YouSaid · the spoken record

Jeremic

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177
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2008-11-26
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2011-11-29
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un-security-council

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  1. The best way to ensure full freedom of movement in the territory is through dialogue, engagement and close work between the parties, especially the parties on the ground, all of which Serbia strongly supports.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  2. Serbia strongly reiterates the need for transparency and fairness in this investigation. I appeal to the members of the Security Council to allow fairness and transparency to prevail for the sake of the families of the victims. Finally, I would like to underline once again that Serbia has made and will continue to make strong calls for peace and stability inside the territory. President Tadie today made a very strong call for that, and I wish to reiterate it here in this Chamber. We need to refrain from the use of force and from violence. Barricades are not in anyone's interest, but they must not be removed violently; that is only going to lead to more violence.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  3. It may be organized crime if one is trying to sell somebody's organs on the international black market for organs, but it is a war crime when several hundred civilians are allegedly taken to a clinic to be killed and their organs removed during a conflict. That is a war crime, not organized crime, and it should be treated as such. All of the war crimes committed in the wars of Yugoslav succession have so far been treated in the same way, with the Security Council being kept abreast of what was going on in the investigations. What we are asking for is simply to be treated in the same way and that this serious, heinous allegation of a war crime be treated in the same way as any other war crime, namely, that it not be hidden from the international community. That is what the families of the victims demand.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  4. That is simply a fact of life and a part of the reality that we have to take into account when we try to resolve peacefully the problem that we have at hand. In response to a statement made here with regard to the Ahtisaari Plan, I would like to underline that this Plan was not in line with resolution 1244 (1999). It was discussed here in the Chamber on numerous occasions and failed to receive the support of the Council. I would like to remind members that, despite numerous attempts, the Ahtisaari Plan did not receive the endorsement of the Council. For us in Serbia, it is null and void. In speaking about human organ harvesting and trafficking, one country here today repeatedly referred to that as organized crime.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  5. I remember the time when there was very little trust in Serbian institutions in Kosovo and when the whole series of parallel structures - actually, the entire life of Kosovo Albanians - was organized in a way that was entirely parallel to the legal institutions of the Republic of Serbia. At that time, every single country in the world recognized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia. I am referring to the pre-1999 period. They were structures that had absolute parallelism with the legal structures of the Republic of Serbia, because the Albanians had no trust in the structures of the Republic of Serbia. Today, the situation is pretty much parallel in the north. Kosovo Serbs have zero trust in the structures that are Pristina- based.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  6. I would like to briefly address some of the remarks made in the Chamber this morning. First of all, I would like to refer to the so-called parallel structures. In order to have something parallel, one needs to have something to which it is parallel. Those are the only structures that exist in that part of our sovereign province. Those are the only structures that are providing any kind of order in that part of the territory. There are no other structures. Truly parallel structures are ones that are not in line with resolution 1244 (1999), but that are organized based on the unilateral declaration of independence of 17 February 2008. I think that the lack of trust is what is really at the heart of what we are discussing here.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  7. I call on the Security Council to make sure that no more forceful unilateral acts are allowed to take place, and that it does so in clear, unequivocal, unbiased and status-neutral terms. I urge this body to take that crucial step without any further hesitation. If we are genuinely concerned about peace and stability in Kosovo - if re-establishing security and improving the quality of life for the people on the ground is our objective - then there can be no justification for refusing to heed such a call right now. A failure to act would be a disappointing abdication of the responsibility entrusted to this Council by the world's family of nations. Taking charge of the present moment, on the other hand, cannot but enhance the enduring benefit and honour of the founding principles of the United Nations.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  8. If both sides are prepared to be flexible, common ground can surely be found. A great twentieth-century leader famously once called for a fresh start. "Let us begin anew", he said, "remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate. Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belabouring those problems which divide us". We too must reinvigorate our efforts. It is essential that all stakeholders pledge to make the dialogue the sole mechanism within which differences will be brought to the fore. We are facing a worsening situation in Kosovo. It necessitates more active engagement by this body.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  9. That raises the question of whether he truly committed suicide, as the local police have preliminarily concluded. My Government is resolved to undertake all the necessary measures to pave the way for establishing a comprehensive peace between Serbs and Albanians. We will keep working relentlessly in its pursuit, despite all the setbacks caused by unilateralism. Dialogue is the only vehicle to reach that goal. Its intention - as stated in a General Assembly resolution that was adopted by acclamation and initiated the dialogue, is to "improve the lives of the people" (resolution 64/298, para. 2). That is its most important, status-neutral objective. The talks are not an exercise in enforcing either party's legal position. They are focused on practical considerations.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  10. He has been identified by the Council of Europe, together with several others, including Thaci himself, as having played vital roles as co-conspirators in various categories of criminal activity. The witness, Mr. Agim Zogaj, had been under the protection of EULEX, but somehow ended up alone and dead in a park in Duisburg, Germany. Local authorities have stated that they were unaware that he required 24-hour protection. In an authentic diary excerpt published posthumously by the Pristina daily newspaper Koha Ditore, Zogaj addresses Limaj directly, writing that "for years now my children fear you more than they feared Milosevic". In another passage, written just a few days before his death, he suggests that EULEX did not have the capacity to protect him.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  11. That is outrageous and unacceptable. If senior officials of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia brief the Security Council every six months, why should those tasked with the organs trafficking case not do so as well? We have already presented some proposals on the investigation mechanism, and we urge the Council to act upon them. Come what may, the truth cannot possibly rise to the surface without ironclad witness protection guarantees. At this point, they simply do not exist. The recent mysterious death of a key witness in an important war crimes trial has reinforced the perception that EULEX is unable to guarantee the safety of those in its protective custody. The defendant in the case in question is Fatmir Limaj, a powerful former minister in Hashim Thaci's Cabinet.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  12. We are not opposed to the centrality of EULEX in an investigation mechanism. But it must be both empowered by, and accountable to, the Security Council. That has been the standard applied in each previous instance involving serious war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Balkans, whichever side the perpetrators belonged to and irrespective of their political roles. There is no compelling reason not to make a comprehensive, independent investigation accountable to the whole world in this case as well. That is the only way to guarantee fairness and transparency and to prevent doubts about anyone's full commitment. A few days ago, however, the Task Force spokesman said that details of the investigation it is conducting would remain confidential until it has come to an end. That might take years, he added.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  13. We will assist him and his team in any way that we can, for we believe they can make an invaluable contribution to uncovering what occurred inside Kosovo itself. That, however, remains manifestly insufficient, for the alleged harvesting and smuggling of organs of innocent Serbian civilians took place beyond that territory. Despite all protestations to the contrary, it is indisputable that EULEX cannot operate at full capacity anywhere outside Kosovo. In other words, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo has neither an adequate mandate nor sufficient temporal and territorial jurisdiction to carry out an investigation that would be comprehensive in scope. The EULEX Special Investigative Task Force has no ability to enforce the cooperation of all concerned. Only this body can do that.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  14. According to a document of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees entitled "UNHCR Global Appeal 2012- 2013 - Serbia (and Kosovo: SC Res, 1244)", "the potential for returns is almost exhausted". Almost a year ago, the Council of Europe released a deeply disturbing report entitled "Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo". Since that time, excruciatingly little has been done to uncover the truth about those allegations, especially considering the uniquely heinous nature of the charges. In that regard, the recent appointment of Clint Williamson as lead prosecutor for the EULEX Special Investigative Task Force is a welcome development.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  15. They were on their way to sell vegetables at the Strpce farmers market. They were forced out of their vehicle and their Serbian papers - acceptable under the terms of the dialogue - were torn up. Their license plates - also acceptable under the terms of the dialogue - were taken away from them. The ROSU officers then proceeded to beat them mercilessly. Many similar incidents have been taking place, but I believe this one is illustrative enough. Under such shocking circumstances, it is no wonder that, for Kosovo Serb internally displaced persons, the "pace of the returns remains markedly slow" (ibid., para. 32). In that quarter, only 96 ethnic Serbs went back to the province, less than half of the number who returned in the same period last year. The future looks even bleaker.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  16. In addition to the brutal murder of a Kosovo Serb returnee, the report also lists numerous acts of desecration and vandalism against Serbian Orthodox Church holy sites and cemeteries, vehicle stonings, arson attacks, burglaries, theft of farm equipment and drinking well contaminations. The report does not indicate that any of those hate crimes have been solved, or even that anyone has been charged with committing them. Unfortunately, the report omits a number of other incidents that further darken the overall picture of the situation on the ground in the province. I will limit myself to mentioning just one of them, but it is typical. On 28 July, on the outskirts of the village of Doganovie, on the Vitina-Strpce road, two ethnic Serbs from Klokot were stopped by a ROSU contingent.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  17. We therefore echo the report's conclusion that "sensitive issues relating to northern Kosovo can be resolved only through peaceful means, taking into account the views of the communities on the ground" (ibid., para. 56). While we have rightfully focused our attention on events taking place in the North, we must not ignore the fact that the situation in the South has gotten worse, as well. The report underlines that, in comparison to the same period last year, "the number of violent incidents affecting the Serb population [south of the Iber/Ibar] increased following the July events" (ibid., para. 20).

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  18. The removal of barricades is clearly in the interest of peace and stability, but it should be achieved exclusively through peaceful means. We must find the way out of the vicious circle of violence, in which only extremism thrives. It is indicative, however, that almost every time a new round of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina is due to take place - in the present case, tomorrow - unilateralism suddenly comes back to the fore. Negotiations conducted in good faith are predicated on abstaining from the use of instruments of compulsion. Those are mutually exclusive concepts. Either one negotiates in good faith or tries to resolve the issue through forceful imposition. The choice could not be clearer: peaceful dialogue or unilateral action. Serbia is ready for the former, and categorically rejects the latter.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  19. At this particularly delicate moment, it is critical that we send the right messages and draw the appropriate lessons from the recent incident at Dudin krs, near Zvecan, and yesterday's at Jagnjenica. Both began in similar fashion. Unprovoked, KFOR troops rapidly approached the barricades and immediately started to dismantle them with heavy equipment. That caused the situation to escalate. Villagers from neighbouring areas began to arrive to defend their positions. In both cases, scores of civilians and dozens of soldiers were injured. We call upon all stakeholders on the ground in North Kosovo - KFOR and EULEX officials, as well as local community leaders - to engage in dialogue and work together to restore calm immediately.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  20. Not only would that undermine the centrality of the dialogue process, but it was also blatantly obvious that it would heighten tensions in North Kosovo, and would surely result in the loss of the international missions' legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. Unfortunately, the inevitable happened. Residents of North Kosovo responded by reinforcing existing roadblocks and erecting new ones. Their resolute determination to resist the imposition of a decisively unwanted regime has become one of the most conspicuous elements of the reality on the ground. Regretfully, some of the occasional clashes turned violent and resulted in injuries on both sides of the divide. Serbia's strong condemnation of the use of force by any party has always been swift and unequivocal.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  21. It also ignores the terms of the Secretary-General's six-point agreement, which was welcomed by the Council in November 2008 and which states very precisely that "international customs officers appointed in accordance with Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) will be reinstated at gates l and 31". Nevertheless, both the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) chose to support the operation, which began on 16 September. Explicit warnings were voiced in the Chamber on the eve of the announced action that this would effectively mean stepping beyond the limits of KFOR's and EULEX's respective mandates, in violation of resolution 1244 (1999).

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  22. On 7 September, Hashim Thaci, the so-called Prime Minister of Kosovo, explicitly stated his purpose, that is, to "preserve and assume control over the territorial integrity of the Republic of Kosovo". He also said that "Kosovo customs officials, appointed by the Kosovo Customs, will be present; Kosovo border police, appointed by the Kosovo Police, will be present". A document entitled "Kosovo Police Operational Plan" confirmed that intention. It reads: "All operations will be conducted under Kosovo sovereignty and in accordance with Kosovo laws and regulations". That is manifestly incompatible with resolution 1244 (1999), and drastically deviates from the status- neutral framework of the United Nations.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  23. Thanks in part to the swift, yet measured, response by Belgrade, the situation was contained and did not spin dangerously out of control. The overall state of affairs in North Kosovo had ceased to worsen by the end of August, although tensions remained high. It is against that backdrop that the sixth round of dialogue took place in Brussels, on 2 September. Another status-neutral solution was reached, that time on customs stamps. We were led to believe that, in the period ahead, implementation would be discussed in good faith so that underlying procedures could be agreed and put into practice. Instead, for the second time in as many months, an attempt was made to impose an outcome that was clearly outside of the dialogue framework on the very same issue, namely, Gates 1 and 31.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  24. The first time was on 25 July, when the territory's ethnic-Albanian authorities ordered the deployment to North Kosovo of the so-called paramilitary Regional Operational Support Unit (ROSU), with the aim of seizing the administrative checkpoints known as Gates 1 and 31. According to the report, this was "not coordinated with the international presences or the communities on the ground" (S/2011/675, para. 3). As a consequence, dynamics changed overnight - "a significant deterioration in the security situation" (ibid., para. 10) in North Kosovo. The report also states that "In reaction to the actions of Pristina, local Kosovo Serbs, who continue to reject the authority of the Kosovo institutions, erected roadblocks" (ibid., para. 4).

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  25. At the beginning of the three-month period covered by the report of the Secretary-General (S/2011/675), it was possible to be cautiously optimistic, as certain aspects of the situation in Kosovo seemed to be improving. The fifth round of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina had just taken place, on 2 July, and had produced status-neutral agreements in some important areas. Rather than trying to build on the positive momentum, however, a choice was made in Pristina to attempt to unilaterally alter the reality on the ground, clearly outside of the framework provided by the dialogue. That happened twice during the reporting period.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  26. The security situation in our southern province of Kosovo has been greatly aggravated since the end of the previous reporting period. Serbia's repeated warnings that unilateral forceful action would adversely affect stability kept being ignored by some key actors. Despite considerable diplomatic efforts, it has not been possible to reach consensus in the Chamber that unilateralism and the use of force are unacceptable. As a result, today everything is much more difficult, as positions harden in the light of deteriorating conditions on the ground. It is truly frustrating that all of this was eminently avoidable, had everyone had enough patience to seek solutions by exclusively peaceful means and through dialogue.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  27. Thank you, Mr. President, for convening this meeting of the Security Council pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999). I welcome the presence of Special Representative Farid Zarif. I congratulate him on his recent appointment and thank him for his remarks. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo remains a crucial pillar of peace and stability in the province. At the beginning of my statement, I would like to once again express our deep gratitude to the substantial majority of the world's nations that respect Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity. By continuing to support the principle of the inviolability of borders of United Nations States Members, they are preventing a dangerous precedent that could be repeated in any part of the world, with devastating consequences for international peace and stability.

    2011-11-29 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6670 (2011) · source

  28. I call on this Council to commit to ensuring that when we meet next time, the only changes to the reality on the ground are those that are the product of agreement between the parties to the dialogue. Serbia remains committed to the dialogue.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  29. Now is the time for each one of us to make a decision about how to move forward. Our guiding framework can be either the use of force, or dialogue. The former is the choice of despair, the latter of hope. One cannot have it both ways. Unilateralism is incompatible with efforts to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the problem of Kosovo. Everyone must choose which road to take. No equivocation is possible. Serbia reiterates its strong preference for peace and will keep working unrelentingly in its pursuit, despite the terrible setback caused by Pristina's unilateralism. In the Balkans of the twenty-first century, the unsanctioned use of force should not produce an advantage for the party that resorted to it, for that would be tantamount to an encouragement to do it again.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  30. In the past few months, agreements in principle were concluded on aspects of the civil registry and on academic diplomas issues, as well as on elements of freedom of movement, including Kosovo Serb license plates. Yet when Pristina felt it had hit the first bump in the road, it struck out, unilaterally, turning to the instruments of compulsion and violence. My Government chose not to respond in kind. We believe the only way to build bridges across the divide is through dialogue. As one of the twentieth century's most respected moral authorities once exclaimed, we are tied together in a single garment of destiny, caught in an inescapable network of mutuality. And whatever affects one directly, he said, affects the other just as much. This is the truth we live in.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  31. We are aware of the fact that consultations are ongoing, and we appreciate the efforts to reach a consensus in the Council on how to decisively address these monstrous contentions. We will continue to insist, however, that this body must take action so that the full truth concerning these unprecedented war crimes can be uncovered. Come what may, Serbia will not forsake its duty to make sure the Victims' families receive the justice they deserve. The chasm of discord between the stakeholders has been widened by Pristina's unprovoked unilateralism. Its actions have been all the more disappointing given the fact that we had believed the dialogue was taking place in an atmosphere of good faith, conducive to achieving compromise solutions to all outstanding issues. We were making progress.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  32. Only the kidnapping took place within the contours of the province. And as we all know, EULEX cannot operate at full capacity anywhere outside Kosovo. However significant the contribution of what EULEX has called its task force might ultimately become, it is an unassailable fact that the EU's law and order mission in Kosovo currently has neither the mandate nor the temporal and territorial jurisdiction to carry out an investigation that would be comprehensive in scope. On its own, the way it is, it has no ability to ensure the cooperation of the world. Only a mechanism created by the Security Council can do that. We do not expect the discussion on this topic to be concluded today.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  33. I believe that it is our most solemn responsibility to come together in the service of justice and to see that it gets done through a comprehensive, independent investigation accountable to the whole world. I believe we have no right to settle for anything less, for in each previous instance involving war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Balkans, whichever side the perpetrators belonged to and irrespective of their political roles, the Security Council has given a mandate to investigate. Serbia welcomes the EULEX contribution to uncovering what occurred inside Kosovo itself. But the harvesting and smuggling of organs of innocent Serbian civilians took place beyond that territory, as the relevant allegations appear to encompass various United Nations Member States in Europe, Asia and Africa.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  34. The indictment alleges that Haradinaj committed crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war between March and September 1998. He is accused of directly participating in the murder of a number of ethnic Serbs, non-KLA ethnic Albanians and Roma civilians in order to exert control over territory. He is also accused of being subsequently involved in an orchestrated campaign of witness tampering. For the third Council meeting in a row, I have taken up the serious allegations contained in a deeply disturbing report released close to 10 months ago - and overwhelmingly approved by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly on 25 January - entitled "Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo".

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  35. Bllaca has accused Hashim Thaci of responsibility for 450 murders of political opponents and witnesses to war crimes. Mr. Bllaca claims he acquired this first-hand knowledge while working in the special unit for executions of Hashim Thaci's security service. He has said that he reported directly to Azem Syla, identified by the Council of Europe as a leading organized crime figure in Kosovo, together with Fatmir Limaj. Limaj is a former minister in Hashim Thaci's cabinet and a senior KLA official who stands indicted for corruption and war crimes by EULEX. A key opposition leader and former KLA commander as well as former prime minister, Ramush Haradinaj, is being retried before The Hague Tribunal.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  36. On the political front, the murder trials of some of so-called Prime Minister Hashim Thaci's close associates were beginning to reveal awkward connections between public figures and organized crime. Based in part on the sobering testimony of Nazim Bllaca, a confessed assassin and torturer for a quasi-official security service controlled by Hashim Thaci, senior lieutenants such as Fahredin Gashi and Hysni Rama, could be convicted of war crimes, as mentioned in annex l of the report. In addition, a number of seemingly authentic, publicly available videos show Mr. Bllaca negotiating for contract killings with Azem Syla, a former commander in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and currently a deputy leader of Mr. Hashim Thaci's political party. On the record, Mr.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  37. In addition, the Secretary-General's report indicates that Kosovo lost preferential trade treatment by the European Union, which means that products originating from the province are again subject to EU customs duties. The report also indicates that on 1 June, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced the interruption of the l8-month stand-by arrangement with Kosovo, which had violated its budgetary and fiscal commitments to the IMF. Pristina does not presently qualify to keep accessing IMF funds. According to the report, this means that a considerable amount of EU and World Bank funds will not materialize either, as they are linked to clear assurances on a sound macroeconomic framework.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  38. It concluded that Kosovo's overall democracy score declined more than any other in the European region, especially in the areas of electoral process, independent media, judicial framework and national democratic governance. Also during the reporting period, Europol released its biannual Organized Crime Threat Assessment. It identified Kosovo as a major European organized crime hub and stated that ethnic Albanian groups "remain the most prominent in trafficking heroin to and within the EU". On the economic front, consider the Doing Business 201] report jointly issued a few months ago by the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. It compares business regulation in 183 economies around the world. Kosovo ranked overall last in Europe, slipping below its already dismal results for 2010.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  39. Let me underline how important this holy site is for the Serbian people, as it was built on the foundations of the church in which the martyrs of the Battle of Kosovo took communion in 1389, before they went to face the Ottoman invaders. The overall atmosphere during the reporting period must be characterized as deteriorating. This has been the case for some time now, for the roots of democracy have failed to take hold in the province. The United Nations Development Programme's most recent democratization index for Kosovo concludes that "democratic processes in Kosovo do not fulfil the standards". That is consistent with the results of Freedom House's 2011 Nations in Transit report, published in June.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  40. However, it fails to mention the most atrocious example of this type of hate crime, despite the fact that the Kosovo Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe reported it to UNMIK at the beginning of May and again at the beginning of June. According to the Mission, the thirteenth-century Church of St. John the Baptist in village of Samodreza has been "frequently used as a toilet and a waste disposal site by the pupils from the nearby [Kosovo Albanian] elementary school for more than a decade." Earlier this year, measures were finally taken to protect the shrine, including the installation of metal doors at its entrance. During the reporting period, unfortunately, the doors were taken down, and the church again began to be frequently desecrated.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  41. It also refers to figures from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that identify a nearly record-low number of Kosovo Serb returnees: 95. That is less than half the number of those who came back during the comparable period last year. That is a deeply worrisome trend. Unfortunately, the report underemphasizes several alarming incidents that contributed to the overall escalation of fear and uncertainty among Kosovo Serbs. For instance, the report states that some Serbian religious sites and Orthodox graveyards were damaged and focuses on attacks by ethnic Albanian extremists on two medieval holy sites - one against the monastery of Zociste, near the ethnic Serb ghetto of Velika Hoca, the other against the church of Kyriake in the centre of the ancient Serbian capital of Prizren.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  42. It reads: "EULEX will fully respect Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and operate under the overall authority and within the status-neutral framework of the United Nations." (S/2008/692, para. 50) I also underline the fact that the EU's own joint action establishing EULEX begins with a direct reference to paragraph 19 of resolution 1244 (1999). I now turn to the current situation in Kosovo, separate from the developments that I just addressed. The Secretary-General's report underscores a number of disturbing developments concerning the Serbian community in the province. It says: "Criminal incidents affecting minority communities nearly doubled during the past three months compared to the same period the previous year" (S/2011/514, para. 31).

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  43. Finally, I should like to address the basis upon which KFOR and EULEX operate in Kosovo. The only accepted standard - both within NATO and the EU, as well as in this Council - is resolution 1244 (1999) and the status-neutral framework of the United Nations. With regard to KFOR, I refer to paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 9 and 19 of the resolution, as well as to point 3 in annex l and paragraphs 3 and 4 of annex 2. I also refer to paragraph 5 of NATO'S 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration, which reads, in part: "KFOR remains in Kosovo on the basis of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244." With regard to EULEX, I refer to paragraph 50 of the Secretary-General's November 2008 report, which was welcomed by the Council in a presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/44).

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  44. We can bear no responsibility for the last-minute decision made by the dialogue facilitator to impose a hiatus on the process, which is thankfully scheduled to resume in a few days' time. A second misconception involves the misleading term "parallel structures" to designate the Serbian institutions in North Kosovo. Not only are they legitimized by the fact that the overwhelming majority of the population supports them, but in the North, no alternative that passes the test of democracy exists. They are the only ones that can function without constant armed protection. The truly parallel structures that operate in the territory are those created on the basis of UDI and the so-called Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, a document that has never been approved by UNMIK or this Council.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  45. Pristina got away with it back in 2004, and had few reasons to believe it would not do so again on 25 July. Such behaviour cannot possibly contribute to security in the Balkans and must be rejected and condemned in the clearest possible terms. Silence today would be interpreted in Pristina as acquiescence, dramatically increasing the likelihood of further unilateral actions in the North, such as attempting to occupy the Valac electricity substation or the North Mitrovica courthouse. Several dangerous misconceptions have circulated publicly over the past month or so. The record must be set straight. One erroneous belief is that the round of talks between Belgrade and Pristina that was scheduled for 20 July was postponed by Serbia. This is simply incorrect.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  46. Last summer, for instance, an emergency meeting of the Council was held in response to a forcible attempt to establish a so-called Kosovo Government office in the Serbian town of North Mitrovica. Time and again, the international community has unfortunately failed to confront Pristina's unilateralism. Consider the March 2004 pogrom that resulted in the destruction of 35 Orthodox churches and monasteries in a three-day orchestrated campaign of cultural cleansing. Instead of making sure that the guilty were brought to justice, the international community abandoned its standards-before-status approach. The brutal attack on the foundation of our national and religious identity was de facto rewarded, and the unilateral declaration of independence was the result.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  47. Why did EULEX disappear from northern Kosovo in the wake of the ROSU incursion, leaving Serbs with no international police protection whatsoever? Why did EULEX not exercise its broad executive power - clearly defined in the relevant European Union (EU) joint action - to reverse the unilateral decision of Pristina as soon as it had begun? Should attempts to create a new reality on the ground through the use of force be allowed to stand, especially when dialogue between the parties was producing results? What if Serbs had been the unilateralists, instead of ethnic Albanians? 25 July was not the first time that Pristina has purposely created instability. We have seen this scenario before - a provocation followed by violence and, finally, an attempt to blame the victim.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  48. From the outset of this crisis, our position has remained the same, as I made clear in my letter to the Secretary-General, the text of which has been designated an official document of the Council (S/20ll/482). I repeat it today - the status quo ante must be reinstated. Those who destabilized northern Kosovo through the actions of ROSU must be brought to account. Whoever gave the order to cross the Ibar River violated an agreement with EULEX and must suffer the consequences. Today, in this Council meeting, we respectfully ask for answers to some very pointed questions. Who ordered the unilateral action of the ROSU militants on 25 July? Did anyone from the international community know that the operation was about to be put into effect?

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  49. A few days later, Belgrade and KFOR came to an agreement on how to keep ROSU and the so-called Kosovo Customs out of northern Kosovo. On 3 August, KFOR headquarters issued an official communique outlining the parameters of the interim agreement. Ensuring peace and security in Kosovo is the responsibility of the Security Council, as per resolution 1244 (1999). To understand what happened and to determine who is responsible for the dramatic drop in stability throughout the territory, we asked to address the Council as events continued to escalate. An emergency meeting did in fact take place; regrettably, our voice was not allowed to be heard on that day.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source

  50. After an initial pullback, however, some of the paramilitaries turned around and started heading back. This resulted in skirmishes with local Serbs, leading to a number of casualties, including one fatality. Later that day, the ROSU militants began to leave northern Kosovo for good. At the time, it appeared that calm and the status quo ante would be quickly restored without further altercations. On the morning of 27 July, however, attention was drawn to a highly regrettable incident at one of the checkpoints, where masked individuals set fire to the buildings there. The Serbian Government strongly and immediately condemned this act of extremism. We also indicated our readiness to work with relevant stakeholders to uncover the arsonists' identities and motives and to determine whose instructions they were following.

    2011-08-30 · UN Security Council · Security Council, S/PV.6604 (2011) · source