YouSaid · the spoken record

Jean-Pierre Lacroix

lines on the record: 212
first: 2020-04-24
most recent: 2021-05-24
sittings or episodes: 15
sources: un-security-council

Every line below is reproduced as it was said and linked to the record it came from. Nothing here is summarised or generated. Directory · Search · Corrections

“We of course commit to being prudent and conservative in using resources, but, at the same time, we all agree that missions in these dangerous environments need adequate resources.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“Seventh, political engagement with host nations and stakeholders, including for countering disinformation and hate speech, would greatly contribute to enhancing safety and security in high-risk theatres. Eighth, political and technical support to ensure accountability for crimes against peacekeepers is also needed to pursue justice for past crimes and deter future attacks on our missions. Ninth, strengthening trauma care and occupational health, as well as adherence to COVID-19 protocols, is also essential. Finally, avoiding unnecessary cuts to the budgets of Headquarters and missions will help us to ensure continuity of our efforts to strengthen the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“In particular, we need commanding officers with significant operational experience to meet the highest United Nations standards. Third, we also require adequate equipment, particularly armed and utility helicopters, aeromedical aviation resources, quick-reaction companies, forward medical teams, counter-IED equipment, including mine-protected vehicles, as well as jammers and aerial-intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Fourth, we also need qualified military-intelligence personnel and military public-information personnel. Fifth, deploying more female peacekeepers, where available, is also critical to strengthening overall mission performance. Sixth, I also call for the Council’s support to cut the flow of explosive ordinance and IED precursors to prevent the manufacture of IEDs, particularly in the Sahel region.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“As part of A4P plus, we are also focusing our attention on improved strategic communications. Missions are monitoring and countering disinformation, misinformation and hate speech, including in the context of this pandemic. To complement these efforts, coordinated actions by Member States, including members of the Security Council, in line with resolution 2518 (2020), would enable us to better address continuing gaps and shortcomings that persist in the field. First, I would like to underline the importance of deploying uniformed personnel without caveats, particularly undeclared caveats. They undermine the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers and the performance of our operations. Second, I call for Council support in providing personnel with the requisite mindset and leadership skills.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“We are seeking to address such challenges made stark by the spike in fatalities this year. The Secretariat is planning on redoubling its efforts on safety and security going forward. Through A4P plus, we commit to strengthening accountability to peacekeepers. We revised the Action Plan in February to enable us to better adapt to increasingly volatile operating environments, particularly in MINUSCA and MINUSMA. We are strengthening tactical and operational peacekeeping intelligence and situational awareness. We are further enhancing force protection, including through improving capabilities to operate at night. We are strengthening our ability to better understand the nature and source of IEDs. We are also enhancing crisis-management training for mission leadership. And we are holding a new series of CASEVAC stress tests.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“Roll-out is planned for MINUSMA and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan this summer and to all peacekeeping operations by October. Despite the progress made, many factors continue to impede the full safety and security of our peacekeepers on the ground. Ensuring a high level of robustness and capability for all uniformed personnel remains a challenge, and gaps in leadership, mindset and preparation continue to hamper safety and security. In addition, peacekeeping intelligence, situational awareness and early warning need to be strengthened, particularly at the operational and tactical levels. Disinformation campaigns are gaining in prominence in some theatres, putting our peacekeepers at greater risk. The impact of COVID-19 on safety, including occupational health, also continues to be a major concern.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“Conversely, good performance from all mission components, including through a proactive and robust posture, has the potential to enhance the safety and security of peacekeepers. We continue to make marked progress in advancing the performance agenda, even amid the pandemic. We have developed and rolled out a remote predeployment skill-validation process to be utilized as necessary. Five remote predeployment visits were conducted in 2020, and four were conducted in 2021. We also recently restarted in-person predeployment visits, with three having been conducted thus far this year. We are strengthening in-mission performance evaluation of military components, including through the deployment of a new tool which enables evaluation in line with tasks, conditions and standards.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“We have also made progress supporting host countries in their efforts to bring perpetrators of crimes against peacekeepers to justice, including in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), MINUSMA and MONUSCO, which has led to an increase in the identification of alleged perpetrators of crimes against peacekeepers and a rise in the number of investigations and convictions. Six individuals were convicted in the Central African Republic in early 2020, one in Lebanon in December 2020, and, in Mali, one was convicted, and eight were convicted and sentenced in absentia in March 2021. Safety, security and performance are mutually reinforcing and go hand in hand. Ensuring the safety and security of peacekeepers is key to enabling them to perform.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“Several factors contributed to this proactive response and to limiting casualties, such as enhanced predeployment training and the robust mindset of commanding officers and personnel, as well as camp reinforcements and the sound alert provided by a counter-rocket artillery- mortar system installed there. In this case, as in many others, I commend the proactive mindset of peacekeepers as they implement their mandates.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“The increased use of technologies has proved a key multiplier to the enhanced preparedness and capabilities of peacekeepers. As Under-Secretary-General Khare will also tell the Council, camp-security and early-warning technologies have proven effective in enabling missions that are regularly under attack to achieve greater security for their personnel. In an attack on the MINUSMA camp in the Kidal region on 25 April this year, incoming rockets and mortars were detected in advance of impact, enabling staff to take refuge in bunkers and contributing to lives saved. The robust response of a special-forces contingent from Chad during the attack against the Aguelhok camp on 2 April clearly indicates the effect of a comprehensive approach to strengthening safety and security.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“To complement efforts to strengthen policy and procedures, the Secretariat is also pursuing a number of training initiatives. These include stress testing for CASEVAC and crisis-management exercises, the Buddy First Aid Course, the Field Medical Assistant Course and the training of hospital commanders to ensure health- care quality and patient-safety standards. We are also providing mentorship and threat-mitigation training in relation to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as part of our overarching efforts to mitigate the threat of IEDs, and we are seeing results. For example, in MINUSMA, the rate of IED detection and neutralization by peacekeepers on convoys and patrols has increased from 11 per cent of devices detected before detonation in 2014 to nearly 50 per cent in 2020.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“The use of specialized units, such as the tactical unmanned aerial surveillance unit in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), is contributing to the improvement of peacekeeping intelligence, situational awareness and early warning. We have also revised existing guidance, processes and tools, and developed new ones. The revision of the casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) policy, and modifications to the Contingent-Owned Equipment Manual in 2020 tremendously streamlined the evacuation process and reduced delays. We are in the process of establishing a systematic tracking system for violations of status-of-forces agreements, a phenomenon that is unfortunately growing in our missions, to enable us to more systematically support our missions to resolve them.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“We will continue to focus on implementing resolution 2518 (2020) and on taking forward the Action Plan to Improve the Security of United Nations Peacekeepers. Implementation of the Action Plan has enabled us to make significant progress in strengthening the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers. It contributed to a sustained decrease in peacekeeper fatalities resulting from malicious acts from 59 in 2017 to 13 in 2020. With our support, peacekeeping missions continued to strengthen camp protection. For example, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has centralized command, control and coordination in its integrated camps, which has led to more expedient responses to imminent threats. We have also made notable progress in improving the capabilities within our missions.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“The international community has clearly identified the safety and security of peacekeepers as a paramount priority. Obviously, this is one of the top priorities of the Secretary-General and the Department of Peace Operations. I want to thank the People’s Republic of China for its continued leadership in advancing this agenda, including through hosting today’s debate and the recent creation of the Group of Friends on the Safety and Security of United Nations Peacekeepers, which it co- chairs with Brazil, Indonesia and Rwanda. We also continue to strive to do our part. Building on the progress made through Action for Peacekeeping initiative (A4P), safety and security will continue to remain one of our highest priorities as we take forward A4P plus.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“As our missions strive to implement their tasks, it is important to stress that attacks against peacekeepers can constitute war crimes; they are also a huge impediment to the pursuit of peace and an added constraint for the effective implementation of Security Council mandates. In addition to hostile environments and direct attacks, issues related to peacekeeper safety, such as vehicle accidents and illnesses, are also causing fatalities and can significantly affect the ability of peacekeepers to deliver on their mandated tasks. In 2020, for example, 13 peacekeepers lost their lives to violent acts while 15 peacekeepers lost their lives due to accidents and 81 due to illness. This situation has, of course, been compounded by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“I thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to update the Security Council on the measures taken to strengthen the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers. I am pleased to join Under-Secretaries-General Khare and Michaud in briefing the Council. Peacekeeping operations continue to operate in complex environments, where they face an increasing number of attacks against their personnel by hostile actors. Since 1 January of this year alone, 15 peacekeepers have lost their lives owing to malicious acts. I want to express my deepest gratitude for the service and sacrifice of all peacekeepers, particularly those who have lost their lives in the pursuit of peace. One peacekeeper lost continues to be one too many.”
2021-05-24 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/501 (2021) · source
“In that spirit, I welcome the strengthened coordination mechanisms that the Sahel Coalition proposes to implement, which will allow all international partners to leverage their comparative advantages and work together more effectively in the areas of development, good governance, humanitarian assistance and security. In the light of the situation in the Sahel, the international community must be motivated by a shared responsibility to act swiftly and work alongside and in solidarity with the people of the region.”
2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source
“We must be aware of the dire consequences of the security situation for the population, as well as the risks for the rest of the West Africa if the situation in the Sahel is not properly addressed. As calls for additional resources to support the G-5 Sahel’s fight against terrorism continue, there are also calls for increased mobilization to address poverty and the unprecedented humanitarian crisis that currently confronts the region. Strengthening the Joint Force is only one of the many ways that the international community can provide support.”
2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source
“In other instances, life support consumables were reportedly delivered and collected but did not reach the battalions, suggesting the Joint Force’s lack of capacity to travel long distances to deliver supplies. Since the Pau Summit held in January 2020, the strengthening of national armies, the temporary deployment of 600 additional French soldiers to Operation Barkhane, the improved coordination among national armies, Operation Barkhane, the Joint Force of the G-5 Sahel and MINUSMA, while respecting their respective mandates, and the deployment of Task Force Takuba have enabled results to be achieved in the fight against terrorism in the region. However, in spite of this encouraging progress much remains to be done.”
2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source
“The United Nations, alongside the G-5 Sahel and other partners, continues to call for more predictable funding. The G-5 Sahel Joint Force plays a critical role in the regional response to violent extremism. In this regard, it is essential that it receive the assistance it requires to carry out its mandated tasks. Moreover, while the current model relies on quarterly planning for the provision of life support consumables, the Joint Force has indicated that detailed projections of needs remain a challenge in the context of dynamic operations in a highly volatile environment. Unfortunately, however, the current support model provides little room for flexibility. In some instances, the Joint Force seems to lack the capacity to collect the delivered life support consumables from the designated collection points in Mali.”
2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source
“It should be acknowledged that the United Nations as a whole played an important role in implementing the human rights due diligence policy, while providing life consumables support to the Joint Force. With private contractors, however, the United Nations will likely have less visibility and leverage over the support and the policy’s implementation. At the request of the Security Council, the Secretariat carried out an assessment of MINUSMA’s support to the Joint Force under resolution 2531 (2020) in early 2021. The assessment highlighted the progress made in this regard, but also challenges in implementing the enhanced support mandate. First, as much as we commend the European Union for its vital support to the Joint Force, the issue of the predictability of funding remains of concern.”
2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source
“We should acknowledge, however, that the human rights situation in the Sahel is deteriorating significantly because of escalating conflict and the fact that human rights violations allegedly committed by security forces while combating terrorism persist. Both the compliance framework and the human rights due diligence policy are essential to build the capacity of the forces under the G-5 Sahel command to enhance human rights compliance, but these efforts are a long-term endeavour. I therefore encourage all partners to enhance their assistance to OHCHR in support of the Joint Force. Our strong collective support to human rights and the protection of civilians is a prerequisite to winning the war against terrorism.”
2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source
“Recently, the Joint Force and the authorities of Chad and the Niger demonstrated their commitment to investigating and prosecuting the serious allegations of sexual violence reportedly committed by members of the eighth Chadian battalion of the Force deployed in the Niger in late March. Their proactive actions are commendable, as they attest to their professionalism and command responsibilities and demonstrate the important progress made by the Joint Force in operationalizing its human rights and international humanitarian law compliance framework with the support of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), whose role I would also like to commend.”
2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source
“As far as the provost units are concerned, the 13 gendarmes per battalion have been deployed within their respective battalions, in addition to 11 gendarmes in Chad’s second battalion, and are operational for the most part. Moving to the implementation of the human rights and international humanitarian law compliance framework of the Joint Force and the human rights due diligence policy, it is important to note that, while some aspects of essential work remain pending, the Joint Force has taken significant steps in the right direction, notably with regard to mitigation measures being put in place as a result of the ongoing establishment of the compliance framework.”
2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source
“The provision of life support consumables by the Mission has proven critical in sustaining the Joint Force, as it continues to face major challenges with regard to its operational and logistical capacities in providing supplies to its troops — a problem worsened by a lack of suitable means of transport. Going forward, strengthening the Joint Force’s police component will be an important step not only towards improving oversight over military operations but also to linking them to State-building, support to the justice sector and prison reform, as well as efforts under the human rights compliance framework. In this context, the operationalization of the police component has registered some progress with regard to the Special Investigation Units.”
2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source
“In that context, my remarks will consist of taking stock of the support that the international community, and more particularly the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), has provided over the past few months to the G-5 Sahel Joint Force as it continued to scale up its operational tempo in an ever-more challenging security environment. MINUSMA continued to provide logistical support to the seven battalions operating under the command of the Joint Force, within the framework of its mandate. All requests from the Joint Force related to petrol-oil-lubricants and casualty evacuation have so far been honoured. MINUSMA’s responsive operational and logistical support to the Joint Force remained critical to the Force’s operations, especially in Centre Sector.”
2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source
“The Joint Force remains a vital part of security responses to address extremist armed groups in the region, along with other cross-border challenges, including trafficking in persons, illicit goods, weapons and drugs. The G-5 Sahel Joint Force has continued to enhance its operational capabilities. The offensive phase of Operation Sama 2 started in the first week of November and continued into the beginning of January. The Joint Force launched Operation Sama 3 in March, aimed at strengthening and consolidating the outcome of Operations Sama 1 and 2, buoyed by additional capabilities following the deployment of the eighth battalion of the Chadian army at the beginning of March.”
2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source
“Thank you for this opportunity to address the Security Council. Since the previous Security Council debate on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (G-5 Sahel), held on 16 November 2020 (see S/2020/1126), the fight against terrorist armed groups in the region has intensified and continued to mobilize at regional, continental and international levels, despite the ongoing context of the coronavirus disease pandemic. In a testament to this international commitment, Task Force Takuba is now fully operational and has been supporting Malian armed forces in combat. It takes a variety of actors to confront the daunting challenges in the region, and coordination among security actors on the ground remains paramount.”
2021-05-18 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/484 (2021) · source
“In view of the aforementioned, I would request that the Security Council consider a rollover mandate for UNISFA for six months, until 15 October 2021, in order to give the parties the space to discuss future arrangements and the way forward.”
2021-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/408 (2021) · source
“In conclusion, UNISFA leadership will continue to engage with the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan to facilitate the implementation of the pending aspects of their previous agreements. In addition, although the consultations with the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Mr. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, with the Governments of the Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia to discuss UNISFA’s exit strategy were inconclusive, as noted in the Secretary-General’s letter dated 1 April, I would like to highlight that all parties continue to recognize the usefulness and relevance of UNISFA and the fact that the Mission has also been instrumental in addressing tensions between the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya communities through community dialogue and reconciliation initiatives, despite operational constraints due to administrative bottlenecks.”
2021-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/408 (2021) · source
“The quarantine facility with 220 beds, where incoming troops are quarantined before being dispatched to their locations, is contributing to infection prevention, control and monitoring. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, in coordination with non-governmental organizations, continued to provide vital humanitarian and recovery assistance to vulnerable populations within the area. The Amiet common market, comprising more than 1,000 shops and stalls and 360 living shelters, was partially destroyed by fire on 8 February 2021 and 1 April 2021, resulting in a significant economic loss. The humanitarian and development agencies worked closely with local communities to address their immediate and long-term needs.”
2021-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/408 (2021) · source
“In January 2021, the Sudanese authorities introduced a new policy according to which resident visas for UNISFA personnel are issued with a limited validity period, that is, until 31 May 2021, the end of the current Mission mandate, which further complicates matters. As of March 2021, there had been 198 reported cases of COVID-19 in the local community, with 10 confirmed deaths. UNISFA currently has five active positive cases. All are asymptomatic; three cases relate to uniformed personnel, and two are among non-uniformed personnel. All necessary measures were put in place to ensure that all staff comply with the use of the personal infection preventive measures.”
2021-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/408 (2021) · source
“The process of the deployment of the authorized formed police units (FPUs) from China and Tanzania was interrupted owing to the non-issuance of entry visas to the Sudan for the official delegation from Tanzania intending to visit the Mission for mandatory generation activities, as well as the denial of travel permits to visit Abyei for the delegation of China. The deployment of the advanced party of the Ethiopian FPU is subject to visa approval and clearances for contingent-owned equipment. Between December 2020 and January 2021, Sudanese visas were granted to 31 police officers, increasing the number from 16 to 47 police officers. Visas for 77 individual police officers, requested in a note verbale to Khartoum, are awaiting approval.”
2021-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/408 (2021) · source
“A 14 Mile Area ad hoc Committee meeting was conducted from 16 to 19 November 2020 in Gok Machar. In its report, the Committee recommended that the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces Chief of Defence Force issue the orders necessary for the withdrawal of their units from within the 14 Mile Area. The reopening of border crossing corridors has been accomplished, including the reopening of the Meiram-Aweil crossing, which had been temporarily closed owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. Four of the 10 corridors are currently open and functioning.”
2021-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/408 (2021) · source
“There has been modest progress towards the seven benchmarks set out in Security Council resolution 2550 (2020). All requested aerial monitoring missions and ground monitoring missions were approved by the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan in October 2020, and most of them were conducted during the reporting period. JBVMM was granted freedom of movement within the Safe Demilitarized Buffer Zone. With the exception of team site 22, in Abu Qussa/ Wunkur, the parties have deployed national monitors to participate in JBVMM operational activities. While the team site in Abu Qussa/Wunkur is established, it has not yet been operationalized, as South Sudan refuses to deploy national monitors owing to the presence of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army- in-Opposition in the area.”
2021-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/408 (2021) · source
“On 23 November 2020, he also briefed the African Union Peace and Security Council on the situation in Abyei, together with the United Nations Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga. The Acting Head of Mission had planned a visit to Juba in December 2020 to follow up on issues discussed during his previous visit in September 2020, when he briefed South Sudan officials on the situation in Abyei, and also to emphasize to interlocutors the need to hold an Abyei Joint Oversight Committee meeting in earnest. Unfortunately, the visit was cancelled as, in the meantime, agreement was reached that a Committee meeting would take place in late December. In the end, the meeting was not convened owing to the inability to agree on the moderator.”
2021-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/408 (2021) · source
“The group demanded 50 per cent of the load as a precondition to grant passage to the south. After two days of negotiations, it was decided that the humanitarian convoy would return to Khartoum. Fifteen trucks were looted during the incident. Despite the logistical constraints linked to the COVID-19 pandemic, UNISFA has remained fully engaged with both the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan. The Acting Head of Mission visited Khartoum to take part in the JPSM meeting hosted by the Government of the Sudan on 28 and 29 October 2020. That meeting was the first since the JPSM meeting hosted by Juba in February 2020. The Acting Head of Mission returned to Khartoum again in late 2020 and early 2021 for meetings with senior officials to discuss ways to move the Abyei peace process forward.”
2021-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/408 (2021) · source
“The reporting period was also marked by violent confrontations between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities, with one of the major incidents taking place at the Amiet common market on 30 December 2020. During the clash, several shops and properties were destroyed, with five Ngok Dinka and seven Misseriya sustaining injuries. On 15 February 2021, three armed men, suspected to be Ngok Dinka, opened fire on a civilian vehicle about 4 kilometres outside of Abyei town, along the Abyei-Banton road. Six civilians were severely injured in the attack and brought to the UNISFA level II Hospital for treatment. In another worrisome development, between 18 and 21 December 2020, 49 World Food Programme (WFP) trucks with humanitarian supplies en route from the north towards Abyei town were denied access by a Misseriya crowd at Dari village.”
2021-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/408 (2021) · source
“The general security situation in the Abyei Area during the reporting period has been relatively calm, albeit volatile and unpredictable. The most prevalent threats to security were shooting incidents and the increased presence of unidentified armed groups. Out of 47 incidents recorded, 23 were attacks on civilians that resulted in five fatalities and serious injuries. The main supply route between Abyei town and Goli and the Amiet common market and its surrounding villages have been identified as the most volatile areas within UNISFA’s area of responsibility, despite regular patrols and a constant presence along the route by UNISFA troops.”
2021-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/408 (2021) · source
“The main political highlight of the reporting period was the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM) meeting hosted by the Government of the Sudan on 28 and 29 October 2020. During that meeting, several important issues were agreed upon, including the establishment of checkpoints in Abyei, the introduction of search-and-seize operations, the deployment of joint military observer teams throughout Abyei Area, the need for regular meetings of the JPSM and the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, and the need for progress on JBVMM- and border- related benchmarks. The African Union Peace and Security Council held a meeting dedicated to the situation in Abyei on 24 November 2020 and subsequently issued a communiqué calling for community reconciliation.”
2021-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/408 (2021) · source
“On 25 February 2021, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sudan, Mariam al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, chose Juba as her first visit upon assuming her duties in the new Sudanese cabinet. However, that rapprochement did not translate into significant improvements on the ground in the Abyei Area, where the security situation remains tense, as do relations between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities. The inability of the parties to convene for Abyei Joint Oversight Committee meetings has also negatively affected political progress. Hopefully, the recent appointment by Khartoum of Major General Mohamed Alawi Koko as the new co-Chair of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee will help move the political process along.”
2021-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/408 (2021) · source
“I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security Council on developments pertaining to the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), including its support for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM) and the response to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. The six-month reporting period was marked by a continued rapprochement between the Sudan and South Sudan. On 23 November 2020, the Minister of East Africa Affairs of South Sudan, Deng Alor, met in Khartoum with Hassan Sheikh Idris Qadi, a member of the Transitional Sovereign Council, to discuss the implementation of the 3 October 2020 peace agreement, as well as the question of Abyei.”
2021-04-26 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/408 (2021) · source
“As Mali continues to face a host of political, security, human rights and humanitarian challenges, the support of the international community and of the Council remains of the utmost importance to ensure that national stakeholders live up to their commitments. In the words of the outgoing Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, when he addressed you last October, “The success of the political transition in Mali is within reach. The ball remains in the court of Malian women and men. (S/PV.8765, p. 3) “The United Nations must also seize this opportunity to continue supporting and assisting throughout this important phase for a way out of the crisis in Mali”. (ibid.)”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/336 (2021) · source
“This was the second such meeting to take place outside Bamako since the signing of the Agreement in 2015. Both gatherings are of major symbolic significance and are seen as positive and essential steps in improving the Agreement’s ownership among Malian stakeholders, a key factor in its implementation. I urge Malian parties to build on the momentum generated in recent weeks to accelerate the redeployment and effective use of the reconstituted units of the army in the north, the operationalization of the Northern Development Zone and the establishment of the territorial police. Six months after representatives of the signatory movements joined a Malian Government, a first in the years since the signing of the Agreement, now is the time to translate the commitments made into concrete progress on the ground.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/336 (2021) · source
“These elections represent the litmus test for the current transition and a necessary step towards Mali’s return to constitutional rule. Increasing participation, including among women and youth, and boosting the credibility of the polls will be key in avoiding that this landmark of the democratic process once again becomes the trigger of further political instability in Mali. While the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali has remained slow, positive momentum and a new sense of trust among the Malian parties have emerged in recent weeks, and efforts to improve Malian’s ownership of the Agreement have been undertaken. A meeting of the Agreement Monitoring Committee took place in Kayes, southern Mali, on 31 March, less than a month after the previous meeting had taken place in Kidal, northern Mali.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/336 (2021) · source
“With regard to preparations for elections at the end of the transition period, discussions over the past few weeks among transition authorities, political actors and civil society groups have yet to result in an agreement over which reforms should be enacted, including on the important issue of the management of the polls. As a result, an official electoral calendar has not been issued. It is expected that the outcome of the work of the Comité d’orientation stratétique will include a draft reform of the electoral code and an electoral calendar. At this critical juncture, I encourage Malian political actors to work in a spirit of compromise and enact reforms aimed at creating an environment conducive to peaceful, inclusive, transparent and credible elections.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/336 (2021) · source
“I welcome the issuance six days ago, on 31 March, by President Bah N’Daou of a decree establishing the Comité d’orientation stratégique, in charge of political and institutional reforms. Under the authority of the Prime Minister, this committee of 50 members representing all major stakeholders in Mali — from political parties to civil society groups and traditional leaders — is tasked with defining the scope of the reforms to be enacted in the remaining months of the transition. I remain convinced that, working together and building on the conclusions of previous discussions, such as the Inclusive National Dialogue held in 2019, Malian women and men can and must seize this opportunity to find common ground and practical solutions to be implemented in the shortest time frame possible.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/336 (2021) · source
“It is crucial that the pace of these reforms be urgently accelerated, while ensuring that the largest number of actors join the process. In the weeks and months ahead, the success of the transition will depend on the commitment of the Malian stakeholders to ensure that the transition and the key reform processes underpinning it remain inclusive, transparent and credible. MINUSMA, including through the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, will continue to support Malian stakeholders. Among the Government’s pressing priorities is the completion of a series of crucial political and institutional reforms. These include the territorial redistricting, the electoral reforms and the reform of the Constitution.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/336 (2021) · source
“Any sustainable improvement in the security situation in Mali is, in no small measure, predicated on the success of the current political transition. And while the transition remains fragile, over the past three months encouraging signs have been recorded. As outlined in the report under consideration, seven months into a political transition scheduled to last 18 months, transition authorities have kick-started the functioning of the main institutions of the transition. In February, the Government issued its agenda for the period ahead, and the transitional Parliament swiftly voted to approve it during its first session. I am encouraged by the steps taken since then by the transitional authorities to implement their agenda of reforms. I call on all stakeholders concerned in Mali to join these efforts.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/336 (2021) · source
“Despite the encouraging improvements in the security situation in some areas across the region as a result of local peace agreements supported by MINUSMA, I call on the transitional Government of Mali to devise a comprehensive approach to improve the security situation in parallel with efforts to protect civilians and restore State authority and basic social services. This approach would also include sustainable solutions to ensure militias and armed groups lay down their arms and join the dialogue process. This approach should also include a robust effort to ensure accountability and tackle impunity for actors accused of having committed violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.”
2021-04-06 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/2021/336 (2021) · source