YouSaid · the spoken record

Ghafoorzai

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156

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1992-11-16

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2019-05-23

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8

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un-security-council

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1. “During the speech delivered on 9 April 1996 here in the Security Council, we requested the dispatch of a fact-finding mission aimed at assessing the degree and level of foreign intervention, Taliban violations of human rights and Taliban mass engagement in the cultivation, processing and trafficking of drugs. Comprehensive reports have been compiled and submitted to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia and to the United Nations International Drug Control Programme and other bodies about the Taliban drug trade. However, the national drug control strategy for 1996, published by the White House, estimates the worldwide potential net production of opium from Afghanistan between 1992 and 1995 as having doubled from 640 tonnes to 1,250 tonnes.”

   1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

2. “That is why, in a letter dated 9 October 1996 addressed to the President of the Security Council, in document S/1996/842, we requested that the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan take appropriate measures to supervise those border crossing points. Last year, through a memorandum, the Islamic State of Afghanistan asked the Security Council to verify different aspects of the intervention aimed at clearing obstacles to peace in Afghanistan by dispatching a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan. No attention was paid to this request.”

   1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

3. “He said he was told he deserved the beating." While they were being pushed back, the Taliban took hostage scores of young men and elderly people in the areas around Charikar, Qarabagh and Jabal-us-Siraj in the north. Phil Goodwin of the BBC reported that at least five of them were slain on 10 October 1996. Conscription by the desperate Taliban has even extended to the mosques in Kabul, where the Taliban have set each mosque a quota of 100 young civilian worshippers who will be forced to fight. These "forced-to-fight" teenagers, selected to go to front-line minefields, are so cherished that, as they leave, they are given these words of farewell: "Guys, cheer up. You are lucky - we are deploying you for martyrdom". The flow of assistance to the Taliban through the border points of Torkham and Spin-Boldak is increasing.”

   1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

4. “Non-compliance with this rule would result in their being subjected to severe punishment. Employees have been ordered to grow beards in six weeks or face dismissal. Video tapes and audio cassettes have been banned. On 10 October 1996, Reuters reported that cinemas had been shut down and many archival, historical and cultural motion pictures and documentaries set on fire in public. Irreplaceable ancient artifacts, statues and paintings in the Kabul museum and at other historical sites have been either set ablaze or crushed. Sports have been outlawed. Reporters and journalists have been beaten up. On 13 October 1996, Reuters reported that "At least two reporters have been beaten just north of Kabul and one who had his camera smashed complained to the Taliban authorities in Kabul.”

   1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

5. “So far, over 280 people are reported to have had either a leg or an arm amputated without consideration of the real precepts of Islamic jurisprudence. The list of brutal punishments goes on and on. Suffice it to recall that Amnesty International has termed the situation in Kabul a "reign of terror". The latest reports by the international news media indicate that mass arrests, abductions and house-to-house searches after nightfall in Kabul continue. According to Amnesty International, as many as 1,000 civilians in Kabul have been rushed to the front-line minefields to clear the mines by walking over them. Photographic laboratories in Kabul have been closed. Kabul's citizens have been given a 10-day grace period in which to smash their television sets.”

   1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

6. “Under Taliban rule, schools were closed to girls. Women, making up half the labour force, including 25,000 widows, were forced to stay home and not attend work. They were further told not to go out shopping. Those who did faced public chain-lashing and physical beatings. One Afghan woman voiced her complaint to a New York Times correspondent by saying, "In the United States, women are being launched into space, but here in Afghanistan, women are being told that they have no place but in the home." The mass exodus to the north due to the Taliban welcome involved as many as 250,000 people. Many people were driven out of their homes and their properties confiscated. One eight-year-old girl's finger was cut because she had put nail polish on it.”

   1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

7. “Pakistani assistance in terms of military personnel and armaments would not have easily reached the Taliban, had the Council paid adequate attention to our suggestion. On 27 September Taliban, accompanied by Pakistani military officers and militia forces, invaded the capital. Much blood was shed. In the invasion of Kabul, the Taliban were found to have even used chemical or some other type of internationally prohibited weapons, as we brought to the attention of the Security Council in document S/l996/842 of 10 October 1996. And in three weeks since the takeover of Kabul, the Taliban, once termed a "positive element for peace" by United Nations officials, committed acts which earned the condemnation of Amnesty International, women's rights organizations, the international press and countries near and far.”

   1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

8. “News of our plight went unheard, and the Pakistani circles were encouraged. Then, the eastern city of Jalalabad, headquarters of United Nations and other international organizations, centre of intra-Afghan dialogue and an impartial city in the conflict, became the target of Pakistani military intelligence on 11 September 1996; the Taliban turned peace and security there into terror and instability. The United Nations Secretariat looked at the latest development through a tinted lens and once again disregarded foreign intervention. The United Nations considered it an internal development and watched the Taliban move on Kabul. In our statement before the Security Council on 9 April 1996, we suggested the establishment of a United Nations monitoring post along the southern border point of Speen-Boldak between Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

   1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

9. “On 5 September 1995, the city of Herat, under the administration of Commander Ismail Khan, once referred to as the best model of a sound administration by Mahmoud Mestiri, was overrun by the Taliban through the direct assistance and involvement of Pakistani militias. Let us refer to document s/ 1995/767 and the meeting of the Security Council at which we presented good reasons for accusing Pakistani military intelligence circles in that onslaught. For many weeks, following the fall of Herat, all heavy weapons, depots and supplies belonging to Afghanistan were being shipped to Quetta, Pakistan. We asked the Security Council to put an end to the unlawful State-sponsored shipment of Afghan property by Pakistan. Unfortunately, our request to have a United Nations fact- finding mission sent to Herat remained unanswered.”

   1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

10. “As we mentioned last year, 23 of these militia members were taken by His Highness Prince Turki Al-Faisal Al-Saud, the Saudi Arabian Security Minister, to Pakistan as a gesture of goodwill on the part of Afghanistan. When the issue of foreign intervention was raised again, high authorities of the United Nations repeated the familiar line of "no hard-core evidence". We presented a list of the militias through the General Assembly; once again it was not to the satisfaction of United Nations officials. The Security Council did not condemn the aggressor. At times, some United Nations authorities, having turned a blind eye to the true identity of the Taliban, their legacy and massive human rights Violations, labelled the Taliban a "positive element for peace in Afghanistan".”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

11. “The extravagant statements of Nasirullah Babar about the imminent fall of the Panjshir Valley proved to be wishful thinking and clear evidence of official Pakistani intervention in Afghan affairs. He has already shown that he considers Kabul an annex to Pakistan by paying a visit to Kabul on 15 October 1996 - just yesterday - in the middle of consecutive Taliban defeats due to popular uprisings. Despite all that, officials of the United Nations did not take needed steps against these Pakistani military intelligence circles. Later, during the successive Taliban defeats in areas south and east of Kabul, foreign militias joined the ranks of the Taliban. We captured some militia members red-handed, fighting in the front line.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

12. “For those looking for independent witnesses of the active participation of Pakistani fighters among the Taliban, let me quote the news report dated 9 October 1996 by Laurant Hamida of Reuter news agency, who says, "warriors were scaling mountainsides at Qalatak in Salang Valley. Speaking good English and saying they were from the Pakistani city of Karachi, they expelled reporters who had reached there. 'Get out of here or we'll kill you!' yelled one of them." The role of the Pakistani circles in sponsoring the Taliban mercenaries, a role which was already an open secret, became the subject of a confession when Her Excellency Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, admitted the Pakistani involvement in the Taliban during an interview with the BBC.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

13. “Some of their names are as follows: first, Mohammad Jawaid, son of Mohammad Israr, 25 years old, from Multan, Pakistan; second, Khalid, son of Nasrullah, 23 years old, from Karachi, Pakistan; third, Abdul Rahman, son of Shamsuddin, 23 years old, from Kashmir; fourth, Obaidullah Shaheen, son of Allah Dena, 26 years old, from Multan, Pakistan; fifth, Karimullah, son of Mohammad Rafique, 29 years old, from Punjab, Pakistan; sixth, Obaidullah, son of Mohammad Zahir, 22 years old, from Punjab, Pakistan; seventh, Mohammad Omar, Ahmad son of Ahmad, 32 years old, from Karachi, Pakistan; and, eighth, Hassan, son of Abdullah, 30 years old, from Punjab, Pakistan. The Islamic State of Afghanistan will soon present to the Security Council videotapes of these and many other Pakistani captives in the custody of its authorities.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

14. “On 26 September 1996, the pilot of a plane carrying Taliban members from Herat to Peshawar landed in Bagram, the Government air base, and stated how fed up he was with taking orders from Pakistani officers. Among the 31 passengers aboard the plane, including 26 Taliban members, five were Pakistani officers. Pakistani officials first dismissed the news. Later, they claimed the five to be Pakistani religious scholars. Just two days ago, on 14 October 1996, Monica Whitlock, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Central Asian correspondent, travelled to the north of Kabul and saw captured Pakistani militia members and officers.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

15. “We raised our complaints and objections against measures taken by Pakistani military intelligence in the schemes crafted by Nasimllah Babar, the Pakistani Interior Minister, who has been referred to as the commander of the Taliban by Ijaz ul-Haq, member of the Pakistani Parliament and also the son of late General Zia ul-Haq. Through a number of statements and official letters, all published as documents of the General Assembly and of the Security Council, we have brought this to the attention of the President of the Security Council. In the meeting of the General Assembly on 19 December 1995, we introduced the names of some Pakistani military personnel who were in the custody of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

16. “Allow me once again to refer to the main cause of continued conflict in Afghanistan, a cause which unfortunately the United Nations could not effectively challenge. For the past three years, delegations of the Islamic State of Afghanistan have complained to the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council about the continuation of foreign intervention in Afghanistan. Today, we do so again. Unfortunately, the measures taken by the United Nations have been limited to the adoption of resolutions and the issuance of statements. This situation has encouraged the aggressor to take further measures for the realization of its objective to recruit, train, equip and send mercenaries called the Taliban into the territory of Afghanistan.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

17. “What is expected of this Council is that it judge events, as required by the United Nations Charter and recognized principles of international law, and to take appropriate measures. Its remaining silent towards open and naked aggression, and its deviation from principles which 51 years ago earned the commitment of many nations, would be a blow to the essence of the United Nations ideals. I am confident that everyone here shares these Views. Indifference towards these blatant encroachments and violations of the human rights of the people of Afghanistan would take us back to an era when the motto "might is right" ruled, when the cry of oppressed nations was not heeded and when the strongest and the richest alone decided on the future of the planet.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

18. “Our nation is turning this way because the Security Council is the highest source of hope for peoples oppressed, occupied and invaded. The Council is entrusted with the responsibility and the task of preserving peace and security, regional and international. It is natural for us to voice an objection, whenever we want to discharge our responsibility as concerned members of this global family, when we see peace and stability endangered, in howsoever remote a corner of the globe, and the life and prosperity of a nation jeopardized through a multifaceted and multipolar conspiracy orchestrated by military-industrial magnates from abroad. That is the case of Afghanistan today.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

19. “Allow me at the outset, on behalf of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, to express my appreciation to you, Sir, and to the members of the Security Council for convening this meeting, which beyond any doubt is reflective of a deep international concern over the heart-breaking situation in our homeland, the root of which is embedded in foreign intervention. Let me particularly thank the delegations of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan for requesting that this meeting be convened. For four consecutive years, our neighbour, Pakistan, has been acting as an obstacle to the return of peace and normalcy to our war-shattered homeland through a series of conspiracies and schemes. It is because of this that our nation is turning to this Council.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

20. “As a victim of foreign interference, I will not try to explain the situation inside Pakistan, particularly in Karachi - seven independent agencies in northern Pakistan, in Malakand, and so forth - fearing that this would be construed as interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan. As far as the representative of Pakistan's references to legitimacy are concemed. these are only justified if the Pakistani delegation is representing the views of the Afghan opposition. They can continue to do so, but not from the rostrum of the United Nations.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3650 (1996) · source

21. “Perhaps this only justifies our finding that the Pakistani Government lacks a State policy with regard to Afghanistan and that there are many sides in the Pakistani Administration with different voices, according to their group interests and likings. His Excellency the representative of Pakistan said that Pakistan was not interfering in the current conflict in Afghanistan. Owing to the magnitude of Pakistani influence on a number of Afghan factions, especially Taliban, we believe that Pakistan's interference, if it were on the side of peace and the facilitation of national reconciliation, would be welcome by Afghanistan. Once again references were made to who is controlling what part of the country.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3650 (1996) · source

22. “Those objections have been well expressed by high-ranking Pakistani officials, members of Parliament, senators, politicians, writers and others who truly understand the value of Afghanistan's friendship. His Excellency the representative of Pakistan wished to hear the "true voice" of the Afghans before the Council. This only represents an unwillingness on the part of the Pakistani Government to establish friendly relations with Afghanistan and to serve as a positive element for the restoration of peace and stability in its neighbouring country, Afghanistan. What we heard today did not after all seem to be in harmony with what we heard as recently as this morning from Islamabad.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3650 (1996) · source

23. “I just hope that our common efforts will soon generate a genuine Afghan political will in an environment free of foreign meddling, so that all sides may move on and enter into the second stage of their struggle: the struggle for Afghanistan's reconstruction. I would like very briefly to refer to the statement made by the representative of Pakistan. As we have explained in the course of the debate in the General Assembly and in the course of today's debate, our disapproval of the Pakistani attitude is echoed by a wide range of frustration within Pakistan at the unhealthy policy pursued towards Afghanistan by some quarters, especially Pakistani military intelligence.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3650 (1996) · source

24. “However, as far as the Government is concerned, we are only trying to defend the innocent inhabitants of Kabul and State sovereignty, to be transferred to a legitimate and credible, nationally-oriented body capable of improving the situation, a mechanism to be created - as was rightly stated by the representative of Japan - as a result of a genuine inter- Afghan dialogue which would represent the aspirations of the Afghan nation, including the warring sides. I am deeply grateful to those who spoke today and expressed the utmost sympathy and solidarity with the Afghan people in their hour of trial.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3650 (1996) · source

25. “Ambassador Mestiri, in View of the valuable experience he has gained during the past two years, deserves to be supported in his endeavours to carry out the mandate entrusted to him by the General Assembly. The Mission's headquarters was recently moved inside Afghanistan to the eastern city of J alalabad. This is a positive step; however, the office's moving to the capital, Kabul, would contribute to improving the situation there by discouraging the random rocket attacks on that city. For the Council's further information, there are many embassies open in Kabul, and Ambassadors of friendly countries head their diplomatic missions there. We have heard the appeals of speakers, on behalf of their Governments, to the conflicting sides. We assure the Council that these appeals will reach the parties.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3650 (1996) · source

26. “Ideas have also been floated on ways and means that an international effort could pursue to put an end to the conflict. Some may deserve consideration, while others need to be further clarified so that the people of Afghanistan can rest assured that, in any international initiative for their good, consideration of the will of the Afghan people is paramount. It should be underscored that only a process in which the people are involved would guarantee a lasting, durable and comprehensive peaceful political solution. Let me state for the sake of the record that the Afghan Government is ready to listen to and discuss any practical proposal that may be forwarded by the Special Mission.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3650 (1996) · source

27. “However, looking deeply into the root causes of the conflict may bring one to the conclusion that sometimes we actually face no other alternative than to fight for peace. Of course, putting an end to the foreign interference would leave no reason for the conflict to continue. It is true that, with the discontinuation of interference, the sides involved in the conflict would be one step closer to reaching an accord that would once again enable them to stand side by side and jointly strive to rebuild their war-ravaged country. This leads me to recall a consensus, exemplified in the course of today's open debate, that seems to exist on the discontinuation of foreign interference, a consensus which is a matter of satisfaction to my delegation.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3650 (1996) · source

28. “I should like to begin by expressing this brief concluding statement, on behalf of the Afghan people and Government, appreciation to all those who have taken part in the open debate on the situation in my country, Afghanistan. Today's debate has magnified the deep concern of the international community in general and the Security Council in particular about the prevailing problems in our country. The debate has also exemplified a genuine desire to search for ways and means of achieving an end to the "nonsense" conflict in Afghanistan. This desire is in accord with the deep enthusiasm of the Afghan people to see an end to the fighting. Our people has indeed suffered enormously and wishes to cherish the fruits of peace.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3650 (1996) · source

29. “The bulk of these arms that were plundered by the Pakistani Army are still in Quetta. The Security Council should take appropriate steps for the early return of these arms, which belong to Afghanistan. I would mention that, in my letter of 14 September, the Islamic State of Afghanistan reserved its right to take, in due time, appropriate legal action on the international level against Pakistan in order to secure the return of these armaments. I shall conclude with the saying that the difference between a saint and a sinner is that the saint has a past and the sinner has a future. In terms of their attitude towards the Afghan nation, the Pakistani authorities should try to use the future to restore the trust and confidence of the Afghan people.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

30. “The fact-finding mission would also verify the wide range of reports of human rights violations, especially against women, in the areas occupied by Taliban, and it would study and evaluate, to the extent possible, the situation and circumstances in the Taliban-controlled areas in respect of institutionalized criminal and terrorist activities. Thirdly, as I reported in my letter dated 14 September 1995 to the Secretary-General (S/ 1995/795), following the events of 6 September 1995 Pakistani military transport planes and transport vehicles began the systematic transfer of heavy and light weaponry - belonging to the Afghan Ministry of Defence - from Herat towards Quetta, Pakistan. Some of these weapons have since been handed over to the Taliban mercenaries.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

31. “Secondly, the United Nations should send a fact- finding mission to the Taliban-occupied provinces in Afghanistan in order, first, to observe the magnitude of the Pakistani military intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and, secondly, to investigate the cultivation, processing and illicit trafficking of narcotics in the Taliban- occupied areas. As for the Taliban and drug trafficking, Afghanistan has prepared a detailed and elaborate report covering the cultivation, processing and trafficking of narcotics, especially in the south and south-western provinces of Afghanistan. That is an alarming new phenomenon. The report is to be submitted to the United Nations drug control authorities for appropriate action.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

32. “The monitoring post would halt the flow of illicit arms and ammunition inside Afghanistan into the hands of the Taliban mercenaries. This would undoubtedly contribute to achieving the objective of the General Assembly resolution of 19 December 1995, and in this particular case would perform a deterrent role in minimizing the tension and the scope of the armed conflicts. Perhaps the existing military personnel of the Office of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan (OSGA) could be promptly assigned to do the job. There is an imperative need for their presence in the south of the country.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

33. “Its tranquillity is Asia's peace, and Its turmoil is Asia's turbulence." Afghanistan, due to the interference that I have described, is in turmoil. The peace and stability of the region, as recognized by the Security Council in its statement to the press of 13 December 1995, is in jeopardy. The Security Council, on the basis of the mandate the Charter has given it, as well as the expectations of the suffering nation of Afghanistan, should focus its attention and take an appropriate decision to remedy the situation. At this stage I wish to present three specific suggestion for the consideration of the Council. The first is to establish a United Nations monitoring post along the southern border point of Speen Boldak between Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

34. “We are further of the conviction that an end to these blatant interventions would pave the way for peaceful endeavours by the United Nations Special Mission to bring about a far-reaching and just solution to the destructive conflict in Afghanistan. We believe that it is high time for both the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to immediately start serious dialogue and negotiation for the restoration of mutual trust and a cooperative relationship that would definitely contribute to the creation of a sound atmosphere conducive to the restoration of peace in Afghanistan. A well-known philosopher and poet of the sub-continent, Alama Iqbal, has said: "The essence of Asia is a moving mixture. Of that blend, the Afghan nation is the core.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

35. “For the Government of Afghanistan, an aggressor of any sect or philosophy, Muslim or non-Muslim, neighbour or non-neighbour, is regarded as nothing but an aggressor. Afghanistan, as a sovereign State, reserves its legitimate right to seek the assistance - political, moral, and humanitarian - of any country, near or far, in conformity with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, and based upon internationally recognized principles. We assure the Council that, despite the unbearable hardships resulting from foreign interference, conspiracies and diverse other acts, Afghanistan has not entered into any commitment, regional or beyond, which would pose a threat to the national security of the countries in the region or jeopardize in any way the non-aligned status of Afghanistan. We remain committed to this policy.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

36. “We believe that an effective realization of regional cooperation, coordinated by the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), cannot be achieved without a peaceful and cooperative relationship between the two countries. Pakistani circles, in a barren attempt to justify the naked interventions of the ISI in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, have long accused the Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan of receiving military assistance from certain countries. For the sake of the record of this Council, I should like to elucidate the fact that if the Government of Afghanistan had not been committed to the preservation of its sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and the need for a perpetual non-alignment policy, no reasons to endure such sacrifices, pains and rigours would have remained.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

37. “This was a chapter of history during which the Afghan nation exerted itself to fight not only to defend itself, but for the benefit of countries far beyond which were in the way of the former Soviet Union's southward thrust, including Pakistan and other countries in the region and perhaps the entire free world, shielding them from potential threat. As we have stated on numerous occasions, we would like to re-establish close and friendly ties with Pakistan. Obviously, this means that ties are to be based upon mutual respect for sovereignty national unity and territorial integrity and on non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Afghanistan, together with Pakistan, can play a significant role in strengthening and broadening cooperation between all countries in the economic as well as the cultural fields.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

38. “Elaboration of those facts and references to unfriendly attitudes in Pakistani circles do not necessarily imply an intention on the part of the Islamic State of Afghanistan to advocate an antagonistic attitude towards the central Government and the people of Pakistan. The principled foreign policy of Afghanistan requires sincere friendship and cooperation with all States, and with neighbouring countries in particular. We are of the conviction that only such an atmosphere will give our nation the opportunity to reconstruct its war-ravaged country. We remain indebted to the fraternal, friendly Pakistani nation, which stood by us in our days of trial.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

39. “Fifthly, this month as many as 149 rockets have been launched by Taliban, killing 34 people, wounding 114 and destroying 22 houses. In addition, as a result of a Taliban aerial bombardment on 23 December 1995 33 citizens of the city of Kabul were martyred. That number includes seven professional film-makers whose production studio took a direct hit, as well as nine children; 140 were wounded. As many as 40 children have not been accounted for. On 28 January 1996 Taliban bombarded central parts of the capital, resulting in the loss of 10 citizens and leaving many others wounded. On 6 February 1996 a Taliban jet fighter dropped three 250-kg bombs on residential sectors of the city. Happily, this time no casualties were involved.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

40. “First, in late December 1995, the Taliban fired over 205 rockets at the residential areas of Kabul, killing 25 civilians and wounding 47 others, while many houses sustained serious damage. Secondly, during January 1996 Taliban mercenaries launched as many as 331 rockets on residential areas of Kabul, resulting in the loss of 60 lives, and leaving 225 civilians wounded and 65 houses demolished. Thirdly, during February 1996 a total of 71 rockets were showered on Kabul civilian targets, killing 12 people and injuring 54 others, while leaving 11 houses destroyed. Fourthly, during March 1996 they launched 111 rockets on the residential areas of Kabul, killing 31 inhabitants, wounding 44 and inflicting serious damage upon 23 houses.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

41. “All along, the Taliban's dogmatic abstention from negotiations has been based mostly, we believe, upon their possession of the fire-power constantly provided them by Pakistani intelligence circles, typified, among numerous instances, by the Taliban's reported receipt of new Pakistani long-range rockets. As large a city as Kabul, the capital and home to over a million innocent citizens doomed to horrible bereavements, gives testimony to the crimes of the Taliban, who every day open new files of atrocities. In the past the Afghan delegation has presented accounts of the violation of international humanitarian law by the Taliban. The following is a brief report of rocket attacks on civilian targets in the capital, Kabul, perpetrated by the Taliban. This is, and should be, a matter of serious concern for the Security Council.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

42. “This gathering was held with arrogance, and without the participation of any of the main Afghan groups. The final resolution of the Kandahar council, adopted on 3 April 1996, declared Akhound Molla Mohammed Omar, the nominal head of the Taliban, "Amir al-Mominin - the ruler of the faithful", a title not claimed since the end of the Ottoman Caliphate in Istanbul. The content of this decision indicates the pretension of the Taliban to extend their rule not only in Afghanistan but also into neighbouring Islamic countries. This burlesque and extravagant meeting was condemned not only by the Afghan Government but also by the opposition other than Taliban.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

43. “For instance, Taliban leaders on various occasions have castigated the United Nations role in Afghanistan as "futile and vain". They have also rejected any form of negotiation with the Government. As recently as last week, with the help of Pakistani circles, the Taliban convened a gathering called a shura, or council, in Kandahar. It is again with dismay that I note that, according to reliable reports, at 9.30 am. on 29 March 1996 a Pakistani 143-type military transport aeroplane, departing from Karachi, landed at Kandahar airport, bringing a Pakistani political and intelligence delegation which took part in the organization and the convening of that council. In addition, the participants in this shura, or council, were brought to Kandahar by aeroplanes and trucks from Pakistan.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

44. “This approach might give one the impression that the Mission has lost sight of other major elements and stages as basic components of the peace process and as prerequisites for a durable, just and credible political settlement. The Afghan Government has welcomed the strengthening of the United Nations Special Mission through the appointment of four new advisers to directly assist Ambassador Mestiri in his highly arduous and complex task. The peace process in Afghanistan, because of its intricate nature, will be better facilitated now that the Mission enjoys the experience and technical advice of this outstanding group of experts. However, the failure of the Special Mission to identify the actual stumbling block in the way of the United Nation peace endeavours has always been one of the causes delaying the momentum of the peace process.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

45. “We understand that in all peacemaking operations, after securing a genuine positive national environment conducive to peace, the United Nations, as an honest broker, develops a practical and pragmatic approach to ensure an overall agreement and to supervise its implementation. However, in Afghanistan it seems that the United Nations Special Mission - in spite of the rich experience of past United Nations peacemaking activities, in the absence of a political agreement and of due consideration for elements and factors that are imperative for a peaceful political process - has in the past been emphasizing only one element, namely, the transfer of power.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

46. “Generally, the continuous contacts and delicate negotiations with the main actors lead to a formal agreement among the parties, which usually includes, inter alia, two chapters: political and military. The political chapter includes agreements on an immediate cease-fire, structure of power during the transitional period, transfer of power, electoral law, the holding of elections, adoption of a constitution, and so forth. The military chapter of such an agreement generally deals with disengagement, the demobilization of irregular forces, and the building of a national security force.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

47. “Casting an eye over earlier peacemaking activities of the United Nations in other areas of the world such as Cambodia, Angola, El Salvador and so forth, we realize that to some degree there is a unified pattern for peacemaking operations that has been carried out step by step. The first step in all these patterns, as we stated before the General Assembly, is to distinguish the status of the parties in an internal conflict, namely the Government and the insurgent forces. This makes it possible to ascertain their views on a negotiated political settlement. Through the whole process, any United Nations mission needs to maintain its strict impartiality.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

48. “There has been a failure: first, explicitly to identify foreign interference as the root cause of the conflict and to recommend effective measures to terminate it - although it is a matter of gratification to see that paragraph 17 of the recent report of the Secretary-General (A/50/908) cites foreign interference as one of the outstanding causes of the continuation of the conflict; secondly, to identify and observe a logical sequence for the stages of the peace process on a pragmatic and realistic basis, which should include the transitional period required for a political process to generate an overall negotiated settlement; and thirdly, adequately and in a timely manner to identify the true nature of the mercenaries called Taliban at the time of their emergence in September 1994, and subsequently, when their objectives became clear in early 1995, to reveal their well-known foreign linkage.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

49. “It is on the basis of this commitment as well as our realization that we bear a historic responsibility to defend our national sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity that we have to point out some shortcomings in the endeavours of the Special Mission. We hope these shortcomings will be remedied soon.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

50. “Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and to the Head of the Special Mission, His Excellency Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri, and his colleagues for their continuous endeavours aimed at achieving a lasting peace in Afghanistan. The Afghan Government also highly appreciates the valuable endeavours undertaken and the role played by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The efforts of His Excellency Mr. Hamid Algabid, Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Ambassador Ibrahim S. Bakr, Special Representative of the OIC Secretary-General for Afghanistan, and Ambassador Engin Ansay, the Special Envoy of the OIC for Afghanistan, are to be mentioned with gratification. We are committed to cooperating with the United Nations Special Mission in order to enable it to succeed in accomplishing its mandate.”

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source