YouSaid · the spoken record

Gnehm

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118
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1994-05-25
most recent
1997-06-30
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25
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un-security-council

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  1. Savimbi to meet in Angola immediately and regularly until a solution has been reached to all outstanding issues. The international community wants to stop expending scarce and precious resources providing troops to stand between armed factions. We want to turn those resources to reconstructing roads and bridges, hospitals, schools and other elements of the infrastructure Angola will need to achieve the prosperity it deserves and can attain.

    1997-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3795 (1997) · source

  2. Procedures for the normalization of Government control are clearly defined in the Lusaka Protocol and must be followed. We also believe that agreement regarding national symbols would contribute to the national reconciliation process. We urge UNITA fully and immediately to complete the political and military tasks it agreed to in Lusaka. It will have our support to the extent that it does so. We understand UNITA's security concerns and intend to stay engaged in ensuring that both parties abide by their mutual security guarantees, but it is long overdue for UNITA to declare, to disarm and to demobilize its armed elements and to bring UNITA into the mainstream of a peaceful political process. Finally, we urge President Dos Santos and Mr.

    1997-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3795 (1997) · source

  3. We extend our thanks to the personnel of UNAVEM. III and to the troop contributors for a job well done. We also express our gratitude to the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Maitre Beye, for his tireless work. On the occasion of the inauguration of this new United Nations Mission, the United States calls on the Government of Angola and on UNITA to complete the process of peace and national reconciliation. We urge the Government of Angola to exhibit restraint as the peace process enters its final phase. We have been concerned by troop movements and by ceasefire violations in the north- eastern provinces, and we call on the Government of Angola to desist immediately from unilateral military actions outside the Lusaka framework.

    1997-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3795 (1997) · source

  4. The United States is pleased to join with other members of the Security Council in support of this draft resolution, which inaugurates a new phase in United Nations involvement in Angola's peace process. We wish the new United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) success in overseeing the accomplishment of the remaining tasks of the Lusaka Protocol, foremost among them the normalization by peaceful means of State administration throughout the national territory. The establishment of this new Mission is a tribute to the success of its predecessor, the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM. III), which, with its 7,000 troops, upheld the ceasefire, safely disarmed and demobilized more than 60,000 combatants, and brought relative peace to Angola after decades of brutal conflict.

    1997-06-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3795 (1997) · source

  5. We are confident that Ambassador Butler will continue to provide the kind of leadership that distinguished his predecessor. The United States pledges its continued strong support to UNSCOM. in its mission to ensure full Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions. By its decision today, the Council has demonstrated that it will do the same.

    1997-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3792 (1997) · source

  6. cannot fulfil its mandate because of Iraqi interference, if the Executive Chairman cannot report that Iraq is in compliance with the resolutions of the Council, then the day cannot come when sanctions relief is in sight. The steps we have taken here today should be a concrete demonstration of this fact to the ruling clique in Baghdad. We hope they will heed this lesson well and draw the correct conclusions. I should also like to add that by any measure, Rolf Ekeus's efforts as the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM since its beginning in 1991 have been exceptional. He brought refreshing candour, ingenuity and tenacity to the often daunting job of carrying out the Security Council's requirements. We thank Rolf Ekeus for his outstanding service.

    1997-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3792 (1997) · source

  7. Similarly, the Council expresses its intent to impose new measures, targeted precisely at those parties most responsible for the continued concealment of Iraq's weapons programmes, if Iraq ignores this latest draft resolution and fails to comply not just with the form but with the substance of the Commission's authority to conduct inspections and interviews without interference of any sort. My Government shares the concerns of Chairman Ekeus that those hurt most by the actions of the Iraqi Government are the Iraqi people themselves, whose country remains a pariah because of the obstinate refusal of its leaders to abide by their international obligations. We too would like to see the day when Iraq can rejoin the world community as a respected member nation. But if UNSCOM.

    1997-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3792 (1997) · source

  8. The draft resolution limits suspension of the 60-day sanctions review to a fixed period, specifically until the next semi-annual UNSCOM/International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) progress report in October. The Council's action suspends only the reviews scheduled for 30 June and 30 August. In our View, there is no possibility that either of those reviews could result in a change in the sanctions regime, given the extent to which Iraq's current challenge has set back the Commission's work. So this measure sends a strong message to Baghdad that lifting sanctions will be impossible until Iraq fundamentally changes its approach.

    1997-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3792 (1997) · source

  9. Iraq has responded with contempt. Well, the time for mere words is over. Iraq has shown us that it will never voluntarily comply with resolutions of the Council unless the Council acts firmly and decisively to enforce its will. That is why we have brought forward this draft resolution today, which will demonstrate conclusively to Iraq that its actions have serious consequences. Iraq has to know that if it not only fails to make progress but deliberately moves backwards in its respect for the Council and for the Commission, then there is a price to pay. Let me be clear about the action the Council is taking today. We have chosen these particular steps because they are measured and targeted.

    1997-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3792 (1997) · source

  10. He underscores again that Iraq maintains a policy deliberately designed to conceal the extent of its capabilities and the quantities of weapons it still maintains from the eyes of United Nations inspectors and continues to provide deliberately misleading information in its so-called full, final and complete declarations. His recent briefings to the Council confirm that there has been no improvement in these alarming policies since April. The report also concludes, tellingly, that UNSCOM will not be able to complete its work until the "major political decision" is made by Iraq's leadership "to give up, once and for all, all capabilities and ambition to retain or acquire proscribed weapons". Time and again this Council has expressed its support for UNSCOM. through resolutions and the statements of the Council President.

    1997-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3792 (1997) · source

  11. Not only do these actions grossly violate Iraq's obligations under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1060 (1996), they abrogate even the modalities that Iraq itself agreed to with the Chairman just last year. And as Iraqi officials said explicitly to UNSCOM. inspectors, these obstructionist actions were taken under orders from the highest authorities in Baghdad. There can be no doubt, as Chairman Ekeus has documented, that the UNSCOM. system of inspection, verification and elimination faces the most serious threat it has faced since it was established. Iraq's continued failure is a serious threat to the region's peace and security. In his report of 11 April, Chairman Ekeus states that he cannot certify that Iraq has accounted for all the proscribed weapons it possesses.

    1997-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3792 (1997) · source

  12. Since 1991, Iraq has made every effort to conceal its true weapons capabilities, to destroy evidence of its programmes and supply routes and to lie about it to this Council. In the last two years, Iraqi efforts to interfere with the Special Commission in the execution of its mandate have intensified. UNSCOM. inspectors have videotapes of members of the Republican Guard burying missile components; UNSCOM. inspectors have observed blatant efforts to remove documents and other evidence from sites while the inspectors themselves have been prevented from entering; and UNSCOM. inspectors have been refused permission to interview knowledgeable individuals.

    1997-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3792 (1997) · source

  13. Six long years after the ceasefire resolution 687 (1991) established the framework for establishing peace and security in the Persian Gulf and for reintegrating Iraq into the community of peaceful nations, Iraq remains far from compliance with the obligations it made to this Council. On the contrary, Iraq has expended its best efforts to thwart the will of the Council, particularly in the crucial area of weapons of mass destruction. Never has this been made more clear than by Chairman Ekeus when he briefed the Council this week on the extremely serious incidents that have led us to this draft resolution today. Chairman Ekeus documented a pattern of Iraqi abuses that extends well beyond the three incidents of blockage directed at inspection teams of the United Nations Special Commission (UN SCOM) on 10 June and 12 June.

    1997-06-21 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3792 (1997) · source

  14. The voices of those who want all their fellow Afghans to have a role in selecting their leaders and in determining the social practices for their communities deserve to be heard. The United Nations and our individual Governments should do all we can to ensure that this silent majority has a voice.

    1997-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3765 (1997) · source

  15. We believe it could succeed in launching a true political process if the Afghan groups were willing to negotiate in good faith. Many Afghans openly express their hopes and aspirations for their country. They long for peace and security and a government that will restore the economy, the infrastructure and their livelihoods. Much of the populace has accepted Taliban rule - not, I would say, because they want a severe judicial regime or social and religious restrictions imposed on all, but because they are desperate for peace and a semblance of normal life. The Taliban have brought a modicum of peace to much of Afghanistan, but at a real price. In our view, the Afghan people should not be faced with a stark choice between security with political constraints and social intolerance, and no security at all.

    1997-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3765 (1997) · source

  16. In our View, this Council should remain concerned about the unrelenting flow of weapons and equipment to the warring parties by outside powers, despite the disclaimers we hear from all. So to all those engaged in such resupply, the members of this Council should have only this to say: "You are undermining the cause of peace in Afghanistan and perpetuating the conflict. And, ironically, your efforts are unlikely to change the outcome." The Head of United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan, Mr. Norbert Holl, has worked tirelessly to persuade the warring groups to sit down together and discuss the parameters of a peace. The United States Government commends the enormous efforts and dedication of Mr. H011 and his staff in what must seem to be a thankless and unproductive task. We stand fully behind the United Nations Special Mission.

    1997-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3765 (1997) · source

  17. All groups must work towards a broadly representative government acceptable to all Afghans. Let me take this occasion to respond to disinformation that the United States has given support to the Taliban. We do not support the Taliban or any other group. But neither do we put blame on the Taliban for the ills of Afghanistan, for which all parties are responsible. We have repeatedly and clearly conveyed to parties our deep concerns on terrorist/militant training camps, on narcotics production and trafficking and on human rights, particularly the rights of women and girls. We have reminded the Taliban that it is their responsibility to reassure their neighbours that they have no intention of challenging their territorial integrity or exporting Taliban ideology.

    1997-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3765 (1997) · source

  18. Since this Council last discussed Afghanistan in October, the Taliban have advanced north of Kabul and into central Afghanistan in an effort to push aside their rivals, General Dostum and Commander Massoud. These military moves towards the northern border and the Taliban's extremely conservative social policies greatly alarmed Afghanistan's neighbours. Observers vary on whether the Taliban can prevail over Dostum and Massoud and succeed in taking over the north, but this remains a possibility. The United States Government has repeatedly urged an end to the fighting and urged a practical dialogue in the spirit of compromise. We have also encouraged others to make this key point, in particular to the Taliban: stability cannot be achieved if one group tries to rule all Afghanistan on its own.

    1997-04-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3765 (1997) · source

  19. Nevertheless, the United States cannot in good conscience condone the return of all UNMOT personnel to Tajikistan or another extension of its current mandate beyond 15 June until it is clear that the personnel will be able to carry out their mandate free of threats to their lives and liberty. We look forward to continued good news from the inter-Tajik talks, and we look forward to an easing of the security situation so that the international community can return to its work. The establishment of peace in Tajikistan requires support for national reconciliation from the entire population of Tajikistan, from all its regions and from all its political movements. Reconciliation will create conditions for a democratic society and a peaceful and prosperous Tajikistan.

    1997-03-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3752 (1997) · source

  20. A campaign of terrorism has targeted for assassination persons appearing to be ethnic Russians, including two guards at the United States Embassy. We are deeply concerned that this unacceptable security situation makes it impossible for UNMOT to fulfil the military portions of its mandate. In this regard, we welcome the communique from President Rakhmonov and Mr. Nuri deploring acts of terrorism, and we call upon the parties to fulfil their commitments to create a reasonably safe environment for international personnel. We recognize that the Government of Tajikistan has made efforts to bring to justice some of the criminal elements responsible for these abuses.

    1997-03-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3752 (1997) · source

  21. We call upon the parties to implement fully their agreements and to ensure the participation of all their forces in implementing the accords. In contrast to these successes, however, the security threat to international personnel has hindered the ability of the international community to assist the parties in their quest for peace. These threats have forced the Secretary- General to suspend United Nations activities in Tajikistan to the real detriment of the people of Tajikistan. This situation must be resolved immediately. In the last three months, unarmed UNMOT personnel have been taken hostage and subjected to gross mistreatment, including the threat of execution. Other international personnel have also fallen victim to similar abuse.

    1997-03-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3752 (1997) · source

  22. Since then the parties, in a spirit of compromise and reconciliation, have held two full negotiating rounds and another summit meeting. They have succeeded in abiding by an effective ceasefire, evolved a framework for restructuring the Government and sharing power and, most recently, at the latest Moscow round, agreed on a method of combining armed forces. The Protocol on Military Issues signed in Moscow represents a very significant, practical step forward towards building trust, ending Tajikistan's civil conflict and reintegrating the Tajik nation. We are grateful to the Russian Federation for facilitating those negotiations. The United States congratulates the parties for these accomplishments and at the same time urges them to complete successfully the difficult task of negotiating peace for their country.

    1997-03-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3752 (1997) · source

  23. We welcome the Secretary-General's report of 5 March on the situation in Tajikistan and express our appreciation for the efforts of Special Representative Merrem to bring about a lasting solution to the conflict. Our thanks also go to the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) for its contributions under stressful conditions, as well as to those member States that contributed personnel for UNMOT. The United States is pleased with the progress being made in the inter-Tajik talks to bring an end to the conflict. In this regard, the United States supports the adoption of a three-month extension of UNMOT's mandate to signal the Council's encouragement of the political process. The search for peace has gained momentum rapidly in the three months since the Council last renewed UNMOT's mandate.

    1997-03-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3752 (1997) · source

  24. The United States has already begun an ambitious post-war assistance programme that will provide millions of dollars in additional aid as part of a process to create a new, peaceful and prosperous Guatemala. Despite this setback today, we remain determined that those who support peace in Guatemala will find a way to support the noble ends of the Guatemalan peace process.

    1997-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3730 (1997) · source

  25. Unfortunately, this body failed to agree upon the Secretary-General's recommendation for the establishment of a military observer group to monitor that demobilization. URNG and the Guatemalan Government agree on the need for a short demobilization period that will quickly get URNG fighters back into productive civilian life. The United States and the other Friends of Guatemala will continue to seek a means to that end. The reconstruction of Guatemala's infrastructure and reconciliation in Guatemalan society will take time and substantial international support: financial and moral. Donors will meet in Brussels later this month to coordinate international assistance to Guatemala.

    1997-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3730 (1997) · source

  26. We are proud to have served as a member of the Group of Friends since 1994, when the United Nations took over moderation of the negotiations. The international community has made peace in Guatemala a priority. The tireless efforts of the Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, together with the international community, have now come to fruition. On 29 December in Guatemala City, the Government of Guatemala and URNG ended their nation's long, bloody civil war, which has cost more than 100,000 lives. The realization of a comprehensive peace in Guatemala is a tremendous achievement. It ends the last conflict in Central America and the longest-running armed conflict in the hemisphere. The most immediate need in Guatemala is to demobilize 3,000 URNG guerrillas and help them return to civilian life.

    1997-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3730 (1997) · source

  27. It is most unfortunate that the Security Council could not reach agreement on authorizing a military observer component to the United Nations Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala, the Mission that we call MINUGUA. After 36 years of war, the Guatemalan people have the chance to fulfil their rich potential. The Guatemalan Government, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), the United Nations, the Friends of Guatemala and others have invested significant diplomatic and financial resources in bringing peace to Guatemala. We regret that one member of the Council was not able to give the larger interest of regional peace and security the priority it deserves. Since democratic government was restored in Guatemala in 1985, the United States has supported a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

    1997-01-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3730 (1997) · source

  28. Continued Sudanese non-compliance with the demands of the international community not only will bring these measures into force, but will compel consideration of further steps.

    1996-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3690 (1996) · source

  29. This grace period has one purpose: to give the Sudanese a chance to abandon their attempt to defy the will of the Security Council and the norms of international decency. There is one way, and one way only, for the Sudanese Government to avoid these sanctions: to take meaningful and convincing steps to cooperate in tracking down the three suspects and to bring an end to Sudanese support for terrorist groups. International terrorism targets unprotected people, people who want only to live in privacy and peace. All Member States face its threat. World leaders have stressed their commitment to the battle against terrorism time and time again. Today we take a small step forward in that campaign. Our patient approach must not be misread in Khartoum. Our collective commitment to eradicating terrorism is unflagging.

    1996-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3690 (1996) · source

  30. Instead, it is prepared to apply measured, incremental pressure on the Government of Sudan until it meets fully its obligations. The Council will act today in a manner which carefully avoids aggravating the humanitarian crisis in the Sudan. We will ensure that if Sudan forces us to implement sanctions on its airline, humanitarian relief will continue. This draft resolution is what I might call a wake-up call to the Sudanese authorities. In 90 days we will meet to decide the entry into force of the sanctions agreed to today and to set up their modalities. Because of the binding nature of today's decision, there can be no question of backtracking if the Sudanese remain obstinate. There must be no confusion on that point.

    1996-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3690 (1996) · source

  31. The international community has demanded two simple steps of Sudan: the surrender of the three remaining suspects responsible for plotting the terrorist attack on Egyptian President Mubarak and, secondly, the end of its support for terrorism. The Government of Sudan so far has refused to comply with these straightforward requirements. The Secretary-General's latest report makes that fact quite plain. What we have witnessed instead, and what we have heard today, is a phony Sudanese public relations campaign to try to convince the world that Sudan has cooperated in the security field. As adoption of this draft resolution will make clear, the international community is neither confused nor distracted by such tactical ploys.

    1996-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3690 (1996) · source

  32. We do so because we have not given up hope for Liberia - hope that Liberians will take hold of their destiny and recover their country from the grip of those who only wish to destroy it; hope that law and order can again be brought to Liberia; hope that Liberia can be liberated from war. Over the next three months my Government will be watching closely to see if any of these hopes are fulfilled. If not, we and the Security Council will have to re-evaluate our approach. And so again we urge all those in Liberia, particularly the faction leaders, to use this time to meet the conditions ECOWAS has laid out and offer their people the chance for peace that they so much deserve.

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  33. Once again Liberian leaders must decide what course to pursue. We hope they will implement the recent agreements reached in Accra. The Liberian warlords must order their forces to disarm and leave Monrovia in peace. ECOMOG commanders must reassert their control over Monrovia. And the Council of State must begin to act like the Transitional Government that was envisioned in the Abuja Agreement. And by the end of this week the Security Council must decide on the future of UNOMIL. We are heartened by the continuing commitment of the ECOWAS States and by the steps ECOMOG has taken to deploy throughout Monrovia. We encourage them to continue such efforts. Therefore, we support extending UNOMIL's mandate for three months.

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  34. This Mechanism for Returning Liberia to the Abuja Agreement provides concrete steps needed to restart the peace process. These steps include restoration of the cease-fire, withdrawal of all fighters from Monrovia, deployment of ECOMOG throughout the city and restoration of Monrovia as a safe haven. These steps are necessary if there is to be continued international involvement. This is the message that my Government delivered to the Liberian parties through high- level delegations we sent to Monrovia in the past weeks. We commend the ECOWAS countries for their clarity of purpose and their dedication in the face of tremendous difficulties. We believe that the Security Council must support this important initiative by the countries of the region. The Accra meeting has given Liberia yet another chance to return to the path of peace.

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  35. Only a few UNOMIL military observers remain, and the fighting often precludes them from any attempt to carry out the most basic tasks of their mandate. We are outraged by the looting of the United Nations, the non-governmental organizations, the churches, the hospitals and the homes of Liberian people. What can we do? The answer is not to abandon Liberia. We agree with the views of the Secretary-General in his report - the international community must remain engaged in the efforts to provide relief and to bring peace to the people of Liberia. The regional countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have taken the lead in this respect. The meeting of their Foreign Ministers in Accra on 7 May developed a plan to restart the peace process.

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  36. And now the Secretary-General tells us in his report that fighting is seriously jeopardizing the Abuja peace process and has reversed the gains made over the past few months. As Ambassador Albright observed after her Visit to Monrovia in January, the problem in Liberia is a struggle among a few elites for power. In April, these faction leaders demonstrated their commitment to their own interests rather than the good of their people. They reignited the violence; they turned Monrovia from a safe haven into a war zone; they looted the equipment of relief agencies whose only goal was to help the Liberian people. Today fighters openly drive convoys of stolen United Nations and non-governmental organization vehicles around Monrovia. My Government was forced to conduct an emergency evacuation of most of the international community from Liberia.

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  37. All of us have watched in horror over the past two months as Liberia has descended from hope into despair. Driven by warlords, Liberia has careened off the road to peace and national reconciliation. Only a few months ago, we spoke hopefully of the Abuja peace Agreement, of the pioneer role of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as a regional peace-keeping force, and of the important contribution which the United Nations - particularly UNOMIL - was making to the peace process. A transitional Council of State had been installed, and we looked forward to elections in August. We expected Liberia's leaders to complete the remaining steps required under Abuja so that Liberians could finally enjoy the peace they have sought for six long years of civil war.

    1996-05-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3667 (1996) · source

  38. We believe that firmer measures should be taken, not against the people of Sudan, but against their unresponsive Government. The Government of Sudan, however, should take no comfort from the fact that today's measures are not as strong as they might be. For the Council has promised that if the Government of Sudan fails to meet our requirements in the next 60 days, we will seek more meaningful sanctions. We hope that the Government of Sudan gets the message, turns over the suspects and stops supporting other terrorists. If not, we will be back here in two months to do whatever is necessary to compel Sudan to abide by the rules of a civilized nation.

    1996-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3660 (1996) · source

  39. Our objective, often repeated by Egypt, Ethiopia and other neighbours of Sudan, is to bring about an end to Sudan's support of terrorist groups. If we are serious about our commitment to combat terrorism, we must put our words and our intentions into meaningful action. Today's resolution is another step toward true action. On the positive side, the Council has finally determined that Sudan's actions in supporting the cowardly terrorist attack on President Mubarak, and continuing to foster terrorism around the globe, are indeed a threat to international peace and security. By imposing initial sanctions, the Council is telling the Government of Sudan that we will not be content with mere words. We favour the steps the Council is taking today, but we must say again that they are not big enough.

    1996-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3660 (1996) · source

  40. To support its terrorist clients, Sudan regularly abuses the prerogatives of sovereign States by giving out Sudanese passports, both diplomatic and regular, to help non-Sudanese terrorists travel freely, as documented in cases involving Ethiopia, Egypt and Tunisia. It uses Sudan Airways to transport terrorists and their weapons, as in the cases of Ethiopia and Tunisia; it makes financial resources and safe refuges available to terrorists; and it provides the very weapons terrorists use to inflict their horror, as in the Mubarak assassination attempt in Addis Ababa. All Member States face the international threat of terrorism. We have all stressed in various forums that we will fight global terrorism wherever it appears.

    1996-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3660 (1996) · source

  41. Sudan's efforts to export terrorism have even reached the United Nations. Two employees of the Sudanese Mission to the United Nations were active accomplices in the plot to assassinate President Mubarak during a visit to New York. They were also active accomplices in efforts to blow up the very building that we are meeting in today. They provided information on the President's itinerary. These two employees also offered to provide identification cards and parking passes so that terrorists could plant a bomb, like the one at the World Trade Center, in the basement of this building. These are not just allegations - they are part of the public, official record of a criminal trial held openly here in the courts of the City of New York.

    1996-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3660 (1996) · source

  42. Sudan continues to harbour members of the Abu Nidal organization, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement - Hamas - the Egyptian Al-Gama'a-Islamia, and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group. These terrorist organizations threaten Governments in Egypt, Algeria, Israel and elsewhere. The National Islamic Front also supports Islamic and other opposition groups from Tunisia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, as we heard earlier. All of these Governments have beseeched Sudan to cease its sponsorship of violent opposition movements, but without success, as we heard from the representative of Uganda earlier in this debate. Uganda and Eritrea have been forced to sever relations with Khartoum because of the threat these organizations based in Sudan posed to them.

    1996-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3660 (1996) · source

  43. Sudanese authorities were aware of the location of the three before, during and after the assassination attempt, and after the extradition request from Ethiopia was received. Sudan has harboured the three suspects, and officials of the National Islamic Front have protected them. As shocking as are Sudan's complicity in, and efforts to cover up, the attack on President Mubarak, they are only part of a broader pattern of Sudanese support for terrorism, which equally demands action by the international community. Under the policy of the National Islamic Front, Sudan welcomed a long list of terrorist organizations, providing a meeting point and training centre for their violent activities outside of Sudan.

    1996-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3660 (1996) · source

  44. We have noted press reports that one of the suspects has now turned up in Afghanistan, making the absolutely unbelievable claim that he has not been in Sudan in months. His recent arrival in Afghanistan from Sudan does not change the fact that the Government of Sudan has the responsibility to ensure his extradition to Ethiopia. Let us be clear: If Sudan believes that it can escape its responsibility simply by sending the three suspects out of the Sudan, it is wrong. As today's resolution makes clear, the Government of Sudan, which sheltered these terrorists, has broad responsibility for seeing that they are returned to Ethiopia for trial. We will not be satisfied until Sudan has fulfilled this responsibility. The claims of the Government of the Sudan that it has tried to locate the three wanted suspects have no credibility.

    1996-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3660 (1996) · source

  45. In adopting resolution 1044 (1996), the Council recognized Sudan's complicity in supporting and sheltering those who plotted the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Mubarak and the Government of Sudan's sponsorship of terrorism as part of its foreign policy. Resolution 1044 (1996) required two simple steps from Sudan for it to begin to return to the good graces of the international community: to surrender the three remaining suspects in the Mubarak assassination attempt and to cease its support for terrorism. The Government of Sudan has refused to comply with these two simple requirements, as the Secretary-General makes clear in his report. Instead, Khartoum has focused its efforts on a public-relations campaign and on smuggling the three suspects out of the Sudan.

    1996-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3660 (1996) · source

  46. My Government supports this resolution, but it does so with reservations. We do not believe that the sanctions outlined in this resolution are sufficient to convince the Government of Sudan to cease its sponsorship of international terrorism and return to the fold of responsible, law-abiding nations. My Government welcomes this Council's concern to combat terrorism. However, in failing to impose more meaningful sanctions against Sudan, we risk further insecurity and instability for the people of eastern Africa, the Middle East and the Sudan. I must share the concern expressed by Ambassador Eteffa in his excellent presentation. This resolution raises questions as to whether the world community is as prepared as it should be to fight against State-sponsored terrorism with determination, courage and responsibility.

    1996-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3660 (1996) · source

  47. We should also discuss the prospects for convening a conference on Afghanistan that could help accelerate the peace process. It is essential to create a forum in which the legitimate aspirations of the vast majority of the Afghan people can be expressed and where a mechanism for governing can be established. The United Nations will do what it can to bring the Afghan parties together, but in the end it is up to those parties who are waging war to choose the other road, the one that will bring peace and reconciliation, at last, to Afghanistan.

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

  48. There needs to be a cease-fire and progress towards a comprehensive peace plan. There are a number of ideas which have been floated as means to achieve the desired end in Afghanistan. I repeat that each one requires the political will of the various factions. The United States wishes to work closely with other concerned countries to explore what more the United Nations can do at this critical juncture to bring about a lasting peace. We renew our call that all outside parties desist from providing weapons or any other assistance to the armed factions. We are aware that several countries are considering an arms embargo against Afghanistan. The United States believes this is worth exploring further, if it could be effectively implemented.

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

  49. We call upon all the Afghan factions and the outside parties that support them with funds and weapons to realize the futility of continuing the conflict in Afghanistan. A military solution will not and cannot provide a lasting peace. In Afghanistan, where the economy has been totally shattered, many Afghan men take up arms only because they have no other way to earn a living to support their families. It is imperative, therefore, that the armed factions make a serious commitment to speak directly to their enemies. We understand that efforts have been under way for months to achieve reconciliation among the groups. The United States, like many Western, Islamic and other nations, stands ready to contribute to that task. However, rebuilding cannot begin until there is a true peace. We want an immediate end to the fighting.

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source

  50. This aid mainly has been targeted for refugee care and repatriation and to support demining operations. Some very limited funding goes for anti-narcotics efforts. Since 1989 the United States has provided some $700 million in humanitarian assistance. The aid figure for last year alone was nearly $50 million. Today the Security Council has the opportunity to explore what actions it might take to further encourage this process of reconciliation and to achieve progress towards a peaceful political settlement. But neither the Security Council, the United Nations nor the international community can create peace in Afghanistan. Only when the parties have the political will to make peace, to end this war of all against all, will Afghanistan be able to build its way to stability and reconciliation.

    1996-04-09 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3648 (1996) · source