YouSaid · the spoken record

Grossi

lines on the record: 51
first: 2022-03-04
most recent: 2023-05-30
sittings or episodes: 4
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“The IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya continues to be present there. We will continue and reinforce our presence to avoid what must be avoided at all costs — that on top of the situation that we are living in this conflict, we would add the unspeakable tragedy of a nuclear accident. That should never happen, and the IAEA will spare no effort to make sure that it does not happen.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“In the midst of these complex and concerning circumstances in which we have been living over the past year and a half, today constitutes a step in the right direction when it comes to the safety and security of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. We are encouraged by the expressions of support for our work, including on the seven indispensable pillars and the five principles that I have established today. We commit to continue working to consolidate them and to be even more effective in protecting this facility. I also express our readiness, as indicated on various occasions, to continue keeping the Council abreast and informed about the situation, including the implementation and observance of the five principles that I enumerated today. I will say that our work continues.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“Mr. Grossi: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council, as well as the representative of Ukraine for the important elements they have brought to the discussion today. Their words undoubtedly constitute an expression of support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since the beginning of the war. We take note of the different nuances and aspects raised by all around this table. As my Brazilian colleague was saying, there may be differences, but there is consensus in the Chamber around the idea that there should never be a nuclear accident. To that end, the work of the IAEA is truly indispensable.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“Avoiding a nuclear accident is possible. Abiding by the IAEA’s five principles is the way to start. The IAEA’s five principles to avoid a nuclear accident are hereby established. The IAEA intends to start monitoring the principles through its on-site mission.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“To that effect, all efforts should be made to ensure that off-site power remains available and secure at all times. Fourthly, all structures, systems and components essential to the safe and secure operation of the plant should be protected from attacks or acts of sabotage. Fifthly, no action should be taken that undermine these principles. The IAEA experts onsite, namely, the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya, will report to the IAEA Director General on the observance of the principles. The Director General will report publicly on any violations of the principles. I respectfully and solemnly ask both sides to observe the principles. I request the members of the Security Council to unambiguously support them. Let me say something very clearly: the principles are to no one’s detriment; they to everyone’s benefit.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“As a result of the intensive consultations, I have identified the following concrete principles to help ensure nuclear safety and security at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in order to prevent a nuclear accident and ensure the integrity of the plant. I see the commitments as essential to avoiding the danger of a catastrophic incident. First, there should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant, in particular targeting the reactors, spent fuel storage, other critical infrastructure or personnel. Secondly, the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant should not be used as storage or a base for heavy weapons — for example, multiple-rocket launchers, artillery systems and munitions and tanks, or military personnel that could be used for an attack from the plant. Thirdly, off-site power to the plant should not be put at risk.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“Those common-sense rules derive from a vast body of IAEA documents, guidelines and experience. They have been universally cited and supported. That is very encouraging. A nuclear or radiological accident during the ongoing conflict could have disastrous consequences for the people of Ukraine, the people of Russia, neighbouring States and beyond. The time has come to be more specific as to what is required. We must prevent the dangerous release of radioactive material. To that end, and mindful of the seven indispensable pillars, which I just cited, I have been working intensively, and in consultation, with the leadership of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“They are as follows: first, the physical integrity of facilities — whether it be the reactors, fuel ponds or radioactive waste stores — must be maintained; second, all safety and security systems and equipment must be fully functional at all times; third, the operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure; fourth, there must be a secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites; fifth, there must be uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation to and from the sites; sixth, there must be effective on-site and off-site radiation monitoring systems and emergency preparedness and response measures; and, seventh, there much be reliable communication with the regulator and others.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“As the Council knows, since returning from my first of two missions to the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in September 2022, I have been urging all parties to preserve the nuclear safety and security of the plant. That has involved numerous meetings, intensive consultations and exchanges, including at the highest levels in Ukraine and the Russian Federation. As the Council will recall, only a year ago I elaborated on the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“Military activities continue in the region and may well increase very considerably in the near future. The plant has been operating with a significantly reduced staff, which, despite being in temporary shut-down, is not sustainable. There have been seven occasions when the site lost all off-site power and had to rely on emergency diesel generators, which, as everyone knows, is the last line of defence against a nuclear accident, in order to provide essential cooling of the reactor and spent fuel. The most recent one — the seventh — occurred just one week ago. We are fortunate that a nuclear accident has not yet happened. As I said to the IAEA Board of Governors in March, we are rolling the dice, and, if this continues, then one day our luck will run. We therefore must all do everything in our power to minimize the chance that it does.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“We are putting in place a comprehensive programme of health-care assistance, including through equipment and psychological support for all Ukrainian nuclear workers. In addition to our work on nuclear safety and security, we are also continuing our vital safeguards verification activities across Ukraine, ensuring that there is no diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. We are also keeping the world informed of the situation at Ukraine’s nuclear sites in more than 160 web statements, updates, reports and briefings, including to the General Assembly and members here at the Security Council. The nuclear safety and security situation at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in particular continues to be extremely fragile and dangerous.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“Their presence allows us to provide the international community with reliable information on the safety and security situation at each of those sites as well. Another 58 of our staff have been part of those teams, totalling more than 2,350 person-days of our staff in Ukraine. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security and the Under-Secretary-General for Operational Support once again for their help in making that happen. Moreover, we have facilitated an international assistance package totalling more than €5 million, with 17 deliveries of vital equipment to Ukraine. I thank Member States for their contributions in that regard.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“There have been 12 expert missions to Ukraine; I personally led seven of them, including two to the Zaporizhzhya plant. In addition, since 1 September 2022, we have had an IAEA Support and Assistance Mission stationed at the Zaporizhzhya plant, which is literally on the front lines of this war. And we are on the eighth rotation of our dedicated and courageous staff, who have had to cross that front line to undertake that vital work many times. Twenty-three of our staff have been part of those teams. And, since January of this year, we have had other dedicated IAEA experts stationed at every other major Ukrainian nuclear site — the Rivne, South Ukraine, Khmelnytskyi and Chornobyl nuclear power plants.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“But first I want to briefly update members on what the Agency has been doing in Ukraine. It is now over 15 months since the beginning of the war. May I remind the Council that this is the first time in history that a war is being fought amid the facilities of a major nuclear power programme. That includes several of Ukraine’s five nuclear power plants, and other facilities have come under direct shelling. All of those plants have lost off-site power at some point. Furthermore, one of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants — the Zaporizhzhya plant — has come under Russian military and operational control. The IAEA has been closely monitoring the situation and assisting Ukraine every single day since the start of the war. That assistance has involved the continuous engagement of the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“Mr. Grossi: I thank you, Mr. President, and the members of the Security Council for allowing me the opportunity today to update the Council on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) activities concerning safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine. Your own personal conviction, Sir, in supporting me and the work of the IAEA has been remarkable. I thank you very much. I also thank the Council for its continuing support for the IAEA’s efforts. I will also lay out basic principles needed to prevent a nuclear accident. I have addressed the Council on the situation in Ukraine four times before, on 4 March (see S/PV.8986), 11 August (see S/PV.9109), 6 September (see S/PV.9124) and 27 October 2022 (see S/PV.9172). However, I see today’s meeting as the most important one, and I will explain why.”
2023-05-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9334 (2023) · source
“I know that with the bright and dedicated people from the United Nations Department for Safety and Security, the Department of Operational Support and the Secretary-General himself, we are going to be able to do it. Now my invitation, my urge and my appeal are for us to work together for the protection of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant through the establishment of a nuclear safety and security protection zone. The International Atomic Energy Agency will be contacting all sides very soon with concrete steps for their consideration.”
2022-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9124 (2022) · source
“At the moment, I would say that I think the most important developments are yet to come. As I said in my report, I will soon be approaching the relevant parties with some very concrete elements for their consideration in order to try to move forward with the next logical step after the important first one, which will be to establish immediate protection for the plant. I am always at the disposal of the Security Council and the Secretary-General, whose support I am very grateful for. We will continue to count on his support to our personnel, especially those who remain at the plant and will have to be replaced at some point in the rotation that we are going to establish.”
2022-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9124 (2022) · source
“The representative of the Russian Federation asked some more concrete questions, but if I may I will address them globally, given that he referred to the interactions that led to the mission and how it was facilitated. I think it took a lot of effort from all sides and I am very grateful for the fact that if we go back to the start of the year — and, indeed, the months that followed — there were plenty of obstacles that the mission had to face in terms of its itinerary, characteristics and even logistics. Finally, I think there was a minimum common denominator in terms of reaching the conviction that the mission had to proceed. That was indeed the case, which is why I would like to acknowledge all who made it possible. Some of the representatives here today also referred to that.”
2022-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9124 (2022) · source
“Mr. Grossi: I value all of the comments made by delegations concerning the work we have carried out so far. They are a tremendous source of encouragement with regard to the work we are undertaking and that is to come. The purpose of all that work, as I was saying before, is not only to produce reports — although reports are often the indispensable basis for political action — but to get things done and to improve the situation. I am also grateful for the recognition of the importance of the seven pillars we have delineated, as well as the widespread support for our idea and our initiative to establish an interim measure to maintain the safety and security of the power plant through a protection zone.”
2022-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9124 (2022) · source
“Such a measure can be considered an interim measure in the hope that other, more comprehensive measures of a more effective nature in the context of the conflict — which is not in the remit of the IAEA, of course — can be agreed upon. Nonetheless, it is something that can be done now. We have the inspectors already deployed there and they are doing their work. We can agree on a very simple but incredibly necessary protective mechanism to avoid what is happening now, as we speak — the shelling of a nuclear power plant. Let us seize this opportunity so fundamental for peace and security and to protect the populations of Ukraine and beyond.”
2022-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9124 (2022) · source
“At present, through the IAEA, the United Nations and the international community have the capacity to obtain a direct and immediate evaluation of the situation on the ground as it develops. Such a fact is unprecedented. In the past, when IAEA inspectors visited places that had undergone difficult circumstances, such as Chornobyl and Fukushima, or armed conflict, such as in Iraq, it was always after the fact. It was always to pick up the pieces and to remediate what had already happened. In this case, we have the historical and ethical imperative to prevent something from happening. By having established a presence and by agreeing to a special safety and security protection zone, we have the opportunity to prevent an incident from happening. As is stated in the report, we are ready to consult quickly with the parties.”
2022-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9124 (2022) · source
“The seventh and last pillar states that there must be continued and reliable communications with the Ukrainian regulator and others. We have seen repeatedly that those lines of communication have been interrupted. In its seventh recommendation, the IAEA therefore recommends that, in line with each one of the seven safety and security pillars, reliable and redundant communication means and channels be secured at all times. The historic mission that took place last week provided us and the international community with a precious instrument in the presence of an IAEA assessment and monitoring mission that could provide us all today with a comprehensive report that provides a neutral, impartial and technical reading of the situation. Moreover, what is also of enormous value is the fact that IAEA inspectors have remained at the site.”
2022-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9124 (2022) · source
“In that regard, our concrete recommendation is that all the parties should commit and contribute to ensuring effective supply chains. Accordingly, we would like to recall that, through the IAEA assistance and support programmes that we have provided, for example, in Chornobyl a flow of supplies has been significantly re-established, and a similar mechanism could be put in place in Zaporizhzhya. The sixth pillar refers to the functioning of the radiation monitoring systems in order to ascertain the situation and whether there is radiation in the atmosphere. We have networks of monitoring equipment that have been affected. The concrete sixth recommendation in our report indicates that the site should continue ensuring that functionality, including by drills and exercises that the IAEA can help ensure.”
2022-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9124 (2022) · source
“With regard to this pillar, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommends that the off-site power supply line redundancy be re-established and be made available at all times. For that to be possible, all military activities that may affect the power supply systems must be stopped immediately. The fifth pillar states that there must be uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation to and from the site. As the Secretary-General rightly reminded us, we must keep in mind that, as the biggest in Europe, the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant is a large industrial site requiring a constant flow of spare parts and other equipment. That situation is currently being abnormally disrupted in the context of the conflict.”
2022-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9124 (2022) · source
“We were able to work together alongside the experts, and we came to the conclusion, which is in a specific recommendation of my report, that the operator should be allowed to return to exercising its clear and routine line of responsibilities and authority and that an appropriate work environment must be re-established, including with proper family support for the staff. The fourth pillar refers to the off-site power supply. I have also referred to that in the past, and, as everyone knows, that is crucially important in the sense that a nuclear power plant without any external power supply may lose crucial functionalities, including the cooling of its reactors and spent fuel. Without that, we could have a very serious nuclear accident.”
2022-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9124 (2022) · source
“We know and we observed that the operators at the plant were operating under extremely challenging circumstances, with the presence of military equipment and vehicles in its various areas. In that regard, our concrete recommendation is that the military vehicles and equipment that are currently present inside nuclear plant buildings on the site be removed so as not to interfere with the normal operation of the nuclear safety and security system. The third pillar states that the members of the operating staff must be able to perform their duties without undue pressure or difficult circumstances. As Council members know, that has been addressed time and again during the crisis, especially since the nuclear power plant was occupied in March.”
2022-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9124 (2022) · source
“Unfortunately, as I had the opportunity to say in my briefing on 11 August (see S/PV.9109), under the Chinese presidency, that has happened, and that continues to happen. Wittingly or unwittingly, the physical attacks and the hits that the facility has taken that I could personally see and assess together with my experts are simply unacceptable. We are playing with fire, and something catastrophic could happen. That is why, in our report, we propose the establishment of a nuclear safety and security protection zone, limited to the perimeter and the plant itself. I will return to this point later. The second pillar, which is important, states that all safety and security systems and equipment should operate normally and unhindered and be fully functional.”
2022-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9124 (2022) · source
“Today Council members may have seen that I issued a comprehensive report emanating from the mission I had the honour to lead last week in Ukraine and the visit to the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant. The mission was the result of the painstaking work of almost six months, during which time strenuous efforts were deployed to try to do just that: to be there with our inspectors and draw up a comprehensive report of the situation to corroborate some of the facts that we have been observing for the past six months. It was our intention to not stop there, but also provide very concrete recommendations based on what we saw at the plant. The first important safety pillar that exists at any nuclear facility is not to violate its physical integrity.”
2022-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9124 (2022) · source
“It is a pleasure to speak before the Security Council for the third time this year on the situation in Ukraine, and a special pleasure to do so under the French presidency. (spoke in English) I also want to thank the Secretary-General for his presence among us today. In his remarks, he referred to the remarkable work that the United Nations provided through its personnel to our important mission in accompanying its members for a few days and sharing some very tense moments. I could see their heroic dedication and devotion to the cause of the United Nations. I thank the Secretary-General once again. We will continue, I hope, working together to bring stability to the nuclear facilities in Ukraine.”
2022-09-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9124 (2022) · source
“It is therefore no longer a matter of “if”; it is only a matter of “when”. And the “when” must be “as soon as possible”. It is only the “how” that needs to be addressed. As I indicated in my initial briefing, I am consulting — and I will be intensifying my consultations — with Ukraine and with the Russian Federation. Of course, the United Nations, through the United Nations Department for Safety and Security, has been involved in all of this, with a view to having the IAEA conduct a mission that is so badly needed. Of course, after that, or at any other moment, I will be at the disposal of the Security Council to continue briefing on our function and on our mission to support Ukraine at this important hour and to restore complete safety and security to all the facilities in the country.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“Mr. Grossi: I thank the President for giving me the opportunity to make a succinct closing statement. I want to thank all members of the Council for their statements, which are very important for us at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as they help us to understand even better how they see things. Of course, it is not our remit to get into the political considerations, and we recognize the obvious differences that exist. But there is something very important that I at least personally take from this meeting. There is a common denominator in the Chamber in New York: everybody agrees that nuclear safety and security must be preserved; everybody agrees and supports the seven pillars of nuclear safety and security; and everybody believes that the IAEA mission must take place.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“Those actions could lead to serious consequences. The IAEA is ready to help avert such an escalation of the crisis. I want to thank the Secretary-General, who has been steadfast in his support for our mission. I had an opportunity to discuss with him in New York a few days ago following his statements of support, without which our work would be tremendously more difficult. I thank the Security Council for having given me this opportunity to say, and sometimes to reiterate, that this is a serious and grave hour, and the IAEA must be allowed to conduct its mission to Zaporizhzhya as soon as possible.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“The previous IAEA missions that I have mentioned on a couple of occasions — to South Ukraine and Chornobyl — were proof that being there, establishing the facts, is what is needed at the moment. Overall, I also believe that our own site presence will allow us to both carry out the technical activities I just described and also provide a stabilizing influence. I want to underscore that the IAEA has been ready to undertake such a mission since June, when we were ready to go. Unfortunately, due to political factors and other considerations, it was not possible. We have seen what has happened over the past two months. We cannot allow such factors to delay us any longer. I reiterate that military actions that have even the smallest potential to jeopardize nuclear safety or security at this nuclear installation must stop immediately.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“The mission to the site will also allow us to carry out urgent safeguard activities, such as verifying the status of the reactors and the inventories of nuclear material, including fresh and spent fuel storage, where we currently have no remote data transfer of surveillance. Furthermore, we need to perform maintenance on all IAEA safeguards equipment in order to ensure their remote data transmission and the maintenance of continuity of knowledge, which is indispensable after leaving the facility. I am convinced that admission to the Zaporizhzhya plant could be beneficial not only for the work of the IAEA and for the international community’s assessment of what is going on, but also for the operators and regulators of the nuclear plant itself.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“However, the contents of such statements are frequently contradictory. And, without a physical presence, the IAEA cannot corroborate some very important facts. It is the facts gathered during a site visit that are needed so that the IAEA can develop and provide an independent assessment of the nuclear safety and security risks. Among other critical activities, what are we intending to do? We would assess the physical damage to the facilities. We would determine whether the main and backup safety and security systems are functional and evaluate the working conditions of the control- room staff.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“As has been said many times, this facility is currently in Russian-occupied territory, so it cannot be reached by travelling exclusively through Ukrainian- controlled territory. We need to continue to work pragmatically with the authorities of both countries in efforts to obtain access for our experts to the Zaporizhzhya plant. I am personally ready to lead such a mission, as I did for South Ukraine and Chornobyl, leading a team of experts from the IAEA. We have been preparing for this, and time is of the essence. I propose — I plead — for the mission to be given a green light as soon as possible. Ever since the installation has been under the control of Russia, the IAEA has received information from Russia, as well as from Ukraine, indicating the state of the facility, its operation and the damage assessed.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“The Agency continues to monitor the situation to identify any potential implication that could arise at the facilities. Based on the most recent information, experts have preliminarily assessed that there is no immediate threat to nuclear safety as a result of the shelling or other military actions. However, that could change at any moment. We certainly can all agree that any nuclear catastrophe would be unacceptable. Therefore, preventing it should be our overarching goal. We must all work together to prevent it. That is our duty and our common responsibility. In order to help achieve that, I ask that both sides cooperate with the IAEA and allow a mission to the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant to proceed as soon as possible.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“Additionally, Ukraine has reported to us that the plant staff have restricted access to the on-site emergency crisis centre. As of today, the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant has limited access to off-site power — one external high-voltage line and one high-voltage backup line to the thermal power plant — due to the damage from the shelling to which I just referred. In particular, I remain very concerned about the situation at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, and I reiterate that any military action that jeopardizes nuclear safety and security must stop immediately. Military actions near such a large nuclear facility could lead to very serious consequences. Even before these most recent events, I had already expressed great concern about the extremely stressful and difficult conditions faced by the Ukrainian operating staff.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“It is therefore clear that there is a direct link between these external intervention attacks and what is happening at the plant. The emergency protection system of the affected unit was triggered, and diesel generators were set into operation to restore the power supply for that unit. As we speak, the unit remains disconnected from the grid. There was also shelling in the area of the nitrogen- oxygen station at the plant. Firefighters quickly extinguished that fire; however, repairs must be assessed, evaluated and done. On 6 August, one staff member of the Zaporizhzhya plant working in the area of the dry spent nuclear fuel storage facility in the vicinity was injured during a new episode of shelling, which also caused some physical damage.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“Furthermore, there have been several resolutions adopted by the IAEA General Conference. That is the framework that must be observed. We are all aware — and today’s briefing is taking place against this backdrop — that the situation at the nuclear facilities in Ukraine, in particular at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, has been deteriorating rapidly, to the point of becoming very alarming. On 5 August, the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant was subjected to shelling, resulting in several explosions at within the site. Those explosions took place near the electrical switchboard of a 750-kilowatt external power supply that caused the shutdown of the electrical power transformer and two backup transformers. Consequently, one reactor unit was shut down and disconnected from the electrical grid.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“I will not list them all but, in general, they include crucial aspects dealing with the physical integrity of the plants, the off-site power supply, which, as members know, is indispensable for cooling systems in nuclear power plants, emergency preparedness measures and systems and so on. The issue is that all seven pillars have been compromised, if not entirely violated, at one point or another during this ongoing crisis. Legally speaking, when it comes to attacks or the possibility of attacks on nuclear facilities, we do not work in a vacuum. The international community took a stance very early on against challenges of that kind. Additional Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions prohibit such attacks against, as they were referred to back in the day, nuclear electrical generating stations in armed conflict.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“The two expert missions to Ukraine, which I led personally, as I said, allowed us to see for ourselves the situation on the ground and provide technical assistance, that which was already given and that which is ongoing. Of course, there are several humanitarian, political and legal issues, which are within the remit of the Security Council. However, as members very well know, our work focuses exclusively on the technical issues related to safety and security and the safeguards inspections in Ukraine. Earlier in the year — and I also had an opportunity to recall this just a little more than a week ago as I addressed the ongoing Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT in New York — I outlined a number of indispensable pillars — seven of them — which are cardinal and crucial to ensuring safety and security.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“The Agency has conducted nine safeguards missions in Ukraine — at the South Ukraine nuclear power plant, the Rivne nuclear power plant, the Khmelnytskyi nuclear power plant and the Chornobyl site and Kyiv area — which are under IAEA safeguards, pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement that the Agency has with Ukraine. Those on-site inspections have enabled the Agency to fulfil its obligatory safeguards objectives. Remote monitoring from IAEA headquarters of other nuclear power plants and the Chornobyl area are ongoing. Very recently, I had two teams at the Chornobyl site performing critical safeguards verification activities.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“I have also personally led two missions to provide assistance to Ukraine — one at the South Ukraine nuclear power plant in March and, subsequently, a second one at the Chornobyl site in April. The Agency has also been coordinating offers of assistance from our member States. It has facilitated the provision of equipment, monitored the radiation situation and provided personal protective equipment and radiation monitors. In total, to date, 12 member States have offered assistance. The Agency and I, too, have been in frequent contact with both Ukraine and the Russian Federation to make sure that we have the clearest picture possible of the evolving circumstances at this time.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“Mr. Grossi: It is indeed a great pleasure to have this opportunity to brief the Security Council on the situation at the nuclear facilities in Ukraine. As the Council knows, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been actively assessing the situation at those facilities since the conflict began in February. Members may recall that I had an opportunity to report on the state of affairs back in March (see S/PV.8986). Since 24 February, the IAEA has activated its Incident and Emergency Centre, established regular contact with the Ukrainian authorities and closely monitored the situation at the facilities, as well as activities involving radioactive sources and nuclear material in Ukraine. I have issued frequent, almost daily, updates on the IAEA website to ensure that everyone has updated information.”
2022-08-11 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9109 (2022) · source
“I stand ready to answer any questions and clarify any particular points that may not be clear. I am sorry for the poor quality of my connection. As Council members are aware, I am currently airborne. I am on my way to Tehran to deal with another issue, which is of direct interest to the Council, hopefully involving a solution to the outstanding aspects of the nuclear power programme in the Islamic Republic of Iran.”
2022-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8986 (2022) · source
“Needless to say, in particular, the mission of the IAEA, if and when it takes place, would not have anything to do with the political and diplomatic aspects that are within the purview of the Security Council. Such a mission would be strictly restricted and circumscribed to the safety and security of the nuclear installations in Ukraine, which, as facts have shown, are evidently at constant risk of damage and accidents. I hope that these basic elements will help the Security Council in its evaluation of the situation. As I asked my Board of Governors in Vienna, we would ask Council members to support my efforts as Director General and those of the IAEA to ensure a basic element in this very difficult situation, which is the safety and security of this important part of the infrastructure of the country.”
2022-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8986 (2022) · source
“That all constitutes the basis of the regular updates, of which we have received 10 or 12 so far and which have been made available on the IAEA website. At the same time, I indicated this morning my readiness to travel, as soon as practicable, to Chernobyl in order to consult with our Ukrainian counterpart and, when and if necessary, the forces in charge to establish a stable framework to ensure the observance of the basic principles of safety and security, starting with the physical integrity of the facilities. Basic elements of that proposal have already been shared with the Ukrainian counterpart and the Russian authorities, who are, at this point, evaluating it. We believe that, as we have received a direct request for assistance, it is our duty at the IAEA to heed that call and try to provide assistance.”
2022-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8986 (2022) · source
“Only the building around the reactors themselves were hit by those projectiles and caught fire. Members may have seen some images of that in social media. After that, the operations of and at the plant have continued. From a technical point of view, we consider that its operation is continuing normally, although, as I have stressed to the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there is, of course, nothing normal about the situation when military forces are in charge of the site. In terms of the next steps, we remain in permanent contact with the Ukrainian governmental nuclear regulatory authorities, as well as Energoatom, the company that operates those facilities and the operators there.”
2022-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8986 (2022) · source
“A few days ago, we were again informed by the Russian Government that military forces were moving in the area of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant with the similar mission to take over control of that facility. We have received information since then that their advance towards the perimeter of the nuclear power plant was met by opposition and groups of civilians blocking access to the plant. Finally, last night, in the early hours of the morning, we received information that a projectile had impacted a building adjacent to the block of six reactors. The projectile impacted the building and a fire ensued, which, after some time, was put out by the fire brigade at the station. We can confirm through our contacts at the regulator, as well as directly from the plant, that no security or safety systems have been compromised.”
2022-03-04 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.8986 (2022) · source