YouSaid · the spoken record

Garang De Mabior

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24
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2005-02-08
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2005-02-08
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un-security-council

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  1. “I hope the points covered in my few remarks were useful to members and will be useful in achieving a fair, just and comprehensive political settlement in Darfur and eastern Sudan so that we will have comprehensive peace throughout the Sudan and so that we can enter a new era of peace, stability and development.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  2. “In war, as in other areas of activity, often the best course of action is to reinforce success. The correct and prudent course of action is therefore to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement while at the same time searching for a fair and just political settlement for Darfur and eastern Sudan. Waiting for a solution to Darfur before implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement would surely lead to a serious disaster - not only for the Sudan, but also for the rest of the region and beyond. We strongly advise against such a linkage. Once more I thank the Council profusely for inviting me to address this world body.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  3. “Some people even go to the extent of saying that there will be no peace dividend for southern Sudan or other areas covered by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement unless the conflict in Darfur is resolved. That position is flawed and counterproductive. First, it punishes two victims of the conflict: southern Sudan and Darfur. It is also morally wrong, as well as politically inapt. Secondly, the logical consequence of that position is that the situation in the south, the Nuba Mountains, the Blue Nile and Abyei to drift back towards war, thereby combining with the present desperate situation in Darfur and the situation brewing in eastern Sudan. That would lead to a scenario of a failed State in the Sudan - the very scenario we wanted to avoid in the first place by signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  4. “As mentioned earlier, and despite what remains a grim picture in Darfur, there is reason to believe - and I am optimistic - that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on 9 January has now considerably improved prospects for the resolution of the Darfur conflict and of the conflict in eastern Sudan. The possibilities created by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement should therefore be fully exploited in terms of finding a fair and just political settlement before the international community resorts to other measures. Finally, I should like to alert this world body regarding a linkage that is sometimes made between implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and resolution of the conflict in Darfur.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  5. “Last September, when I came to New York and met the Secretary-General, I offered the suggestion that a tripartite stabilization force for Darfur, consisting of 10,000 troops from the Government of the Sudan, 10,000 troops from the SPLA and 10,000 troops from the African Union, all with international logistics and other support, would provide an adequate neutral and robust force for the security stabilization of Darfur and the protection of civilians, and thus for the creation of the necessary environment conducive to negotiations and to the reaching of a comprehensive peace agreement. Now that we have signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement with the Government of the Sudan, that offer makes even more sense, and I wish to renew the offer for consideration by all concerned.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  6. “That is the first aspect of the assistance that we can give. On the military and security side, the SPLM could help contribute to the further stabilization of the security situation in Darfur and to the protection of civilians, if asked by parties to the conflict in that region or by the international community with the agreement of the parties.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  7. “I believe that the first step would be for the parties to agree in principle - and preferably even commit themselves in front of the Security Council - to accept the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as the basis for resolving the conflicts in Darfur and eastern Sudan, and perhaps also to commit themselves to a deadline for reaching agreement, as we did in November 2004. The parties could then negotiate the details on autonomy and self-government for those areas, on power-sharing, on wealth-sharing and on security arrangements. The SPLM. could assist them in working out those details. Whatever permutations can be made with respect to those parameters - autonomy, power-sharing, wealth-sharing and security arrangements and that would bring peace to the Sudan and keep the country united would be a necessary price to be paid by all the parties.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  8. “From there, I went to Asmara to consult with President Afwerki and all the Darfur groups: the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), as well as with the Beja Congress and the Rashaida Free Lions of eastern Sudan. Finally, I came through Cairo, where I consulted with Minister Omar Suleiman, because the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) negotiations, including eastern Sudan, are under Egyptian mediation. As a result of those consultations and my knowledge of the situation, I am encouraged to believe that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement can be successfully applied and adapted to the conflicts in Darfur and eastern Sudan so that a comprehensive peace agreement may be achieved for the whole of the Sudan.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  9. “As co-architects of the Naivasha protocols and of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, we would offer our views and suggestions on how elements of the protocols could be adapted to the Darfur situation in the framework of the Abuja forum, and eventually also to eastern Sudan under some forum acceptable to the parties. For that purpose of providing assistance, when I learned that I was coming to New York, before coming here I passed through Kenya to consult with President Mwai Kibaki and through Addis Ababa to consult with Alpha Konare, who holds the Darfur file for the African Union, and with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  10. “The Janjaweed militias should be reined in, and those among them who are eventually proven to have committed serious crimes or atrocities should be punished - after peace is achieved in Darfur, not before, as that would be putting the cart before the horse, in which case neither the cart nor the horse will move and neither will go anywhere. Although the SPLM. is not part of the current Government of the Sudan - and is also not a part of the Darfur armed opposition - we have a moral and political obligation to assist the Sudan in achieving comprehensive peace. The SPLM. stands ready to offer its help in finding a resolution of the conflicts in Darfur and in eastern Sudan. That assistance can come in two different forms.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  11. “Events since then have vindicated our position, which we wish to reiterate again today. The SPLM, having recently concluded its own peace agreement with the Government of the Sudan, feels encouraged and optimistic that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement will enhance the chances of a peaceful resolution in Darfur and eastern Sudan. First and foremost, an atmosphere sufficiently conducive to constructive dialogue between the Government of the Sudan and the armed opposition must be created. The parties ought to abide fully by their commitment to cease hostilities.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  12. “The conflict in Darfur is old; it did not start in 2003, as some reports appear to indicate. It also did not come about because the armed opposition in Darfur felt left out in the IGAD/Naivasha peace process. The conflict in Darfur goes back to the 1980s, before the present Government came to power - and even before that. But this is not the time or the place to talk about the history and background of the conflict in Darfur. When conflict intensified in Darfur at the end of 2002, the SPLM. wasted no time in declaring that the pursuit of military victory by either side would be futile and would only escalate the conflict, and that the Government of the Sudan and the armed opposition in Darfur should seek a peaceful, negotiated political settlement in the shortest time possible.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  13. “And we believe that we will achieve that goal if we implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and if we work in partnership as Sudanese. I am aware that the United Nations system is naturally used to dealing with States, under a one- country/one-system model. But the one-country/two- systems model that we have negotiated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, to which the United Nations was a witness at the signing ceremony in Nairobi on 9 January, is the will of the Sudanese people. I appeal to the United Nations system to respect that and to reflect it in all its dealings with the Government of National Unity and with the government of southern Sudan, without prejudice to the unity and sovereignty of the Sudan. Thirdly, I want briefly to talk about peace in Darfur and in eastern Sudan.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  14. “Also in that connection, on the issue of the United Nations peace support operation in the Sudan, I want to point out that we, the Sudanese, have ourselves voluntarily negotiated a unique Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which prescribes, for lack of better terminology, a one-country/two-systems model during the six years of the interim period, at the end of which the people of southern Sudan and Abyei will exercise the right of self-determination to choose between remaining in a new and united Sudan and opting out, for an independent southern Sudan. We believe that this is the best way to achieve justice and equality for all Sudanese, irrespective of whether they are of Arab or African origin, whether they are Muslims or Christians: through voluntary union.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  15. “In the endeavours to monitor and verify compliance by the parties with their commitments under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, we see the United Nations acting in concert with other players within the framework of the assessment and evaluation commission, as stipulated in the Peace Agreement. Those are details that we would like to discuss with the Council if we leave a delegation here at the United Nations.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  16. “be placed here so that we can discuss the details of the peace support mission for the Sudan and so that we can contribute ideas, as we said in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement when we requested the United Nations to "constitute a lean, effective, sustainable and affordable United Nations peace support mission to monitor and verify this Agreement and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as provided for under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter". There are also many other issues on which we will need to discuss and coordinate, such as the size of the force and which countries will contribute. In general, and in terms of the overall implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, we need to have a common concept of the process. The United Nations is not alone on this issue.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  17. “I take the opportunity of my visit to the Security Council to call upon, and urge, the international community to act speedily to help us with the enormous tasks of the voluntary return, reintegration and rehabilitation of returning refugees and internally displaced persons. The parties in general, and especially the SPLM, need a great deal of assistance to enable them to fulfil their obligations and to continue to fully own and implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. With respect to the United Nations peace support mission for the Sudan, I would like to say that the SPLM. welcomes, and supports in principle, the deployment of a United Nations peace support mission to the Sudan, as requested by the parties in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In that context, I would ask that a representative of the SPLM.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  18. “When the Security Council met at Nairobi, I appealed to the international community through the Council to contribute generously and to fulfil its obligations at the donors conference. Clearly, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement presents many challenges and opportunities for the Sudan, the region, Africa and the world at large. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement has to be translated into real and tangible benefits. Refugees and internally displaced persons are already moving to their respective homes in southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, the Blue Nile region and Abyei - before the necessary minimum social amenities are put in place. That is creating further distress for the host communities, which already find themselves in a fragile situation.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  19. “That draft will be presented to the 60- member, all-inclusive National Constitutional Review Commission for discussion, further development and eventual adoption by the SPLM. National Liberation Council and the Government of the Sudan's National Assembly, hopefully within the next six weeks. It is the interim national constitution that will constitute the necessary constitutional instrument to launch the Government of National Unity, the government of southern Sudan and the other structures stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to call on the international community to contribute generously at the Oslo donors conference.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  20. “We are also holding discussions with the Government of the Sudan so that, soon after our current visit to the Security Council, the SPLM. will send advance teams to Khartoum, Juba, Malakal, Wau, Kadugli, Damazien and Abyei - the areas specified in the Agreement - for ease of coordination of the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and so that we do not have to communicate far from each other. Both the Government of the Sudan and the SPLM are also currently evaluating the drafts of their respective joint assessment missions. A final joint document will soon be ready for presentation to the donors conference in Oslo, hopefully next month. We are also working jointly to produce an initial draft of the interim national constitution, in consultation with other political forces in the country and with civil society groups.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  21. “That is why, in the general and fundamental provisions of the ceasefire arrangements component of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, we said that "The parties agree that the national ownership of the peace process, political will and continuous dialogue are indispensable elements for sustainable peace. They shall collaborate to observe and respect the ceasefire and resort to their own wisdom to contain and solve any problem that may arise." In preparing to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) has established several committees to work out mechanisms to transform its various organs from organs of guerrilla warfare and armed opposition to institutions of good governance.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  22. “We were not surprised, but we are delighted by out people's outpouring of overwhelming support for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Accordingly, the SPLM. National Liberation Council, which is the Movement's highest legislative body, unanimously ratified the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 24 January 2005, after two days of deliberations in Rumbek. The Government's National Assembly also unanimously ratified the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, on 1 February 2005. In that regard, I wish to declare, on behalf of the parties and the people of the Sudan, that we are proud of that achievement and that we have national ownership of the Agreement.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  23. “It took the parties 10 years under the mediation of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) - from the time when the Declaration of Principles was issued, in 1994, and the Machakos Framework Agreement was reached, in July 2002, to the holding of intensive negotiations at Naivasha, where Ali Othman Taha and myself sat for 16 months, from September 2003 to the end of December 2004 - for the final Peace Agreement to be reached. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is a truly Sudanese product, which was facilitated by an African regional mediation effort by the countries of IGAD, namely, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, with facilitation by the international community, and especially the troika countries of the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway, in addition to Italy, the Netherlands and other countries.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source

  24. “Mr. Garang de Mabior: First, let me thank you, Sir, and this world body, the Security Council, for inviting me to this meeting. I would also like to thank the Council for coming to Nairobi last November, which contributed positively to the achievement of peace in our country. We - the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of the Sudan - promised the Council and the Sudanese people that we would deliver a Christmas and new year's present in the form of comprehensive peace, and we did precisely that. We are grateful to the Council and to all those who facilitated the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Agreement we signed on 9 January 2005 ushered in a new era in the history of the Sudan, the region and Africa.”

    2005-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.5120 (2005) · source