YouSaid · the spoken record

Hwang

lines on the record
155
first
2022-08-09
most recent
2023-12-19
sittings or episodes
22
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un-security-council

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  1. Secondly, the Council must reaffirm the goal of the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as repeatedly agreed in multiple Council resolutions. Thirdly, the Council should stress the importance of the full implementation of all relevant Council resolutions, whose sanctions regimes are the most sweeping and comprehensive in terms of subject, scope and level. That is the absolute minimum for which the Council must stand united and the starting point needed to reverse the trend of impunity regarding North Korea. Let us take a unified stand to reverse the current trend. Let us take a determined step in the name of the Security Council. The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.

    2023-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9514 (2023) · source

  2. Faced with such a grave threat, the Council must stand united and speak with one voice. In that regard, my delegation urges the two permanent members that are hesitant to take additional sanctions measures at least to join us in sending the following three messages. This is the common ground that I am sure the Council, which bears the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, can agree upon despite different views on additional sanctions. First, the Council must condemn the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s continued provocations and continued development of its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

    2023-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9514 (2023) · source

  3. However, we should not put the cart before the horse. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s ever-growing unlawful nuclear and missile threats are the very reason that we are strengthening extended deterrence cooperation with the United States, not the other way around. On 17 December, which was one day before the ICBM launch and the twelfth anniversary of the passing of Kim Jong Il, the father and predecessor of the current North Korean leader, the Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Workers’ Party, exalted the late leader for the nuclear weapons programme’s great national historic achievement. That is yet another example that clearly shows that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s missile launches, including the ICBMs this time, are based on its own playbook.

    2023-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9514 (2023) · source

  4. Against such a menacing and existential threat, the Republic of Korea must, and will, take all necessary measures to protect the lives and safety of our people by maintaining a robust, combined defence and deterrence posture. We will be relentless in response to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s continued provocations in cooperation with the United States and Japan. We will be tireless and will prevail in the contest of resolve vis-à-vis the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. At the same time, we reiterate our position that the door for dialogue and negotiation remains wide open without any preconditions. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is again attempting to shift blame to others in a false endeavour to establish a pretext for the unlawful launches of ballistic missiles.

    2023-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9514 (2023) · source

  5. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea officially indicated the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in 2022 and then passed a law in September of that year that lowered the threshold for using nuclear weapons and even opened the door for a pre-emptive nuclear attack. Furthermore, the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, has overseen and guided numerous drills of North Korean military units on the spot for the deployment and operation of tactical nuclear weapons. From the security perspective of the Republic of Korea, not only ICBMs, but the entirety of its ballistic missile programmes, including short-range ballistic missiles, pose a grave threat to our national security.

    2023-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9514 (2023) · source

  6. Furthermore, my delegation also emphasizes that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea issue is no longer a regional one. It has already been spreading insecurity to other parts of the world and threatening the lives of ordinary people around the globe. We see Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ammunitions and weapons in wars and conflicts, many banks and companies around the world attacked by North Korean hackers and revenues generated by illicit activities such as cryptocurrency theft and overseas workers, in direct violation of relevant Council resolutions, are then siphoned off to its WMD programmes. My delegation would like to bring to the Council’s attention the fact that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nuclear threat has entered a new phase since last year.

    2023-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9514 (2023) · source

  7. Yet we have done nothing over the years, and in the meantime, the frequency and intensity of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s provocations have been drastically ramped up. More than 100 ballistic missile launches, including 13 ICBMs and three so-called satellite launches, since last year are unprecedented, even compared with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s missile launch activity over the past three decades. As I pointed out at the previous meetings, it is deeply concerning to see this body locked in a stalemate and being ridiculed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Seeing the Council’s continued failure to unite in condemning those dangerous provocations, let alone taking action in response, the Pyongyang regime is now rushing towards the point of no return.

    2023-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9514 (2023) · source

  8. It is indeed deplorable to see the Pyongyang regime wasting its scant resources on developing its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme, while turning a blind eye to the suffering of its own people and only taking care of a handful of the ruling class who are loyal to the regime in Pyongyang. If left unchecked, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could be emboldened to engage in further provocations, threatening the entire international community. I am sure that no Council members want that. The Council has expressed its determination to take further significant measures in the event of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s provocations regarding resolution 2397 (2017).

    2023-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9514 (2023) · source

  9. I thank you, Mr. President, for convening this urgent meeting of the Security Council. I also thank Assistant Secretary- General Khiari for his briefing. The Republic of Korea condemns in the strongest possible terms the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch on 18 December and its short-range ballistic missile launch on 17 December, intended to directly target the Republic of Korea. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is continuing its reckless provocations and the development of its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in violation of multiple Council resolutions.

    2023-12-19 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9514 (2023) · source

  10. In conclusion, the Republic of Korea calls on Member States to abide responsibly by the relevant binding and non-binding international instruments on small arms. At the same time, we would like to highlight that we are not only firmly committed to those mechanisms, but also ready to contribute to and support relevant capacity-building efforts to promote compliance.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  11. In addition to the synergies created across the United Nations system and the various international instruments, regional and subregional efforts can serve as effective catalysts for achieving these objectives at the international level. As one of the signatories to the shared commitments on women and peace and security, we recognize the connection between gender and small arms. The gender perspective is clearly captured in the Secretary-General’s report on small arms and light weapons (S/2023/823). We note with concern the disproportionate impact that the diversion and illicit transfer of small arms, light weapons and ammunition can have on women and girls, and we call for the full, equal, meaningful and safe participation of women throughout decision-making processes in arms control and disarmament.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  12. We also underscore the constructive role played by the relevant subsidiary bodies of the Council and their Panels of Experts in reporting on the implementation of sanctions. At the same time, we believe that United Nations sanctions regimes should be more efficient and strategically targeted, reflecting the developing situation on the ground while addressing relevant unintended humanitarian concerns. The Republic of Korea reiterates the integral role of the Security Council in addressing this issue in tandem with the discussions in the General Assembly in a mutually reinforcing manner. We encourage the Council to remain seized of the matter and to holistically address the issue of small arms as the primary organ of the United Nations responsible for maintenance of international peace and security.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  13. Let me also take this opportunity to underline a unique tool at the disposal of the Security Council, that is, Council-mandated arms embargoes. Arms embargoes imposed by the Council contribute to curbing the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons and thereby prevent the escalation of conflict and promote peace all across the world. We strongly support and are committed to the full implementation of the Council-mandated arms embargoes and condemn any illicit flow of arms and ammunition in violation of the relevant Council resolutions. With that in mind, my delegation condemns the illicit transfer of military equipment, including ammunition, by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  14. Against that troubling backdrop, we express our strong support for the comprehensive implementation of various international instruments, namely, the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, the International Tracing Instrument and the recently adopted Global Framework for Through-life Conventional Ammunition Management (see General Assembly resolution 78/47). As the President of the ninth Conference of States Parties to Arms Trade Treaty, the Republic of Korea would also like to highlight the importance of universalizing and implementing the Arms Trade Treaty as the first legally binding instrument regulating the conventional arms trade.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  15. I thank you, Mr. President, for convening today’s meeting. I also thank High Representative Nakamitsu, Ms. Aptel and Ms. Mutota for their insightful briefings. The Republic of Korea recognizes the deeply detrimental and cross-cutting effects on international peace and security of the diversion and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. The uncontrolled transfer and misuse of small arms and light weapons initiates, aggravates and sustains armed conflict, transnational crimes and terrorism, all of which hamper sustainable development in vulnerable countries.

    2023-12-15 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9509 (2023) · source

  16. I also stress that the door for dialogue and negotiations remains wide open, without any preconditions. We strongly urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to refrain from further escalatory actions, fulfil its international obligations and return to diplomacy.

    2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source

  17. It is also regrettable that some erroneous arguments being presented here represent a false comparison. Our satellite launch is completely legal and was correctly announced beforehand. It is not prohibited by Council resolutions, and neither does it pose any threat to international peace and security. It has nothing to do with the development of ICBM technology. The opposite is true of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s launch, which is illegal, threatening and conducive to the development of ICBMs. I would once again like to emphasize the importance of the Council’s unity in condemning the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and in faithfully implementing the resolutions of the Council. Let us unite together against this repeat offender and take a determined step in the name of the Council.

    2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source

  18. For more than three decades, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been developing its unlawful nuclear and ballistic-missile programme, based on its own playbook. The root cause lies in the nature of the regime of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea itself, not the so-called hostile policies of the Republic of Korea or the United States, which are non-existent. Pyongyang’s ever- growing threats are the very reason that the Republic of Korea is strengthening its extended deterrence cooperation with the United States, not the other way around, as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea claims. It is a legitimate defensive effort in response to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s increasingly menacing nuclear and missile threats. A responsible Government should protect the lives and safety of its people.

    2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source

  19. As we have repeatedly emphasized in this Chamber, all Member States must implement all the relevant Council resolutions in full. However, if Security Council members violate the resolutions in a deliberate and flagrant manner, or do not implement them faithfully, all of our efforts in the Council will count for nothing. It is important to remind the Council once again that the Russian Federation itself voted in favour of all 10 substantive sanctions resolutions from 2006 up until 2017, including resolution 1718 (2006), establishing an arms embargo. We therefore urge Russia to abide by the resolutions and immediately cease its illicit activities. It is regrettable that we are once again hearing the same misleading arguments today, a fallacy of false equivalence.

    2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source

  20. Left unchecked, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s proliferation of weapons and military technology — whether conventional or even nuclear — will further aggravate insecurity around the globe. The recipients, in addition to belligerent States, could also be terrorists or other non-State entities in any part of the world. For example, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is supplying ammunition to the Russian Federation in its war on Ukraine. My delegation is gravely concerned about the military cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. All arms transfers to or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as well as technical cooperation concerning its weapons programmes — whether conventional or nuclear — directly violate multiple Security Council resolutions.

    2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source

  21. Regrettably, but not surprisingly, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Defence Ministry announced on 23 November that it will never be bound by the Comprehensive Military Agreement and forward-deployed its military assets in the area near the demilitarized zone, threatening us with a possible high-intensity provocation. That is yet another clear example showing the degree to which the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is unfaithful to its own promises on inter-Korean agreements. Yet it has tried to shift the responsibility to the Republic of Korea and is threatening further provocative actions. My delegation would like to emphasize that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s provocative behaviour is no longer a regional issue but one of global concern directly affecting all parts of the world.

    2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source

  22. Moreover, we have seen it launch military reconnaissance satellites three times this year, and it has announced additional launches in the near future. With its satellite launch, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is attempting to advance not only its ICBM technology but also its reconnaissance capability. The Republic of Korea cannot sit idly with its hands tied any more. As a necessary measure for protecting our national security and the safety of our people, my Government has decided to suspend a portion of the Comprehensive Military Agreement that pertains to the establishment of no-fly zones. It is a minimum defensive measure aimed at restoring reconnaissance activities that had been conducted normally before the Comprehensive Military Agreement was signed.

    2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source

  23. Both sides were to refrain from any hostile military activities in or around the demilitarized zone or bordering areas, whether on land, at sea or in the air. A no-fly zone was established within kilometres of the military demarcation line of the demilitarized zone. Some guard posts were to be removed from the demilitarized zone. However, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea abused and virtually nullified the agreement by infiltrating drones into the Seoul area and firing artillery rounds into the coast off the Republic of Korea, for example. Those are only a few of the 17 explicit violations by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, not counting thousands of other relatively minor violations.

    2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source

  24. They include, to name only a few, the 4 July South-North joint statement in 1972; the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement in 1991; the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in 1992; the 15 June joint communiqué in 2000; the 4 October Declaration in 2007; the Panmunjom Declaration and the Comprehensive Military Agreement in 2018. The objectives of those agreements were to ease military tensions and build a peaceful Korean peninsula based on mutual respect. However, history has amply demonstrated that Pyongyang is ready to renege on the promise of dialogue and cooperation at any moment. Violations of the Comprehensive Military Agreement are the latest case in point.

    2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source

  25. It is deeply concerning to see the authority of this body repeatedly eroded and ridiculed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. We need to act resolutely before it is too late to fix. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a determined and premeditated serial offender against its obligations under the Charter, in particular the obligation under its Article 25 to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s astonishing record of violations of agreements is not limited to international ones. It has unilaterally violated bilateral agreements with the Republic of Korea again and again.

    2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source

  26. I cannot find any other country in the world that has a celebration on its calendar of an illegal activity explicitly banned by the Security Council. Furthermore, in September the Supreme People’s Assembly, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s rubber- stamp legislature, amended its Constitution in order to enshrine its nuclear policy, significantly lowering its threshold for using nuclear weapons, such as allowing for a pre-emptive nuclear attack on Seoul. Today in this Chamber we are seeing the representatives of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, who three months ago, also in this Chamber, denied the legitimacy of the Security Council (see S/PV.9406), once again repeating the same absurd and unreasonable claims.

    2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source

  27. Any launch that uses ballistic-missile technology, regardless of its success or payload, can contribute to the further advancement of such technology, in particular intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Because of that, multiple Security Council resolutions prohibit the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from carrying out any launch using ballistic-missile technology. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is now moving beyond violating the multiple Security Council resolutions on this issue almost to mockery of the decisions of the Council. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea designated 18 November as its so- called missile industry day, commemorating the test launch of its Hwasong-17 ICBM on the same day last year.

    2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source

  28. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s statement reads that, “the launch will make a significant contribution to definitely ramping the war preparedness of the armed forces and secure their capability to reconnoitre the South Korean region.” The launch also had nothing to do with the legitimate use of outer space. Article III of the Outer Space Treaty says that the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s illegal activities have never fallen into this category.

    2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source

  29. My gratitude goes to you, Mr. President, for convening this urgent meeting of the Security Council. My appreciation also goes to Assistant Secretary-General Khiari for his briefing. The Republic of Korea condemns in the strongest possible terms the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s so-called military reconnaissance satellite launch on 21 November, local time, in flagrant violation of multiple Security Council resolutions. The launch took place earlier than the date specified on the issued notice to airmen, indicating that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea does not even bother to follow its own announcements, let alone ensure the safety of other countries. The launch was anything but peaceful.

    2023-11-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9485 (2023) · source

  30. We will actively integrate the women and peace and security agenda into the agendas of the Council in various contexts, not only during our monthly presidency but also through the entire term of our membership of the Council. We will do our utmost to ensure the full, equal meaningful and safe participation of women and look forward to working closely with other Council members in that regard.

    2023-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9452Resumption1 (2023) · source

  31. Last but not least, women peacebuilders, as well as human rights defenders, should be provided with the necessary resources. We emphasize the importance of ensuring adequate, predictable and sustained financing for the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda. The Republic of Korea increased its contribution to the Peacebuilding Fund to more than $4.3 million this year and will consider further increasing its contributions, both to implement the women and peace and security agenda and to advance peacebuilding. Taking full consideration of the dire need to support women’s participation in all peace processes, the Republic of Korea is proud to announce that it will join the statement of shared commitments to advance the women and peace and security agenda as an incoming member of the Security Council.

    2023-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9452Resumption1 (2023) · source

  32. Secondly, ensuring a safe environment for women’s participation is imperative. It is alarming that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights documented incidents of reprisals against 172 women and girls working with the United Nations in 2022. Furthermore, more than 30 women from civil society who addressed the Security Council last year were targeted for reprisals. We condemn all attacks and reprisals against women involved in human rights, humanitarian work and peacebuilding activities, especially those who are cooperating with the United Nations. We must ensure their safety through monitoring and reporting, as well as preventive measures, including robust mandates for United Nations missions to protect and promote women’s participation.

    2023-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9452Resumption1 (2023) · source

  33. In the Sudan, widespread sexual violence terrorizes women and girls in Darfur and beyond. To address that reality and fully implement resolution 1325 (2000), on women and peace and security, we must recommit to the agenda and enhance the Security Council’s role. First, the full, equal and meaningful participation of women should be practice, not rhetoric. As that commences with listening to women’s voices and making their perspectives integral to decision-making, we welcome the increased number of women civil society briefers to the Council. As part of our own efforts, the Republic of Korea has been proudly hosting the annual International Conference on Action with Women and Peace since 2019. We look forward to hearing from a diverse constituency of women at the upcoming fifth Conference, to be held on 30 November in Seoul.

    2023-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9452Resumption1 (2023) · source

  34. I thank Brazil for hosting today’s important meeting. My gratitude also goes to the Secretary-General and the Executive Director of UN-Women, as well as all the other briefers, for their valuable remarks. The Republic of Korea aligns itself with the statement to be delivered by the representative of Canada on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security. The Secretary-General’s report on women and peace and security (S/2023/725) provides another frustrating picture of our current reality. Exclusion, inequality and misogyny encapsulate the status of women across the world, as described in the report. In Afghanistan, women have been progressively erased from public life through the issuance of more than 50 edicts to suppress their rights.

    2023-10-25 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9452Resumption1 (2023) · source

  35. Korea has been similarly engaged in refugee community assistance in Kenya and Uganda, emergency health care and food assistance in areas affected by the coronavirus disease in Peru and the Philippines, drought response efforts in Ethiopia and rapid emergency assistance for earthquake-stricken communities in Türkiye this past February. As an incoming member of the Security Council, the Republic of Korea is committed to assuming greater responsibilities and increasing its contributions to the international community. To that end, we are planning an unprecedented increase in our humanitarian aid budget for next year. We will be continuing our efforts for more effective and efficient humanitarian assistance with creative and innovative public-private partnership projects.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  36. Today Korea’s public-private partnerships encompass a wide range of emergency relief, disaster risk reduction, early recovery, aid for refugees and displaced people and gender-based violence prevention. Examples where we have witnessed positive outcomes include the assistance provided by Korean non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to female Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh in 2018. The NGOs demonstrated their experience, know-how and sensitivity in psychosocial counselling and trauma therapy for the victims of sexual violence.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  37. Mastercard’s digital technology and electronic prepaid cards have enabled millions of Syrian refugees to purchase food and other necessities without having to wait in long lines. In a similar vein, the role of the United Parcel Service in the delivery of humanitarian aid is now indispensable in many regions. Additionally, IKEA’s partnership with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has been crucial in delivering 80,000 innovative refugee housing units to displaced people in 80 countries worldwide. The Korean Government is increasingly expanding its cooperation with private partners for humanitarian aid operations.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  38. Given that no country or region can enjoy true peace and security unless the humanitarian needs of its inhabitants are met, public-private partnership is a welcome trend, as it helps to alleviate and prevent the root causes of humanitarian situations. Encouraging such partnerships can serve to assist in the implementation of humanitarian-development- peace nexus programmes. In addition, public-private partnerships can be used as an opportunity to bring in private social entrepreneurs who leverage cutting-edge technologies, such as artificial intelligence and the blockchain, into the humanitarian assistance domain. A notable example is the collaboration between the World Food Programme and Mastercard.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  39. Let me begin by expressing my delegation’s heartfelt condolences to the peoples and Governments of Libya and Morocco. The topic of today’s open debate is particularly relevant, as we are now witnessing humanitarian needs rising virtually everywhere, stemming mainly from conflicts and natural disasters. Meanwhile, the funding gap between those humanitarian needs and the resources required to address them continues to widen. Simultaneously, the increasingly complex and intertwined nature of humanitarian crises necessitates greater engagement from the private sector, with its resources, experience, advanced technology and logistics capacities. That is why partnerships with the private sector have proven both effective and efficient in numerous humanitarian aid operations across the globe.

    2023-09-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9418 (2023) · source

  40. As an elected member of the Security Council starting next year, the Republic of Korea looks forward to actively contributing to the Council’s noble endeavours to maintain international peace and security, including the critical issue of food security.

    2023-08-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9392Resumption1 (2023) · source

  41. Late last year, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea adopted a new policy banning private commerce in grains, with the aim of tightening central control over food distribution. That has exacerbated hunger among ordinary North Koreans, who, except for the top brass, have relied on local private markets for food, because the State distribution system has not functioned since the mid-1990s. I feel obliged to bring the issue to the attention of the global community, because I am seeing our Korean brothers and sisters across the border suffering from chronic and human- made food shortages. We need to remember that it is innocent, ordinary people who endure the brunt of food insecurity, whether conflict- or regime-induced.

    2023-08-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9392Resumption1 (2023) · source

  42. And that food crisis is unquestionably regime-induced, the result of three wrong choices — nuclear and missile development, the closure of the border and a market-distorting policy. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has wasted its scarce resources, which have exploded vainly in the skies thanks to the unprecedented scale and frequency of its missile launches over the past year and a half, 12 of them intercontinental ballistic-missile launches. According to some estimates, the resources expended on them would have been enough to cover the country’s annual food shortfall last year. Moreover, the coronavirus disease pandemic provided a pretext for sealing off the border, thereby curbing access for the United Nations and international humanitarian assistance to the people of North Korea.

    2023-08-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9392Resumption1 (2023) · source

  43. The Republic of Korea has pledged to double its rice aid to Africa to 100,000 tons a year. And in May, at the Group of Seven Summit, President Yoon Suk Yeol announced the K-Ricebelt project, designed to help African countries produce rice locally. After its completion five years from now, the project is expected to continue to provide rice to 30 million people in eight African countries. I would like to take this opportunity to highlight the serious food insecurity that exists in another part of the world, where the situation is no less grave than in areas of conflict. The long-standing acute and chronic food shortages in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have recently deteriorated further.

    2023-08-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9392Resumption1 (2023) · source

  44. In that regard, my delegation welcomed the Security Council’s adoption of presidential statement S/PRST/2023/4 this morning and is pleased to join the joint communiqué condemning the use of food as a weapon of war. We also call for the extension of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, through which 32 million tons of grain were released to the global market over the past year. We note with grave concern that climate change is exacerbating both conflict and food insecurity. The Council should facilitate thorough climate-risk assessments and call for climate-informed early warning, prevention and peacebuilding in vulnerable environments. Those compounding effects are especially concerning for Africa, which has also felt the biggest impact from the increase in food prices since the war on Ukraine began.

    2023-08-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9392Resumption1 (2023) · source

  45. I would like to express our appreciation for the United States’ leadership, Mr. President, in continuing to address the issue of conflict-driven food insecurity over the past three years. My gratitude also goes to the three briefers for their insightful presentations. In the twentieth century, humankind dreamed of a world in which no one suffered from hunger, thanks to modern science and agricultural technologies. To our dismay, however, that dream has not been realized. As articulated in resolution 2417 (2018) and noted in this year’s report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/345) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the devastating impacts of armed conflict on food security require urgent action on the part of the international community.

    2023-08-03 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9392Resumption1 (2023) · source

  46. To that end, we need to make our utmost effort to ensure the full, equal, meaningful and safe participation of women at all stages of the peace process. The Republic of Korea created an international forum called Action with Women and Peace in 2018. At the fifth conference, to be held later this year, we look forward to hearing from more women, including survivors. As an elected member of the Security Council for the term 2024—25, the Republic of Korea looks forward to contributing to the Council’s noble work of preventing conflict-related sexual violence and ensuring justice for all those affected.

    2023-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9378Resumption1 (2023) · source

  47. The Republic of Korea would also like to emphasize the importance of a survivor-centred approach in addressing conflict-related sexual violence, as outlined in resolution 2467 (2019). Heeding the voices of survivors and responding to their needs are essential to provide relevant support and help them reintegrate into communities. In that regard, the Republic of Korea takes pride in its continued contributions to the Global Survivors Fund since its inception. As one of the main donors to the Fund, we have promoted its activities around the globe, which include providing survivors with financial compensation, vocational training and medical and psychological care. Last but not least, it is critical that survivors not remain mere victims of the violence but are transformed into agents of peace.

    2023-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9378Resumption1 (2023) · source

  48. In particular, the Republic of Korea is deeply concerned about pervasive impunity for conflict- related sexual violence, which not only discourages the victims from reporting the crimes but also instils fear of reprisals or the recurrence of violence. Impunity must not become the norm, and conflict-related sexual violence should not be seen as an inevitable consequence of conflict. While ensuring accountability at both the local and national levels is crucial, my delegation also supports the Security Council’s efforts to incorporate sexual and gender-based violence as a designation criterion for United Nations sanctions regimes. Targeted United Nations sanctions against those who perpetrate and direct sexual violence in conflict can address impunity as well as serve as a deterrent.

    2023-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9378Resumption1 (2023) · source

  49. Since the unanimously adopted resolution 1820 (2008) in 2008, on conflict-related sexual violence, the Council has renewed and strengthened its commitment to eliminating conflict-related sexual violence through several related resolutions in the years that followed. The key promise that those resolutions made was to prevent and eradicate such crimes. Nevertheless, it is distressing to note that the latest report of the Secretary-General documents over 2,000 cases of conflict-related sexual violence again, including in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Ukraine, with little significant reduction observed over the past decade.

    2023-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9378Resumption1 (2023) · source

  50. My delegation would like to express its appreciation to the United Kingdom for convening today’s open debate on this important matter. We would also like to convey our gratitude to all the briefers, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Ms. Pramila Patten, and warmly welcome this year’s report by the Secretary-General (S/2023/413). The Republic of Korea aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Canada on behalf of the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security and the statement to be delivered by the representative of Botswana on behalf of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect. I would now like to deliver the following statement in our national capacity.

    2023-07-14 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.9378Resumption1 (2023) · source