YouSaid · the spoken record

Graf Zu Rantzau

lines on the record: 174
first: 1992-07-16
most recent: 1995-06-30
sittings or episodes: 28
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The representative of France, in his capacity as representative of the presidency of the European Union, will express the concern of the European Union about the difficulties the Middle East peace process is currently encountering. We fully subscribe to his statement. Like our European partners, we too attach utmost importance to the necessity of re-establishing the momentum of the peace process. It is obvious that the peace process cannot be interrupted for too long without the risk of its being harmed. Both sides have to understand the other's concerns and fears. For the Israeli side, the increase in terrorist attacks on its citizens and the resulting security concerns are of paramount importance. For the Palestinian side, Israeli settlement activities in the occupied territories are one of the major obstacles to the peace process.”
1995-02-28 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3505Resumption1 (1995) · source
“Only the Government of Angola and UNITA can make UNAVEM. III a success. Only their willingness to achieve peace and their commitment to making the Lusaka Protocol work can lead to long-lasting peace for Angola. If the cooperation required of the Angolan parties is not forthcoming, the Security Council will have to reconsider the role of the United Nations in Angola. We have carefully considered the various arguments. There are obvious risks if the international community gets involved in a new peace-keeping operation in Angola. But we think that the international community is right to incur those risks to help achieve a real and lasting peace in Angola. We shall therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“I should also like to highlight two other important elements of the draft resolution: the importance, given the magnitude of this problem in Angola, of expeditiously establishing a well coordinated and comprehensive mine- clearance programme, and the importance of establishing a United Nations radio station in consultation with the Government of Angola. As an element for future consideration I should like to mention the necessity of finding a solution to the problem of the financing of political parties. This is an important matter. Experience in Mozambique, where the Government originally undertook the obligation to provide financial and other means to RENAMO, has shown this aspect to be particularly relevant in a peace process. Let me now return to the underlying question of authorizing UNAVEM. III.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“We cannot be absolutely sure whether the parties will continue to demonstrate the political determination to abide by the commitments they undertook in Lusaka. Another more practical but none the less substantial aspect of the Council's decision is that, if peace-keepers are to be deployed, there must be not only a peace to be kept, but other conditions as well, to lend meaning to the peace-keepers' task. The timetable agreed upon by the parties in the Lusaka Protocol has already slipped considerably. In this respect, the approach outlined in the report of the Secretary-General and reflected in the draft resolution to authorize UNAVEM. III immediately but to deploy the infantry units only gradually seems to us to be sensible.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“The meetings of their Chiefs of Staff and the regular meetings of the Joint Commission have been important confidence-building measures. Yet there is one crucial confidence-building measure still missing: a meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. Such a meeting must take place as soon as possible. We have carefully studied the Secretary-General's recommendation that the Council establish an enlarged peace-keeping operation, UNAVEM. III, in Angola. In the decision of the Council, two aspects have to be considered. On the one hand, a sizeable United Nations presence in Angola will certainly assist the peace process and help to successfully implement the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. On the other hand, the situation in Angola remains fragile.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“I would like to thank them for their substantial statements, which underline the importance which the Organization of African Unity attaches to the situation in Angola and to African solidarity. The signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20 November 1994 and the agreement on a cease-fire two days later are encouraging events in the recent tragic history of Angola. Since then, despite mutual accusations by the Angolan Government and by UNITA of cease-fire violations, the cease-fire has generally been observed. The decision of the Security Council to restore UNAVEM. II to its previous level certainly played an important role in the consolidation of the cease-fire. But another important factor was the cooperation between the Government of Angola and UNITA.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate you, Sir, on your country's assumption of the presidency of the Security Council. We are privileged indeed to have you preside over the Council, on whose work the outstanding professional and human qualities of Ambassador Legwaila have already left their mark. I should also like to thank Ambassador Cardenas for the exemplary manner in which he and his delegation conducted the proceedings of the Council. Furthermore, it gives me great pleasure to welcome the ministerial delegation of the Organization of African Unity, its Secretary-General and, in particular, the Minister for External Relations of Angola.”
1995-02-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3499Resumption1 (1995) · source
“None the less, a great deal remains to be done, and we are counting on the Government of Haiti to address these matters vigorously. The international community, the United Nations system and the Member States must make a large contribution to that effort in order for the Haitian Government to succeed. Hence, my Government stands ready to participate in the economic reconstruction of Haiti.”
1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source
“While there is now no danger hovering over the Haitian Government, there are none the less elements of concern that we must, unfortunately, take into account: the numerous criminal acts often perpetrated by members of the old regime; the increasing number of uncontrolled weapons; the insufficiency and continued ineffectiveness of the law- and-order forces; and the lack of judicial authorities to initiate penal proceedings. The Haitian Government, with the assistance of the United Nations Mission in Haiti and the international community, must urgently focus all its attention on these concerns. In the final analysis, we must realize that the efforts to stabilize Haiti will depend in very large part on its socio- economic development, and we see some encouraging signs in this regard.”
1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source
“We have already witnessed a perceptible improvement in the situation in Haiti. Haitians now enjoy fundamental rights - in particular, the rights of freedom of expression, assembly and association - to a greater extent than ever before. It is essential to maintain a stable and secure environment in Haiti in order to further consolidate its democratic structures, and we hope that the soon-to-be-held legislative elections will strengthen the progress already achieved.”
1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source
“Mr. Graf zu Rantzau (Germany) (interpretation from French): Germany considers that the time has come for the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to fulfil all of its functions. That is why we voted in favour of today's Security Council resolution on Haiti. On this occasion, my Government would like to express its gratitude to the States participating in the Multinational Force, which, so far has opened the way for the return of the elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, for the restoration of the legitimate Government of Haiti and for the re-establishment of a stable and secure environment in that country. The Multinational Force and the United Nations Mission in Haiti must together provide the guarantee that the critical transitional phase, which coincides with the holding of legislative elections, will also be a success.”
1995-01-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3496 (1995) · source
“After almost 20 years of turmoil and suffering, the people of Mozambique now have the chance to build a better future for themselves. No one expects the road ahead to be easy. The weapons arsenals of both former conflicting parties, arsenals that still exist in Mozambique, remain a cause for concern. The reconstruction of democratic institutions will continue to require political and material support from the international community. Considering all that has been achieved in the last two years, however, we feel that we have reason to be optimistic about the future of Mozambique. I would therefore request Minister Simao to assure his people of our continued solidarity. Finally, I want to associate myself fully with what will be said by the Permanent Representative of France on behalf of the European Union.”
1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source
“Even a success story may include some lessons to be learned. I want to mention just a few. Peace-keeping operations will be even more successful when they embrace the principle of lean management. This holds true not only for Headquarters but also for the individual operations on site. Efficient management includes transparency and cost-effectiveness in the handling of tender offers. The Mozambican experience demonstrates the importance of guaranteeing freedom of movement in the country for civilians and returnees from the very start of the mission. In order to ensure this, the mission should be capable of executing police tasks from the outset. The verification of the disarmament of conflicting parties should be concluded by the end of the mandate of a peace-keeping operation.”
1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source
“We would further like to mention the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission, whose task was to guarantee the implementation of the Peace Agreement and compliance with the timetable and with the cease-fire. The active role played in the Commission by its international members, jointly with the representative of the United Nations, has turned it into an effective instrument to further the peace process. We should think about including similar mechanisms in future peace- keeping missions as well. An important prerequisite for the implementation of the Rome Agreement was the establishment of the United Nations Trust Fund to provide logistical support. Its significance cannot be overestimated, since it enabled the opposition to participate in the peace process on an equal economic footing.”
1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source
“Even if the original time-frame turned out to be too ambitious and had to be changed, in the end a number of factors were decisive for the success of ONUMOZ. The most important prerequisite for the success of the peace process was the desire for peace on both sides. A continuation of the civil war, which could not have been won by military efforts, would have further devastated an already exhausted country. Both parties to the conflict realized this. Even the most favourable circumstances, however, cannot prevent the development of crisis situations that threaten to derail the peace process. Tribute is due the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Aldo Ajello, for his tireless efforts to find creative solutions to the various unexpected difficulties along the way.”
1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source
“My Government is very pleased that we have this occasion to discuss in the Security Council the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) a few days before it successfully completes its mission. I especially welcome the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mozambique, His Excellency Mr. Leonardo Santos Simao, on this occasion. I listened attentively to the very impressive statement he made before the Council. Only two years after the General Peace Agreement was signed on 4 October 1992, its main goals have been achieved: a cease-fire, the dissolution and disarmament of the Government and RENAMO troops, the establishment of a joint defence force, the repatriation and reintegration of approximately 5 million refugees and internally displaced persons, and the holding of the first general presidential and parliamentary elections.”
1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source
“This shows how regional and subregional organizations can assist the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security. We know that the African countries contributing to ECOMOG are shouldering a heavy burden and we think that they should be assisted. I am glad to recall that my Government has offered ECOMOG 35 trucks to help it carry out its mandate. The Security Council and the international community can assist the peace process. But the various Liberian parties are ultimately responsible for the future of their country. It is up to them to advance the process of national reconciliation and thus to lay the foundations for a lasting peace. We call on them truly to respect the Accra Agreement as well as the Akosombo and Cotonou Agreements, to which they have committed themselves.”
1995-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3489 (1995) · source
“In this respect, we are deeply concerned about the failure of the Liberian parties to reach agreement on the composition of the Council of State as stipulated in the Accra Agreement. It is crucial that the cease-fire, the agreed timetable towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict, and the other relevant aspects of the Accra Agreement be respected meticulously. Otherwise the Council will not be able to examine UNOMIL's mandate more thoroughly. While it is important to be cautious today, this does not mean that we should hesitate to assist the peace process in Liberia. In this respect, I should like to point out the important role which the Cease-fire Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG), together with UNOMIL, is playing in securing such a process.”
1995-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3489 (1995) · source
“Germany views the signing of the Accra Agreement by all the Liberian parties concerned as an encouraging step towards peace in Liberia. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), under the current leadership of President Rawlings of Ghana, has played a most important role in securing this Agreement. We hope that, together with the Akosombo Agreement and the underlying Cotonou Agreement, it will prove to be the basis for a more dynamic peace process in Liberia. We voted in favour of extending the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for three months. During this extension the Liberian parties will have to prove their commitment to the peace process.”
1995-01-13 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3489 (1995) · source
“For the time being, my delegation believes that all possibilities under the existing mandates of UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force should be examined in order to improve the situation on the ground. We attach particular importance to operative paragraph 7 of the resolution. Finally, we note with satisfaction the willingness expressed by the Russian Federation to brief the Council more frequently on the operation of the CIS peace-keeping force in the area. Greater transparency can only be helpful in achieving our common goals.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3488 (1995) · source
“We would hope that the authorities in Sukhumi would be able to accept timetables to this effect. We note that in November the Secretary-General's Special Envoy and the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation suggested that the Abkhaz side accept the return of 3,000 returnees until the beginning of January- that is, in the space of approximately six weeks. The resolution renews UNOMIG's mandate for a period of four months. At the same time, it foresees a thorough review of the situation before the mandate expires. We hope that the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy, as well as the Representatives of the Russian Federation, will underline in their contacts with the parties, that progress in all areas must be achieved during the coming months.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3488 (1995) · source
“It calls upon both parties to reach substantive progress in the political negotiations. The parties must understand that UNOMIG's presence is predicated upon a viable political process. In this context, I would like to underline that Germany accepts that the Abkhaz side too has understandable and legitimate concerns. We continue to be willing to listen to the Abkhaz case. At the same time, it must be clear that a political solution must be based on the principles contained in the relevant resolutions of this Council, in particular on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia. With regard to the return of refugees, it is our opinion that the Abkhaz side has to a large extent failed to honour its commitments. The resolution therefore calls upon the Abkhaz side to accelerate this process significantly.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3488 (1995) · source
“The Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic, in recent consultations, made a very pertinent remark. He said, 'UN OMIG may be a small operation, but it is an operation of great importance: We fully concur with that evaluation. The mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) is special in that it is built upon close cooperation with the peace-keeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the area. The stakes involved in this joint undertaking are high. We are deeply concerned about the situation as described in the report of the Secretary-General. We deplore the lack of progress in the political process, as well as the standstill regarding the return of refugees. The resolution just adopted by the Council is an appropriate response to this situation.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3488 (1995) · source
“Together with our partners in the Contact Group, we are already pressing ahead for negotiations to achieve an overall settlement on the basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group's peace plan as a starting point. With regard to the United Nations Protected Areas, too, we urge the parties to negotiate constructively on the international plan, once it is finalized, and we call on Belgrade to support this process. When resolution 943 (1994) was adopted last September, I had the honour to speak for the European Union in this forum. Let me reaffirm what I then emphasized: those who persist in a policy of war and obstruction will be isolated and only prolong the suffering of their own people. Those who move forward on the course of peace will get our support and will be able to lead their people into a better future.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“Belgrade itself must move closer to important further steps, and thus prove, by its deeds, that it has really changed its policy in the former Yugoslavia. Mutual recognition between all States of the former Yugoslavia at the earliest possible date is an urgent political necessity. Such mutual recognition would, in our view, dramatically change the political landscape in this region and greatly enhance the chances of ending the conflict. At the same time, bold steps in this direction by Belgrade would allow a bold reaction by the international community. The recent agreements between the Bosnian parties on a cease-fire and on a complete cessation of hostilities for roughly the next hundred days provide a new opportunity for intensified peace efforts.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“We must be certain that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities remain firm in this respect. But our expectations of Belgrade go beyond that. The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continues to bear major responsibility for everything that has happened in the former Yugoslavia. This is why we expect the Belgrade Government to fully use its influence with the various Serb parties to bring them closer to a negotiated solution. They must bring home to the Bosnian Serbs that there is no alternative to accepting the Contact Group peace plan as the basis for a peaceful settlement. They must also tell the Croatian Serbs in the United Nations Protected Areas, in clear terms, that any political concept more far-reaching than regional autonomy in Croatia is unrealistic.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“The message of the draft resolution to be adopted today is clear. Belgrade must continue to hold course. What is necessary are deeds, not words. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities must withhold all support for the Bosnian Serb military. They should physically block all crossing points that the ICFY Mission cannot monitor continuously. We urge Member States to provide the ICFY Mission, to whose dedicated personnel we pay tribute, with any information that might be relevant for its reports. On their side, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities must maintain their current cooperation with the ICFY Mission and not give rise to any suspicion that they turn a blind eye to smuggling efforts or other violations of the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“After the adoption of resolution 943 (1994), fuel sent from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has facilitated military activities of the Krajina Serb forces, who continue to be active in border-crossing attacks on the Bihac area. This was and remains completely unacceptable. We demand that all so-called Krajina Serb forces withdraw from Bosnian territory. We have supported the inclusion of new provisions in the draft resolution, with the aim of cutting off shipments of fuel and other non-humanitarian supplies through Bosnia to the United Nations protected areas. We also welcome the fact that in future the mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) will report on whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia side is complying with this specific requirement.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“Secondly, did Belgrade sustain its course with regard to acceptance of the Contact Group plan and its break with the Pale leadership? This is no easy or routine matter. After very careful scrutiny of all available information, we have reached the conclusion that both these questions can be answered with a sober 'Yes'. At the same time, there is in our view no reason for any special acknowledgement with regard to the line followed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities. A peace-oriented policy by Belgrade is, after all, in the best interests of the people of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia themselves.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“Serbian nationalism - the ruthless readiness to wage war for more territory - was and continues to be a main cause of this conflict. This is clearly visible in the unresolved situation in Bosnia, as well as in the Serb-held territories of Croatia. Early last fall, after an important policy shift by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Security Council, through resolution 943 (1994), granted a provisional, limited and revocable suspension of certain sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Today, a hundred days later, the Security Council must decide on two important questions. First, did the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia authorities implement the border closure effectively and did they cooperate with the Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia?”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“Allow me at the outset to assure you, Mr. President, of my delegations's full confidence in your wise counsel and guidance of the Council. I should also like to express our appreciation for the excellent work done by your predecessor, the Permanent Representative of Rwanda, Ambassador Bakuramutsa. In addition, I should like to thank the Permanent Representative of Oman for the kind words of welcome that he addressed to, amongst others, my delegation. It also gives me great pleasure to welcome the presence at the Council table of His Excellency Mr. Antonio Martino, the Foreign Minister of Italy, a member State of the European Union. The day must come when the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, with all the atrocities and suffering of innocent people caused by it, is settled.”
1995-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3487 (1995) · source
“In our view, we are now at a decisive point in our endeavour to resolve the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Let us stand together in full support of the intensive peace effort currently under way.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“For his part, the Secretary-General, in his report to the Security Council dated 17 September 1994, has expressed the view that the lifting of the arms embargo would exacerbate the conflict. Lifting the arms embargo, as some have proposed, would be fundamentally incompatible with the neutrality and impartiality of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). As a result, the Secretary-General himself has stated that it would require the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina. We believe that this continues to be valid. What is needed in the coming months, on the basis of the results already achieved, is a decisive political effort to create necessary conditions for a peaceful solution to the conflict as foreseen in the Contact Group plan. The European Union remains committed to maintaining the momentum of this process.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“Only those bold steps will make possible an equally bold response by the international community to Belgrade. For the peace process to achieve the desired tangible results, we need some time, even if we would all prefer immediate results. It would be a tragic mistake to undermine the intensive peace efforts currently under way by decisions that could have dangerous, incalculable consequences. We must not allow a situation to arise in which our common desire to overcome the war and the tensions in Bosnia is narrowed down so as to be focused exclusively on the question of lifting the arms embargo. A decision to lift the arms embargo must remain a last resort. We continue to be convinced that a political settlement should be pursued until all avenues are 20 exhausted. We firmly believe that this stage has not been reached.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“Let me state again that in our view such a course of peace would require that the FRY authorities, in the absence of a Bosnian Serb acceptance of the peace plan, take the following steps: recognition of Bosnia and Croatia within their internationally recognized borders; continued endorsement of the Contact Group plan for Bosnia, which would ensure, were the Bosnian Serbs to accept the plan, balanced treatment of the Bosniac-Croat and Bosnian Serb entities, including the establishment of parallel special relations with neighbouring countries, provided this is not inconsistent with the integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; endorsement of the plan by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, once finalized, as the basis of the solution for the areas of Croatia under the protection of the United Nations; maintenance of an effective and verified regime whereby exports from the FRY to the Bosnian Serbs would be restricted to humanitarian assistance until the Contact Group plan had been accepted by Pale; and verified maintenance of the FRY policy that exports to the Krajina Serbs are equally restricted until the International Conference's plan for the areas of Croatia under the protection of the United Nations, once finalized, is accepted by Knin.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“Since the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY) has a major responsibility for the present situation in the former Yugoslavia, it must contribute constructively to further progress on the way to a political solution. If Belgrade were to undertake significant further steps, proving by deeds that it has really changed its policy in the former Yugoslavia, this would significantly increase the chances for a peaceful settlement.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“What is urgent now are further joint and even intensified political efforts to achieve the strongest possible pressure towards a political settlement. If the Bosnian Serbs continue to be recalcitrant, they will only achieve their total isolation and bring themselves closer to the abyss. From our side, we must focus on alternative ways and means to foster the cause of peace in the former Yugoslavia. The European Union, therefore, strongly supports the introduction of additional elements into the peace process. 19 In our statement before the General Assembly last Thursday on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we proposed a wider approach.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“But the inescapable consequences of the resumption of fighting would be increased suffering to civilians in Bosnia, further disruption of international humanitarian assistance, the undermining of international efforts towards reconstruction throughout the country, and an increased threat to the safety of personnel of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and others involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Moreover, there is a risk that the day when a negotiated settlement will be achieved will be further postponed. We call on all the parties to exercise the utmost restraint, to cooperate fully with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and with UNPROFOR, and to cease hostilities.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“I have the honour of speaking on behalf to the European Union. The current Bosnian Serb policy of rejection and obstruction - and the understandable frustration it causes - must not be allowed to cause the situation to deteriorate further. It is not part of the European Union's plan to see the unsatisfactory status quo maintained; that is why we have already suggested an alternative approach to overcoming Bosnian Serb obstinacy, which continues to be the main obstacle to a peaceful settlement.”
1994-11-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3454 (1994) · source
“Time is now required for the peace process to achieve the desired tangible results, even though we would all prefer immediate results. It would be a tragic mistake to undermine the search for a negotiated settlement by 11 decisions that could have dangerous and unforeseeable consequences. The day must come when the flames of war in Bosnia are finally extinguished. The time must come when the peoples and States on the territory of the former Yugoslavia coexist peacefully side by side, within internationally recognized borders. The members of the European Union believe that the time has now come for the international community to support in full unanimity the intensive peace effort currently under way.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“Of course, we must have positive proof that the border with Bosnia is and will remain closed to all but humanitarian supplies, in particular to weapons and fuel. We welcome the arrangements made for the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) Mission, as contained in its initial report, which aim to determine clearly and unequivocally whether or not the border closure is implemented. Thus, through the adoption of the three draft resolutions, the Security Council will emphasize today that those who choose the course of peace will receive our support and those who persist in rejecting peace and embracing war will be isolated and prosecuted. The draft resolutions that will be put to the vote today need a chance to prove their effectiveness.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“Secondly, the Bosnian Serbs must realize that they will remain totally isolated as long as they block the peace process and continue the abhorrent practice of "ethnic cleansing." We welcome the tightening of sanctions provided for in the present draft resolution as a means to increase the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the territorial proposal submitted by the Contact Group. Thirdly, with regard to the third draft resolution, concerning the suspension of certain sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), we are united in our view that the decision of President Milosevic to close the border deserves a positive reaction from the international community.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“The European Union and its member States firmly believe that the three draft resolutions on which the Security Council is about to take decisions constitute an important step in the international peace effort. In essence, these decisions by the Council will convey an unequivocal message to the Bosnian Serbs. First, we condemn the "ethnic cleansing" which the Bosnian Serbs have systematically carried out in the areas they occupy. This persistent and systematic campaign of terror must stop immediately and those responsible must he held personally accountable. In this context, we again emphasize the importance of the work of the International Tribunal set up to punish crimes in the former Yugoslavia. We therefore fully support the draft resolution elaborated by the non-aligned members of the Security Council.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“From the beginning of the crisis, the European Union has consistently worked for the most intensive peace efforts possible on the part of the international community, involving the United Nations, the European Union, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, to ensure the cohesion of their initiatives. Our aim was and still is to exert the strongest possible pressure in order to bring an end to the war and tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina through a negotiated settlement. On 6 July, the Contact Group submitted a proposal for a territorial settlement to the parties, offering a viable and realistic basis for a peaceful solution. The European Union welcomes the fact that the proposed territorial settlement has now been accepted in full by all sides except the Bosnian Serb party, and strongly urges this party to do likewise.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“Mr. President, allow me to assure you of my delegation's full confidence in your wise counsel and guidance of the Council. I would also like to express our appreciation for the leadership shown by your predecessor, Ambassador Vorontsov. I speak on behalf of the European Union and its member States. Finland, Norway and Sweden support this statement. The crisis in the former Yugoslavia continues to be a cause of deepest concern to the international community. The ongoing fighting and bitter hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina pose a serious threat to international peace and security, causing immense and unacceptable human suffering.”
1994-09-23 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3428 (1994) · source
“My Government hopes that the NATO Council's decision will bring the political process forward. Towards this end my Government supports continued close cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union. Germany also welcomes an active, strong role for the United States of America. The support of the peace efforts by the Russian Federation will be of great importance. The peace talks in Geneva continue. Without the necessary political will of the three conflicting parties they cannot be successful. The key to an end to the suffering lies in their hands. Against the will of the conflicting parties, a political solution cannot be found. My country will spare no effort to help restore peace and stability in the former Yugoslavia.”
1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336Resumption1 (1994) · source
“Almost 400,000 refugees have found shelter in my country, more than twice as many as in all other European countries together. A total of 612 million Deutschmarks have been spent on humanitarian aid. It is not acceptable that delivery of humanitarian assistance is constantly hindered, that aid workers are threatened and attacked. My Government has always supported the Bosnian Muslims in the search for a solution which secures the physical and political survival of the Muslims as a nation in their home State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This implies above all a satisfactory territorial solution, including access to the Sava River and to the sea. Also, the city of Mostar should be placed under the administration of the European Union. My Government has offered to provide an administrator for Mostar.”
1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336Resumption1 (1994) · source
“Only when a political solution proves impossible is the use of force permitted to achieve the aims set out in Security Council resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993). My Government favours a political solution. So does NATO. The decision of the NATO Council is aimed at demilitarizing Sarajevo and placing it under United Nations administration through negotiations and in agreement with the European Union's Action Plan. The decision commends the European Union's political plan of action. This plan is based on the conviction that for moral and humanitarian reasons everything possible must be done to put an end to the bloodshed and suffering in the former Yugoslavia, and especially in Sarajevo. We cannot accept this brutal aggression against innocent people. Germany has done its utmost to alleviate the suffering of these victims.”
1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336Resumption1 (1994) · source
“If, after the 10-day deadline, non-authorized arms systems have not been withdrawn, the use of force will become inevitable in order to restore peace. Attempts by the Bosnian Serbs to undermine the deadline by obstructing negotiations will and can no longer be tolerated. This is NATO's concrete answer to the Secretary-General's request of 6 February 1994. My Government has from the beginning supported the French and United States initiatives on which NATO's decision is based. My Government warmly welcomes the NATO Council's decision. Let me emphasize: the decisions taken by the NATO Council and by the Council of the European Union cannot be seen as retaliation or as a desire for military action. They are part of the political process towards a negotiated settlement.”
1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336Resumption1 (1994) · source
“On 9 February 1994 the North Atlantic Council took decisions of great importance. It called for the withdrawal or regrouping and placing under the control of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), within 10 days, of the heavy weapons of the Bosnian Serb forces located in an area within 20 kilometres of the centre of Sarajevo, and excluding an area within 2 kilometres of the centre of Pale. The decision of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is balanced because it also calls upon the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the same period, to place under UNPROFOR control its heavy weapons within the Sarajevo exclusion zone and to refrain from attacks launched from within the current confrontation lines in the city.”
1994-02-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3336Resumption1 (1994) · source