YouSaid · the spoken record

Fernando Arias

lines on the record
16
first
2020-12-11
most recent
2020-12-11
sittings or episodes
1
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un-security-council

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  1. “There can be no justification for the use of these abhorrent weapons ... We must remain united and determined in preventing their use ... It is imperative that those who use, or have used, chemical weapons are identified and held accountable.” Those words are not mine. They were part of the message delivered by the Secretary- General a few days ago, on 30 November, on the occasion of the Day of Remembrance for all Victims of Chemical Warfare.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  2. “The OPCW is mandated to prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons, and there is no room for complacency, because the goal of destroying all declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, which will be soon accomplished, is only one important milestone in our work. For the past 23 years, the OPCW has delivered concrete results. Over the past seven years, it has been under growing scrutiny. Despite that pressure, the Organization has maintained its professionalism and focused faithfully on its mission. We will continue to stay the course that was assigned to us by the 193 States parties to the Convention. We owe it to the victims of the use of chemical weapons and to future generations. In conclusion, let me cite four very short sentences. “The use of chemical weapons … is intolerable and a serious violation of international law ...”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  3. “That is essential, as the OPCW’s headquarters has continued to be subjected to various sorts of cyberattacks throughout the year. The number of those attacks is on the rise, and the level of sophistication is considerable. The situation regarding the international non-proliferation and disarmament regimes is worrisome. Many of those regimes are under threat, while others continue to lack efficient verification or structured mechanisms capable of ensuring confidence in their implementation. Against that backdrop, the Chemical Weapons Convention embodies a total and verifiable ban on an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. We work for the complete elimination and total destruction of chemical weapons, with zero tolerance. The Convention is a modern and comprehensive international legal instrument.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  4. “The project to build a Centre for Chemistry and Technology — the ChemTech Centre — close to the OPCW headquarters in The Hague has made steady progress this year, within the planned timeline and budget. The construction of the facility is scheduled to begin in the summer of next year and to be completed by the end of 2022. The Centre will support international cooperation and capacity-building activities for States parties in order to better protect them against the risk of the use of chemical weapons and to enhance international cooperation on the peaceful uses of chemistry, with the ultimate goal of protecting people and the environment. It will also house a state-of-the-art laboratory. And not least, the Centre will play an important role in ensuring the OPCW’s business continuity.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  5. “All of those developments demonstrate the need for the OPCW to remain capable of professionally and independently addressing all challenges related to chemical weapons. We need to maintain our capacity to render expert assistance to all 193 States parties whenever we are requested. But we also need to be able to accompany and support States parties in increasing their own national capabilities to counter threats of the use of chemical weapons. Plots or attempts to use chemical weapons by non-State actors have been reported in member States across various regions. The risk is real, and the international community needs to tackle it up front.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  6. “The Technical Secretariat has since engaged with the Russian Federation to resolve the outstanding legal, technical and operational matters necessary for such a visit to take place. The Technical Secretariat is still awaiting elements in that respect from the Russian Federation before being able to deploy a technical assistance visit to Russia, as was done for Germany. The detailed correspondence exchanged on that issue with the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the OPCW will be made available via the OPCW’s public website. The Technical Secretariat and its network of designated laboratories look forward to assisting the Russian Federation in its request, as has been done previously with other States parties.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  7. “The results of the analysis confirmed that traces of a toxic chemical of the Novichok family were found in Mr. Navalny’s blood. According to the CWC, the poisoning of an individual through the use of any nerve agent is a use of a chemical weapon, whether or not that chemical is included in the Convention. Upon receipt of the analysis of the samples by the designated laboratories, the Technical Secretariat prepared its report, which was shared with the German authorities. At Germany’s request, the Technical Secretariat subsequently shared the summary of the report with all States parties and made it public. On 6 October, I received a request from the Russian Federation for a technical assistance visit under paragraph 38 (e) of article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention, concerning the same incident.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  8. “At the same time, it also relies on information given by States parties to the CWC, as requested in the relevant decisions of the Executive Council. Aside from its Syria-related work, the Technical Secretariat was called on to assist with another incident involving the use of chemical weapons. On 20 August, Alexei Navalny, a Russian citizen and political activist, fell seriously ill while travelling by plane in Russia. Two days later, Mr. Navalny was taken to Germany for medical treatment. In September, the Technical Secretariat conducted a technical assistance visit in response to a request from Germany under paragraph 38 (e) of article VIII of the CWC. During the visit, a team of experts from the Technical Secretariat collected biomedical samples directly from Mr. Navalny, with his consent, for analysis by OPCW-designated laboratories.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  9. “To date, given the gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies that remain unresolved, the declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic still cannot be considered accurate and complete. On 2 October, the Technical Secretariat released two reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons in Aleppo in November 2018 and in Saraqib in August 2016. The reports concluded that it was not possible for the Mission to establish whether chemicals were used or likely used as a weapon in those incidents. The Mission is continuing to analyse the information collected from its most recent deployments in eight different cases. I wish to stress here that the Technical Secretariat independently collects its own information.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  10. “The Technical Secretariat therefore requested that the Syrian Arab Republic declare the exact types and quantities of chemical agents produced or weaponized at the site in question, in line with the relevant provisions of the CWC. At this point, I would like to recall that the initial declaration of a State party is an important and compulsory step upon joining the Convention. Within 30 days of its accession, each State party has to provide a full declaration of its chemical weapons programme, if any. During the seven years that have elapsed since Syria joined the Convention in 2013, the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW has spared no effort in assessing Syria’s initial declaration and assisting the country in completing it.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  11. “In the course of that deployment, the DAT collected samples, verified the destruction of items previously observed as not destroyed and discussed the current status of all outstanding issues. The activities and outcomes of the DAT’s deployment were reported to the Executive Council in October. During the recent round of consultations, three issues related to the Syrian initial declaration were closed, while 19 issues remain outstanding. One of those 19 issues pertains to a chemical-weapon production facility that the Syrian National Authority declared had never been used for the production of chemical weapons. The review of all the information and other materials gathered by the DAT since 2014, including samples, indicates that the production or weaponization of chemical- warfare nerve agents did take place at that facility.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  12. “In that context, I should recall that while the Technical Secretariat has had the authority to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in Syria since June 2018, the Technical Secretariat is neither a public prosecutor nor a court of justice. States parties do have tools at their disposal to proceed further on the basis of the information they have received. The same applies to the Security Council and to the United Nations more broadly. In the meantime, the IIT is continuing its investigations into other incidents falling under its purview. The twenty-third round of consultations between the OPCW Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) and the Syrian Arab Republic took place in Damascus from 22 September to 3 October.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  13. “Sarin was used on two of those occasions and chlorine on one. Following the issuance of the IIT report, the Executive Council of the OPCW adopted a decision in July requesting that the Syrian Arab Republic declare to the Technical Secretariat, within 90 days, the chemical weapons used in the attacks in Ltamenah. Under that decision, Syria was also requested to declare all of the chemical weapons it currently possesses and to resolve all outstanding issues regarding its initial declaration. On 14 October, I reported to the Executive Council and all States parties that the Syrian Arab Republic had not completed any of those requirements. A draft decision was put forward by France on behalf of 46 States parties with a view to further addressing the issue. It will be discussed during the second part of the Conference in spring 2021.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  14. “In preparing for the Conference, we took into consideration the COVID-19 situation in The Hague, the guidance of the Dutch authorities and, at the same time, the need to fulfil the Conference’s obligations. The Conference concluded with the adoption of the programme and budget for 2021, which are vital to the functioning of the OPCW. The Conference will most likely resume in spring 2021 and will address all of the remaining agenda items. I will refer now to the Syrian chemical weapons dossier. As I mentioned in my briefing to the Council in May, the Technical Secretariat released the first report of the IIT on 8 April. The report concluded that there are reasonable grounds to believe that individuals belonging to the Syrian Arab Air Force used chemical weapons in Ltamenah on three occasions in March 2017.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  15. “Verification has progressed at chemical-weapon destruction facilities thanks to modifications that ensure the health and safety of inspectors and personnel on site. The Technical Secretariat resumed its industry inspections in mid-September based on an adjusted prioritization plan. Old chemical-weapon inspections were conducted this year at a number of sites. The OPCW’s International Cooperation and Assistance Division was able to deliver 38 online capacity-building events this year, benefiting some 1,400 participants. And on 30 November and 1 December, the first part of the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) was held in The Hague.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source

  16. “I thank the South African presidency for this opportunity to inform the Security Council about developments at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) since my previous briefing, on 12 May, at the invitation of the Estonian presidency. At that time, I briefed the Council on the first report issued by the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which identified the perpetrators of several cases of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Over the past seven months, the OPCW Technical Secretariat has continued to adapt its activities to the impact of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in order to continue to deliver its services to member States and implement the mandates received.”

    2020-12-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2020/1202 (2020) · source