iraq, the international community mounted what was referred to as the Global Coalition against Da’esh. Terrorism was driven out from upstream to downstream in Africa. The continent bore the brunt of the activities taking place upstream in Syria and Iraq, but no similar coalition was mounted to defeat Da’esh in Africa or to deal with the threat downstream. In other words, Africa was left to bear the consequences of those who were fleeing Syria and finding safe haven on the continent. The fifth factor is related to the ailing war on terrorism in Africa.”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source

  9. “The coming together of Al-Qaida groups under the umbrella of Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam waal-Muslimin in 2017 marked a new era for jihadist terrorism in Africa. Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam waal-Muslimin has been able to team up with Da’esh groups, such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, to carry out some of the largest and most gruesome terror attacks in West Africa and the Sahel. The concentration of those attacks in Burkina Faso and Mali illustrate the impact on governance. Boko Haram or the Islamic State West Africa Province has demonstrated the potency of such nexus or cross- fertilization schemes of terror organizations in Africa. The group has benefited enormously, both materially and financially, and in terms of recruitment through support and operational collaboration with herders, bandits, kidnappers and artisanal miners.”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source

  10. “Despite the tendency of Western scholars to dismiss the role of poverty, our studies in Africa show irrefutable empirical evidence that many of the young people who have joined Da’esh and other terror groups in Africa have done so because of poverty and unemployment. Da’esh has exploited poor communities for recruitment and support. The third factor, which serves to highlight this point, is the ability of Da’esh to work with other terror and criminal groups on the continent. We are seeing something that rarely happens elsewhere — collaboration, especially joint operations between Da’esh and Al-Qaida. The splintering of terror groups that we saw in the post-9/11 era is now being replaced with alliances, amalgamation and regrouping of terror groups, irrespective of their ideological creed.”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source

  11. “I would like to cite a recent report published in May in South Africa by investigative journalists. The report details some of the informal methods and networks used to mobilize huge sums of money. It describes how more than 6 billion rands — about $400 million — was mobilized through a range of methods, including the use of spaza shops and the hawala system in South Africa to finance Da’esh groups in Mozambique, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and elsewhere. The lingering grievances about global injustices and the lack of political will to deal with the Palestinian problem remains a rallying cry for many young people in Africa. It is the main source of radicalization and why many young people join the Islamic State.”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source

  12. “There are several factors responsible but, for the sake of time, I will highlight just a few. The first is the presence of natural resources. Terrorism in Africa is more or less a battle over Africa’s natural resources. That is clearly evident in the strategic locations of terrorist groups in Africa. Da’esh is no exception: those groups are located at borderlands whereby countries intersect and mostly where natural resources can be found. The Secretary-General’s report has highlighted the sources of funding for Da’esh. What we are seeing in Africa is that those groups practically have self-financing capabilities, either through the direct extraction of natural resources — especially through illicit artisanal gold mining — or through the use of extensive networks.”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source

  13. “The Lake Chad basin continues to serve as the group’s biggest area of operations; the Sahel, particularly the Liptako-Gourma region, has become ungovernable; and Somalia remains the hotspot for the Horn of Africa. There have been recent attempts to take over Uganda and destabilize the country — although they failed, the threat posed by Da’esh through its affiliate, the Allied Democratic Forces, remains serious. Islamic State Central Africa Province has turned some regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mozambique into human slaughterhouses. As it stands, none of the five geopolitical regions as defined by the African Union has been spared. The use of local affiliates remains the most successful Da’esh model in Africa. But what are the factors that have made Da’esh so successful in Africa?”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source

  14. “I would, however, like to use the next several minutes of my time to step outside of the frame of the report to offer some perspectives on why the threat posed by Da’esh to Africa is growing day by day and why the continent is not only a hub, but could also well be the future of the caliphate. The presence of the Islamic State in Africa today is deep and concerning. The group has expanded its influence beyond measure. At least 20 countries in Africa have directly experienced Islamic State activity. More than 20 others are being used for logistics and to mobilize funds and other resources. There are now regional hubs, which have become corridors of instability in Africa.”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source

  15. “Mr. Ewi: I thank you very much, Mr. President,, for this opportunity to address the Security Council on such an important issue as the threat posed by Da’esh to the international community. On behalf of the Institute for Security Studies, one of the leading think tanks on human security in Africa, I wish to congratulate you and your Government on your dynamic leadership of the Council. I also join you and other members of the Council in congratulating the Secretary-General on an excellent report (S/2022/576), presented by the Under-Secretary- General for Counter-Terrorism. We generally agree with the analysis contained in the report, which has truly highlighted some of the vexing issues on the continuous threat posed by Da’esh to the international community.”

    2022-08-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9108 (2022) · source