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Fedotov

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385

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1994-10-21

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2019-09-10

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un-security-council

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1. “UNITA has blocked the extension of the administration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation to the so-called sensitive areas - first and foremost, Andulo, Bailundo, Mungo and Nharea - and has actively increased its military capacity. Armed attacks on Government representatives, the staff of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola, other international personnel and the civilian population have escalated dangerously. As a result of UNITA's irresponsible activity, the military-political situation has sharply deteriorated and the peace process has been pushed to the brink of collapse, raising the danger of the resumption of civil war. The situation calls for decisive and prompt measures on the part of the Security Council to alleviate the crisis in the Angolan settlement.”

   1998-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3891 (1998) · source

2. “Mr. Fedotov (Russian Federation) (interpretation from Russian): It is my pleasure to welcome the State delegation of Angola, led by General Carneiro, and to thank him for his important statement. Russia highly appreciates the constructive position of the Government of Angola on the issues of the political settlement, its dedication to the Lusaka Protocol and its resolve to complete the peace process successfully. Unfortunately, a different and diametrically opposed approach is espoused by the UNITA leadership, which, ignoring the Security Council's repeated warnings, continues obstinately to refuse to fulfil its obligations.”

   1998-06-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3891 (1998) · source

3. “We continue to be concerned by information about arms flows to the forces of the former Rwandan regime, in Violation of the embargo imposed by the Security Council in resolutions 918 (1994) and 1011 (1995). Given the continued seriousness of this problem, we support the reactivation of the work of the International Commission of Inquiry, which, we believe, is essential to deter political and ethnic extremism in the region. The Russian delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.”

   1998-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3870 (1998) · source

4. “Mr. Fedotov (Russian Federation) (interpretation from Russian): The Russian Federation notes with satisfaction that the situation in Rwanda has stabilized to some extent. The Rwandan people, after suffering the horrors of genocide, are slowly but surely returning to normal life. We also attach great importance to the swift, final normalization of the situation in the Great Lakes region as a whole, without which it would be difficult to achieve a lasting stabilization of the situation in Rwanda and in the surrounding region. An important element in strengthening security in the region is the establishment of a lasting barrier to the illegal flow of arms that could fuel a new spiral of bloodshed.”

   1998-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3870 (1998) · source

5. “This must not be done by increasing sanction measures, which may have the most adverse repercussions for the entire Balkan region and many other States besides. The efforts of all interested countries and international organizations must be directed to encouraging and supporting the political process, fostering dialogue to the greatest extent possible, and preventing any deterioration of the situation. Russia will continue to work precisely to that end.”

   1998-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3868 (1998) · source

6. “As the draft resolution confirms, concrete progress to resolve the issues relating to the situation in Kosovo will improve the international position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and prospects for normalization of its full participation in international institutions. Russia sincerely hopes that this will happen as soon as possible. It is also important that the draft resolution clearly links the restrictions it imposes to existing agreements in the region on the levels of armaments, inter alia, the Florence Agreement on Subregional Arms Control. We see the main task of the international community to be the full promotion of the consolidation of progress made in the situation around Kosovo.”

   1998-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3868 (1998) · source

7. “Nevertheless, the draft resolution has been able to define strict criteria; if Belgrade complies with these, the Security Council will decide to lift the embargo. We note that the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia have already taken important steps in that direction. They have announced the withdrawal of police units; the International Committee of the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations have been given access to Kosovo; the President of Serbia, Mr. Milutinovie, officially announced his readiness for a political dialogue with the Kosovar Albanians, without preconditions. We encourage Belgrade to intensify these positive efforts.”

   1998-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3868 (1998) · source

8. “It may be useful in this context for the Secretary- General, in preparing the reports contemplated in the draft resolution, to conduct investigations on the supply of weapons, training, and financial and other support for the Kosovo terrorists from the territories of neighbouring and other countries. Russia's position has been and continues to be that the Security Council' s establishment of a military embargo, like any military sanctions, is possible only with a clear exit strategy. In the future, we will continue to advocate the need to limit the sanctions with a clear schedule, following the expiration of which the Council will have to decide whether or not the sanctions should be extended. Unfortunately, our approach has not, for the time being, received sufficient support in the Security Council.”

   1998-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3868 (1998) · source

9. “The prospects for such a settlement depend on the political will and willingness to take a constructive approach of both sides - the Serbian leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovar Albanians. One of the most important conditions for the viability of the embargo is an effective monitoring regime for its implementation, particularly on the Albanian-Macedonian border. The illegal arms traffic must be reliably impeded and mere declarations on that subject do not suffice. It is precisely from this perspective that we must consider the mandate of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force.”

   1998-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3868 (1998) · source

10. “At the same time, the situation in Kosovo, despite its complexity, does not constitute a threat to regional, much less international peace and security. It is precisely this understanding that is reflected in the draft resolution before us today. It was extremely difficult for Russia to agree with such a measure as the introduction of a military embargo. We embarked on this step only on the understanding - which is now embedded in the draft resolution - that the issue is not about punishing anyone, Belgrade in particular, but about specific measures designed to prevent an increase in tensions, to erect an obstacle to external terrorism, and to foster the political process with a view to a speedy and lasting settlement.”

    1998-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3868 (1998) · source

11. “While we condemn the use of excessive force by the Serbian police, we also strongly condemn any terrorist acts on the part of the Kosovar Albanians, including the so-called the Kosovo Liberation Army, and other manifestations of extremism, which seriously destabilize the situation and complicate the search for a mutually acceptable and effective political settlement of the situation. This approach is based on a key principle of Russian foreign policy: Terrorism is categorically unacceptable in any form or manifestation and calls for the most decisive condemnation of the international community. Clearly, any foreign support for terrorism must be nipped in the bud, which requires a coordinated international effort. Unfortunately, the events in Kosovo have an adverse regional impact.”

    1998-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3868 (1998) · source

12. “Mr. F edotov (Russian Federation) (interpretation from Russian): From the very outset, the Russian Federation has viewed the recent events in Kosovo as the internal affair of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We strongly believe that the basic principle for a settlement of the situation in Kosovo is that that autonomous region must remain within Serbia on the basis of unswerving compliance with the principle of the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of the republics that make it up. Only within this legal framework is an effective settlement of the Kosovo problem possible through peaceful political dialogue without preconditions or unilateral approaches. It is precisely in support of such a political process that the decisions of the international Contact Group, adopted at London and Bonn, are directed.”

    1998-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3868 (1998) · source

13. “The question of the future role of the United Nations in fostering national reconciliation, and in particular in preparations for holding elections, can be decided later in the light of developments and on the basis of the recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General, which will be submitted by 20 June 1998. For all these reasons, the delegation of the Russian Federation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.”

    1998-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3867 (1998) · source

14. “Success in this area is possible only through the united efforts of all political forces in the Central African Republic. The effectiveness of the international community's assistance in achieving a definitive resolution of the crisis in that country depends on the readiness of its Government and all parties in the Central African Republic to demonstrate further political will, implement strictly the Bangui Agreements and comply strictly with the National Reconciliation Pact. We consider as optimum the initial mandate for the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), as defined in the present draft resolution, as well as the strength of its military component. Our understanding is that its full deployment will be completed by 15 April so as to ensure an orderly transition from MISAB to MINURCA.”

    1998-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3867 (1998) · source

15. “Mr. Fedotov (Russian Federation) (interpretation from Russian): We are pleased to note that progress has been achieved in normalizing the situation in the Central African Republic. To a significant extent this is due to the vigorous work of the International Monitoring Committee for the implementation of the Bangui Agreements and of the Inter- African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB). At the same time, it remains necessary to continue international assistance for the consolidation of the process of national reconciliation in that African country and to maintain a secure environment conducive to the holding of free and fair elections. An important factor in establishing long-term peace and stability is finding a speedy and effective solution to economic and social problems.”

    1998-03-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3867 (1998) · source

16. “In principle, we are prepared to take a positive View of the establishment in the Central African Republic of a United Nations peacekeeping operation that is limited in time and in resources. We are prepared to take a further, more specific decision following an additional report from the Secretary-General on the extension of the mandate and the possible peacekeeping operation.”

    1998-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3853 (1998) · source

17. “We proceed from the premise that international assistance in support of the Bangui Agreements is of great significance for the stabilization of the situation in the Central African Republic. We also note that although progress has undeniably been made in restoring peace and bringing about reconciliation in that country, it is not yet irreversible. Of great significance for further stabilization is the commitment of all to the Bangui Agreements. It is obvious that the difficult economic and social situation remains a major destabilizing factor. In order to improve that, we must undertake the efforts necessary for economic and social recovery, which would be a sound basis for normalization as a whole.”

    1998-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3853 (1998) · source

18. “Mr. Fedotov (Russian Federation) (interpretation from French): Our delegation is pleased to have this opportunity to see you, Sir, presiding over this meeting of the Security Council on the question of the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement (MISAB). This happy occasion is especially symbolic Mr. Foreign Minister, since your country, and in particular President Omar Bongo, have made and continue to make such a crucial contribution to a political settlement in the Central African Republic. (spoke in Russian) The Russian delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution to extend the authorization for MISAB until 16 March.”

    1998-02-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3853 (1998) · source

19. “We are grateful to the sponsors of the draft resolution for having taken our proposals into account in the draft. In View of that and the points I made earlier, and in a spirit of compromise, our delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.”

    1997-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3837 (1997) · source

20. “We also deem it appropriate to note that in the context of the Haitian operation we cannot forget the acute financial crisis the United Nations is experiencing, the reasons for which are well known to all, namely, the problem of non- payment by a number of States Members. Even this comparatively small new Mission in Haiti is still very burdensome for the lean United Nations peacekeeping budget. In this connection, I would emphasize that the Russian Federation has no debts with regard to the Mission in Haiti, and we hope that other States will discharge their obligations. We welcome the additional voluntary contributions by interested States to ease the financial implications for the United Nations of carrying out this new operation.”

    1997-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3837 (1997) · source

21. “We have accommodated their wishes and are prepared to support the proposal to establish a new United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) in order to continue international assistance to strengthen the Haitian National Police, but with the clear understanding that the new operation will, as the draft resolution provides, have a clearly defined mandate limited to a single one-year period ending on 30 November 1998. In our View, future assistance to the Haitian National Police should be provided through the United Nations special agencies and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), international and regional organizations and bilateral channels by interested countries.”

    1997-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3837 (1997) · source

22. “We are not against maintaining a United Nations presence in Haiti, but with the proviso that it is conducted in keeping with today's real requirements. In our view, the peacekeeping role of the United Nations in Haiti has been successfully fulfilled. At the same time, we have taken into consideration the request of President Rene Preval and the recommendation of the Secretary-General, as well as the views of the group of Friends of the Secretary- General for Haiti.”

    1997-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3837 (1997) · source

23. “The situation in Haiti is marked by a complex transition to democracy, which unfortunately does not have firm roots in Haitian society, and has been exacerbated by a prolonged social and economic crisis. In this context, resolving the problem of Haiti's economic rehabilitation and reconstruction takes on particular importance. We are convinced that only by successfully carrying out that task can we create a truly firm basis for the strengthening of democracy in that country. The international community will in future have to supply technological, economic and financial assistance to support political stability and balanced development, democratic institution-building and respect for human rights.”

    1997-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3837 (1997) · source

24. “Mr. Fedotov (Russian Federation)(interpretation from Russian): The Russian delegation is pleased to note that the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), which played a significant role in strengthening the bases of constitutional democracy, has successfully fulfilled the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council under resolution 1123 (1997). The United Nations military operation has been completed. A stable, albeit fragile, situation is being maintained in Haiti. The Haitian National Police continue to gain experience. Events in that country, as we have repeatedly pointed out, did not and still do not pose a threat to regional peace and security.”

    1997-11-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3837 (1997) · source

25. “At the same time we would like to express the hope that the grace period granted UNITA will be properly heeded, that it will allow that organization to take a sober look at the situation for which it is to blame and lead UNITA to carry out what it has long been expected to carry out. We hope that this in turn will make it possible not to introduce the additional sanctions against UNITA contained in the draft resolution. This is what we sincerely hope will happen.”

    1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source

26. “These are precisely targeted and concrete and will not effect those representatives of UNITA who are members of Parliament or the Government or who are cooperating with the Joint Commission. Provision is made for deferring the imposition of the sanctions and for the possibility of their being lifted, as well as for the adoption of further sanctions against UNITA if it were to fail to fully and expeditiously fulfil its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol. It is our belief that this sends a tough but necessary and clear signal that the patience of the international community is at an end and that it will no longer accept either the obstacles placed in the way of the implementation of the peace process in Angola or the disregard of the international community's decisions.”

    1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source

27. “All this confirms the fact the leader of UNITA, Mr. Savimbi, has no interest in pursuing the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and in transforming his organization into a genuine political parts/- The international community has frequently had occasion to warn UNITA that such an obstructionist attitude was unacceptable, expecting that these signals would be duly heeded. Unfortunately, this did not occur. UNITA is defying the United Nations and the Security Council. We believe that the international community has no other choice but to give an appropriate reply. The draft resolution prepared by the troika contains additional sanctions to be imposed on UNITA.”

    1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source

28. “It is that organization's fault that the implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol has been completely paralysed and that we have not received any reliable data about the upcoming disarmament and demobilization of the armed forces of UNITA. UNITA is not complying with the process of demobilizing its soldiers. There is information that already demobilized soldiers as well as new civilians have been enlisted into the army. And the VORGAN radio station continues to broadcast hostile propaganda. They continue to put obstacles in the way of the representatives of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA). The statement by UNITA on 11 August and, above all, its actual activities do not constitute a satisfactory reply to the demands which have been made by the Security Council.”

    1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source

29. “The international community is entitled to demand that the Government of Angola - but, indeed, first and foremost that the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) - fully and without further delay carry out the remaining aspects of the peace process and refrain from any further acts that might worsen the situation. This is precisely what guided Russia in drawing up, together with the other members of the troika, the draft resolution that is before the Security Council today. As is clearly stated in the draft resolution, UNITA bears the main responsibility for the present situation.”

    1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source

30. “Unfortunately, these hopes, and indeed the aspirations of the Angolans themselves for a safe and peaceful future, have not been realized. More than that, there is a real danger that the peace process may be reversed. The deterioration of the situation requires very close scrutiny on the part of the Security Council and the Secretary-General, and also redoubled efforts on the part of his Special Representative and of the United Nations mission in Angola, as well as on the part of the troika of observer States. In light of the developing situation it is quite justified that there should be adjustments to the process of withdrawing the United Nations military contingents from Angola.”

    1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source

31. “Mr. Fedotov (Russian Federation) (interpretation from Russian): The Russian Federation, a member of the observer troika regarding a settlement in Angola, is eager that consistent progress be made in the peace process and that peace and concord be speedily restored. Overcoming the many years of conflict in Angola would not only be a blessing for the people of that country and for all States of the region, it would also represent a major success for United Nations peacekeeping operations and for the international community as a whole. Recent events in Angola - the inauguration of the Government of Unity and National Reconciliation - had strengthened our hope that a final settlement of this conflict was imminent.”

    1997-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3814 (1997) · source

32. “Bearing in mind the requests addressed by the Guatemalan parties to the United Nations, the recommendations of the Secretary-General and the views of the Group of Friends of the Guatemalan Peace Process, Russia supports the proposal to give to the United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA), on a temporary basis, a group of 155 military observers for a three-month period, with a clearly defined one-time mandate. In light of what I have said, the Russian delegation voted for that draft resolution. We regret that it was put to a vote with such haste, at a time when consultations on the issue could have been continued.”

    1997-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3730 (1997) · source

33. “For our part, we are prepared to help further in the interests of favourable external conditions for a successful completion of that process. Highest commendations deservedly go to the activities of the United Nations mediation group in the negotiations between the Guatemalan parties. We would like to express to the members of that group our gratitude for their contribution to achieving peace in Guatemala.”

    1997-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3730 (1997) · source

34. “The signing between the Government of Guatemala and the insurgent movement Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca on 29 December 1996 of the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace was an important event, marking the culmination of a long-standing internal conflict in that country and the last hotbed of armed resistance in the Central American region. We are sure that the achievement of peace in Guatemala, after 36 years of civil war, will promote the strengthening of stability and security not only there, but throughout all Central America. Russia, which has consistently advocated a firm political settlement in Guatemala, feels that the efforts of the international community should now be directed towards strengthening the peace process in that country.”

    1997-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3730 (1997) · source

35. “Mr. Fedotov (Russian Federation) (interpretation from Russian): The Russian Federation notes with great satisfaction that, after long years of armed conflict and instability, Central America has now embarked on a stage of consolidating peace processes and strengthening democratic institutions and economic recovery. It is one of the few regions of the world in recent times to achieve genuine and tangible progress in the settlement of internal conflicts. This has been possible largely because of the efforts of the international community, and above all of the United Nations.”

    1997-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3730 (1997) · source

36. “In the view of the Russian delegation, the draft resolution on Angola submitted for consideration today by the Security Council is up to the key tasks of the current stage of the peace settlement. We believe that this draft resolution will send a serious signal to the Angolan parties on the need to speed up implementation of the commitments they have undertaken and to take the peace process to the finish line.”

    1996-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3722 (1996) · source

37. “It is obvious that what is now the largest United Nations peacekeeping operation cannot be shut down overnight. We are in favour of this process being thought through carefully, implemented gradually and sufficiently flexibly, without unjustified delays, but also on the basis of the real status of the peace process. In that context, we believe it would be useful for the Security Council, before the end of February 1997, to send its mission to Angola, which would allow us to draft an adjusted strategy and tactics for UNAVEM. III in its final phase and to define a position on the basic parameters for a continued United Nations presence in that country.”

    1996-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3722 (1996) · source

38. “Procrastination in the implementation of these aspects of the settlement is unacceptable and could have a very negative impact on the peace process as a whole. It is important to strengthen the political base in every possible way in order to hasten the peace process, which, in our view, would be promoted by the speedy convening of a fifth meeting in Angola between President Dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. Of exceptional importance, too, are the issues of establishing unified armed forces and the Angolan National Police and accelerated demobilization of ex-combatants. Although quite a few complex and large- scale tasks lie ahead, the peace process in Angola is moving unswervingly into its final phase: the expiry of UNAVEM. III's mandate in little more than a month and a half.”

    1996-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3722 (1996) · source

39. “In turn, the Government of Angola has announced its decision to incorporate nine UNITA generals into the Angolan Armed Forces. These important steps open up the opportunity to finalize the settlement of the core military issues and to focus on the outstanding political questions. Of high priority here are the return to Luanda of the UNITA deputies of the National Assembly, the formation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation, and an agreement on the status of the President of UNITA. These tasks must be resolved by the end of the year and should allow for the establishment of effective structures of State administration throughout the territory of the country, which could ensure the political and social stability without which the restoration of peace and normal life for Angolans is impossible.”

    1996-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3722 (1996) · source

40. “Unfortunately, the peace process in Angola, despite considerable achievements, is developing very unevenly and often requires pressure on the sides; in particular, on UNITA, to overcome the obstacles that arise. Nevertheless, the Angolan settlement is moving forward step by step, bringing us closer to the desired threshold where the peace process will become irreversible. Today a major success was achieved in this regard. The leadership of UNITA has finally made an official statement that it has concluded the quartering of all its military personnel and police, with the exception of 453 persons to be quartered in the next few days. It has also handed over all of its weapons to the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM. III).”

    1996-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3722 (1996) · source

41. “Mr. Fedotov (Russian Federation) (interpretation from Russian): The second anniversary of the signing of the Lusaka Protocol was commemorated on 20 November 1996. This Protocol became the basis of the peace process in Angola, opening up real prospects to the people of Angola for the restoration of long-awaited peace, stability and national reconciliation. The Russian Federation, one of the troika of observers to the Angolan settlement, is sincerely interested in the successful development and speedy conclusion of the peace process and is sparing no effort to achieve that goal. Ending the conflict in Angola, which has lasted for many years, would be not only the greatest boon to the people of that friendly country, but also a major success for the peacekeeping activities of the United Nations and of the international community as a whole.”

    1996-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3722 (1996) · source

42. “Nevertheless, in the light of all of the views stated above, our delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us.”

    1996-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3721 (1996) · source

43. “As regards external support for reform and development programmes, there must be significant and decisive action and coordination of international efforts by the United Nations specialized agencies, international financial organizations, including the Bretton Woods institutions, donor States and neighbouring and interested countries. In conclusion, I must emphasize that our work on the draft resolution demonstrated once again that constructive approaches and mutual respect for positions and interests help the members of the Council to find universally acceptable decisions. We are grateful to the sponsors of the draft for its reflection of a number of the basic elements of our approach, although we would have preferred more radical reductions in the United Nations military element.”

    1996-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3721 (1996) · source

44. “At the same time, we will be ready to consider recommendations of the Secretary-General regarding the possible nature and form of a subsequent international presence in Haiti, as provided for in the draft resolution. In this context, it is important that the draft resolution single out the high-priority tasks of the economic rehabilitation and reconstruction of Haiti. The Russian Federation has often expressed its View regarding the fact that the major cause for the continuing problems of that country is its difficult socio-economic situation. We are convinced that only a speedy recovery of the economic situation and stable development in Haiti can provide a truly sound foundation for lasting stability and the further strengthening of democracy in that country.”

    1996-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3721 (1996) · source

45. “All United Nations operations must, in one way or another, be time-bound. The maintenance of a significant United Nations presence in Haiti in the form of military elements, particularly against the backdrop of the far more drastic crisis situations in other regions of the world and the extremely difficult financial situation of the Organization, could be perceived as a manifestation of double standards, especially when one takes into account the totally different attitude towards other truly critical and more volatile flashpoints. As for Haiti's potential difficulties, inter alia, in the area of internal security, after the withdrawal of UNSMIH they will have to be resolved not by means of United Nations peacekeeping operations but rather with the assistance of mechanisms external to the United Nations.”

    1996-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3721 (1996) · source

46. “At the same time, if in the light of the Secretary- General's report in March next year, the Security Council deems it possible to conclude this operation two months earlier, by 31 May 1997, we will be ready to support such a proposal. The principal thing is that it be clearly spelt out by the draft resolution's sponsors that the mandate of UNSMIH is being extended for a final time. And this time will, indeed, be final. At this stage, provisions have already been made for a reduction in the military element of 100 people financed by the United Nations and for the Secretary-General to submit future recommendations regarding further reduction in the size of the Mission. Thus, the bases have been laid for a phased, full withdrawal of the military elements of the United Nations from Haiti by the time the mandate of UN SMIH is ended.”

    1996-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3721 (1996) · source

47. “It is our profound conviction that the situation in that country did not and does not represent a threat to international or even regional peace and security. It has lost the specific characteristics on account of which we once agreed to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation there. At the same time, taking into account the appeal of the President of Haiti, Mr. Rene Preval, the recommendation of the Secretary-General and the views of the group of "Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti", Russia agrees, in principle and in the spirit of compromise, to a final extension of the UNSMIH mandate for a concluding eight-month period.”

    1996-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3721 (1996) · source

48. “Mr. Fedotov (Russian Federation) (interpretation from Russian): The Russian delegation notes with satisfaction the recent progress made towards consolidating democracy and constitutional order in Haiti and the establishment of the new Haitian police. The highest praise goes to the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), which is responsibly carrying out the tasks that have been entrusted to it by the Security Council. We should like to express our gratitude to the staff of this Mission, among whom are our compatriots, for their tireless efforts to support and strengthen democracy in Haiti. As we have stated on numerous occasions, the Russian Federation had doubts regarding the necessity to extend the mandate of this Mission, and in particular to preserve its military element, and our position in this regard remains unchanged.”

    1996-12-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3721 (1996) · source

49. “We expect that they will make use of this last chance offered them for the speedy realization of the peace plan in all its aspects; otherwise, as is emphasized in the report (S/1996/684) of the Secretary-General, the international community will have no option but to leave Liberia. The Russian delegation is prepared to support the draft resolution before the Council, giving a green light to the extension the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia until 30 November 1996, and we note with satisfaction that this draft resolution clearly directs the Liberian parties to comply scrupulously with the commitments they have entered into and provides strong political impetus in support of the efforts to make progress in the peace process and in national reconciliation in Liberia.”

    1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source

50. “It is exceedingly important that the member States of ECOWAS show the necessary determination and consistency in implementing this policy, clearly coordinating their activities. It is also necessary to have proper cooperation between ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in carrying out their respective mandates; there lies the key to the success of the peace process. Noting the substantial objective difficulties to the implementation of the Abuja Agreement, we believe it important that the efforts of the regional peace-keepers be supported by the necessary additional resources. At the same time, we are firmly convinced that responsibility for the establishment of peace in Liberia lies ultimately with Liberians themselves and with their leaders.”

    1996-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3694 (1996) · source