YouSaid · the spoken record

Holomisa

lines on the record
19
first
1992-07-16
most recent
1992-07-16
sittings or episodes
1
sources
un-security-council

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  1. “In conclusion, it is clear that there is no free politicking in South Africa today. This is exacerbated by the role of the State in fomenting so-called black-on-black violence by deploying its security forces and surrogates to undermine the political strength of its opponents. It will serve no purpose for the international community to insist on the resumption of CODESA negotiations under existing arrangements and in the present climate. As long as the South African Government lets its hounds and wolves loose freely to devour unarmed and imnocent blacks, negotiations will not get back on track.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  2. “The international community has to subject the De Klerk regime to an unceasing string of unrelenting and inexorable scrutiny of its bestial conduct regarding domestic developments since February 1990, namely the hand of the State in the incessant massacre of blacks and its unshakeable determination to frustrate the achievement of a negotiated settlement not acceptable to it. To rebuild trust and foster the spirit of confidence in the resumption of negotiations after the graphic illustration of the regime's bad faith and hidden agendas highlighted above, the international community will have to consider the advisability of endorsing or ratifying built-in mechanisms to ensure that Mr. de Klerk and his cronies do not determine the pace of change and negotiations unilaterally as they have done at CODESA 2.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  3. “The right-wing military formations are openly training and publicly displaying their weapons. The international community will have to address itself to Mr. de Klerk's assertion that there will be no interim government in South Africa if the liberation movements do not disband their military wings. This new attitude surprised many because the ANC in particular has suspended the armed struggle and has not engaged in hostile acts against Mr. de Klerk's Government. Mr. de Klerk stated, when unbanning the liberation movements, that their military wings were also unbanned.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  4. “Once an international body to play a peace-keeping role in South Africa has been identified its duties should include: First, dispatching an advance team to the country to meet various leaders with a view to acquainting itself with all the problems besetting South Africa and its created independent homelands; Secondly, looking into the general stability of the whole country, concentrating on rural areas where there is absolutely no free politicking in some homelands; Thirdly, helping create a free political climate to facilitate the mobilization of support by all political parties and organizations; Fourthly, helping identify all foreign mercenaries in the employ of the South African Defence Force and repatriating them to their countries of origin; Fifthly, monitoring Armscor, which produces arms in South Africa, and its agents and preventing the flow of weapons from the South African Defence Force and South African Police stores to their surrogate forces; Sixthly, monitoring the possibly extensive violation of the arms embargo, to check and establish whether the secret funds are used to purchase in foreign countries weapons which are used to kill blacks; Seventhly, taking over the entire control of the National Peace Accord and revamping it, paying more attention to the following: the code of conduct and control of the State's armed forces; the control of the armed wings of the liberation movements as well as the white right-wing military formations.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  5. “The international peace-keeping force, whose dispatch to South Africa we clamour for, can discharge its duties honourably and to the satisfaction of all only when its endeavours to restore peace and calm to the strife-torn areas are accompanied and matched by visible and tangible progress in constitutional negotiations.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  6. “There is no hope for regional cooperation at both the political and economic levels as long as the intractable problem and vexed question of South Africa is not addressed. It is our considered position that the presence of the international community in South Africa will become effective and meaningful only when it has a direct say over the negotiation process. It must be invested with mandatory powers to intervene and arbitrate between the parties jockeying for power. To avert further racial polarization because of the anger and frustration with the impasse in CODESA the international community should set out to help all sides to accelerate the pace of change within carefully determined time-frames.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  7. “The cold war may have come to an end, but its ripple effects are still painfully felt in South Africa by the victims of apartheid. This scenario derives from the fear of the ascension to power of a party favourably disposed to the two countries which will swiftly move to take drastic action and halt the flow of aid, supplies and logistical support to the rebel movements and.thereby foil the entire grand strategy of seeking to install in power henchmen of international vested interests. We urge the international community to take a fresh look at the unfolding scenario in South Africa and heed the pertinent facts I have canvassed. If these issues are ignored South Africa will slide into chaos and anarchy, and a bloody conflict will ensue. Already southern Africa is bleeding due to the lack of growth in South Africa's economy.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  8. “They should avoid taking unilateral decisions without consuiting the South African black protagonists on punitive measures against the country lest these organisations | are viewed as stabbing the oppressed black masses in the back, as was the case in 1910. We do not want to conclude that there is a premeditated strategy to inflict severe political defeat on blacks by De Klerk and his allies with the full backing of the international community. I have a strong feeling that the political fortunes and settlement of the South African dilemma are tied to Angola and Mozambique. The armed UNITA and RENAMO bandits trained, equipped and funded by South Africa and some of its Western allies must, it appears, be safely placed in power before our country is propelled to a non-racial democracy.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  9. “Another source of concern is the impression that negotiations are an affair for the tripartite group - that is, the ANC, the Nationalist Party and Inkatha only. This impression must be corrected, as there are the PAC, AZAPO and other political parties in the homelands which enjoy equal status with KwaZulu's Chief Minister, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi. We have learned from the African experience that the exclusion of other political formations from the negotiation process leading to freedom and independence results in political instability and insurrection. Members of the international community, such as this body, should exercise caution when it comes to the issue of rewards.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  10. “It weakens them by failing to comply with the agreements reached with them and in this way discredits them in the eyes of their supporters, The collusion of vigilante groups with the South African security forces in spreading civil mayhem in black communities, as has been witnessed in the black townships, is another pointer to South Africa's determination to have the upper hand in the negotiations with some of its homeland Government allies. The sudden springing up, emergence and proliferation of politial parties in certain black areas is the direct outcome of a carefully pre-conceived plan to confuse and catch people and use them as voting cattle for the future Nationalist Party-led grand alliance against the liberation movements.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  11. “He seems over-anxious to placate the international community and polish and veneer South Africa's sordid image there so that South Africa is accepted back into its fold. There is a growing perception among the victims of apartheid that the South African Government's decision to unban all liberation movements stems from a desire to maintain a two-way communication with them - that is, to negotiate with them on the one hand and to weaken them on the other.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  12. “When the misdeeds and acts of omission and commission of the Government of the Republic of South Africa become public knowledge, it offers the feeble excuse that they took place in the past. It would appear even in this negotiation process that the voteless and voiceless majority will depend on the attitudes, feelings, inclination and disposition of the De Klerk Government about what it can concede to blacks and what it can save for white supremacy. We still doubt the unequivocal commitment of the South African Government to real change - that is, to accede to one person, one vote, which is the basis of majority rule. Every bit of evidence to date indicates that whatever changes De Klerk introduces are a result of a reaction to international and internal pressures.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  13. “The State order for the assassination of Goniwe and others was revealed through my office as a result of an authentic document anonymously addressed to me. Today I also have in my possession a thick file sent in the same manner. The day I decide to release it that will prove beyond doubt that white South Africa is an expert on destabilizing black communities, resulting in bloodshed and loss of human life, in order to facilitate its stay in power. The history of South Africa's political minefields shows that the South African Government denies knowledge of everything in which it is invoived only for it to be proved later that it committed serious offences, as in the case of Goniwe and others, Trust Feeds, the Inkathagate scandal and the support for the UNITA and RENAMO forces.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  14. “To corroborate the fact that the white South African Government employs mercenaries to achieve its nefarious political objectives, I would note that the failed coup attempt against Transkei was spearheaded by members of the "Lesotho Liberation Army", trained, funded and equipped by the South African Government to overthrow the Government of the late Chief Lebua Jonathan of the Kingdom of Lesotho. Those men are in the custody of the Transkei Government and appearing in court facing treason charges. The Lesotho Liberation Army members confirmed in court our intelligence reports to President De Klerk in 1990 that a farm belonging to a certain Mr. Van Tonder in Queenstown, bordering Transkei in the west, was used for training and as an assembly point whence the men departed to kill sleeping Transkei Defence Force recruits, using mortars.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  15. “It is indeed, I submit, political blackmail aimed at causing our local population to become disenchanted with the Government through deliberately engineered mass starvation and thus to contemplate an uprising. This strategy has been pursued since 1988-1989; it culminated in an abortive coup on 22 November 1990. All available evidence in the Supreme Court of Transkei - manned by seconded South African judges - so far points to South Africa's complicity from the hatching of the coup to its staging.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  16. “It extends to the homeland Governments that are considered averse to the dirty tricks of the National Party Government and to its propensity to deploy its forces against unarmed and innocent blacks. The Transkei Government, which has fully aligned itself with the broad democratic movement, has been particularly targeted for financial strangulation by the Government of the Republic of South Africa for more than two consecutive financial years, in a bid to force it to toe the line. Last year, for instance, our budget was approved by South Africa in October instead of April, and in March this year we were told to close our books. This year's budget, for 1992-1993, has not yet been approved. What would members call that? Is it not destabilization?”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  17. “It is argued in other circles that the present Government of the Republic of South Africa is not a colonial one, in which case the international community would be justified to intervene, as was the case in Namibia and Zimbabwe. I submit that South Africa is a sovereign, independent State, but that the transfer of power by the mother country, Britain, in 1910 to the white minority qualifies the present South African Government as a colonial administration, for the indigenous people of South Africa are denied self-determination in all organs of the governing process. I note its current strategy of attempting to co-opt liberation movements so as to make them share the current blame for violence and other issues. The destabilization of biack communities does not end with the black townships.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  18. “Legally, he has taken South Africa to the pre-1948 period, when apartheid had not yet been legalized and institutionalized. Blacks did not have the right to vote during either of those periods, and they do not enjoy that right now. His overriding concern now is to compete with the liberation movements for influence with the international community, displace them as a factor and render them ineffective. The regime's intransigence has precipitated the impasse in the negotiations. President De Klerk, of course, met his allies before CODESA 2 and pledged to slow down the pace of negotiations. At CODESA 2 he insisted on extremely high special majority percentages, which he knew would not be accepted by South Africans.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source

  19. “Mr. HOLOMISA: First, I should like to thank the Council for this opportunity to join its debate this afternoon. As the Council is assembled here today to examine the scourge of violence in South Africa, we need first to define violence in the context of the South African social, economic and political situation. The apartheid system and white domination have always been underpinned by maximum State violence ruthlessly employed to coerce the unrepresented majority of South Africans to yield willy-nilly to white rule. What Mr. De Klerk has done between 1990 and today is to restore South Africa, in the political sense, to the pre-1960 era, when political organizations enjoyed freedom of movement, association and assembly.”

    1992-07-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3096 (1992) · source