YouSaid · the spoken record

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192

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1994-03-09

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1996-12-12

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31

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un-security-council

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1. “The human rights situation in Gali and throughout Abkhazia is of great concern. We support the efforts of Deputy Special Envoy Bota, working in conjunction with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. Ayala Lasso, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to establish a programme for the protection and promotion of human rights in Abkhazia. The pervasive lawlessness and incidents of ethnically based abuse throughout the security zone have had a destabilizing effect. The sort of killings described in the letter from the Ambassador of Georgia, although still under investigation, contribute to this instability and thus discourage the return of refugees and displaced persons.”

   1996-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3618 (1996) · source

2. “The Abkhaz side should take note that the Security Council has not wavered in its absolute support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia. And yet, broad autonomy is available to the Abkhaz people - with their own parliament, constitution, courts and other state symbols - if they would negotiate within the parameters suggested by Special Envoy Brunner and the Russian Federation. The Abkhaz-Georgian conflict created a quarter of a million refugees and displaced person. Only an insignificant trickle have returned to their homes. The resolution demands that the Abkhaz side accelerate significantly the voluntary return of the refugees. Moreover, the Council calls upon the Abkhaz, as a first step, to promote the return of refugees and displaced persons to the Gali region, a traditional Georgian area.”

   1996-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3618 (1996) · source

3. “The United States would now like to take this opportunity to express its firm support for the extension of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). UNOMIG has served as a positive element in the international community's efforts to resolve the conflict in Georgia, and the United States is pleased that, through this resolution, UNOMIG will be able to continue operations over the next six months. The United States deeply regrets the lack of progress between the parties in achieving a political solution to the conflict in Georgia. The resolution adopted today calls upon the parties, in particular the Abkhaz side, to achieve substantive progress without further delay towards a comprehensive political settlement.”

   1996-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3618 (1996) · source

4. “May I begin, as other members of the Council have this afternoon, by congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency for January. We hope the work of the Council this month will be more tranquil than the weather we are experiencing outside. Under your able and experienced leadership, we have no doubt it will be. You will have our full cooperation in this regard. My delegation would also like to express its appreciation and admiration to Ambassador Lavrov and his delegation for their excellent work during the month of December. Finally, my delegation would like to take this opportunity to express again its sincere welcome to the five new members of the Council. We look forward to working with all of them in the months ahead.”

   1996-01-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3618 (1996) · source

5. “However, we think the basic format that now exists is a good one, and our efforts should be directed towards strengthening it rather than setting it aside in favour of new arrangements.”

   1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source

6. “Finally, the same considerations suggest that the troop contributors would benefit from somewhat greater consultation among themselves ahead of meetings on the major missions. This might allow for earlier identification of key common issues; it could expedite the task of consulting with capitals; it could permit concerns to be conveyed to the Secretariat even in advance of a Secretary-General's report; and it could result in the selection of one of their number to serve as a focal point during the regular three-way consultations with the Secretariat and the Security Council. As my remarks have shown, the United States believes that the Council should consider further refinement and improvement in consultative arrangements with troop contributors.”

   1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source

7. “Although most Council members take it upon themselves to learn troop contributor Views, a brief oral report directly from the presidency would better ensure that this information gets to all Council members in a timely manner. Thirdly, this issue of timeliness is one of the most difficult. The press of events often forces the Council to act upon a Secretariat report very quickly, leaving little time for troop contributor consultation or communication with capitals. Notwithstanding this, and whenever possible, the distribution of relevant papers, the timing of meetings with troop contributors and of Council "informals" should be scheduled so as to give the fullest opportunity for an informed discussion.”

   1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source

8. “But for the more complex or risky missions some strengthening of consultative arrangements is worth exploring. We have a few suggestions to strengthen the arrangements agreed to last year. First, Council Presidents should be encouraged to take a greater part in the discussion. Of course, the President cannot speak on behalf of the Council regarding matters on which it has not made a decision, but when the Council is seized with an issue affecting troop contributors and considering alternative courses of action, the President should be encouraged to summarize those options and the views pertaining to them. Secondly, the 1994 statement anticipated that Presidents would summarize the views of troop contributors during the course of relevant informal consultations of Council members. This rarely takes place.”

   1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source

9. “Meetings between the Council, troop contributors and the Secretariat are now routinely convened before mandates are extended, terminated or significantly altered, and before other significant anticipated developments. The second positive result is that due to this regularity there is more meaningful opportunity for a timely exchange of views, particularly with the Secretariat, on the issues at hand. On the other hand, it is fair to say - and I will try to make this point diplomatically - that the November 1994 statement provided for a somewhat more dynamic and substantive discussion than sometimes takes place in these meetings, as well as for somewhat greater participation by the Security Council President. These concerns are less important for relatively straightforward missions or those that are routinely extended.”

   1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source

10. “Over a year ago the Council took several important steps to improve arrangements for consultations with troop contributors. The ensuing months have been a useful trial period. After several dozen troop-contributor meetings under the new format, there is general agreement that the change has been positive. But at the same time there are clearly areas where further improvements would be desirable. Today's Security Council meeting is a good opportunity to take stock of where we are, and we commend the Ambassadors of Argentina and New Zealand for having taken the initiative to propose it. Among the positive effects of the November 1994 changes, two stand out. One is predictability.”

    1995-12-20 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3611 (1995) · source

11. “My Government recognizes that much work remains to be done in translating the Geneva principles agreed today into a viable peace settlement. We will do our part. We call on the parties to do theirs. As President Clinton stated today in Washington, "All the parties will need to display the same flexibility and statesmanship that made today's agreement possible if we are to turn away from war and achieve our common goal of a durable peace in the Balkans."”

    1995-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3575 (1995) · source

12. “The current round of air strikes will end as soon as the Bosnian Serb leadership complies with the conditions put to them by General Janvier, which call for nothing more than the implementation of Security Council resolutions. While my Government regrets that air strikes are necessary, we fully support the action taken by the United Nations and NATO to deter further attacks on the safe areas. Those actions are fully authorized by existing Security Council resolutions. It was the Security Council which created the safe areas, and it was the Council that gave the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) the mandate to deter attacks against them. We believe that the Council must now support UNPROFOR'S efforts to implement that mandate. Today's events are a hopeful indication that the parties will choose reconciliation and reconstruction.”

    1995-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3575 (1995) · source

13. “We believe that to defend the possibility of a diplomatic solution the international community had no choice but to respond forcefully to the Bosnian Serb attack on the Sarajevo marketplace. The Bosnian Serb leadership knew the decisions of the Security Council which declared Sarajevo a safe area. They had been warned that continued attacks on the safe areas would lead to a strong response. They chose to ignore that warning, and now must accept the consequences of their actions. The United Nations has made it clear that it is not at war with the Bosnian Serbs; nor is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at war with the Bosnian Serbs.”

    1995-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3575 (1995) · source

14. “This effort to broker a settlement has not, of course, been the work of one nation or even of a few nations, but has included the efforts of the United Nations, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Contact Group, the European Union and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. We must all continue our efforts to assist the parties who have the ultimate responsibility to decide in favour of peace. The United States agrees with all other members of this Council that the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be settled on the battlefield. This is why we have placed so much emphasis on, and invested so much effort in, finding a diplomatic solution.”

    1995-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3575 (1995) · source

15. “We may be at a turning point in the bloody conflict that has ravaged the former Yugoslavia. With the signing today in Geneva of a joint statement and agreed basic principles, the basis is laid for an end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even though the threat of war is still with us, these events have opened a narrow and precarious window of opportunity for peace. The international community has worked hard to broker a durable and just negotiated settlement. Indeed, lives have been lost in this effort, including recently those of three dedicated and talented American diplomats, three peacemakers: Robert Frasure, Joseph Kruzel and Nelson Drew. I would like to think - indeed, I believe - that their tragic loss has contributed to the movement towards peace that was in evidence today in Geneva.”

    1995-09-08 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3575 (1995) · source

16. “We believe the Government of Rwanda should take measures as soon as possible to reduce the prison population through the release of young and elderly prisoners whenever possible, to reach agreement with international humanitarian organizations on steps to alleviate the overcrowding, to reduce the number of arrests to the absolute minimum, and to take steps to establish a functioning judiciary in Rwanda, beginning with naming a new Supreme Court. The Council's action today takes one step towards addressing the problems of the region. We trust that the Secretary-General and the Governments of Rwanda and its neighbours will also take steps which are necessary for improving the situation. The Council, for its part, will surely be taking further actions to address the multifaceted situation in Central Africa.”

    1995-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3566 (1995) · source

17. “Today's resolution underlines the expectation that the Government of Rwanda will shoulder all the responsibilities of an effective government, including creating the conditions of trust and confidence which are necessary for the safe and voluntary return of refugees. One key element in creating such a climate of trust is an immediate improvement in the overcrowded conditions of Rwandan prisons. The United States is gravely concerned about the humanitarian crisis caused by the detention of more than 50,000 prisoners.”

    1995-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3566 (1995) · source

18. “The Government of Rwanda has agreed to certain conditions, such as reporting its purchases to the Council, in order to assuage the concerns of Council members and neighbouring States. We appreciate the flexibility shown by the Government of Rwanda on these issues. We fully support its right of self-defence, but underline that an unwarranted stockpiling of arms should not take place. This step, however, goes only part of the way towards normalizing the situation in Rwanda. The prompt submission by the Secretary-General of recommendations for a commission of inquiry into allegations of arms flows to former Rwandan armed forces and the speedy establishment of such a commission are also necessary for the reduction of tension and the creation of a climate of trust.”

    1995-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3566 (1995) · source

19. “The United States has just cast its vote in favour of a resolution which in effect removes the arms embargo placed upon the previous Government of Rwanda. The current Government of Rwanda has been seeking this change for a number of months, and we have supported its request from the beginning. The Government of Rwanda faces a threat from extremists in the militias and former army, who will - according to the terms of today's resolution - continue to be restricted from buying arms. With the adoption of this resolution, the Government of Rwanda will be better able to deter violent action by these groups or, if necessary, defend the new Rwandan society it is trying to build.”

    1995-08-16 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3566 (1995) · source

20. “We hope that our combined efforts can contribute to a lasting peace in Angola, and we appeal to other States to contribute funds, equipment and personnel towards this very worthy goal.”

    1995-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3562 (1995) · source

21. “We look to other United Nations donor States to support demining and reconstruction activities through non-governmental organizations, through contributions to UNAVEM. III and through donations to the United Nations Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Angola. We will continue to coordinate closely with the United Nations and with other donor States to build up the Angolan Government's ability to continue mine-clearance operations and other efforts at reconstruction and development for the long term. The success of the peace process will require the concerted efforts of the Angolan Government, UNITA, the United Nations, donor Governments and Angola's friends and neighbours.”

    1995-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3562 (1995) · source

22. “The Government of Angola has already allocated $3 million for demining, and UNITA is becoming more involved in national demining planning - a trend that we hope will continue. United States assistance is designed to aid the peace process immediately by facilitating the deployment of UNAVEM. III troops. In the longer term, United States assistance will also help to clear crop lands to reduce the need for food aid and will give the Angolans the ability to conduct demining operations themselves for the long time required to eradicate this threat from the land. The assistance provided by the United States is merely a start when we consider the magnitude of the problems facing Angola.”

    1995-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3562 (1995) · source

23. “At the international meeting on mine clearance, held in Geneva in July, my delegation announced a contribution of more than $7.5 million for demining in Angola this year. This figure includes cash and equipment to support demining by non-govemmental organizations and the United Nations. These funds effectively double all current demining spending in Angola. Some skilled non-govemmental organizations have already been successfully engaged in demining, but their activities are insufficient for the number of mines and the size of the territory. The Angolan armed forces and UNITA must be involved to the greatest extent possible in clearing the areas they have mined. The Angolan Government and UNITA both have acknowledged the seriousness of this problem. They plan to cooperate through the Angolan Central Mine-Action Office.”

    1995-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3562 (1995) · source

24. “We must also be mindful of the possibility of increases in mine accidents as humanitarian-aid convoys begin using roads ahead of mine-clearing operations. Destroyed bridges and a number of mined areas have already slowed movements of peace-keepers. In order to help to surmount these obstacles, the United States has made an offer of bridging material to UNAVEM. III, in addition to the assistance for mine clearance that we have pledged. Land-mines have been a deterrent to more rapid progress in accomplishing UNAVEM's goals. The completion of scheduled deployment depends on having clear and passable routes. The Secretary-General has called upon States Members of the United Nations to aid ongoing demining efforts in Angola. United States support for mine- clearance and mine-awareness activities is an important component of our efforts.”

    1995-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3562 (1995) · source

25. “The United States has been a firm supporter of the Lusaka accord and believes that this process has placed Angola on the road to lasting peace. Over the past two years we have provided more than $200 million in humanitarian and emergency assistance in the form of food aid and medical supplies. The United States wishes, in cooperation with the United Nations, to help Angola to develop its long-term economic potential and reduce its reliance upon emergency assistance. We are concerned, however, that road conditions are inhibiting the deployment of United Nations peace- keepers to Angola and are slowing the progress of the peace process. About 45 per cent of the bridges in Angola were damaged or destroyed during the civil war.”

    1995-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3562 (1995) · source

26. “My delegation strongly endorses the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM. III) to continue its support of the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz", the Lusaka Protocol and the resolutions of this Council. Several factors have contributed to the successful progress to date, not the least of which has been the regular personal contact between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. We commend those two leaders on the impetus they have given to the peace process and encourage them to continue in this constructive vein. We also commend the excellent works of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, and all those associated with UNAVEM. III for bringing the peace process to this hopeful stage.”

    1995-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3562 (1995) · source

27. “I should like, first, to extend to you, Sir, my delegation's congratulations on your assumption of the Council presidency for the month of August. We know that we will be in good and wise hands. We would also like to express our great appreciation to the Permanent Representative of Honduras and his delegation for their excellent stewardship of the Council during the month of July. I should like to join other representatives by extending my delegation's welcome to the United Kingdom's new Permanent Representative. We offer him our very best wishes and our hopes for great success as he takes over his new responsibilities at the United Nations. The Council has acted today to continue an effort which is succeeding - step by step and more slowly in some areas than we had hoped, but succeeding surely and steadily.”

    1995-08-07 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3562 (1995) · source

28. “It is also important that UNOMIG's mandate be completely fulfilled, especially the directive to maintain close contacts with both parties to the conflict and, by its presence in the area, to contribute to conditions conducive to the safe and orderly return of refugees and displaced persons. UNOMIG should make better use of public information to promote the image of the United Nations as a helpful, neutral player. Finally, we are concerned that the UNOMIG operations be recognized as fully supportive of Georgia's territorial integrity, which the Council has repeatedly affirmed. While the Abkhaz may have de facto control over a part of the Republic of Georgia, they do not have the rights of a sovereign State. UNOMIG's ability must be consistent with the position of the Council that it does not and will not accept Abkhaz independence.”

    1995-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3535 (1995) · source

29. “Rather, we believe that, assuming the CIS Heads of States' approval of an extension of the CIS peace-keeping operation until 31 December 1995, the Council will be in a better position in mid-January of 1996 to make a decision on UNOMIG's future, knowing the disposition of the CIS operation. I would also like to share a few thoughts on what my Government sees as the vital task of enhancing UNOMIG's overall capabilities. While we support the important contribution UNOMIG has made on the ground, we believe it could be made even more effective. We would welcome a review by the Secretary-General of UNOMIG's budget and operations in light of the need to contain costs wherever possible. We are also interested in steps that could enhance the security of UNOMIG personnel.”

    1995-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3535 (1995) · source

30. “The Abkhaz party must cease its obstruction of refugee return, and both parties must work seriously and genuinely with the Secretary-General's Special Envoy and with the active facilitation of the Russian Federation toward a political settlement. Let me clarify my Government's support for extending UNOMIG for approximately eight months, a longer period than we have previously supported for UNOMIG. Our position does not mean greater satisfaction with the situation on the ground or with the negotiation process. Nor does it predict infinite willingness to extend UNOMIG if its presence is not contributing to progress toward a settlement.”

    1995-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3535 (1995) · source

31. “UNOMIG will remain only as long as the Council is satisfied that the parties are doing their utmost to protect UNOMIG personnel. We also join other members of the Council in noting with encouragement the positive role UNOMIG and the CIS peace-keeping force are playing and the effective coordination of these two separate missions. At the same time, however, we are profoundly disappointed at the lack of progress on the return of refugees and displaced persons and on negotiations toward a political settlement of the conflict. The parties must understand that the willingness of the Council to continue its support of these processes through the presence of UNOMIG depends on real progress in these matters.”

    1995-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3535 (1995) · source

32. “The Council members who informally constitute the "Friends of Georgia" and the other members of the Council have approached this extension of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) with an unusually high degree of consensus. This is prompted by developments, some positive, some negative. Like other members of the Council, we are encouraged by the fact that the cease-fire has, by and large, been observed by both parties. At the same time, we share with other members the concern over the increasing number of violent incidents directed against innocent civilians and against members of UNOMIG and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peace-keeping force, in large part, by armed elements that the parties claim are outside their control. Both parties to the conflict must take steps to rein in these elements.”

    1995-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3535 (1995) · source

33. “At this our first opportunity during the month of May, may I extend the congratulations of my delegation to you on the assumption of the Council presidency. Clearly, this is the month for new French presidents. I wish to assure you of our cooperation and support. May I also take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation and admiration to Ambassador Kovanda and his delegation for the Czech Republic's excellent stewardship of the Council during the month of April. And, finally, may I extend my delegation's welcome to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia for his presence here today and through him we would like also to extend our greetings and best wishes to President Shevardnadze.”

    1995-05-12 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3535 (1995) · source

34. “In the resolution we approved today on Croatia, we may be satisfied that we have avoided an immediate and disastrous widening of the war. That is no small accomplishment. But whether we have bought more than time for Bosnia or Croatia we cannot now determine. In the weeks ahead we must continue our diplomatic efforts on all fronts, while recognizing that the ultimate success or failure of those efforts will be determined - as they must - by the people of the region itself.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

35. “Finally, in The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the name of the United Nations force deployed here will change, but its purpose - to deter the spread of conflict - will not. The change acknowledges that the circumstances in the three countries where UNPROFOR forces have been deployed differ and that specifically tailored mandates are required. At the same time, by retaining important links between the forces, the Council recognizes that tensions and conflict in the region are closely connected and that efficiency of operations is essential. In summary, we have reached another bend in the road in our effort to contain and ultimately settle the complex and tragic conflicts that erupted in Croatia and Bosnia following the breakup of Yugoslavia.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

36. “We wish to remind those guilty of human rights violations that they will be held personally responsible for their crimes. The presence of United Nations forces in Bosnia is not an end in itself: to have meaning, it must contribute to political progress. Such progress is dependent, in turn, on the will of the parties. The same is true of an agreement to cease hostilities temporarily. Real solutions depend on the willingness of political leaders to make hard decisions - to accept peace as a goal and to compromise in order to allow communities to rebuild, children to live like children and parents to put food on the table at night. Here, the responsibility for failure thus far rests squarely on the Bosnian Serb party for its unwillingness to enter into negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group plan.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

37. “UNPROFOR in Bosnia has not achieved its mandates in full, but its presence, assisted at times by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enforcement measures, has saved lives and helped make possible the creation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. My Government is concerned by the recent increase in violence in violation of the agreed-upon cease-fire, which runs through the end of April. We urge an end to these violations and an extension of the cessation of hostilities beyond 30 April. We urge also that the parties allow implementation of all elements of the original agreement, including separation of forces and the interposition of UNPROFOR troops along the separation line. My Government is also concerned by the continued, blatant violation of human rights by the Bosnian Serb party, especially in the Banja Luka area.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

38. “My Government expresses its appreciation to other Council members for their help and cooperation in coming to agreement on this important resolution. Special respect is due also to President Tudjman and his Government for their wisdom and statesmanship - despite intense pressure and justifiable frustration - in choosing a path that will maximize prospects for a durable peace. The same general considerations that apply to the presence of a United Nations force in Croatia apply in Bosnia as well. The current situation is unsatisfactory; the alternative of withdrawal and renewed all-out war is worse.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

39. “My Government is concerned that goods are crossing these borders in violation of paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 820 (1993), without Croatia's permission or knowledge. The resolution adopted today can be considered a constructive response to a complex, dangerous and tangled situation. It is better than renewed war, but it does not, in itself, resolve the fundamental social, political and security- related issues that now divide Croatia. Even the details of how the new United Nations force will operate must still be worked out. The continued international presence will keep open a window of opportunity within which the parties may negotiate to settle their differences. Whether that opportunity is seized or squandered is up to the parties; a settlement cannot be imposed by the Council or by any other outside force.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

40. “Today, the Council is proposing a new United Nations peace-keeping force with a new mandate to assist in controlling Croatia's international border, help implement the Cease-Fire and Economic Agreements and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance through Croatia to Bosnia. The creation of this new force underlines the Council's commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders. That is why this new operation will be called the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia. The Government of Croatia, and only the Government of Croatia, has the right to control Croatia's international borders.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

41. “Renewed efforts to tighten sanctions directed against that faction are warranted. With these general considerations in mind, I would like to address the specific resolutions we have just adopted. First, with respect to Croatia, we understand the concern expressed by President Tudj man's Government that the situation on the ground, with approximately one quarter of Croatia's territory under local Serb control, has become increasingly untenable. This is because important elements of the Vance plan designed to achieve a permanent solution that respects the territorial sovereignty of Croatia have not been implemented.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

42. “It has saved hundreds of thousands of lives and restrained - although it sometimes has been unable to prevent - further aggression and violence. There has been understandable frustration, on the part of the Governments of both Croatia and Bosnia, with UNPROFOR's limitations. But the withdrawal of the United Nations Force from either country at this time is not a solution to those frustrations, but, rather, an invitation to a new round of intense violence that would cause further destruction of economic and social structures and leave thousands more dead. My Government supports continued diplomatic efforts, through the Contact Group, to discourage new fighting and to gain viable political settlements both in Croatia and Bosnia. The intransigence of the Bosnian Serb faction remains the major obstacle to peace.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

43. “May I begin by expressing my delegation's appreciation to Ambassador Li Zhaoxing for his excellent service as President of the Council this month and to you, Sir, for your very able substitution and quick gavel today. May I also express my delegation's indebtedness to the Permanent Representative of Botswana for his stewardship of the Council in February. We voted on these resolutions today determined to prevent, if we can, a wider war in the Balkans. We proceed in the hope that leaders in the region do not want such a war and that, given time, they will agree to the principles of sovereignty, law and respect for human rights that could form the basis for a lasting peace. Since its creation three years ago, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia has performed a multitude of difficult tasks.”

    1995-03-31 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3512 (1995) · source

44. “There is much that remains to be done to complete the establishment of a Tribunal so that it is in a position to try and punish those guilty of serious violations of international humanitarian law. There is much that remains to be done to establish a justice system in Rwanda. By adopting this draft resolution today we would move the process along and provide further evidence of our commitment to continue to do so. Let me say in conclusion that we have been pleased to work with the other members of the Council - including in particular Rwanda - to achieve the adoption of the draft resolution.”

    1995-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3504 (1995) · source

45. “It condemns attacks against persons in the camps and calls upon States to take steps to prevent such attacks. It calls upon States to arrest and detain persons when there is reason to believe that they incited or participated in such attacks. Removing those who threaten violence against refugees if they attempt to return to Rwanda removes one of the major impediments to voluntary return. Of course, the draft resolution makes it clear that the arrest and detention of persons must take place within the framework of law, including international standards concerning human rights. The draft resolution is a step in a process. It builds on the resolutions that the Council has adopted, which are recalled in the first preambular paragraph. It is not the end of the process.”

    1995-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3504 (1995) · source

46. “In the first place, the draft resolution underscores the objective of the International Tribunal, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 955 (1994). If the Tribunal is to contribute to terminating the impunity with which atrocities were committed in Rwanda in the past, it is necessary that it be able to take custody of those who committed such acts. Such persons must not be allowed to slip away. The final preambular paragraph, which reminds States of their obligations under resolution 955 (1994), and paragraph 1, which asks States to arrest and detain persons who there is reason to believe committed acts within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, are steps to this end. In the second place, the draft resolution seeks to ameliorate the situation in the refugee camps and to facilitate the return of the refugees.”

    1995-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3504 (1995) · source

47. “We believe that it is important that persons suspected of leading last spring's genocide in Rwanda or in States neighbouring Rwanda should be detained until the International Tribunal for Rwanda can investigate and make decisions about prosecution. Their detention, as called for in this draft resolution, would be a tangible sign of the international commitment to holding individuals accountable for these atrocities and would thus improve prospects for reconciliation in Rwanda. Having defendants in custody would also enhance the credibility of the International Tribunal, which will start investigations in the next few weeks. I should like to highlight especially two aspects of the draft resolution - both dealing with the aftermath of the tragic conflict in Rwanda.”

    1995-02-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3504 (1995) · source

48. “I visited Mozambique myself as part of the Security Council Mission last August, and I know the tremendous commitment to overcoming difficult circumstances which all the personnel of ONUMOZ displayed, led by the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Aldo Ajello. It is my fervent hope that in the coming months and years, the Council will be able to see other operations brought similarly to triumphant conclusions.”

    1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source

49. “But when the people of Mozambique asked for assistance it was willingly given. Now the international community will watch carefully to see how the people of Mozambique build on this investment. We all have a stake in continued peaceful progress in Mozambique. The people and the Government owe it not only to themselves but to all of us to forge ahead along the path we have helped them lay out. We believe they can do it. We look forward to following their progress and celebrating further milestones along the way. It has been a gratifying personal experience for me to watch this important United Nations operation come to a successful conclusion.”

    1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source

50. “My country will be there to help. We must bear in mind, however, that hopes for national unity and recovery can be realized only if Mozambique remains committed to democracy, economic reform and national reconciliation. The critical work of reconciliation in Mozambique is far from over. Soldiers laying down their arms and citizens voting in an election are merely steps along the path: big steps - important steps - yes; but not the end of the journey. The Government and the people of Mozambique must continue this journey, including the process of political dialogue and reconciliation between the Government and the opposition. The people of Mozambique and the international community have invested too much to leave the work unfinished. The United Nations has limited financial and human resources.”

    1995-01-27 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.3494 (1995) · source