YouSaid · the spoken record

Feltman

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838

first

2012-08-22

most recent

2018-02-28

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59

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un-security-council

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1. “Despite the significant progress made in reaching the affected people in the Lake Chad basin, the humanitarian needs in the region continue to be staggering. Approximately 10.7 million people require humanitarian assistance. With 8.5 million people in need, north-eastern Nigeria is again enduring the worst of the crisis. Funding continues to fall significantly short. At present, the regional appeal requesting $1.5 billion for 2017 is funded at only 40 per cent. The region now faces the rainy season, when food insecurity is at its worst, with thousands of farmers having missed four planting seasons in a row owing to conflict, resulting insecurity and displacements.”

   2017-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8047 (2017) · source

2. “Unless robust peacebuilding efforts are introduced, the reintegration of ex-combatants, including from Boko Haram and Vigilante groups, risk generating additional tensions and to heighten the risks of secondary conflict. Furthermore, the report notes the need for greater attention and funding to support development interventions, including community stabilization, economic revitalization and prevention, so as to build community resilience and ensure durable solutions. Yesterday, Under-Secretary-General Lowcock of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs concluded his first Visit to the Niger and Nigeria to increase international visibility of the humanitarian situation, discuss with the Governments and consider practical steps to further strengthen the response.”

   2017-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8047 (2017) · source

3. “Insecurity has sparked large-scale unemployment and left 1 million school-aged children deprived of education. The substantial economic impact of the crisis has reached nearly $9 billion across north-eastern Nigeria alone. Poverty, the low legitimacy of the State, human insecurity and climate change, among other challenges, compound that dire situation. As is so often the case, women and the youth are key risk groups. Conflict and displacement have eroded, and in some cases ruptured, the bonds between and within communities. Intra-communal structures and processes that traditionally regulated Violence and resolved conflicts have weakened. We detect worrying signs of social fragmentation as tensions emerge from ethno-religious, social and other divisions, including between internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities.”

   2017-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8047 (2017) · source

4. “The United Nations and international partners are working to sustain the momentum generated by those events. Last week in Berlin, the United Nations participated in the first senior officials' meeting of the Oslo Consultative Group on Prevention and Stabilization in the Lake Chad Region. The meeting brought together representatives of the affected countries, donors and regional and subregional organizations. Discussions focused on addressing the structural causes of the crisis and included community stabilization, the restoration of services, local governance systems and the prevention of violence. Turning to development challenges, I note that the Lake Chad basin crisis has wreaked havoc on basic infrastructure assets and Government services.”

   2017-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8047 (2017) · source

5. “In terms of political advocacy, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa and his Special Representative for Western Africa and the Sahel, respectively, regularly visit the affected countries to promote enhanced interregional cooperation. They propose a regional strategy to address the root causes of the crisis. Such a strategy should be owned and supported by the affected countries as well as the relevant subregional organizations, including the Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic Community of West African States and the Lake Chad Basin Commission. The Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region, held in February, and the visit by the Council in March brought needed attention to the long-neglected crisis in the Lake Chad basin.”

   2017-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8047 (2017) · source

6. “We thank the Government of Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross for their efforts to the release of an additional 82 girls kidnapped from Chibok in the north-eastern part ofNigeria in 2014. The recent visit to Nigeria by the Deputy Secretary- General and the Executive Director of UN-Women served to shed further light on the plight of women and girls in the Lake Chad basin. Unfortunately the fight is far from over. One hundred and thirty attacks attributed to Boko Haram in the four affected countries in June and July resulted in 284 civilian fatalities - a significant increase as compared to 146 attacks and 107 civilian fatalities in April and May. The most affected countries remained Nigeria, followed by Cameroon, the Niger and Chad.”

   2017-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8047 (2017) · source

7. “Mr. Feltman: I thank you, Mr. President, and the members of the Security Council for this opportunity to brief the Council on the Secretary-General's report (S/2017/764) on the situation in the Lake Chad basin. Allow me to comment first on security and political developments. Thanks to coordination among affected countries, we have witnessed encouraging progress in the fight against Boko Haram. The Secretary-General commends the Governments of the region for their efforts, including through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Without question, Boko Haram's combat capacity has diminished, but to compensate for that, Boko Haram has changed tactics by increasing the use of suicide attacks.”

   2017-09-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8047 (2017) · source

8. “We will continue to follow the developments and remain in close coordination with the concerned international organizations, members of the Council and other Governments concerned.”

   2017-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8039 (2017) · source

9. “As was said in the Security Council meeting last week (see S/PV.8034), as tensions rise so does the risk of misunderstanding, miscalculation and escalation. The latest serious developments require a comprehensive response in order to break the cycle of provocations from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Such a response must include wise and bold diplomacy if it is to be effective. As the Council considers its reaction, the Secretary- General reiterates the importance of responding to humanitarian imperatives regardless of the political situation. The people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea rely on the international community to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need.”

   2017-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8039 (2017) · source

10. “The Secretary-General condemns the underground nuclear test announced by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This act is yet another serious breach of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's international obligations and undermines international non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. This act is also profoundly destabilizing for regional and international security. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the only country that continues to break the norm against nuclear test explosions. The Secretary-General reiterates his call on the Democratic People's Republic ofKorea leadership to cease such acts and to comply fully with its international obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. The Secretary-General counts on the Security Council to remain united and take appropriate action.”

    2017-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8039 (2017) · source

11. “This is the second emergency Security Council meeting on non-proliferation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in less than a week, and the tenth time the Security Council has met to discuss the Democratic People's Republic of Korea this year. On 31 August, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Foreign Ministry issued a statement rejecting the Security Council's recent presidential statement S/PRST/2017/l6, and said that the ballistic missile launch of 29 August was the "first step taken by the Korean People's Army in its Pacific operation and a meaningful prelude to restraining Guam". There are reports today indicating that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea may be preparing new ballistic missile tests. We are alarmed by this dangerous provocation.”

    2017-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8039 (2017) · source

12. “In an earlier statement the same day, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea official media reported that their leader had inspected what they claimed to be a hydrogen bomb, which was conspicuously displayed in front of a payload fairing for a Hwasong-l4 intercontinental ballistic missile. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea article stated that the hydrogen bomb was "a multi-functional thermonuclear nuke with great destructive power which can be detonated even at high altitudes for super-powerful EMP attack". This was a rare reference by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the use of an electromagnetic pulse, which, triggered by a nuclear weapon, would aim for widespread damage and disruption to electricity grids and sensitive electronics, including on satellites.”

    2017-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8039 (2017) · source

13. “Experts have estimated a yield of between 50 and 100 kilotons, or on average more than five times more powerful than the weapon detonated over Hiroshima and at the low end of the yield of a modern thermonuclear weapon. The CTBTO detected a second smaller seismic event at the location of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea test site eight and half minutes after the main event. The CTBTO has not yet completed its analysis of this second event, but experts have speculated that it could have been caused by the collapse of the tunnel used in the nuclear test.”

    2017-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8039 (2017) · source

14. “The Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), in Vienna, said in a statement that the organization's monitoring stations had picked up an unusual seismic event in the area of the site used in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for its previous nuclear tests. The CTBTO's data indicated that the event measured approximately 6.0 in magnitude. Governmental sources from United Nations Member States measured a yield as high as 6.3. In any case, it is evident the yield of the device was larger than any of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's previous nuclear tests.”

    2017-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8039 (2017) · source

15. “Mr. Feltman: In a statement by its official news agency on 3 September, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced that it had successfully conducted a sixth nuclear explosive test. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea characterized the event as a "perfect success in the test of a hydrogen bomb for intercontinental ballistic missile". The Democratic People's Republic of Korea further said that it also "marked a very significant occasion in attaining the final goal of completing the state nuclear force".”

    2017-09-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8039 (2017) · source

16. “The Secretary-General is hopeful that all participants will continue to make progress in the implementation of the agreement and, in the process, secure its durability. In conclusion, I would like to acknowledge the leadership of His Excellency Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi of Italy in his role as Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). I would also like to convey our fullest support to him, as well as to the Security Council, in the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).”

    2017-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7990 (2017) · source

17. “In addition to the findings I have just mentioned, the report also reflects official information provided by Member States to the Secretary-General, including from Israel, Lebanon, South Africa, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United States of America and Yemen. The Secretariat has not been able to independently corroborate those reports and will provide further updates, as appropriate, should additional information become available. As we are about to enter into the third year of the implementation of the JCPOA, the Secretary-General would like to once again reaffirm the particular responsibilities of JCPOA participants in carrying forward the full and effective implementation of this agreement.”

    2017-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7990 (2017) · source

18. “Fourthly, the report also highlights the participation, for the second year in a row, of the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) in the Iraq defence exhibition held in March, which may again have implications regarding the implementation of the assets freeze. Since the D10 is an entity on the list maintained pursuant to resolution 2231 (2015), its funds, other financial assets and economic resources on the Iraqi territory should have been frozen by the Iraqi authorities. The issue was raised again with the Permanent Mission of Iraq, and the Secretary-General intends to report to the Council in due course. The Secretary-General's report also provides information on additional travels by Major General Qasem Soleimani since the second report (S/2016/ll36). The travels were reported by Iranian and Arab media outlets.”

    2017-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7990 (2017) · source

19. “In that regard, I would like to quote exactly from the third report of the Secretary-General: "I call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to avoid such ballistic missile launches, which have the potential to increase tensions. I appeal to all Member States to redouble their efforts to promote peace and stability in the region." (S/2017/515, para. 9) Thirdly, in terms of restrictions on arms-related transfers, the report includes additional information on the seizure of an arms shipment by the French navy in the northern Indian Ocean in March 2016. In January 2017, France invited the Secretariat to examine the seized arms. After examination of the weapons and analysis of information provided, the Secretariat is confident that the weapons seized are of Iranian origin and were shipped from Iran.”

    2017-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7990 (2017) · source

20. “In that regard, I wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge the excellent cooperation we have with the European External Action Service, especially its Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission. Secondly, regarding the implementation of ballistic missile-related provisions, the report notes that, on 29 January, Iran launched a medium-range ballistic missile. Letters were submitted to the Secretary- General by Iran and Israel, and jointly by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, concerning the launch. The letters presented a range of views and interpretations. As in the case of the ballistic missile launches by Iran in March 2016, there was no consensus in the Security Council on how this particular launch related to resolution 2231 (2015).”

    2017-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7990 (2017) · source

21. “Since 30 December 2016, 10 new nuclear- related proposals were submitted to the Security Council for approval, bringing to 16 the total number of proposals submitted since implementation day. Of the 16 proposals, 10 were approved by the Council, two were withdrawn by the proposing States and four are currently under review. The proposals were processed in accordance with the timelines established by resolution 2231 (2015), with due regard for information security and confidentiality. The operational linkages established between the Security Council and the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission are both effective and efficient.”

    2017-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7990 (2017) · source

22. “The report was submitted to the Council on 16 June pursuant to annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) and paragraph 7 ofthe note by the President of the Council issued on 16 January 2016 (S/2016/44). As guided by the Security Council, the report of the Secretary-General focuses on the implementation of the provisions contained in annex B to resolution 2231 (2015). Let me turn to the main findings of the third report. First, the Secretary-General has not received any report, nor is he aware of any open source information, regarding the supply, sale or transfer to Iran of nuclear- related items undertaken contrary to the provisions of the resolution. I also welcome the fact that Member States are making greater use of the procurement channel.”

    2017-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7990 (2017) · source

23. “The Secretary- General believes that the comprehensive and sustained implementation of the JCPOA will guarantee that Iran's nuclear programme remains exclusively peaceful, while allowing for transparency, monitoring and verification. It will also provide Iran with an opportunity for greater engagement with the international community and assist in increasing Iran's trade and economic relations. It will also bring forth to a satisfactory conclusion the consideration of the Iranian nuclear issue by the Security Council. I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on the third report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2017/515).”

    2017-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7990 (2017) · source

24. “Hence, it is imperative that all JCPOA participants, the United Nations and the international community at large, continue to support the full and effective implementation of this historic agreement. Today's meeting of the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) is taking place against the backdrop of steady implementation, cooperation and progress. Since implementation day, on 16 January 2016, the International Atomic Energy Agency has issued seven reports documenting continued implementation by Iran of its nuclear- related commitments. The recent 25 April meeting of the Joint Commission of the JCPOA in Vienna - the fifth meeting since implementation day - noted the continued adherence to JCPOA commitments by all its participants, and stressed the need to ensure its full and effective implementation.”

    2017-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7990 (2017) · source

25. “Mr. Feltman: Two years after the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Secretary-General is immensely encouraged by the continued commitment by all participants to the agreement. The JCPOA - reached by the E3/EU+3 and Iran on 14 July 2015 - is the embodiment of successful multilateral diplomacy, political will and perseverance. This diplomatic achievement reflects the spirit and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and gives us all hope that even the most difficult issues among States can be addressed through dialogue, understanding and reciprocity. As noted by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Ms. Federica Mogherini, this agreement belongs to the entire international community.”

    2017-06-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7990 (2017) · source

26. “Consequently, the Secretary-General welcomes the focus that the Security Council has put on this matter and urges it to enhance multilateral cooperation to address the threats and challenges he has reported on. The Secretary-General considers countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism to be one of the highest priorities of the Organization. That is why, in his report contained in documentA /71/858, currently being considered by the General Assembly, he recommends the establishment of a new office of counter-terrorism headed by an Under-Secretary- General. I am convinced that the new office will provide stronger leadership to our counter-terrorism efforts, enhance United Nations coordination and increase the impact of our assistance to Member States.”

    2017-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7962 (2017) · source

27. “Partnerships between the United Nations system and regional stakeholders need to be strengthened to effectively support G-5 countries' efforts to fight terrorism and illicit trafficking. The United Nations is renewing its engagement in the region, following an independent review of the Integrated Strategy for the Sahel. Since the first report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2253 (2015), ISIL and its affiliates have remained under continuous military pressure and experienced significant setbacks. At the same time, ISIL is becoming an increasingly transnational threat, which severely undermines international peace and security.”

    2017-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7962 (2017) · source

28. “Fourthly, the United Nations is assisting Member States and regions most at risk and where United Nations support can bring added value. For example, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, as mandated by resolution 2195 (2015) and presidential statement S/PRST/2015/24, and in collaboration with other CTITF entities, is developing a regional all-of- United Nations integrated assistance for countering terrorism initiative for the Group of Five (G-5) Sahel countries, as well as a national initiative for Mali. As mentioned in the report, the United Nations engagement in the Sahel will evolve in response to the continued threats posed by terrorism, violent extremism, transnational organized crime and illicit trans-border trafficking.”

    2017-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7962 (2017) · source

29. “The CTITF office and CTED recently concluded the second iteration of the Security Council-mandated all- of-United Nations capacity-building implementation plan to stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. While the projects and the plan continue to address the entire life-cycle of the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon, the updated version focuses on the tail end ofthe life-cycle, with a number ofprojects related to prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration to support Member States in their efforts to address returnees. A number of projects have now been completed or are well under way. The plan now includes 50 projects, submitted by 13 entities, with a total budget of $107 million over five years. Forty-one per cent of the total budget is funded.”

    2017-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7962 (2017) · source

30. “Thirdly, the efforts of United Nations entities, as well as those of other key actors, such as INTERPOL and the Financial Action Task Force, have helped strengthen regional and national frameworks to counter terrorism financing and stem the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. Other examples in the report include CTED's assessments and identification of good practices, and the capacity-building initiatives of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, including on the legal and judicial aspects of terrorism financing, kidnapping for ransom and asset freezing, and border security and management.”

    2017-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7962 (2017) · source

31. “First, since the adoption of resolution 2253 (2015), 11 associated individuals have been listed in the ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list. Among them, eight are listed as financiers or financial facilitators. Secondly, Member States are making substantial progress on adapting their legal and operational frameworks to the requirements of Security Council resolutions in order to address the terrorist financing and foreign terrorist fighter threats. Notwithstanding that, more work needs to be done with regard to the implementation of those norms and mechanisms, including in the context of terrorist asset-freezing, cross-border movement of cash, and human rights- compliant travel measures to address the foreign terrorist fighter threat.”

    2017-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7962 (2017) · source

32. “I welcome the efforts of the Council over the past months to adopt resolutions on countering terrorist narratives; protecting critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks; stemming the destruction, looting and smuggling of cultural heritage sites and artefacts, as well as their illicit trade and trafficking carried out by terrorist groups or in a context of armed conflict; and addressing the terrorist threat in the Lake Chad basin region. Member States, the UnitedNations and international, regional and subregional organizations continue to strengthen existing tools while also developing new ones to address the rapidly evolving threat posed by ISIL, including the threat posed by returning foreign terrorist fighters. In that context, the report highlights some points that deserve attention.”

    2017-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7962 (2017) · source

33. “With regard to ISIL's evolving threat outside of Syria and Iraq, ISIL-affiliated groups in North Africa have shown considerable resilience and pose a serious danger. For example, while ISIL in Libya has been weakened after losing a significant portion of the territory it controlled, its threat persists in Libya and in neighbouring countries. In West Africa, ISIL is challenging established Al-Qaida affiliates. In East Africa, emerging ISIL affiliates operating in Puntland and parts of southern Somalia compound the threat posed by Al-Qaida's affiliates. Al-Shabaab, ISIL in Somalia and ISIL in Yemen represent an increasing menace. ISIL in Afghanistan is shifting its focus to the north of the country. The threat level has intensified in South-East Asia, with ISIL directing more of its attention, including its propaganda, at the region.”

    2017-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7962 (2017) · source

34. “Despite growing liquidity shortages, ISIL may be able to stretch further its existing resources. ISIL continues to fund affiliates, while urging them to become more self-sufficient and proactive in developing internal revenue streams. Money services, including exchange houses and money couriers, continue to be a preferred method for ISIL and its supporters to move funds across borders. As Member States consider efforts to counter ISIL financing, a key concern is how to allow reconstruction and stabilization funds to flow into liberated areas, including by reconnecting international financial structures, without also enabling ISIL remnants to abuse those structures and exploit that new liquidity.”

    2017-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7962 (2017) · source

35. “However, returnees and the relocation of fighters from the conflict zones to other regions now present a considerable threat to international security. Although ISIL's financial situation has steadily declined over the past 16 months, it continues to rely chiefly on the same two revenue streams, namely, sales of hydrocarbons and extortion/taxation, which may amount to tens of millions of dollars per month. ISIL has also drawn income from antiquities smuggling, agricultural products, the sale of electricity, exploitation of mineral resources such as phosphates and sulfuric acid, external donations, kidnapping for ransom and human trafficking. As ISIL loses its control on population centres and its forces continue to dwindle, it will also have substantially lower costs.”

    2017-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7962 (2017) · source

36. “In Europe, ISIL has used its online presence to encourage supporters to mount attacks in their countries of residence. That has led to multiple attacks, including in Belgium, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Some attacks were carried out by foreign terrorist fighter returnees, while others were conducted by individuals who had not travelled to conflict zones. Investigations demonstrate that the perpetrators, despite being sometimes labelled as lone actors, often received support or resources from facilitators and, in a number of cases, were in direct contact with ISIL enablers. The report notes a decrease in the flow of foreign terrorist fighters and in the overall number of ISIL fighters during the past 16 months.”

    2017-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7962 (2017) · source

37. “This fifth report has taken a global approach, with a focus on the financing of terrorism. The report stresses that ISIL, despite continuous military pressure, continues to resist, particularly in Mosul and Raqqa. At the same time, ISIL has reorganized its military structure, giving more power to local commanders, and is more focused than ever before on enabling and inspiring attacks outside of conflict zones. The threat from ISIL has been intensified by its use of the Internet and social media to disseminate propaganda online to a wide international audience. Although the volume of such messages has declined over the past 16 months, the threat persists as supporters outside Syria and Iraq collect and redistribute that propaganda.”

    2017-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7962 (2017) · source

38. “The report was prepared with the input of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, and in close collaboration with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and other relevant entities. Since January 2016, the four previous reports to the Security Council on the threat posed by ISIL have focused on the global landscape; South-East Asia; Yemen and East Africa; Libya and Afghanistan; and Europe, North Africa and West Africa.”

    2017-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7962 (2017) · source

39. “Mr. Feltman: At the outset, I would like to reiterate, on behalf of the Secretary-General, my solidarity with the people and the Governments of Iraq, Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, Egypt and Iran following the recent terrorist attacks on their cities. I call on all Member States to redouble their efforts to strengthen international cooperation to address terrorism and violent extremism, and bring those responsible for these despicable attacks to justice. I am grateful for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the fifth report of the Secretary- General on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat (S/20l7/467).”

    2017-06-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7962 (2017) · source

40. “As the Secretary-General has said, these events underscore our belief that the only way to resolve the conflict is through a political settlement. We urge the parties to renew their commitment to making progress in the Geneva talks as soon as possible. In that regard, resolution 2254 (2015) and the Geneva communique of 30 June 2012 (S/2012/522, annex) remain the foundation of United Nations mediation efforts and contain the core principles for them - and, ultimately, for a solution.”

    2017-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7919 (2017) · source

41. “In the case of Syria, there can be no genuine protection if the parties to the conflict, Government and opposition alike, are permitted to act with impunity and if the Syrian Government continues to commit human rights violations against its own citizens. Protecting the Syrian people requires immediate action, action that is rooted in the principles of the United Nations and international law. Mindful of the risk of escalation, the Secretary-General has publicly appealed for restraint in order to avoid any acts that could deepen the suffering of the Syrian people. We further urge all parties involved in military operations to abide by international humanitarian law and take all necessary precautions to avoid and minimize civilian casualties.”

    2017-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7919 (2017) · source

42. “We hope that the Council can unite and exercise that responsibility to investigate the alleged use of chemical weapons in Khan Shaykhun. It is important that the Council send a strong collective message that any use of chemical weapons will not be tolerated and will have consequences. The Secretary-General stresses that the international community has a responsibility to hold any perpetrator of chemical-weapons attacks accountable and to ensure that chemical weapons are never again used as an instrument of warfare. The protection of civilians and accountability should be at the top of our peace and security agenda.”

    2017-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7919 (2017) · source

43. “According to news reports, the United States said that it had informed Russian Federation forces of the strike in advance, using the established de-confliction mechanism, and taking precautions to minimize the risk to Russian or Syrian personnel located at the airfield. A statement from the Syrian General Command of the army and the armed forces called the attack a "blatant act of aggression" that had caused six deaths and "huge material damage". Iran and the Russian Federation condemned the attack. The United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and New Zealand have expressed some support for the strikes. The Security Council has the primary responsibility for international peace and security.”

    2017-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7919 (2017) · source

44. “The Secretary-General, in a public statement, shared that he was appalled by the chemical-weapons attack in Khan Shaykhun and the deaths of and injury to many innocent civilians. This morning at approximately 4.35 a.m., two United States naval vessels deployed in the eastern Mediterranean Sea launched a total of 59 cruise missiles targeting the Al-Shayrat military airbase in Horns governorate. The United States has stated that this was in response to what it says was the Syrian Government's use of chemical weapons from this airbase. The United States claimed that the missiles severely damaged or destroyed Syrian aircraft and support infrastructure and equipment.”

    2017-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7919 (2017) · source

45. “The Syrian Government cited the presence of the Al-Nusra Front in these areas, claims that were disputed by the opposition. Subsequently, during February and March, armed opposition groups, sometimes coordinating with the Al-Nusra Front, launched offensives in Dar'a Damascus and Hamah. 5 On 4 April, as Government forces were fighting to regain territory recently lost to opposition offensives in northern Hamah, alarming reports emerged of an alleged chemical attack in nearby Khan Shaykhun, in southern Idlib. Sources on the ground reported airstrikes. The Council, of course, discussed this at an emergency meeting on 5 April (see S/PV.7915). The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has announced that its Fact-Finding Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic is starting to investigate the alleged Khan Shaykhun attack.”

    2017-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7919 (2017) · source

46. “Mr. Feltman: Let me also convey, on behalf of those of us in the Secretariat, our condolences and our shock to our friends from Sweden on the attacks in Stockholm. The Secretary-General is following this with great concern. The Council has requested the Secretariat to provide an update on Syria. In addition, the Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, will brief the Council in less than a week. I will therefore keep my remarks short. In the last two months, we have seen the 30 December 2016 ceasefire falter amid a steady escalation of military activity. In mid-February, Government forces escalated their military operations in several areas of Damascus and Homs, recapturing Wadi Barada and Al-Waer in Horns. Military advances there were accompanied by the large-scale evacuation of fighters and their families.”

    2017-04-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7919 (2017) · source

47. “As CTITF Chair, and in the light of this debate and the resolution that was adopted today, I will encourage the CTITF Inter-Agency Working Group on Countering the Financing of Terrorism to develop new projects to help Member States protect their cultural heritage. The United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, have demonstrated their determination to further integrate the protection of cultural heritage in their counter-terrorism work. With the support of United Nations entities, Member States are strengthening their legal frameworks and criminal justice systems and enhancing their collaboration to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks against their cultural heritage. I believe we can, and must, do even more. Resolution 2347 (2017) provides a good basis to do just that. The United Nations stands ready to do its part.”

    2017-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7907 (2017) · source

48. “We need to put a stronger focus on investigation, cross- border cooperation and exchange of information, and on bringing in private and public sector partners, including dealers and the tourism sector, to promote supply-chain integrity and stop the illicit trade and sale of cultural property. The United Nations system, particularly through the entities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), is increasingly supporting Member States' efforts to address these threats through advocacy and capacity-building assistance. For example, the UNESCO and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime are already working together, along with INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization and other partners, to assist Member States in protecting cultural heritage and countering the trafficking in cultural property.”

    2017-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7907 (2017) · source

49. “This is based on the United Nations Conventions against Transnational Organized Crime and Corruption, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the International Guidelines for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Responses with Respect to Trafficking in Cultural Property and other Related Offences. Protecting cultural heritage requires us to make every effort to implement this international legal and normative framework and strengthen international cooperation. It also demands a global criminal-justice response that can prevent trafficking in cultural property by disrupting organized criminal and terrorist networks, including through anti-corruption and anti-money- laundering action, and bringing perpetrators to justice.”

    2017-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7907 (2017) · source

50. “Meanwhile, during the fifth review of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the General Assembly expressed concern, in resolution 70/291, that terrorists may benefit from transnational organized crime in some regions, including from the trafficking of cultural property, and condemned the destruction of cultural heritage by terrorist groups. In paragraph 3 of resolution 68/127, the General Assembly deplored "attacks on religious places and shrines and cultural sites in violation of international law, in particular human rights and humanitarian law". Moreover, there is already a strong international legal and normative framework to address these crimes.”

    2017-03-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.7907 (2017) · source