YouSaid · the spoken record

Ghafoorzhi

lines on the record
8
first
1996-10-16
most recent
1996-10-16
sittings or episodes
1
sources
un-security-council

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  1. “1 would just like to respond to the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan by referring to the saying about the fox in the coop, with eggs and the chicken in his mouth, blaming the cow in the field for causing the chicken to cry out.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

  2. “In brief, I should like to say that the people of Afghanistan, who enjoy deep-rooted religious, historical and cultural ties and bonds of brotherhood with the people of Pakistan, still appreciate the assistance of our Pakistani brothers and sisters during the 14 years of our rightful jihad and national struggle. All this means that the Pakistani representative should do something better than continue to deny the negative role of his authorities in the Afghan conflict. Ironically. in his statement before the Security Council this afternoon, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan blames the continued conflict on the interference of others.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

  3. “In this very explosive and volatile situation, I wonder if any member of the Council would consider such a trip on the part of the Interior Minister of Pakistan to Kabul and then to Mazar-i-Sharif and then finally to Kandahar, the headquarters of the Taliban, anything but a contradiction of the claim that has been made. The immediate implication of this trip is that it can only exacerbate the conflict. Is this not interference? How else could it be described other than as a gesture that is provocative and destructive to intra-Afghan dialogue. Mr. Nasirullah Babar would know that he is not the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan and responsible for coordinating policies in support of its subordinates, the Taliban. His trip as Interior Minister of Pakistan must mean something other than was explained.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

  4. “After General Dostum joined the Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the Pakistani Interior Minister, Mr. Babar, flew to Mazar-i-Sharif yesterday to meet General Dostum. We are not sure what was discussed in that meeting, but one subject we are sure was not raised with General Dostum was congratulations on his decision to join the Islamic State of Afghanistan headed by Mr. Rabbani. It must have been quite to the contrary. It should be remembered that the Pakistani authorities have always said they have a policy of according no preferential treatment to any Afghan side.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

  5. “The emphasis at this crucial juncture is on further strengthening the Special Mission, as suggested in our proposed draft resolution, distributed this morning. This is indicative of our belief in the competence and capability of the Special Mission and of the facilities that it has at its disposal to promote an early return of peace to war-shattered Afghanistan. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan made some remarks in his statement that call for some brief response. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan once again reaffirmed his country's attitude and position of not having a one-sided approach towards the groups and parties in Afghanistan. Permit me once again briefly to state what happened just yesterday, as I mentioned in my statement this morning.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

  6. “As far as Islamic status is concerned, we have always steadfastly supported that principle, whether we were in a strong position or a defensive posture, because we believe that this path is beneficial to the higher interests of our country and of our people. Surely, the record of the United Nations Special Mission for Afghanistan shows this. Moreover, now and in the past we have always accorded special importance to the role of the United Nations Special Mission. It would not be far from the truth to say that the Islamic State of Afghanistan has been one of the parties that has been most cooperative with the Special Mission. We highly value the good offices of His Excellency the Secretary-General and His Excellency Mr. Norbert Holl's tireless efforts as a friend of the Afghan people.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

  7. “The occupation of a city, on the one hand, or the repulsion of force on the other cannot solve the problem in an intermingled society such as ours, particularly not in the face of increasingly widespread foreign intervention. We believe that all sides must abstain from the search for unilateral, monopoly power. All sides must consider the other parties to the Afghan conflict to be equal and fraternal. So that equality can reign in the future political life of Afghanistan, each party should be able to guarantee and secure their political independence, national unity and territorial integrity through the civilized practice of negotiations. But we cannot improve the situation if the Taliban continues to reject any viable solution to the problem - and it is the only side in the conflict to do so.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source

  8. “In the name of the bereaved Afghan nation, I wish to extend gratitude to all those who took part in today's meeting and expressed their support for the cause of peace and stability in Afghanistan either on behalf of their countries or, as in the case of Italy and Ireland, on behalf of a group of countries. I remind those who expressed their disapproval of the continuation of the conflict in our country that we supported talks and negotiations to take the place of military confrontation and lead to the formation of a broad-based government of national unity representing every Afghan side. Certainly, a military solution will not solve the crisis in Afghanistan. All the Afghan sides must have realized this.”

    1996-10-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3705 (1996) · source