YouSaid · the spoken record

Francisco Caetano José Madeira

lines on the record
12
first
2021-02-22
most recent
2021-02-22
sittings or episodes
1
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un-security-council

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  1. The renewal of the AMISOM mandate must take into account the prevailing political and security realities on the ground and the need for us all not to put those hard-won gains at risk.

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  2. That assessment will also allow AMISOM to further reconfigure so as to better support Somalia’s security and broader stabilization requirements. Later this week, the Security Council will review AMISOM’s mandate. Since the deployment of AMISOM in 2007, the Mission has continued to achieve its strategic objectives. That has come at a huge human cost. That sacrifice by AMISOM, together with that of the Somali security forces, has over the past 14 years resulted in the creation of a physical space where life evolves in relative safety, political dialogue and reconciliation can take place and governance, humanitarian relief and the extension of State authority can become a reality across Somalia.

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  3. The African Union strongly believes that the holding of a force generation conference as soon as practically possible will address the full range of requirements for the success of the ongoing transition operations. It would also allow international partners to identify resources to ensure that the implementation of the Somali transition plan does not suffer further delays. We also believe that, as we continue to support and implement the transition, it must be our collective responsibility to realistically and transparently assess the conditions on the ground. In that connection, as the Council is now aware, the African Union is in the process of conducting its own independent assessment to decide on the future of AMISOM in Somalia after 2021.

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  4. The African Union remains committed to working closely and in coordination and complementarity with the Somali security forces with a view to further strengthening and expediting their taking over of security responsibilities from AMISOM. It is in that context that the African Union Peace and Security Council in its recent communiqué took note of the progress of the Somali transition plan review. In the area of operations, the success of the transition plan will very much depend on our capacity to expedite the generation of a well-trained, well-equipped, well-supported and capable Somali army. Without a very clear, resourced and implementable force generation plan, the discussions that we have been having and the decisions that we have taken will be compromised.

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  5. In implementing its transition obligations under Operation Badbaado 1, with the exception of the capture of Basra town, AMISOM has successfully completed its transition tasks in Lower Shabelle. The completion of Operation Badbaado 1 will now allow AMISOM to commence transition operations in Middle Shabelle. That new phase of operations will be greatly enhanced by the recent deployment of four helicopters from the Republic of Uganda. In accordance with resolution 2520 (2020), I can report that AMISOM has also commenced implementing its reconfiguration, as agreed at the joint AMISOM- SNA sector commanders conference in October 2020, with key tasks endorsed at the Operations Coordination Committee, also in October 2020, and widely welcomed by international partners at the European Union security event on Somalia in November 2020.

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  6. Secondly, particularly in Bay and Bakool, Al-Shabaab has placed emphasis on conducting disruptive operations, targeting humanitarian aid convoys and, in some cases, cargo aeroplanes carrying goods and supplies. Thirdly, Al-Shabaab is extending its tentacles and increasingly making its presence felt in Galmudug. That has led to the group intensifying its attacks in that member state in recent months, such as the Gaalkacyo Stadium attack last December. However, despite the coronavirus disease pandemic and the limitations imposed by seasonal rains, we have been able to contain Al-Shabaab’s activities through enhanced collaboration and joint operations with the Somali national forces and allow life to evolve in relative security in most population centres across AMISOM areas of operations.

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  7. With regard to security, in general the situation remains volatile, as Al-Shabaab is strategically positioning itself with a view to maximizing its capacity to thwart the upcoming electoral process. In that regard, it places a particular focus on Mogadishu, where it continues to unleash its deadly attacks. Beyond Mogadishu and in AMISOM areas of operations, we continue to observe three emerging tactics of Al-Shabaab, with the obvious goal of destabilizing the elections in the federal member states. First, Al-Shabaab has been mobilizing forces as part of its plans to retake key locations in Lower and Middle Shabelle so as to facilitate its deadly operations in the Banaadir region.

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  8. Despite the challenges and delays I have just mentioned, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continues to deliver on its election-related responsibilities, particularly with regard to the provision of election security, training and technical support. In delivering those tasks, there has been enhanced and more complementary collaboration and coordination between the AMISOM police and the Somali police, the AMISOM civilian component and their counterparts in Government departments, journalists and civil society and the AMISOM military and the Somali National Army (SNA). That multifaceted interaction and collaboration will be very important and necessary during the actual election process.

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  9. It is important that the leaders come up with a specific date to meet and look into those proposals, which hold the key to overcoming the technical hurdles that have impeded the 17 September agreement from being implemented and elections from being delivered. But the events of 19 and 20 February took place after the Baidoa proposals had already been released and a date for a meeting of the leaders to look into them had been proposed. That meeting did not take place. A space must be created to carefully look into that, and we, as international partners, should support the Somali stakeholders in that endeavour. Maintaining channels of communication and dialogue remain vital tools in that effort.

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  10. In that regard, a great deal has already been achieved. The leaders of the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states, the two chambers of the national Parliament, the Council of Presidential Candidates, the business community and the civil society organizations have all recognized and endorsed the 17 September agreement. The 19 and 20 February clashes did not question the validity of the 17 September agreement. The recently held Baidoa technical discussions, to which all the federal member states sent experts to participate, came up with proposals that all the participants unanimously adopted and recommended that the leaders of the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states meet, endorse and agree on a road map for elections.

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  11. He reiterated the importance and absolute necessity for elections as a means for the renewal and reaffirmation of people’s trust and confidence in their leaders and for the consolidation of the peace, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. The armed clashes of 19 and 20 February have died down and stopped, but the political tension and the underlying causes that led to those clashes have not. It is therefore important that Somali stakeholders return to the negotiating table, remain focused and continue with their dialogue, guided by the spirit of constructiveness, compromise and consensus, so as to agree on a credible process that can, in a peaceful and conducive environment, deliver a free and transparent election in conformity with the 17 September agreement.

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source

  12. I thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to brief the Security Council on Somalia once again. Let me start by congratulating the United Kingdom on its presidency of the Security Council for the month of February. Today’s meeting is taking place in the aftermath of the events of 19 and 20 February, which resulted in the eruption of armed clashes in Mogadishu as Somali political leaders struggle to unlock the current political impasse and allow the country to hold peaceful, inclusive and transparent elections. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission, His Excellency Mr. Moussa Faki Mahamat, demanded restraint and urged Somali stakeholders to refrain from acts that may escalate tensions or lead to further violence.

    2021-02-22 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/173 (2021) · source