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Haekkerup

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2001-03-16
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2001-10-05
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un-security-council

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  1. It is very clear, in how we have defined the powers of the provisional self-government, that questions about the final status or the sovereignty are not part of the mandate. That is a reserved power and will be dealt with when we come to the final political settlement. I want to underline that point so that there is no doubt about what is the position in that regard.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  2. I fully agree with that. But I have to say that when I accepted to be the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for this mission I had to realize, reading resolution 1244 (1999), that that was not the case. The resolution of course has a goal, but there is no answer to the question about what the final settlement is going to be. This is what makes the mission interesting and challenging: to move toward the harbour without knowing precisely where we will land - but getting closer to the coastline. I think that is exactly what provisional self- government is about. Finally, I would like to underline that, as the Yugoslav Ambassador clearly said, provisional self- government does not prejudice the final status.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  3. It is very important that we do not get a negative response from the Kosovo Albanian population, and therefore we try to handle it carefully, knowing that if the first returns fail it will be much more difficult to have returns on a larger scale. Up to now it has worked out very well, and I appreciate that everybody understands the sensitivity of this. On the other hand, one should never doubt the commitment of UNMIK to continue returns, and on a larger scale. We will certainly be ready to put forward our plans as we approach the next season of returns. I would like to thank Ukraine for the remarks about providing training for civil emergencies for the KPC. It is a very important process to develop that capability. I would also like to say that Ukraine had - I think it was a Norwegian metaphor: sailors should know where the harbour is.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  4. But this case underlines the importance of working together, trying to address trafficking in arms and in women, and of course organized crime in general. Therefore I wish to stress that we are committed to it; we will continue our efforts. It is one of our priorities, to try to stop this sort of thing. On returns, I would just make one remark. It is pointed out that in two years we have seen only 80 persons return. But it has to be clear that these are the first returns, and that is the important thing. I had discussions with Kosovo Albanian leaders, and they supported the principle of return. The Interim Administrative Council made a decision on a declaration on the principle of returns, and we now see the first returns. It is a fragile process.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  5. Both KFOR and UNMIK police - KPS - have done a lot to deal with this. I have to say - and I know that you know this - that this is an area where multi-ethnic cooperation works very well. Not so long ago we had a big weapons cache in the Pec region, a truck coming into Kosovo. I do not think it was meant to stay in Kosovo; it transited Kosovo and most likely would have continued and the weapons would have ended up in Macedonia. But it came through Montenegro, from Bosnia. Fortunately, police in Bosnia have been able to get their hands on the people behind this. Of course the weapons came from different locations inside the region and outside the region. So it is not a Kosovo phenomenon. In this case it was very clear that Kosovo was only a transit area for these weapons.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  6. There will be e and we may already see the first signs - during the election campaign, and maybe shortly after it, an increase in political violence, but that will not only be inter-ethnic. That will certainly also be Albanian-Albanian violence associated with the process of having elections. Nevertheless, we will do our utmost to avoid it. We are putting many resources into trying to make campaigning Serb politicians from Serbia proper, Kosovo Serb politicians and Albanian politicians as secure as possible during this election campaign. We are dedicated to that. We should be able to deliver the necessary security and cooperation with KFOR. Ambassador Durrant had a question about the flow of arms into Kosovo. We have done a lot to address this. We passed the regulation on illegal weapons possession.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  7. I fully agree that the security situation and the freedom of movement of Kosovo Serbs and some members of the other communities is not good enough, and our entire aim is really to change that through the means that we have. But this will not prevent them from safely participating in the election, because we will organize the election in such a way that it will be possible for Kosovo Serbs in our communities who might feel threatened to go and vote without fear; we will simply organize it so that they can vote in the enclaves where they live and work. So it is not in that way that there is a security threat to participation in the elections. It is very important to underline that.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  8. But getting the right legislation is only half of it. The other half is getting the capabilities. Here the creation of an organized crime bureau is essential. It will give us the possibility of turning intelligence into evidence. Members must realize that it will take some time to infiltrate these organizations, follow them and know what their pattern of actions is before we get results. But the fact that we are building the capabilities now bodes well for the future. If we do not do it now, we shall not be able to address organized crime further down the road. There were also some comments, especially from the Yugoslav Ambassador, on the security situation.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  9. There are a lot of good people in Kosovo, both Serbs and Albanians, who used to work together, live together, know each other and be friends, and they are gradually coming to the fore. We want these people back, and they should be able to set the agenda, not the people who committed the atrocities in the past. The situation is changing, but it takes time and patience. We have to continue and sustain this effort. I would also like to express thanks for the good remarks about strengthening our law enforcement capabilities. I especially thank member countries for giving us the capabilities, especially in the area of organized crime. We have tried to pass many regulations in the past half year, adding legislative or judicial possibilities for addressing organized crime and terrorism, arms smuggling, trafficking in women and so forth.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  10. They have to live in enclaves; they have to be under protection. Of course, one can, as an individual, take a risk as a Serb and walk down the streets of Pristina, but it is a risk. It is a smaller risk for a woman than for a man, but it is still there. In any case, there is the risk of being pointed at, because it is a small community, as the Council knows, and everybody knows everybody else, so people might point at a Kosovo Serb. What we are still lacking to some extent is having some Albanians come forward in that situation and ask "So what?" But this is also starting to happen, and it is the change in people's mentality that is exactly what this whole process is about.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  11. So the more serious crimes have been decreasing, even if the overall level of criminality generally is very high. This is not to say that we have reached a level that is good. Ethnic violence is still far too high. It is an exception to the region, in the sense that generally ethnic violence is not high. So we should continue our efforts. But even if we have 50,000 KFOR soldiers and 8,000 UNMIK police Kosovo Police Service officers, that is not enough to stop violence. Of course, as we improve our capabilities we will do better, especially with the creation of pillar I, the justice and police pillar, and the additional resources will be helpful in achieving better results. But it is also a process involving the people. When it is said that the security of Serbs is threatened, that is right.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  12. Mr. Haekkerup: First and foremost, I wish to give thanks for the support given by the members of the Security Council for the Mission. I will certainly bring to the members of the Mission - the men and women working there - the Council's kind words about what they are doing. Some aspects that came up in this part of the interventions are very important to address. In particular, security and violence in Kosovo were very much in the picture. I might perhaps explain a little more about developments over the last year. Criminality in general is high in Kosovo. It is also high compared with the rest of the region, but not extremely high compared with the rest of the region. We have had a development whereby violence has been decreasing; ethnic violence, especially, has gone down by 40 per cent.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  13. But we feel that there could be an upsurge in political violence in connection with the campaign and we tried to get KFOR to take all the necessary steps we can. But I have to say that the politicians are saying the right things. Whether this will have an impact or not remains to be seen, but it is important that they condemn the violence.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  14. There was also a question raised about detainees and missing persons. I think it is a very important subject, where we already have close cooperation and, actually, two contact groups with Yugoslav authorities, and we have been making considerable progress in exactly these fields, but there is still more to be done and we are working on that together with Mr. Covic'. There were also some comments on political violence. I think there is full agreement that there should be no place for political violence in the election campaign or after the election campaign. It is a very important message. I have to say that all the major Kosovo Albanian leaders have been out condemning political violence.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  15. There was mention made by the representative of the Russian Federation on a status-of-mission agreement and a status-of-forces agreement, and I have to say that it is United Nations policy, I think, that the authority is given by Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), so there is no need to have a separate status-of- mission or status-of-forces agreement. Resolution 1244 gives that mandate clearly. There was also a question about contacts with Osama bin Laden. I have to say that I have no indication that there should have been any contacts between extremist or terrorist groups in Kosovo and Osama bin Laden. But I would be very thankful for any information that member countries can give us regarding this, because it is very important for our picture of what is going on in Kosovo.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  16. Of course, we can contribute to that, and time is on our side. But I also have to underline that time is only on our side if we do the right things and take the necessary steps to move the process forward. But I think we can achieve that, and what we have been doing up to this point actually serves that purpose. But it is not enough to create institutions. It is only an instrument to change what is inside people's heads so that they can overcome the atrocities committed in the past. I think that is exactly what we are trying to do.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  17. I think that is the real point about the elections and the institutions that we are creating: they are in-built mechanisms that will make them work together; and that is exactly what we want. On the joint report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), I have to say that it is very helpful that these two organizations, which have a watch-dog function inside our Mission, are pointing out that ethnic intolerance is still far too high in Kosovo and the security environment is still not satisfactory. This reflects the post-war society. It reflects all the atrocities committed in the past, and, of course, it takes time to overcome what happened. It is something that has to change inside people's heads.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  18. We also are committed to dialogue with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in trying to solve problems of common interest - especially, of course, problems concerning Kosovo Serbs. This process has already been continuing for some time, and we certainly will continue our efforts to find common ground in solving these problems to the benefit of all. I also have to say that even if the Kosovo Serbs should not turn out in big numbers for the elections, we will of course find ways to make sure that they are represented anyhow in our institutions because, as I said, the institutions are not a goal in themselves. The idea is that the institutions are a means to create cooperation to force Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs to work together through these institutions and in that way change the overall security situation.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  19. Mr. Haekkerup: First and foremost, I thank the Security Council members for their support and for the very clear messages about their wish to see Kosovo Serb participation. I think that it is a very important subject, and I can assure the Council that UNMIK will do its utmost to contribute to a process that will lead to Kosovo Serb participation. Of course, we think that we have done a lot, and I can document that. During the time I have been the Special Representative, the prospects for Kosovo Serbs have changed dramatically. We are certainly committed to finding even more areas where we can make improvements, and we will try to do that in a way that will facilitate a decision to participate in the elections.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  20. However, there is no contradiction between remaining critical to aspects of the current, difficult situation and participation in the election. The answer lies not in further alienation and boycott. Responsible leaders who truly pursue the interests of their community must be encouraged by the international community to act accordingly.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  21. With the creation of the provisional self- government, a major step forward in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1244 (2001) will have be taken. But it is not a goal in itself. It is part of a process. It is an essential means to create a safe and secure environment for all of Kosovo's communities. Only by taking the political process forward and making the politicians work together can we overcome the hatred and distrust created by the atrocities of the past, and only in that way can we facilitate a final political settlement in future. Those who do not support participation or put up unrealistic conditions for participation will harm that process. The present concerns of all communities are recognized by UNMIK.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  22. The issue of an eventual declaration of independence would hence be obsolete, since this is by no means within the authority of the self-government. On the contrary, I expect a joint spirit of close cooperation to emerge from the shared need to achieve a common goal. Senior officials from the provisional institutions of self-government and UNMIK will be called upon to work together on a wide variety of issues, from policy formulation to programme implementation, to ensure an overall unity and coherence in the administration of Kosovo. In addition to the institutional dialogue between UNMIK and the provisional institutions of self- government, I will consult with all the political forces represented in the Assembly on matters relevant to the implementation of resolution 1244 (2001) and to the development of self-government in Kosovo.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  23. The Permanent Secretary will be the most senior civil servant in the Ministry and would be primarily responsible for administration - financial and human resources - as well as policy coordination and development. The composition of the Kosovo civil service has to include all the communities, as reflected in the composition of the Assembly. Kosovo civil servants will also work within the reserved structures, where they will report to the relevant Pillar head, instead of to a local Minister. Although there will be a clear functional and organizational separation between UNMIK and the provisional institutions of self-government, procedures will be in place to ensure that the Assembly and the Government fully respect Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  24. A group of senior international advisers will assist the President of Kosovo, in particular in his or her external relations role. I will establish the necessary mechanisms for permanent consultation and support of my Office to the President. In this context, it is important to emphasize that UNMIK will take on a number of new tasks and responsibilities, which will increase the workload of the existing international structures. All our resources will be utilized to the full extent, and UNMIK cannot afford to lose either staff or technical support during the transition period. Kosovo civil servants will work throughout the institutions of self-government. In the Ministries, most Kosovo civil servants will report to, and come under the direct supervision of, the Permanent Secretaries.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  25. Other international staff members will sit in actual line management positions inside the Ministry, where they will implement certain transferred functions for a limited time under the authority of the local Minister. Those international staff members will gradually exchange their functional responsibilities for a purely advisory and oversight role as additional qualified Kosovo civil servants are identified and recruited. In the Assembly, international staff will provide technical and administrative assistance through the Assembly secretariat. This will include legal counsel to the political groups and to the presidency of the Assembly to ensure that all of the acts of the Assembly are in conformity with resolution 1244 (1999) and the Constitutional Framework.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  26. International staff members will be placed in the reserved and transferred structures. In the former, they will implement reserved functions, in line with resolution 1244 (1999) and chapter 8 of the Constitutional Framework. In addition, a number of international staff members will be seconded to the provisional institutions of self-government, mostly to the Ministries. A primary task of these internationals will be to oversee and monitor compliance with resolution 1244 (1999), the Constitutional Framework and key UNMIK regulations. To this end, a senior international officer will sit next to the Minister, where he or she will oversee and monitor as well as advise the Minister in his work.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  27. The Pillar system will continue to exist, as will the current distribution of general areas of responsibility across Pillars. Although most structures associated with the Joint Interim Administrative Structure will be absorbed into these Ministries, some will remain under the immediate control of UNMIK, as foreseen in the Constitutional Framework. In areas such as law enforcement, the judiciary and emergency preparedness, the bulk of existing responsibilities will continue to fall under my immediate authority. Not coincidentally, these are the core areas in which policy is likely to have the most direct impact on the lives of minority communities. By retaining immediate authority in these areas, UNMIK will be in the best possible position to protect the rights and interests of these communities.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  28. The internal organization of the Ministries will follow a standard guideline, which has been adapted according to the individual characteristics of each Ministry's areas of responsibility. The Ministers will be political appointees who have been selected by the Prime Minister and confirmed by the Assembly. The Ministers will be responsible for setting policy and political direction for the Ministries. However, they will not exercise direct administrative control over the Ministries. In addition to support staff, the Ministers will be assisted by up to five political appointees. One or more of those political appointees will serve as a Vice- Minister, to whom the Minister can delegate authority in the latter's absence. The structure of UNMIK itself will remain essentially the same.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  29. Functions transferred to the provisional self-government are provided in the Constitutional Framework, and for the Executive Branch in the Framework Regulation, as elaborated. Once the transfer has taken place, the structures of UNMIK and the provisional institutions of self- government will be separate and distinct entities. The future Assembly, though, will be able to pass legislation only within the areas of responsibility transferred. The Executive Branch will consist of the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministries of Finance and Economy; Trade and Industry; Education, Science and Technology; Culture, Youth and Sports; Health, Environment and Spatial Planning; Labour and Social Welfare; Transport and Communications; Public Services; and Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  30. When the President of Kosovo has nominated a candidate for Prime Minister, he or she will have an opportunity to present a proposed list of Ministers to the Assembly for ratification. Once ratified, the Ministers will take up their posts at the head of the Ministries of the provisional self- government of Kosovo. A key factor in this process will be the extent of Kosovo Serb participation in the elections and its implications for the composition of the Assembly. Functional responsibility for the administration of Kosovo will be cleanly divided between UNMIK and the provisional institutions of self-government. Resolution 1244 (1999) sets out the Mission's mandate, and its post-election areas of immediate responsibility are clearly delineated in terms of functions in chapter 8 of the Constitutional Framework.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  31. The Interim Administrative Council will continue operating until the date of transfer of powers to the provisional institutions. There are a number of regulations that require the attention of this body prior to the transfer of powers. After the certification of elections, the Assembly will hold its inaugural session. Preparations are ongoing to ensure that the Assembly is supported by professional and efficient services and that minority representatives can fully exercise in that institution the rights granted to them in the Constitutional Framework. At the top of the Assembly's agenda will be the election of the presidency of the Assembly and the President of Kosovo.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  32. The composition of those departments reflects the distribution of responsibilities found in the Executive Branch regulation. From 3 October until the certification of the general elections, UNMIK will continue to consolidate the transitional administrative departments while simultaneously preparing for their separation into provisional self-government ministries and reserved UNMIK structures. Also on 3 October, the function of "Co-heads" ceased to exist. All Kosovo Co-heads have been given leave with pay until 17 November 2001. As part of the transition, the two institutions that have ensured the participation of Kosovo representatives in the decision-making process at the highest level will cease. The Kosovo Transitional Council concluded its activities on 2 October.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  33. Following the signing of the Constitutional Framework, the first step in preparing for the transfer of responsibilities was the elaboration of an UNMIK regulation to set out the 10 ministries which will compose the executive branch of the provisional self- government. One of the ministers will come from the Kosovo Serb community and one from another non- Albanian community. Promulgated on 17 September, the Executive Branch regulation defines the powers and responsibilities of the ministers, as well as those of the senior civil servants of the provisional institutions of self-government. The next step was to lay the groundwork for the transfer of responsibility to the ministries themselves. To that end, the departments of the Joint Interim Administrative Structure were merged into transitional administrative departments.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  34. We will, however, continue to closely monitor and support the provisional institutions in their work in order to ensure compliance with resolution 1244 (1999), and with the Constitutional Framework and other relevant UNMIK regulations. It should be emphasized that during all stages of transition UNMIK's overarching mandate remains the same, as does the ultimate authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The transition itself should be smooth and orderly, with minimal disruption to the provision of an interim administration and services in Kosovo. Much of the groundwork for the transition has already been laid, and the rest should be in place by 17 November.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  35. Kosovo Serb leaders and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbian officials have not yet come out in favour of participation. UNMIK will ensure that any Kosovo Serb who wishes to participate has a safe and convenient opportunity to do so, and we will relentlessly continue public information and outreach programmes. UNMIK is on the verge of moving into a determining phase of interim administration in Kosovo. Following the elections in November, the role of UNMIK in the transferred areas will evolve from that of direct administrative responsibility to one of oversight of self-government. As part of that process, UNMIK will transfer many of its interim administrative responsibilities to the provisional institutions of self-government.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  36. Election day will be under lOO-per-cent international supervision, requiring States members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to provide 1,800 international polling station supervisors and the Council of Europe election observation mission to engage another 200 international observers on election day. In addition, more than 6,000 voters are expected to be certified as domestic observers, including representatives from the well-regarded Federal Republic of Yugoslavia non- governmental observer organization, the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID). Neither the successful registration nor the certification of the Kosovo Serb citizens' initiative, Coalition Return, implies a commitment on the part of the Kosovo Serb community to participate on election day.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  37. A Political Violence Task Force has been established for quick and efficient response. Security operations for electoral activities are coordinated through joint election operations centres at the headquarters and regional levels. Public information and outreach will continue to ensure that eligible voters know where, when and how to vote. These efforts will be targeted particularly at smaller communities, women and disabled voters. In an effort to avoid the long queues and confusion of the 2000 election day, UNMIK has improved procedures, with a focus on order and voter convenience.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  38. Because the list is closed, meaning that the voter selects a political entity but not an individual candidate, this should result in women accounting for more than 20 per cent of the Assembly. In response to widespread international concern over radical political movements and individuals, and in accordance with the commitment made to the Council in my last presentation, I have instructed the Central Election Commission not to allow any individual appearing on the United States so-called black list to stand as a candidate. UNMIK and the voters and political leaders of Kosovo are now turning our attention to the 45-day campaign period, which started on 3 October and which will end 24 hours before election day. The civil registration and voter service exercise was notable for its order and lack of violence.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  39. One represents the Kosovo Turk community, two represent the Kosovo Bosniac and Gorani communities, three represent the Kosovo Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, and one represents the Kosovo Serb community. After much internal negotiation, a Kosovo Serb citizens' initiative, Coalition Return, reportedly backed by 21 political parties and non-governmental organizations, was certified on 24 September. This presents a genuine and critical opportunity for the Kosovo Serb electorate to participate in the shaping of the future in Kosovo. The political entities have complied with the requirement that one third of the first two thirds of the candidates on the candidates list must be women.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  40. Although civil registration offices will continue to operate, the voters" list has now been closed. With data processing still under way, it appears that more than 1.2 million persons will be eligible to vote, both inside and outside of Kosovo. Although UNMIK does not collect data on the ethnicity of registrants, we estimate that 83 per cent of eligible voters are Kosovo Albanian, 12 to 13 per cent are Kosovo Serb - that is, approximately 155,000 persons- and the remainder are primarily Kosovo Bosniac and Gorani, Kosovo Turk and Kosovo Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian. Based upon the best available demographic data, those figures indicate that Kosovo's communities have participated in large numbers. The Central Election Commission has certified 26 political entities to stand in the election.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  41. Because early registration turnout was disappointing, especially in Kosovo Serb communities within Kosovo, UNMIK increased the intensity of its coordinated public information and outreach campaigns, and enlisted the help of Kosovo Serb and Belgrade leaders. The decision of Bishop Artemije and other local leaders to register and the unambiguous statements of support from Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Pavle and from President Kostunica of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia led to significant increases in registration among Kosovo Serbs. In order to accommodate the increased demand, the voter service period was extended by two weeks, until 22 September. Every community was offered another secure opportunity to register within that two- week extension.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  42. The Council of Europe Election Observation Mission (CEEOM), responsible for the international monitoring of the electoral process, reports that "overall, the registration process has been conducted in a manner which is in accordance with international standards". The great disappointment of the 2000 municipal elections was the decision of the Kosovo Serb community and large segments of the Kosovo Turk, Kosovo Roma, Kosovo Ashkali and Kosovo Egyptian communities not to participate. UNMIK is pleased to report that all of Kosovo's communities are now in a position to participate in the 2001 Assembly election. UNMIK has provided secure and convenient registration facilities for all potential voters living in Kosovo and elsewhere in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Potential voters living in other countries were able to register by mail.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  43. Kosovo is about to embark on a journey towards sustainable democracy, multi-ethnic dialogue and gradual normalization. UNMIK is making every effort to secure broad participation in the election. It is in the interest of all communities to have a recognized and legitimate voice in the future of Kosovo. Inter-ethnic violence and high criminality, mutual prejudice and intolerance are daily reminders of a post-conflict reality. The hope and potential manifested by the 17 November elections have to be nourished and cultivated by responsible leaders. Initial preparations for the 2001 Kosovo Assembly election have been made. UNMIK has finished a successful inter-pillar civil registration and voter service period. A voters' list is now being produced as well as a ballot, including political entities representing all of Kosovo's communities.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  44. Mr. Haekkerup: It is a true privilege once again to have the opportunity to inform and update the Council on the state of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Since we covered a broad agenda in our last meeting, I will today focus on the Kosovo-wide elections and the establishment of self-government. I also look forward to answering any questions that members of the Council would like to put, and to hearing their comments. These are dynamic and challenging times for UNMIK. We are on the threshold of fulfilling the core objective of resolution l244 (1999) - the establishment of substantial autonomy and functioning self-government in Kosovo. Three days ago, on 2 October, the election campaign was officially initiated. Expectations among ordinary people and political contestants are equally high.

    2001-10-05 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4387 (2001) · source

  45. Finally, there was a question about a Security Council visit to Kosovo. I would like to say that I would welcome such a visit at an appropriate time. Of course, we must look at the security situation. It is also clear that such a visit should be helpful in addressing the implementation of resolution 1244 (1999). As the Council knows, we must look at the situation. Right now the security situation is difficult, and therefore the dates and the itinerary should be carefully considered. I think we should work on the possibility when the situation allows it.

    2001-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4296 (2001) · source

  46. I hope that the things that are happening now will actually push things more in that direction than they already are, simply because there is a growing recognition that what is going on in the region as such - those extremist actions - is certainly not in the interests of Kosovo Albanians. There is a growing recognition of that. Singapore and Jamaica also raised the question of reconciliation. I think that is one of the things that has been missing. Clear statements about the criminal activities that were committed in the past could lead to reconciliation. I think this is one of the areas where we should be working. As the representative of Bangladesh mentioned, the question of missing persons could be a very important step here because those communities have a very strong interest in dealing with this issue.

    2001-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4296 (2001) · source

  47. I have said it already, but I will repeat it to the leaders of Kosovo Albanians: they have to come out clearly - and I think they have done so - and get the message through to their people that what we should do is to isolate terrorism. There was a question asked by, I believe, either Colombia or Singapore about how many local Kosovo Albanians support the extremists. I must say that I think that number is very few. But the number is large enough to make it possible for them to operate ~ and that is a problem. We must arrive at a situation where there the supporters are so few that Kosovo Albanians will report on their activities and make sure that they are stopped.

    2001-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4296 (2001) · source

  48. Basically, I do not think that there is any great trafficking in heavy weapons through Kosovo, but with regard to small weapons, I think that there is. Colombia also had a question about strengthening the law enforcement pillar. What we have really tried to do is to get closer cooperation and better use of resources. But we are also trying to specialize the police and the judiciary and to fight more complicated crimes, as I have already touched upon. As the representative of Ukraine mentioned, human trafficking is one of the areas in which we have also passed a regulation. We have already had some results in repatriating people. I would also like to say a few words about the Kosovo Albanians. I have already touched upon this. I think the representative of the United States of America used very strong words. This is important.

    2001-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4296 (2001) · source

  49. I think many of those weapons predate the conflict - especially with regard to the anti-aircraft gun mentioned by the representative of Jamaica that was confiscated the other day. I do not think this involves the weapons that have arrived lately. Nevertheless, we certainly should address this. There is a proliferation of small arms, not only in Kosovo but in the region, and we should try to do our utmost to stop it. We have therefore passed a regulation on weapons and have started a system whereby people will have to have weapon permits. We have included an amnesty period, but when that period ends, people who are actually found with weapons will be subject to very severe sentences, especially if they have a considerable number of weapons.

    2001-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4296 (2001) · source

  50. I am sure that one of the lines of communication - of goods and other things - goes through Kosovo, and it is very important that we try to address that. I am very glad for the support that we are getting in this respect. But I also have to tell the Council that it should not expect quick results because fighting organized crime, as some of the members of the Council know, is a very complex thing. Getting the right structures in place now will be important to our chances in the future. Terrorism certainly does not affect only Kosovo, but also the rest of the Balkans and Europe. I am also thankful to those countries supporting the idea of additional international judges and prosecutors. A question was raised about weapons. I can assure the Council that there are too many weapons in Kosovo, and we are certainly trying to address that.

    2001-03-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4296 (2001) · source