YouSaid · the spoken record

Gamsakhurdia

lines on the record
13
first
2008-08-28
most recent
2008-08-28
sittings or episodes
1
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un-security-council

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  1. “Russia, which has sincere feelings of friendship and cordiality for the Georgian people, is confident that, sooner or later, Georgia will find worthy leaders who will genuinely be able to care for their country and develop relations of mutual respect on an equal footing, as well as good-neighbourly relations with all the peoples of the Caucuses. Russia will be ready to promote that in any way possible.”

    2008-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5969 (2008) · source

  2. “It is necessary to emphasize that, in accordance with the Declaration, every State must refrain from any violent actions that might deprive people of their right to self-determination, freedom and independence. The actions of States must also comply with the principles of equality and the self-determination of peoples. States must also have governments that represent all the people living on their territory. There can be no doubt that Saakashvili's regime in no way complies with those high standards established by the international community.”

    2008-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5969 (2008) · source

  3. “In the light of the appeal of the South Ossetian and Abkhaz peoples, the parliaments and presidents of the two Republics, the views of the people of Russia and the positions of both chambers of Russia's Federal Assembly, the President of the Russian Federation took a decision on the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and on concluding with them treaties on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. In adopting that decision, the Russian side has based itself on the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and other fundamental international documents, including the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States.”

    2008-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5969 (2008) · source

  4. “The glimmer of hope that once existed for the implementation of the joint initiative by the Presidents of Russia and France of 12 August 2008 quickly vanished when Tbilisi in fact rejected the initiative and Mr. Saakashvili's defenders followed his lead. In addition, the United States and several European capitals are promising Mr. Saakashvili protection through NATO, are calling for the rearming of the Tbilisi regime and are already supplying him with new deliveries of weapons. That is a direct invitation to new escapades.”

    2008-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5969 (2008) · source

  5. “In that regard, we cannot fail to recall the role that was played by those who have throughout the years pandered to the militarist regime of Saakashvili, supplied him with offensive weapons in violation of the regulations of the OSCE and the European Union, dissuaded him from shouldering his obligations on the non-use of force and inculcated in him a complex of impunity, including, among other things, with regard to his authoritarian actions to crush dissidents in Georgia. We know that, at specific stages, the external patrons attempted to restrain Saakashvili from irrational military escapades. But he clearly was completely out of control. It is alarming that not everyone was able to arrive at objective conclusions in connection with Georgia's aggression.”

    2008-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5969 (2008) · source

  6. “Through the aggressive attack on South Ossetia on the night of 8 August 2008, which caused numerous casualties, including among peacekeepers and other Russian citizens, as well as preparations for similar actions against Abkhazia, Saakashvili himself put an end to the territorial integrity of Georgia by using crude and blatant military force against people whom, in his own words, he wanted to see as part of his State. Saakashvili left them no other choice but to provide for their own security and to seek to exercise the right to self-determination as independent States.”

    2008-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5969 (2008) · source

  7. “In accordance with the law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the procedure for the resolution of issues linked to the secession of a republic from the Union, autonomous entities within the Union's republics had the right to independently resolve the issues of whether or not to remain part of the Union and of their legal status in the event of the republic's cessation from the Union. Georgia prevented Abkhazia and South Ossetia from exercising that right. Nevertheless, Russia has consistently maintained its policy, while in good faith carrying out its peacekeeping and mediating functions. Russia has attempted to help achieve peace agreements and demonstrated restraint and patience in the face of provocation. Nor did we abandon our position after the unilateral proclamation of Kosovo's independence.”

    2008-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5969 (2008) · source

  8. “Every year of Saakashvili's rule has been characterized by his total inflexibility and unceasing provocation, including the staging of incidents in the zones of conflict in the form of attacks on Russian peacekeepers and his deprecating attitude towards the democratically chosen leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As a result of Tbilisi's actions, the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflict flared up once again in the early 1990s. Since then, Russia has done everything in its power to assist in settling those problems on the basis of the recognition of the territorial integrity of Georgia. Russia took that position despite the fact that Georgia, in declaring its own independence, had violated the rights to self-determination of the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”

    2008-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5969 (2008) · source

  9. “The introduction by Saakashvili in 2006 - in violation of all agreements and decisions of the United Nations - of a Georgian military contingent into the upper Kodori Valley, undermined the progress made in the settlement process of the mechanisms, including the implementation of the March 2003 agreements achieved by President Putin and President Shevardnadze regarding joint efforts on the return of refugees and the opening of rail connections between Sochi and Tbilisi. By openly continuing to ignore Georgia's commitments and agreements in the framework of the United Nations and the OSCE, Saakashvili established a puppet administrative Government for Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order once and for all to drive the last nail into the coffin of the negotiating process.”

    2008-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5969 (2008) · source

  10. “Following Zhvania's mysterious death, in February 2005, Saakashvili categorically rejected all agreements. That determined his attitude towards the Abkhaz settlement, the basis for which was the agreement signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994 on a ceasefire and the separation of forces. In accordance with that agreement, collective peacekeeping forces were deployed in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. In addition, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia was established, as well as the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Georgia.”

    2008-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5969 (2008) · source

  11. “However, the genuine prospects for peace that once were dashed when, at the end of 2003, power was seized in Georgia through revolutionary means by Mikheil Saakashvili, who immediately began to threaten that there would be a solution by force to the Abkhaz and South Ossetian problems. In May 2004, units of special troops and internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia were introduced into the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. In August, Tskhinvali was subjected to artillery shelling and an attempt was made to seize it. With Russia's active mediation, the Prime Minister of Georgia, Mr. Zurab Zhvania and the leader of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, signed a ceasefire protocol. In November 2004, another document was signed on means for the normalization of relations on the basis of a stage-by-stage approach.”

    2008-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5969 (2008) · source

  12. “In 1992 in South Ossetia and in 1994 in Abkhazia, peacekeeping forces were created, agencies were established to promote, with the facilitation of Russia, a strengthening of confidence, and to promote a resolution to address the objectives of social and economic recovery and the issues of political status. Those steps were supported by the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which were involved in the work of the appropriate mechanisms and sent their observers to the zone of conflict. The peacekeeping and negotiating mechanisms were complex. Nevertheless, they succeeded in functioning and helped to bring the positions closer together and to achieve specific agreements.”

    2008-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5969 (2008) · source

  13. “Mr. Gamsakhurdia: "Georgia for Georgians", which he tried to implement in 1992, having annulled the existence of entities on Georgian territory and having sent Georgian troops to attack Sukhumi and Tskhinvali in order to reinforce by force the reign of illegality that had already been established. Genocide had already been carried out then in South Ossetia, and the Ossetians had been subjected to destruction and mass expulsions. Thanks to the selfless actions of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian peoples and the efforts of Russia, it was possible to terminate the bloodshed, to conclude the ceasefire agreement, to create mechanisms for peacekeeping and for considering all aspects of a settlement.”

    2008-08-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5969 (2008) · source