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28
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1999-07-08
most recent
2001-09-10
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4
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un-security-council

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  1. We continue to be convinced that the Security Council must remain focused and committed to maintaining a United Nations military, police and civilian presence in East Timor until such time as the new country has established a truly self-sustaining administration and the security situation is no longer of concern. We look forward, therefore, to the Secretary- General's report due next month, which will recommend the size, shape and timetable for the successor mission to UNTAET.

    2001-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4367 (2001) · source

  2. We also extend our congratulations to the United Nations on the smooth arrangements for the election, which, in our view, establishes a new benchmark for future United Nations missions. The New Zealand observer team's report adds to the international consensus that the ballot was free, fair and credible. The international community and the people of East Timor should have great confidence in the integrity of the election outcome. The conduct and successful staging of these elections also provides an excellent basis for the planning of the successor mission to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). New Zealand has previously stated its strong belief that the United Nations must equip East Timor to take full responsibility for its own affairs.

    2001-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4367 (2001) · source

  3. Thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity to speak today. May we also express our thanks to Under-Secretary-General Gue'henno for his excellent briefing this morning on the result of the election in East Timor. It is indeed with great pleasure that we join with others who have spoken earlier in warmly congratulating the people of East Timor on the successful completion of their first democratic elections. The high voter turnout and the peaceful and tolerant environment in which votes were cast are evidence of the commitment of the East Timorese people to the process towards independence. We look forward to the announcement of the inaugural meeting of the East Timorese Constituent Assembly as an important step towards that goal.

    2001-09-10 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4367 (2001) · source

  4. Above all, however, my Government is convinced that the Security Council must stay focused on and fully committed to East Timor. This operation is unique and in turn offers the United Nations the opportunity of an all-too-rare success. Comparisons are occasionally drawn with the operation in Kosovo and, certainly in terms of their complexity, the two share some aspects in common. But East Timor is very much the child of the United Nations, from the 1999 popular consultation onwards, in a way that other operations are unlikely ever to be. East Timor can and indeed will succeed as an independent State, but for some time to come a continuing United Nations presence will be critical to ensuring a return on the investment we have collectively made so far in terms of lives and financial and other resources.

    2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351Resumption1 (2001) · source

  5. We welcome the fact that significant progress has been made in planning for an integrated mission mandated by the Security Council and funded from assessed contributions to succeed UNTAET, and we look forward to the Secretary-General's further report towards the end of October. As a troop contributor, we have already indicated to the Secretary-General our willingness to maintain a significant military presence with the United Nations in East Timor as far ahead as November next year. New Zealand strongly believes that the United Nations must equip East Timor to take full responsibility for its own affairs. We must also provide the people of East Timor with a clear understanding of the implications of right-sizing the United Nations presence over time.

    2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351Resumption1 (2001) · source

  6. The Secretary-General also notes in his report that the Atambua verdicts are yet to be appealed and that the decree establishing an ad hoc tribunal for human rights violations in East Timor is still to be amended. We very much hope that the new Indonesian Government will give prompt attention to meeting international expectations in these matters. Both the Secretary-General in his report and the Special Representative in his briefing earlier today have addressed the question of a United Nations successor mission to UNTAET after independence. We fully share the view that it is wrong to equate East Timor's attainment of political independence with the establishment of effective administration.

    2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351Resumption1 (2001) · source

  7. We urge the new Indonesian Government to move quickly to fulfil Indonesia's obligations to this Council to disband and disarm the militia groups in West Timor so that this can take place. While dealing with these issues, we would also like to take the opportunity to express our appreciation for recent efforts by the Indonesian Government to bring the killers of Private Manning to justice. We welcomed the visit to the crime scene in East Timor, and subsequently to New Zealand, of an Indonesian police investigation team. We look forward to cooperation between UNTAET and Indonesia, as the parties with jurisdiction, producing an effective trial and sentences commensurate with the seriousness of the crime. We remain aware, however, that there are other cases, such as that of Private Devi Ram J aishi of Nepal, that have yet to see progress.

    2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351Resumption1 (2001) · source

  8. In these circumstances, it goes without saying that any decisions on adjustments to the United Nations presence - post-elections or post-independence - must be based on conditions on the ground, including a thorough security and threat assessment. They must also take into account the views of troop-contributing countries, as was recognized in the Council's resolution 1338 (2001) of January this year. The Government of Indonesia is to be congratulated on having carried out a refugee registration exercise last month. It was an important first step. New Zealand, along with others, stands ready to assist Indonesia in the next steps of repatriation and resettlement, but only in circumstances in which the security of international workers can be guaranteed.

    2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351Resumption1 (2001) · source

  9. It is depressing to read in the Secretary- General's report that some hard-line militia elements have been encouraged to plan the resumption of offensive operations by the derisory sentences handed out to the killers of three staff members of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees at Atambua and by the insignificant jail term handed out to a well known militia leader. It is also of great concern to note from the report that some groups may be deliberately lying low until independence in the belief that the international military presence will then be removed. Clearly, it is essential that we should not, however inadvertently, send any signals that might encourage them in this belief.

    2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351Resumption1 (2001) · source

  10. We understand the apprehensions and even disquiet which may surround this event, but we are heartened by the signing earlier this month of the pact of national unity, whereby the political parties committed themselves to respecting each other and the election outcome and to defending multi-party democracy. We look forward to the East Timorese people expressing their will freely and peacefully in order to cement the next step towards regaining their independence for the first time in some 500 years. New Zealand remains very concerned, however, by the activities of militia groups and the threat they continue to pose to the goal of a stable and secure East Timor.

    2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351Resumption1 (2001) · source

  11. May I express my delegation's pleasure at seeing Mr. Ramos-Horta here in the Council today, and also convey our appreciation to Mr. Vieira de Mello for his excellent briefing earlier today. I am sure we are all greatly encouraged by the progress made in the territory over the past six months. We congratulate the East Timorese people and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) on their achievements in the face of enormous odds. Today, we stand on the verge of the next critical phase in East Timor's evolution: the elections to the Constituent Assembly in a month's time.

    2001-07-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4351Resumption1 (2001) · source

  12. While these are complex and challenging issues, increased effectiveness lies in the hands of the Security Council and the General Assembly. As we have suggested, the Council should focus on designing better targeted sanctions regimes with clear objectives and exit strategies, regular reviews and stronger institutional support, including the provision to the Secretariat and Member States of the necessary technical expertise and advice to make sanctions work better. Finally, for its part the General Assembly might consider adopting a separate budget with adequate resources for implementing sanctions mandates and supporting the sanctions committees, along the same lines as the budgets established for peacekeeping operations and the International Tribunals.

    2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source

  13. These are but a few of the measures that my delegation believes could improve the current effectiveness of sanctions regimes. Furthermore, up to now the international community has depended on existing structures and resources to manage the application and enforcement of sanctions. This approach has entailed very little financial cost to the membership, but in some cases it may have contributed to devastating suffering and long-term degradation for civilian populations, far in excess even of the kind of damage that might be inflicted by armed conflict or war. This situation poses, as the Secretary-General has said, a moral dilemma for the United Nations, which has a responsibility to protect the vulnerable and the weak.

    2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source

  14. United Nations agencies, as well as humanitarian organizations, should also be able to apply directly to the sanctions committees for exemptions. The Secretariat should establish a dedicated unit to maintain the necessary databases and to process applications and notifications electronically. The sanctions committees should be able to draw on special expertise to identify the profiles of their targets and design the scope of proposed targeted sanctions accordingly. Clear exit strategies identifying the actions required to suspend or remove sanctions should be built into mandates in order to clarify the inducements for compliance. There should also be mechanisms in place to monitor and assess regularly the impact of sanctions. The possibilities for better border control measures should also be explored.

    2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source

  15. First, the trend away from general trade sanctions towards a more selective approach needs to be accelerated, with greater efforts made to identify a limited range of goods and services that would target the interests of the regimes and elites identified as responsible for threats to peace and security. These could include financial sanctions such as the freezing of assets, bans on foreign travel and the imposition of more precisely defined and better monitored arms embargoes. Secondly, the procedures for approving humanitarian exemptions to sanctions regimes should be overhauled and streamlined. For example, lists of exempt foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, medical and other humanitarian supplies should be better defined and agreed, and decisions on dual-use goods made more transparent.

    2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source

  16. Rather, it is their effectiveness and their unmoderated side effects on innocent civilians and neighbouring countries that is at issue. In its presidential note of 29 January 1999, issued under the symbol S/1999/92, the Security Council offered a number of practical proposals for improving the work of the sanctions committees. Welcome as these were, they did not go far enough. More needs to be done. We were grateful for the work done recently by Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada and others to investigate the feasibility of developing better targeted, "smarter" sanctions regimes. We endorse these efforts and urge the Security Council to improve the overall efficacy of sanctions by taking a more graduated - perhaps a two-pronged - approach to sanctions in the future.

    2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source

  17. On the other hand, sanctions can cause serious humanitarian distress for ordinary people and, if sustained over a long period of time, severe damage to the local infrastructure. In addition, there is ample evidence of numerous structural, processing and administrative problems which impede the effectiveness of sanctions. New Zealand believes that the Security Council needs to develop, as a priority, a more focused and refined approach to reduce the unintended consequences of sanctions, especially the incidence of humanitarian suffering. Let me say, at this point, that the aim of sanctions is not in question. New Zealand supports the use of sanctions as a legitimate instrument, provided for by the Charter, for dealing with threats to international peace and security.

    2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source

  18. The mechanisms for enforcing them have too often been lacking or have not been uniformly implemented. There has been little reliable information on or monitoring of their actual effects. Sanctions have had a limited record of success in achieving the goals for which they were imposed. Compliance has often been inadequate or uneven, the economies of neighbouring countries can be impacted adversely, and black markets and smuggling in banned goods or commodities can flourish. In the case of comprehensive trade sanctions imposed on authoritarian regimes in particular, we have seen how the unintended effects can be manipulation and profiteering by the elite, who thus escape any adverse impact on themselves and may even exploit the situation to their own advantage.

    2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source

  19. The Secretary-General has on more than one occasion drawn attention to deficiencies in their application and also to the unintended harm they may inflict on innocent and vulnerable people, most recently, for example, in his millennium report entitled "We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century" (A/54/2000). It is easy to see why sanctions have become an instrument of choice. Their imposition represents a useful, low-cost middle course of action somewhere between diplomatic censure and the use of force, by means of which the Security Council may address a serious threat to international peace and security. The problem is, however, that sanctions, and comprehensive sanctions in particular, can be a blunt instrument.

    2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source

  20. Mr. President, may I first congratulate you and your delegation on bringing this very important matter to the Security Council this month in this open format. I would also like to thank the Under- Secretary-General, Mr. Prendergast, for his valuable introduction to today's debate. As others have observed, the Council's recourse to sanctions, which are specifically provided for under Article 41 of the Charter, has increased dramatically in recent years. The increasing frequency with which sanctions are being used has helped highlight some serious shortcomings.

    2000-04-17 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4128 (2000) · source

  21. 57] This concise statement captures very well the need to take adequate steps to deal with problems which, if left unresolved, could lead to a return to armed conflict. It also underlines clearly the need for due weight to be given to the reintegration aspect of the tripartite topic we are discussing today. For, without a successful reintegration effort, the dividends of disarmament and demobilization may prove short-lived.

    1999-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4020Resumption1 (1999) · source

  22. A further essential building block is the promotion of good governance. We are attracted to the definition set out by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that good governance is "the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels in a manner that is participatory, transparent and accountable". Good governance, in effect, means that priorities are based on a broad consensus in society, while at the same time the voices of the poorest and most vulnerable are heard. Finally, we believe it is useful to recall the words of former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali when he wrote in An Agenda for Peace that "Preventative diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post- conflict peace-building is to prevent a recurrence". [A/47/277, para.

    1999-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4020Resumption1 (1999) · source

  23. Reintegration nevertheless remains a complex and expensive activity. It is particularly difficult to implement successfully in economies which are stagnant or severely disrupted as a result of conflict. Ideally, emphasis should also be placed on programmes which promote reconciliation at the same time, for example, by recruiting former combatants to work side by side in a new police force, where this is feasible. In regard to Bougainville, New Zealand is continuing to provide, by means of official development assistance, support for the peace process, including the restoration of civil authority and a variety of vocational training programmes with a focus on reintegration. It is pleasing to report that we have found it possible to offer training programmes in which former protagonists learn side by side.

    1999-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4020Resumption1 (1999) · source

  24. In particular, this means early consultation with the parties to the conflict. As for external resources, we can only agree with the observation made by several speakers today that it is essential that our collective peacekeeping efforts enjoy a more secure financial basis than exists at present. One of the key lessons learned from New Zealand's experience in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, is the need to give ownership of the peace settlement and subsequent disarmament and reconstruction mechanisms to the parties concerned. Along with Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu, we continue to provide personnel to the Peace Monitoring Group and to take part in regular peace process consultative meetings. However, our own role is essentially peripheral to that played by the political leaders themselves.

    1999-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4020Resumption1 (1999) · source

  25. At the national level, it should be an overriding concern to develop as soon as possible a national capability in demobilization and reintegration activities so as to reduce dependence on external inputs. Sustainability, of course, implies that initiatives are designed with a view to avoiding a return to conflict. It also means promoting growth and development over the medium to long term and ensuring equitable access to the benefits of such growth. The successful implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in a peacekeeping environment depends a good deal on the provisions made in the agreement ending the conflict in question, as a number of others have pointed out today. Activities in support of these processes should, as far as possible, be carefully planned and designed from the very beginning.

    1999-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4020Resumption1 (1999) · source

  26. For instance, where a society has been severely disrupted by civil war or ethnic conflict to the point that its domestic institutions have collapsed, the role of the United Nations and other external agencies is likely to need to be extensive. In other situations, however, where an established and internationally recognized Government remains in place after a period of conflict, the role of outsiders, including the United Nations, is likely to be more limited. A rigid conceptual framework should therefore be avoided. As for building capacity, there is the need to provide, at the level of the individual, education, training and information regarding options which may be available to ex-combatants to help them deal with problems encountered on demobilization.

    1999-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4020Resumption1 (1999) · source

  27. We have also drawn from our participation in regional arrangements, such as the Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, where the United Nations is also playing a key role in the peace process through its Political Office (UNPOB), and which was, of course, the subject of my Australian colleague's statement earlier. It seems to us that, in designing a framework for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex- combatants, three factors are essential. These are flexibility, building capacity and sustainability. With respect to flexibility, we suggest it is essential to recognize that different circumstances warrant and should be accorded different approaches.

    1999-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4020Resumption1 (1999) · source

  28. May I start, Mr. President, by saying how pleased my delegation is to have this opportunity to participate in an open debate of the Security Council on this very important topic. I would like to congratulate you on your initiative in calling this meeting. We have prepared our statement today drawing largely on our national experience in United Nations peacekeeping operations, such as the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). I must say that I found the statement made earlier by the representative of Mozambique particularly valuable.

    1999-07-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.4020Resumption1 (1999) · source