YouSaid · the spoken record

GAMBARI

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1992-07-15
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2012-07-24
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un-security-council

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  1. Mr. Gambari: In my briefing of 20 March 2002, I informed the Council that the Secretary-General intended to send me on an extended mission to Angola, which intention was endorsed by members of the Council in their last presidential statement on Angola, contained in document S/PRST/2002/7, of March 28 2002. The objectives of the mission were to deliver a written message from the Secretary-General to President dos Santos; to witness the signing ceremony of the Memorandum of Understanding, which is complementary to the Lusaka Protocol; to clarify the role of the United Nations during the current, and next, phase of the peace process; and to have substantive discussions with the President and with senior members of the Government on how the United Nations can best assist in the peace process.

    2002-04-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4517 (2002) · source

  2. The United Nations Development Programme could also provide support for serious national non- governmental organizations and other members of civil society in the area of peace and the promotion of capacity-building and human rights, and even in humanitarian assistance. Finally, there is the possibility of a meeting with the Secretary-General. That has been requested by leaders of the churches - again, not one church - and civil society. I think that we should try to exhaust those avenues for encouraging civil society at this point. I want to take this opportunity to wish all members of the Council a very happy holiday season.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  3. Finally, with regard to the role of civil society, as I mentioned earlier, I believe that the Government has no objection to the role of churches -I use the plural - and all other members of civil society as facilitators. As for the Arria-formula meeting with the Security Council, that is, of course, in the hands of Council members. But I would suggest that we proceed on that issue with great caution, because we must be careful not to damage the relationship which has been carefully built up between the United Nations and the Government of Angola. Furthermore, I would suggest that we have not yet exhausted the United Nations capacity to continue to encourage the work of civil society in the peace process - through, for example, the policy statements emanating from the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  4. How will the current sanctions be affected if the opportunity for dialogue bears fruit? I think we need to draw attention to the various elements of United Nations sanctions. The first is the political element - the travel ban on some members of UNITA. Secondly, there is the dimension of closing down their offices in some key capitals. And thirdly, there is the military dimension of the sanctions. I believe that a time may come when the political aspect might have to be reconsidered, perhaps, regarding the suspension of the travel ban on some UNITA officials. I would not say that that time has come yet, but the issue might have to be considered at an appropriate time by the Council - those officials who need to travel for the sake of peace -though this will have to be clearly identified and specified.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  5. Members of civil society are continuing to put pressure on both sides to try to end the war and agree to a ceasefire, because the people of Angola have simply suffered too much and for too long as a result of this conflict. I would also like to refer to the role of the neighbouring countries. Their support has been critical, and their clear position on the need to maintain sanctions has also been helpful. I would also add that I believe that the strong support by the Council for a political settlement each time it has spoken or made a pronouncement has also been a contributing factor. As to the question of Savimbi's seriousness about dialogue and ceasefire, I guess my response would be that we will have to find out. And the best way to find out is to actually try to make some contacts and clarify situations.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  6. Neither of these strategies was supposed to be an end in itself but, rather, a means to nudge the Government of Angola and, more particularly, Savimbi's UNITA, towards a political settlement of this conflict. I believe that the two-pronged strategy appears to be bearing fruit. I would also consider that the military weakness of UNITA provides a window of opportunity. In any talks with Savimbi's UNITA, the Government of Angola would not be talking from a position of weakness but, in fact, from a position of strength. I believe it is also fair to say that the military pressure against UNITA has clearly increased considerably. I would also like to mention the important role of civil society; I will come back to this issue later.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  7. But clearly - and I mentioned this to my interlocutors in Luanda - a possible visit by the Secretary-General will be conditional upon progress on all fronts. These would include the peace process and, perhaps, some of those areas in which the technical team from the United Nations is having fruitful discussions with the Government of Angola - elections, the fund for peace and the pilot programme for demobilized soldiers. I think these are opportunities that we need to explore further. A question was asked about the factors that have created new windows of opportunity. I would suggest that such factors include the two-pronged United Nations strategy of improving relations with the Government of Angola and imposing sanctions against UNITA.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  8. In this regard, I would like to say that what the Secretary-General has directed me to do is, among other things, to build upon the support of those who would like to be allies of the Secretary-General in trying to examine the prospects of these windows of opportunity - in other words, those who are willing to stake political capital on encouraging both sides to move in the direction of talks, even if, initially, they will be talks about talks. In this regard, I would also like to mention to members of the Council that the Government of Angola has sent a formal invitation for the Secretary-General to visit Angola in the near future. The Secretary-General was awaiting the outcome of my visit and, of course, he will have to look at his own calendar.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  9. The challenge is how to establish credible contacts between the Government and UNITA and to make such contacts regular and, we hope, productive. With regard to the role of the churches and civil society in such a dialogue, again I would like to underscore the need to keep each role separate. Their role is supposed to be that of facilitator, rather than of mediator. The issue was also raised about creative ideas for the way forward.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  10. On the issue of next steps for getting dialogue off the ground and the new role for the United Nations, I believe that the Government of Angola is very clear that what the United Nations needs to do is to assume the role of mediator, without ruling out a complementary or supplementary role for civil society, with other Governments as facilitators. We have pretty much been given the go-ahead to explore how we can get such a dialogue going, and in the next few days or weeks we will be thinking, within the Secretariat, about the necessary steps. Once we get clearance from the Secretary-General, we will proceed accordingly. On the question as to whether the advice to move the peace process off the streets and into serious contacts and negotiations enjoys the general consensus of those to whom we talked, I would say that the answer is "Yes".

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  11. I believe that we need to continue to encourage the Government to do more to take advantage of the window of opportunity in the areas where humanitarian assistance can be delivered safely, in cooperation with the United Nations, the international aid agencies, the international non- governmental organizations and all of the stakeholders. As to whether the Security Council would want a specific briefing on the humanitarian situation, as has been done in the past, that, of course, is for the members of the Council to decide. I agree with those who have observed that the crux of this matter is really the peace process and the way forward, because if the peace process accelerates, the issue of humanitarian assistance will also be positively affected. I would like to respond to some of the questions asked.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  12. I should like also to associate myself with the assessment that, although in some areas the situation is bad and getting worse, the efforts of the Government of Angola really constitute good and positive news in terms of the acceptance by the Government of Angola that it has the primary responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance to its own people, the internally displaced persons. As I also mentioned, every effort is being made- and in this respect I was put in touch with personnel in the Office of the President - to ensure the improvement of the physical infrastructure to promote the delivery of humanitarian assistance: roads and bridges, and the important airport in Kuito, which is being repaired.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  13. Mr. Gambari: I want to begin by thanking all of the members of the Council for the kind words addressed to me for the work that I carry out on behalf of the Secretary-General in trying to move towards a political settlement of the conflict in Angola. A number of issues have been raised, and I will summarize them in three categories: first, the humanitarian situation; secondly, the political situation, and in particular the peace process; and thirdly, the role of civil society. With respect to the humanitarian situation, I should like to confirm that the figure provided me in Angola on the number of internally displaced persons is indeed 4.1 million.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  14. In this regard, the Secretary-General has directed me to continue consultations with certain Southern African Development Community (SADC) leaders, other African leaders and other Member States on the way forward. Under the guidance of the Secretary-General, we in the Secretariat will continue to work on these issues and also to work with the Council and all other interested parties to find ways to accelerate the peace process in the context of the Lusaka Protocol, so that peace can come to Angola sooner rather than later.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  15. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that, meanwhile, the pilot programmes that have been discussed with the United Nations technical teams and the Government of Angola will have a component of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants into civilian life, in which the Government of Angola will take the lead. The Government has also informed us that there are a number of UNITA combatants defecting to Government-controlled areas who are arriving with their weapons. Hence, it is important that a mechanism be considered and designed which can facilitate the collection and destruction of such weapons. In conclusion, there is indeed now a window of opportunity to advance the peace process in Angola which the United Nations should explore.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  16. On a related matter, my delegation has also had the opportunity to discuss with the authorities the issue of the collection and destruction of weapons, in the event that the peace process accelerates. The Government had indicated, in its four-point peace plan, that the United Nations should assume responsibility for this task. Accepting such a task would, however, involve an adjustment to the current mandate and capacity of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA). As we know, its current mandate allows UNOA to have two dimensions: capacity-building in the area of human rights and helping to promote humanitarian assistance. We now have a subject which is ripe for further discussions in the Secretariat and, later, with the Council.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  17. They also emphasized that, while the group could largely convey UNITA's position, the final decision still lay with UNITA leadership, headed by Mr. Savimbi. Hence, if peace is to be achieved, dialogue with Mr. Savimbi should be reopened. In this regard, we have recent information to the effect that Mr. Savimbi has expressed interest in re- establishing dialogue with the Government in Luanda, within the Lusaka Protocol, but there is a need to authenticate this source. Throughout our consultations in Angola, I appealed to the parties, saying that it was time to take the peace process off the streets and to find the right channels through which serious discussions on peace could take place. The Government and UNITA parliamentarians appear to have seen the wisdom in this appeal.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  18. It controls no territory or municipalities and is facing numerous defections from its rank and file, including some top officers. In fact, we are told that right now there are a total of about 200 officers left with Savimbi's UNITA. However, the Government recognizes that UNITA is still capable of conducting attacks of terror, which undermine peace and the socio-economic development of the country. On their part, UNITA parliamentarians also reiterated the organization's commitment to peace through a dialogue within the framework of the Lusaka Protocol. However, they cautioned that the Lusaka Protocol should not be used simply as a platform to obtain UNITA's surrender. The Lusaka Protocol should be implemented with the necessary adjustments, as indicated in the 12-p0int peace plan that UNITA had communicated to the United Nations.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  19. With respect to the prospect of peace, it is gratifying to note that for the first time, there is a convergence of opinion among the people consulted that the United Nations should play a more proactive role in the peace process. The Government reiterated that it would have no objection to the role of the churches in facilitating contacts with Savimbi's UNITA, but that this should be done through the United Nations, which should resume its role as mediator. Meanwhile, the Government believes that UNITA's military capacity has been almost totally destroyed and that only a miracle could save it. According to the Government, UNITA is operating with residual forces only, without any capacity to attack military targets.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  20. The challenge now being faced by the authorities is how to consolidate the delivery of humanitarian aid to places that are now accessible by road as a first step and gradually expand access to the entire country. However, the Government is of the view that there is now no need for the establishment of humanitarian corridors in classical terms, because UNITA does not control any known territory. Nonetheless, it is willing to consider the idea of "safe areas" where humanitarian assistance can be delivered to those who badly need it. These places will be secured and protected through an arrangement which is satisfactory to the United Nations, humanitarian agencies and other interested parties. Now I would like to come to the crux of the matter: the peace process itself.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  21. The World Food Programme (WFP) representative, who is also Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for Angola, informed me that the WFP convoys have started delivering food by road to places that could not be reached until a few months ago. The Government has also repaired some of the infrastructure, such as bridges and airstrips. The airstrip in Kuito, particularly, is currently being repaired, and access has improved on the whole in the south, the north and the centre of the country. Only the eastern province remains rather difficult to access. Furthermore, the Government has instructed the defence forces to deliver food where security cannot yet be guaranteed, while attempts are being made to meet the security standards imposed by humanitarian agencies and to extend State administration to those areas.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  22. For example, it has allocated additional funds to tackle the increasing influx of internally displaced persons to urban areas, resulting from recent military offensives by Government forces. Moreover, the Government has made plans to resettle 500,000 people by early next year, and the United Nations agencies have pledged to resettle another 150,000. The Government has also closed down the transitional camps, whose facilities are grossly inadequate. The situation in the nutrition centres showed some improvements from May to early September, although it appears to have worsened from about two months ago because of the new movement of the population from rural areas to urban areas. Moreover, the Government has improved access and food delivery to many parts of the country that were not possible to reach by road.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  23. This rapid and large increase in internally displaced persons is attributed to the current Angolan Armed Forces offensive and to the so-called mop-up operation undertaken by Government forces. The mop- up operation is a strategy consisting of moving people from their areas of origin into camps for internally displaced persons with the aim of depriving UNITA of its support base, especially for food and recruitment of military personnel. In any case, the increase of internally displaced persons has led to high rates of malnutrition within the camps, among other problems. Nevertheless, the Government has made enormous efforts to improve the humanitarian situation in the country.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  24. Furthermore, it is estimated that currently more than 60 per cent of Angolans do not possess any form of identity document. A multi-agency technical team will be helping the Government to draw up a programme for civil registration, which is crucial for electoral registration and other issues. The humanitarian situation was generally described as worsening in a number of areas. The number of internally displaced persons and refugees has grown beyond the capacity of humanitarian agencies to cope. It is estimated, for example, that the number has reached 4.1 million - and one must recall that this is a country with a total population of about 12 million.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  25. With specific regard to the proposed national elections, the Government continues to express its commitment to hold them soon. However, it is becoming clear that the second half of 2002, which the Government had indicated as the date for the elections, is not realistic. The discussions of the fundamental principles for a new Constitution appear deadlocked, the main obstacle being whether the provincial governors should be directly elected or, as the case is now, appointed by the President of the Republic. However, this and other contentious issues may be resolved by February 2002, when the Constitutional Commission will submit a draft of the Constitution. It is important to remember that the draft will then be submitted for public debate, which may take another six months before the final draft is approved.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  26. Three main areas of cooperation and support have been identified, as follows: first, the design of an integrated development pilot programme in two provinces involving the creation of capacity to plan and prepare appropriate budgets at the provincial level, and rehabilitation of infrastructures and preparation of programmes to alleviate the social hardships of the people and employment generation; secondly, the design of a programme for peace and reconciliation in which the Fund for Peace and National Reconciliation is expected to play a leading role; and thirdly, the design of a civil registration programme and other programmes to strengthen institutions, which will address the current obstacles to free and fair elections, envisaged for 2002.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  27. The Minister of Interior, who is also the Chairman of the intersectoral Commission for peace and national reconciliation, informed me that the Government of Angola is fully satisfied with the recommendations made by the mission and the spirit of cooperation that has been established between the Government team and the United Nations team. A technical team is to be sent for a follow-up mission in J anuary-February 2002 for a four-week stay in Angola to work on details of the programme of action and the implementation strategy.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  28. Last but not least, the Government should be encouraged to implement programmes of political and economic reforms, which, we believe, will be additional contributions to the peace process. In my last briefing to the Council, I informed it that the Secretary-General had approved the dispatch of a multi-agency exploratory mission to Angola from 17 to 27 September 2001. Its report was carefully reviewed in the Secretariat. A second mission was then sent to Angola ahead of me, and it stayed in Angola during my visit to discuss with the authorities the findings of the earlier exploratory mission and prepare a programme of action.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  29. I am happy to report to the Council that during my last visit to Luanda, from 8 to 14 December, all these issues were discussed extensively with the Government in a spirit of give and take. My overall assessment is that progress is being made on all fronts and that the main elements of the United Nations policy and strategy for helping to end the conflict in Angola appear to have been reaffirmed. Let me reiterate to the Council the fundamentals of this policy. First, there can be no military solution to this conflict. Secondly, sanctions are an important instrument with which to press UNITA to abandon war and return to the political process. Thirdly, support for civil society is an important aspect of the peace process.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  30. Secondly, the amber light: these were issues on which the Government informed me that more time was needed for further consideration before giving definite responses, such as the modalities for the disarmament of UNITA combatants and the collection of weapons, as mentioned in the Government's four- point peace plan; direct contacts with UNITA's Jonas Savimbi; and the possibility of establishing humanitarian corridors. Thirdly, the red light: these were issues that were regarded as non-negotiable, such as any attempt to resolve the Angolan conflict outside of the Lusaka Protocol framework or any attempt to renegotiate the Protocol itself. In this regard, however, the Government recognized that some adjustments may have to be made to the provisions of the Protocol in order to take account of the changed realities on the ground in Angola.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  31. When I briefed the Council on my last Visit to Angola, in May this year, I mentioned that there were three sets of issues that constituted the outcome of that visit, and in fact compared them to a set of lights. First, the green light: these were issues on which the Government would like to begin immediate engagement and cooperation with the United Nations, such as the management of the Fund for Peace and National Reconciliation, the design and implementation of pilot projects for demobilized soldiers and resettled internally displaced persons, and assistance in the electoral process.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  32. I also met with the Ministers for External Relations, Mr. Miranda; of Interior, Mr. Dos Santos "Nando"; and of Planning, Ms. Lourenco. Meetings were also organized with the President of the National Assembly, Mr. Roberto de Almeida; the Secretary-General of the ruling MPLA party, Mr. Lourenco; representatives of the Inter- Denominational Committee for Peace in Angola (COIEPA) and other members of the civil society; leaders of the parliamentary groups; UNITA parliamentarians; UNITA Renovada; humanitarian agencies; national and international non-governmental organizations; the Troika and other members of the diplomatic corps; the group of donor countries; and other stakeholders in Angola.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  33. The main objective of my mission was to hold consultations with the Government, the political parties, the churches, civil society representatives and other concerned parties on how best the United Nations can help accelerate the peace process in Angola within the framework of the Lusaka Protocol. I was also in Angola to discuss with the authorities and national and international non- governmental organizations the ways and means to improve the humanitarian situation facing the people of Angola. The highlight of my visit was the meeting with President Jose' Eduardo dos Santos, who for the first time received me at the beginning of my visit and not, as usual, towards the end. I believe this was a deliberate act meant to set the tone for subsequent discussions with the relevant members of his Cabinet.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  34. Mr. Gambari: I also would like to say how delighted I am that the Secretary-General has decided to attend our meeting this morning. It shows the importance he attaches to African issues in general and, of course, to the long conflict in Angola in particular. I feel like a member of the faculty of a secondary school addressing a gathering at which the headmaster is present, so if I am a bit nervous, please forgive me. I am delighted to brief the Council on my last mission to Angola. The mission took place at the invitation of the Government of Angola, upon the directive of the Secretary-General and with the blessings of the members of the Council, which was so powerfully expressed at the last open meeting on Angola, on 15 November.

    2001-12-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4444 (2001) · source

  35. As usual, I will be delighted to make a report to the Council upon my return. That is, of course, after I have briefed the boss, the Secretary-General, who has sent me.

    2001-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4418 (2001) · source

  36. I am glad to inform members that our Office in Luanda informed me today that we received a special message on behalf of the Government of Angola at the highest level confirming that urgent action has commenced to repair the airfield and that the Government will increase efforts to transport relief materials from Huambo to Kuito, in close collaboration with the United Nations agencies. Finally, I have taken careful note of the expression of support for the mission to Angola that I will be undertaking on behalf of the Secretary-General. I look forward very much to the visit and hope that, with the usual cooperation of the Government of Angola, civil society and other stakeholders there, the consultations in the country will be positive and contribute, in however modest a way, to finding lasting peace in the conflict in Angola.

    2001-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4418 (2001) · source

  37. Therefore, the Security Council has the responsibility of tightening its own sanctions against UNITA in order to make the armed wing of UNITA abandon violence and embrace the political process. Thirdly, the efforts of civil society to promote a peaceful political settlement of the conflict in Angola need the full support of the international community. Fourthly, we need to support the efforts of the Angolan Government in the provision of humanitarian assistance for those in need in Angola and in capacity-building on human rights. I have one other point. The delegation of Singapore drew attention to the state of disrepair of the airfield in Kuito in Bie province, which will retard the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need.

    2001-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4418 (2001) · source

  38. It is also the best way to end the suffering, at last, of the people of Angola as a consequence of the war. May I recall that, about two years ago, the four pillars of United Nations policy towards Angola were not universally accepted or, indeed, very popular. Two years later, those pillars of our policy have been received and today endorsed by the Council for their continued relevance. I believe they need restating. First, there can be no military solution to the conflict in Angola and UNITA, above all, needs to realize and accept that fact. Secondly, UNITA is primarily responsible for continuing the conflict and thereby for inflicting enormous suffering on the innocent civilian population of Angola.

    2001-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4418 (2001) · source

  39. Mr. Gambari: I wish to thank our visitor, Mr. Miranda, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Angola. I would also like to thank members of the Council and other delegations for their important statements and for the confidence which they place in the efforts of the Secretary-General, in close consultation with the Government of Angola, civil society and other stakeholders in the country, to help promote peace and national reconciliation there. I wish to assure all that we in the Secretariat will not relent in those efforts aimed at helping to find ways and means to stop the war in Angola, which has gone on for far too long. In our view, the end of the fighting throughout Angola is the best way to end the difficulties surrounding the delivery of humanitarian assistance to those in need in Angola.

    2001-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4418 (2001) · source

  40. Just as I was coming here, our Office in Angola informed me that, today, President dos Santos met with the President of COIEPA, one of the leaders of civil society in Angola. We consider this to be a positive development. In any case, the Secretary-General has directed me to visit Angola later this year, upon invitation of the Government, for consultations with the Government and other stakeholders in the country on how best the United Nations could help in the search for a negotiated peace, so that we can bring the fighting to an end in Angola. The people of Angola deserve peace so that they can enjoy the benefits of the resources which God has given them.

    2001-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4418 (2001) · source

  41. Refugees continue to arrive from Angola into the western province of Zambia, reportedly in deplorable conditions. Quite apart from the humanitarian concerns, it is important that the recent efforts of the Governments of Angola and Zambia to improve security coordination and cooperation along their common border not be jeopardized. Finally, in his report of 10 October, the Secretary- General urged the international community to continue to exert its influence and to assist the parties in finding lasting peace in Angola within the framework of the Lusaka Protocol, including through the identification of practical steps that can help the parties to return to the resolution of their outstanding issues under the Lusaka Protocol and also encouraging the positive role of civil society in promoting lasting peace in Angola.

    2001-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4418 (2001) · source

  42. In a letter to the Secretary-General, President dos Santos formally sought the assistance of the United Nations in these areas. Consequently, a multi-agency United Nations team was sent to Angola in late September to discuss the details of the request with the authorities. The mission has since returned to Headquarters and the results of its findings and recommendations were considered at high-level meetings in the Secretariat. The report submitted by the mission will be shared with the Government of Angola and a follow-up programme of action is being prepared by the Secretariat. Meanwhile, in our view, careful attention needs to be paid to the situation in the Angola-Zambia border area. According to UNOA's assessment, the situation there is neither secure nor stable.

    2001-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4418 (2001) · source

  43. However, he also indicated that there were several preconditions before the elections could take place, such as the need to revise the electoral law, adopt a new constitution, carry out a census, resettle displaced populations and have security guarantees in place. After my last visit to Angola in May 2001, I reported to the Council that there were issues on which the Angolan Government would like the United Nations to begin immediate engagement with its representatives. These are, first, the management of the Peace and Reconciliation Fund; secondly, the pilot project for the resettlement of demobilized soldiers and internally displaced people; and, thirdly, national elections projected for the second part of 2002.

    2001-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4418 (2001) · source

  44. Although UNITA appeared to accept the continuing validity of the Lusaka Protocol, many of the specific proposals emanating from these communications appear to lie outside the framework of that Protocol. On its part, the Church responded by reiterating its appeal for an urgent ceasefire and by forming a peace network comprising several prominent church and civil society leaders. Furthermore, the Angolan National Assembly decided to create a Commission for Peace and National Reconciliation, which is to examine the prospects for establishing mechanisms that may facilitate contacts with the main parties and other relevant actors. In a speech to the Central Committee of the ruling MPLA on 23 August 2001, President dos Santos announced his intention not to stand as a candidate in the next general elections.

    2001-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4418 (2001) · source

  45. On 11 November, in an independence anniversary speech, President dos Santos, inter alia, reaffirmed the validity of the Lusaka Protocol and declared that his Government is ready to discuss ways, mechanisms and guarantees to integrate all citizens who are part of the military wing of UNITA led by Mr. Savimbi. In May, Mr. Savimbi requested the Church, through a letter, to continue its search for peace and national reconciliation in Angola. The leadership of UNITA further issued a document entitled "Proposals for the Solution of the Angolan Conflict". And in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, UNITA reiterated its interpretation of the Lusaka Protocol.

    2001-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4418 (2001) · source

  46. A total of 4.1 million people are estimated to be displaced. Since the beginning of this year alone, humanitarian agencies estimate that as many as 323,000 persons are likely to have been displaced by war-related violence and warn that the number of newly displaced persons could reach 350,000 for the year. War, conflict and displacement have led to significant urbanization. Around 60 per cent of the Angolan population lives in urban areas today and the continuation of the fighting is likely to aggravate the situation further. Concerning the peace process, the Government of Angola has continued to reaffirm its commitment to peace within the framework of the Lusaka Protocol. In this regard, the Government of Angola also established the Fund For Peace and National Reconciliation and approved a four-point peace plan early this year.

    2001-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4418 (2001) · source

  47. The Government of Angola has launched a number of military offensives in the past weeks, particularly in the eastern province of Moxico, where it was reported that the Government took 600 UNITA combatants prisoner, 100 have surrendered and over 1,000 armament pieces were captured. UNITA's strategic operational command centres were also reported to have been destroyed by Government forces. The continuation of the fighting continues to have a devastating effect on the country's social fabric and has further impoverished its people. In general, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated. Today, a tenth of all Angolans depend upon food assistance to survive. Humanitarian agencies report that the condition of children in Angola is very serious. Furthermore, war has also led to massive population displacements in Angola.

    2001-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4418 (2001) · source

  48. Mr. Gambari: On 17 October, I briefed the Council on the activities of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) since April 2001, as contained in the Secretary-General's report in document S/200l/956 of 10 October 2001. Today, I will simply highlight some of those developments and update the Council on the others. It is unfortunate that fighting in Angola has continued and, in some cases, intensified. The guerrilla activities of UNITA have spread to several parts of the country and, indeed, UNITA has claimed responsibility for attacking the locality of Caxito in Bengo province in May, for shooting at a World Food Programme plane near Kuito in June and for attacking a passenger train in Kwanza Norte in August. These attacks have caused over 400 civilian deaths and many more injuries.

    2001-11-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4418 (2001) · source

  49. The Democratic Republic of the Congo will also be a beneficiary of the work of Ambassador Fowler in terms of monitoring and control of illegal exploitation of mineral and other natural resources in that country. We all owe you a debt of gratitude, Mr. Fowler. Good luck in your new assignment.

    2000-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4178Resumption1 (2000) · source

  50. His valuable work on the issue of sanctions against UNITA has greatly helped to restore the credibility of the Security Council and of the United Nations as a whole. I must confess that I personally have benefited from the good work he has done, because it has helped in many ways in my own efforts to restore the trust and confidence between the United Nations and the Government of Angola. I believe there are also other beneficiaries of his work - the people of Sierra Leone, who will shortly be relieved to note that illegal diamonds will now be difficult to export for sale to finance the war activities of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).

    2000-07-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4178Resumption1 (2000) · source